CryptoDB
What Hashes Make RSA-OAEP Secure?
Authors: | |
---|---|
Download: | |
Abstract: | Firstly, we demonstrate a pathological hash function choice that makes RSA-OAEP insecure. This shows that at least some security property is necessary for the hash functions used in RSA-OAEP. Nevertheless, we conjecture that only some very minimal security properties of the hash functions are actually necessary for the security of RSA-OAEP. Secondly, we consider certain types of reductions that could be used to prove the OW-CPA (i.e., the bare minimum) security of RSA-OAEP. We apply metareductions that show if such reductions existed, then RSA-OAEP would be OW-CCA2 insecure, or even worse, that the RSA problem would solvable. Therefore, it seems unlikely that such reductions could exist. Indeed, no such reductions proving the OW-CCA2 security of RSA-OAEP exist. |
BibTeX
@misc{eprint-2006-21716, title={What Hashes Make RSA-OAEP Secure?}, booktitle={IACR Eprint archive}, keywords={public-key cryptography / RSA, OAEP, Provable Security, Public-key Encryption, IND-CCA2, OW-CPA, Impossibiltiy Results}, url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/223}, note={ dbrown@certicom.com 13733 received 30 Jun 2006, last revised 8 Aug 2007}, author={Daniel R. L. Brown}, year=2006 }