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27 March 2017
The early registration deadline for EUROCRYPT 2017 and its affiliated workshops is approaching. After Friday, March 31st, 2017, prices will increase by US$100.

You can register online at

There are two available registration options:
  1. If you are registering to attend EUROCRYPT 2017, regardless of whether you are attending any additional workshops, please select option #1 of the registration form.
  2. If you are registering to attend the workshops but not attending EUROCRYPT 2017, please select option #2 of the registration form.
EUROCRYPT 2017 will be held in the heart of Paris from April 30th to May 4th at Maison de la Mutualité, within 5-min walking distance to Notre-Dame, Sainte-Chapelle, and many other attractions. A detailed program can be found at

The program includes invited talks by:
  • Gilles Barthe (IMDEA Software Institute, Spain) on Advances in computer-aided cryptography
  • Nigel Smart (University of Bristol) on Living Between the Ideal and Real Worlds
In addition to the conference, this edition of EUROCRYPT has a large number of affiliated and co-located workshops jointly organized with EuroS&P 2017. This includes 9 workshops on Saturday, April 29th; and 9 on Sunday, April 30th. For more information, please refer to
Job Posting Chair in Cybersecurity University of York, UK
The University of York is one of the UK\'s leading higher education institutions and a member of the prestigious Russell Group of universities. The Department is renowned internationally for its high impact research, combined with a dedication to high-quality teaching and excellent student satisfaction, as well as strong industrial links, making us one of the UK\'s top Computer Science departments.

The Role

We welcome applications from researchers with a track record as an international leader in Cybersecurity, with some emphasis on pragmatic aspects of Cybersecurity. You will actively engage and collaborate with colleagues leading the development of Cybersecurity research and teaching. You\'ll develop relationships across the wider University and beyond, to help build a distinctive and positive working environment that emphasises excellence.

Salary will be commensurate with experience on the professorial scale: current minimum £61,539 a year

Interviews will be held in York on: 25th May 2017

Why York?

We are a dynamic, research-intensive university and have experienced significant growth over the past ten years, securing national and international recognition for our academic excellence. Our attractive landscaped campus has seen significant development which will continue as the University continues to develop. We are recognised consistently for our family-friendly policies and proud of our Athena SWAN Award.

Closing date for applications: 10 April 2017

Contact: Informal enquiries may be directed to Professor Neil Audsley (neil.audsley (at)

More information:

Job Posting PhD studentship University College London
The rise of decentralized networks, such as Tor and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, has enabled numerous applications, and these technologies offer the potential to enable many more. One could also argue, however, that they have enabled new types of crime. For example, the number of underground markets selling drugs and other illicit goods, such as Silk Road, has grown enormously after the introduction of Bitcoin (and they also rely on the use of Tor). Attacks such as ransomware also seem to some extent impossible to carry out without the use of these technologies.

In order to remove any regulatory obstacles to the adoption of the positive applications of these technologies, it is therefore important to address these negative applications and convince regulators they can be dealt with appropriately. To achieve this, we will develop (1) new heuristics for identifying relationships in a cryptocurrency ecosystem; (2) tools for collecting and analyzing data from underground markets; and (3) new techniques to ensure that honest users continue to maintain their privacy. Eventually, these will all be incorporated into a microservice architecture that provides a forensic tool.

This project is funded by an EU H2020 grant, and will be carried out with partners across Europe. The ideal candidate will have a strong degree in Computer Science, Mathematics, or a related MSc course, and some proficiency with cryptography, machine learning, and/or data analytics.

Closing date for applications: 1 June 2017

Contact: Sarah Meiklejohn

More information:!/?project=229

Invariant subspace attack is a novel cryptanalytic technique which breaks several recently proposed lightweight block ciphers. In this paper, we propose a new method to bound the dimension of some invariant subspaces in a class of lightweight block ciphers which have a similar structure as the AES but with 4-bit Sboxes. With assumptions on the diffusion layer, the dimension of any invariant subspaces is at most 32 when the inputs into each Sboxes are linearly independent. The observation brings new insights about the invariant subspace attack, as well as lightweight countermeasures to enhance the resistance against it.
26 March 2017
In the study of cryptography in $\text{NC}^0$, it was previously known that Goldreich's candidate pseudorandom generator (PRG) is insecure when instantiated with a predicate $P$ in $4$ or fewer variables, if one wants to achieve polynomial stretch (that is, stretching $n$ bits to $n^{1+\epsilon}$ bits for some constant $\epsilon>0$). The current standard candidate predicate for this setting is the ``tri-sum-and'' predicate $\text{TSA}(x) = \text{XOR}_3 \oplus \text{AND}_2(x) = x_1\oplus x_2\oplus x_3\oplus x_4x_5$, yielding a candidate PRG of locality $5$. Moreover, Goldreich's PRG, when instantiated with TSA as the predicate, is known to be secure against several families of attacks, including $\mathbb F_2$-linear attacks and attacks using SDP hierarchies such as the Lasserre/Parrilo sum-of-squares hierarchy.

However, it was previously unknown if $\text{TSA}$ is an ``optimal'' predicate according to other complexity measures: in particular, decision tree (DT-)complexity (i.e., the smallest depth of a binary decision tree computing $P$) and $\mathbb Q$-degree (i.e., the degree of $P$ as a polynomial over $\mathbb Q$), which are important measures of complexity in cryptographic applications such as the construction of an indistinguishability obfuscation scheme. In this work, we ask: Can Goldreich's PRG be instantiated with a predicate with DT-complexity or $\mathbb Q$-degree less than $5$?

We show that this is indeed possible: we give a candidate predicate for Goldreich's PRG with DT-complexity $4$ and $\mathbb Q$-degree $3$; in particular, this candidate PRG therefore has the property that every output bit is a degree 3 polynomial in its input. Moreover, Goldreich's PRG instantiated with our predicate has security properties similar to what is known for $\text{TSA}$, namely security against $\mathbb F_2$-linear attacks and security against attacks from SDP hierarchies such as the Lasserre/Parrilo sum-of-squares hierarchy.

We also show that all predicates with either DT-complexity less than $4$ or $\mathbb Q$-degree less than $3$ yield insecure PRGs, so our candidate predicate simultaneously achieves the best possible locality, DT-complexity, $\mathbb Q$-degree, and $\mathbb F_2$-degree according to all known attacks.
We show how to obfuscate a large and expressive class of programs, which we call compute-and-compare programs, under the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption. Each such program $CC[f,y]$ is parametrized by an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function $f$ along with a target value $y$ and we define $CC[f,y](x)$ to output $1$ if $f(x)=y$ and $0$ otherwise. In other words, the program performs an arbitrary computation $f$ and then compares its output against a target $y$. Our obfuscator satisfies distributional virtual-black-box security, which guarantees that the obfuscated program does not reveal any partial information about the function $f$ or the target value $y$ as long as they are chosen from some distribution where $y$ has sufficient pseudo-entropy given $f$. We also extend our result to multi-bit compute-and-compare programs $MBCC[f,y,z](x)$ which output a message $z$ if $f(x)=y$.

Compute-and-compare programs are powerful enough to capture many interesting obfuscation tasks as special cases. This includes obfuscating conjunctions, and therefore we improve on the prior work of Brakerski et al. (ITCS '16) which constructed a conjunctions obfuscator under a non-standard ``entropic'' ring-LWE assumption, while here we obfuscate a significantly broader class of programs under standard LWE. We show that our obfuscator has several interesting applications. For example, we can take an arbitrary encryption scheme and publish an obfuscated plaintext equality tester that allows users to test whether a ciphertext encrypts some target value $y$; as long as $y$ has sufficient pseudo-entropy this will not harm semantic security. We can also use our obfuscator to generically upgrade attribute-based encryption to predicate encryption as well as witness encryption to indistinguishability obfuscation which is secure for all null circuits. Furthermore, we show that our obfuscator gives new circular-security counter-examples for public-key bit encryption and for unbounded length key cycles.

Our result uses the graph-induced multi-linear maps of Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi (TCC '15), but only in a carefully restricted manner which is provably secure under LWE. Our technique is inspired by ideas introduced in a recent work of Goyal, Koppula and Waters (EUROCRYPT '17) in a seemingly unrelated context.
25 March 2017
We propose simple generic constructions of indistinguishability obfuscator (IO). Our key tool is exponentially-efficient indistinguishability obfuscator (XIO), which is the same as IO except that the size of an obfuscated circuit (or the running-time of an obfuscator) is slightly smaller than that of a brute-force canonicalizer that outputs the entire truth table of a circuit to be obfuscated. A ``compression factor'' of XIO indicates how much XIO compresses the brute-force canonicalizer. In this study, we show that XIO is a powerful enough to achieve cutting-edge cryptography. In particular, we propose the following constructions:

1. A single-key weakly succinct secret-key functional encryption (SKFE) scheme is constructed from XIO (even with a bad compression factor) and one-way function. 2. A single-key weakly succinct public-key functional encryption (PKFE) scheme is constructed from XIO with a good compression factor and public-key encryption scheme. 3. A single-key weakly succinct PKFE scheme is constructed from XIO (even with a bad compression factor) and identity-based encryption scheme.

It is known that sub-exponentially secure single-key weakly succinct PKFE scheme implies IO and that single-key weakly succinct (resp. multi-key non-succinct) SKFE implies XIO with a bad (resp. good) compression factor. Thus, we developed two methods of constructing IO. One uses multi-key SKFE and plain public-key encryption schemes and the other uses single-key weakly succinct SKFE (or XIO) and identity-based encryption schemes. It is not known whether single-key weakly succinct SKFE implies IO (if we use fully black-box reduction in a certain model, it is impossible), but our single-key weakly succinct SKFE scheme gives many interesting by-products.
ePrint Report Lockable Obfuscation Rishab Goyal, Venkata Koppula, Brent Waters
In this paper we introduce the notion of lockable obfuscation. In a lockable obfuscation scheme there exists an obfuscation algorithm $\mathsf{Obf}$ that takes as input a security parameter $\lambda$, a program $P$, a message $\mathsf{msg}$ and ``lock value'' $\alpha$ and outputs an obfuscated program $\widetilde{P}$. One can evaluate the obfuscated program $\widetilde{P}$ on any input $x$ where the output of evaluation is the message $\mathsf{msg}$ if $P(x) = \alpha$ and otherwise receives a rejecting symbol $\perp$.

We proceed to provide a construction of lockable obfuscation and prove it secure under the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption. Notably, our proof only requires LWE with polynomial hardness and does not require complexity leveraging.

We follow this by describing multiple applications of lockable obfuscation. First, we show how to transform any attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme into one in which the attributes used to encrypt the message are hidden from any user that is not authorized to decrypt the message. (Such a system is also know as predicate encryption with one-sided security.) The only previous construction due to Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee is based off of a specific ABE scheme of Boneh et al. By enabling the transformation of any ABE scheme we can inherent different forms and features of the underlying scheme such as: multi-authority, adaptive security from polynomial hardness, regular language policies, etc.

We also show applications of lockable obfuscation to separation and uninstantiability results. We first show how to create new separation results in circular encryption that were previously based on indistinguishability obfuscation. This results in new separation results from learning with error including a public key bit encryption scheme that it IND-CPA secure and not circular secure. The tool of lockable obfuscation allows these constructions to be almost immediately realized by translation from previous indistinguishability obfuscation based constructions. In a similar vein we provide random oracle uninstantiability results of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation (and related transformations) from the lockable obfuscation combined with fully homomorphic encryption. Again, we take advantage that previous work used indistinguishability obfuscation that obfuscated programs in a form that could easily be translated to lockable obfuscation.
Non-malleable commitment is a fundamental cryptographic tool for preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. Since its proposal by Dolev, Dwork, and Noar in 1991, a rich line of research has steadily reduced the number of communication rounds needed for non-malleable commitment, towards the ultimate goal of constructing non-interactive non-malleable commitment from well-studied hardness assumptions. However, this successful research recently hit a barrier: Pass showed that 2-round non-malleable commitment cannot be based on any, even subexponentially secure, falsifiable assumptions, via black-box security reductions [Pass, STOC 2011], and the only known construction of non-interactive non-malleable commitment is based on a new and non-falsifiable assumption [Pandey, Pass, Vaikuntanathan, Crypto 2008].

In this work, we present a construction of 2-round non-malleable commitment from time-lock puzzles; they are "mechanisms for sending messages to the future" proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner in 1996, whose original construction has withstood cryptanalysis for two decades. In addition, our construction uses a subexponentially secure injective one-way function and a non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof system. The key to circumventing Pass's impossibility result lies in leveraging the different nature of hardness provided by time-lock puzzles and classical cryptographic primitives. Conventionally, cryptographic hardness is defined against adversaries with bounded time (or equivalently circuit-size); in contrast, the hardness of time-lock puzzles holds against adversaries with bounded parallel-time (or circuit-depth). This difference allows us to construct commitment schemes that are simultaneously harder than each other according to different complexity measures, which imply a weak form of non-malleability. It is then strengthened through a new 2-round non-malleability amplification technique, and the final protocol is non-malleable even in the fully concurrent setting.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that time-lock puzzles are used constructively outside time-released cryptography, and opens an interesting direction of combining hardness w.r.t. different complexity measures for achieving cryptographic goals.
In leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography, two important concepts have been proposed in order to decrease the success rate of differential side-channel attacks. The first one is to limit the attacker’s data complexity by restricting the number of observable inputs; the second one is to create correlated algorithmic noise by using parallel S-boxes with equal inputs. The latter hinders the typical divide and conquer approach of differential side-channel attacks and makes key recovery much more difficult in practice. The use of localized electromagnetic (EM) measurements has already been shown to limit the effectiveness of such measures in previous works based on PRESENT S-boxes and 90nm FPGAs. However, it has been left for future investigation in recent publications based on AES S-boxes. We aim at providing helpful results and insights from LDA-preprocessed, multivariate, localized EM attacks against a 45nm FPGA implementation using AES S-boxes. We show, that even in the case of densely placed S-boxes (with identical routing constraints), and even when limiting the data complexity to the minimum of only two inputs, the guessing entropy of the key is reduced to only 2^48 , which remains well within the key enumeration capabilities of today’s adversaries. Relaxing the S-box placement constraints further reduces the guessing entropy. Also, increasing the data complexity for efficiency, decreases it down to a direct key recovery. While our results are empirical and reflective of one device and implementation, they emphasize the threat of multivariate localized EM attacks to such AES-based leakage-resilient constructions, more than currently believed.
ePrint Report High Order Masking of Look-up Tables with Common Shares Jean-Sebastien Coron, Franck Rondepierre, Rina Zeitoun
Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we improve the efficiency of the high-order masking of look-up tables countermeasure introduced at Eurocrypt 2014, based on a combination of three techniques, and still with a proof of security in the Ishai-Sahai-Wagner (ISW) probing model. The first technique consists in proving security under the stronger t-SNI definition, which enables to use n=t+1 shares instead of n=2t+1 against t-th order attacks. The second technique consists in progressively incrementing the number of shares within the countermeasure, from a single share to n, thereby reducing the complexity of the countermeasure. The third technique consists in adapting the common shares approach introduced by Coron et al. at CHES 2016, so that half of a randomized look-up table can be pre-computed for multiple SBoxes. When combined, our three techniques lead to a factor 10.7 improvement in efficiency, asymptotically for a large number of shares n. For a practical implementation with a reasonable number of shares, we get a 4.8 speed-up factor compared to the initial countermeasure for AES.
Rational proofs, introduced by Azar and Micali (STOC 2012), are a variant of interactive proofs in which the prover is rational, and may deviate from the protocol for increasing his reward. Guo et al.\ (ITCS 2014) demonstrated that rational proofs are relevant to delegation of computation. By restricting the prover to be computationally bounded, they presented a one-round delegation scheme with sublinear verification for functions computable by log-space uniform circuits with logarithmic depth. In this work, we study rational proofs in which the verifier is also rational, and may deviate from the protocol for decreasing the prover's reward. We construct a three-message delegation scheme with sublinear verification for functions computable by log-space uniform circuits with polylogarithmic depth in the random oracle model.
Side channel analysis and fault attacks are two powerful methods to analyze and break cryptographic implementations. Recently, secure multiparty computation has been applied to prevent side channel attacks. While multiparty computation is known to be fault resistant as well, the particular schemes popular for side channel protection do not currently offer this feature. In this paper we introduce a new secure multiparty circuit to prevent both fault attacks and side channel analysis. The new scheme builds on an existing side channel countermeasure and extends it to preserve errors and propagate them until the end of the circuit. A new recombination operation ensures randomization of the output in the case of an error, ensuring that nothing can be learned from the faulty output. After introducing the new secure multiparty circuit, we show how it can be applied to AES and present the performance and security analysis.
ePrint Report Efficient Sanitizable Signatures without Random Oracles Russell W. F. Lai, Tao Zhang, Sherman S. M. Chow, Dominique Schröder
Sanitizable signatures, introduced by Ateniese et al. (ESORICS '05), allow the signer to delegate the sanitization right of signed messages. The sanitizer can modify the message and update the signature accordingly, so that the sanitized part of the message is kept private. For a stronger protection of sensitive information, it is desirable that no one can link sanitized message-signature pairs of the same document. This idea was formalized by Brzuska et al. (PKC '10) as unlinkability, which was followed up recently by Fleischhacker et al. (PKC '16). Unfortunately, the existing generic constructions of sanitizable signatures, unlinkable or not, are based on building blocks with specially crafted features of which efficient (standard model) instantiations are absent. Basing on existing primitives or a conceptually simple primitive is more desirable.

In this work, we present two such generic constructions, leading to efficient instantiations in the standard model. The first one is based on rerandomizable tagging, a new primitive which may find independent interests. It captures the core accountability mechanism of sanitizable signatures. The second one is based on accountable ring signatures (CARDIS '04, ESORICS '15). As an intermediate result, we propose the first accountable ring signature scheme in the standard model.
Recently, gray-box attacks on white-box cryptographic implementations have succeeded. These attacks are more efficient than white-box attacks because they can be performed without detailed knowledge of the target implementation. The success of the gray-box attack is due to the unbalanced encoding used to generate the white-box lookup table. In this paper, we propose a method to protect the gray-box attack against white-box implementations. The basic idea is to use Boolean masking before encoding intermediate values during the white-box lookup table generation. Compared to the existing white-box AES implementation, the lookup table size and the table lookups increase by about 1.5- and 1.6 times, respectively.
Polytopic cryptanalysis was introduced at EUROCRYPT 2016 as a cryptanalytic technique for low-data-complexity attacks on block ciphers. In this paper, we give an account of how the technique was developed, quickly go over the basic ideas and techniques of polytopic cryptanalysis, look into how the technique differs from previously existing cryptographic techniques, and discuss whether the attack angle can be useful for developing improved cryptanalytic techniques.
This paper puts forward an efficient broadcast encryption in public key setting employing ternary tree subset difference method for revocation. It provides outsider anonymity disabling the revoked users from getting any information of message and concealing the set of subscribed users from the revoked users. Our approach utilizes composite order bilinear group setting and exhibits significant improvement in the broadcast efficiency. The proposed scheme compares favourably over the existing similar schemes in standard model. The public key and secret key sizes are poly-logarithmic while the ciphertext size is sub linear in total number of users. Our scheme achieves selective security against chosen plaintext attack in the standard model under reasonable assumptions.
ePrint Report A note on how to (pre-)compute a ladder Thomaz Oliveira, Julio López, Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez
In the RFC 7748 memorandum, the Internet Research Task Force specified a Montgomery ladder scalar multiplication function based on two recently proposed prime elliptic curves. The purpose of this function is to support the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm included in the coming version of the Transport Layer Security cryptographic protocol. In this paper, we introduce a Montgomery-ladder variant that permits to accelerate the fixed-point multiplication function when applied in the Diffie-Hellman key pair generation step. Our function combines a right-to-left variant of the Montgomery ladder with the pre-computation of multiples of the base point, and by requiring very modest memory resources and a small implementation effort with respect to the RFC 7748 programming code, it obtains significant performance improvements on desktop architectures. To our knowledge, this is the first proposal of a Montgomery ladder procedure for prime elliptic curves that admits the extensive use of pre-computation.
We solve the problem of finding the success rate of an optimal side-channel attack targeting at once the first and the last round of a block cipher. We relate the results to the properties of the direct and inverse substitution boxes (when they are bijective), in terms of confusion coefficients.
Most modern actively secure multiparty computation protocols make use of a function and input independent pre-processing phase. This pre-processing phase is tasked with producing some form of correlated randomness and distributing it to the parties. Whilst the “online” phase of such protocols is exceedingly fast, the bottleneck comes in the pre-processing phase. In this paper we examine situations where the computing parties in the online phase may want to outsource the pre-processing phase to another set of parties, or to a sub-committee. We examine how this can be done, and also describe situations where this may be a benefit.
ePrint Report Side-channel Analysis of Lightweight Ciphers: Does Lightweight Equal Easy? Annelie Heuser, Stjepan Picek, Sylvain Guilley, Nele Mentens
Side-channel attacks represent a powerful category of attacks against cryptographic devices. Still, side-channel analysis for lightweight ciphers is much less investigated than for instance for AES. Although intuition may lead to the conclusion that lightweight ciphers are weaker in terms of side-channel resistance, that remains to be confirmed and quantified. In this paper, we consider various side-channel analysis metrics which should provide an insight on the resistance of lightweight ciphers against side-channel attacks. In particular, for the non-profiled scenario we use the theoretical confusion coefficient and empirical correlation power analysis. Furthermore, we conduct a profiled side-channel analysis using various machine learning attacks on PRESENT and AES. Our results show that the difference between AES and lightweight ciphers is smaller than one would expect. Interestingly, we observe that the studied 4-bit S-boxes have a different side-channel resilience, while the difference in the 8-bit ones is only theoretically present.
This paper explores a new type of MACs called message-recovery MACs (MRMACs). MRMACs have an additional input $R$ that gets recovered upon verification. Receivers must execute verification in order to recover $R$, making the verification process unskippable. Such a feature helps avoid mis-implementing verification algorithms. The syntax and security notions of MRMACs are rigorously formulated. In particular, we formalize the notion of unskippability and present a construction of an unskippable MRMAC from a tweakable cipher and a universal hash function. Our construction is provided with formal security proofs. We extend the idea of MRMACs to a new type of authenticated encryption called verification-unskippable AE (VUAE). We propose a generic Enc-then-MRMAC composition which realizes VUAE. The encryption part needs to satisfy a new security notion called one-time undecipherability. We provide three constructions that are one-time undecipherable, and they are proven secure under various security models.
Sampling integers with Gaussian distribution is a fundamental problem that arises in almost every application of lattice cryptography, and it can be both time consuming and challenging to implement. Most previous work has focused on the optimization and implementation of integer Gaussian sampling in the context of specific applications, with fixed sets of parameters. We present new algorithms for discrete Gaussian sampling that are both generic (application independent), efficient, and more easily implemented in constant time without incurring a substantial slow-down, making them more resilient to side-channel (e.g., timing) attacks. As an additional contribution, we present new analytical techniques that can be used to simplify the precision/security evaluation of floating point cryptographic algorithms, and an experimental comparison of our algorithms with previous algorithms from the literature.
ePrint Report Pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE for Any Ring and Modulus Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, Noah Stephens-Davidowitz
We give a polynomial-time quantum reduction from worst-case (ideal) lattice problems directly to the decision version of (Ring-)LWE. This extends to decision all the worst-case hardness results that were previously known for the search version, for the same or even better parameters and with no algebraic restrictions on the modulus or number field. Indeed, our reduction is the first that works for decision Ring-LWE with any number field and any modulus.
ePrint Report Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption Aayush Jain, Peter M. R. Rasmussen, Amit Sahai
We formally define and give the first construction of (leveled) threshold fully homomorphic encryption for any access structure induced by a monotone boolean formula and in particular for the threshold access structure. Our construction is based on the learning with errors assumption and can be instantiated with any existing homomorphic encryption scheme that satisfies fairly general conditions, such as Gentry, Sahai, Waters (CRYPTO 2013) and Brakerski, Gentry, Vaikuntanathan (ITCS 2012).

From threshold homomorphic encryption, we construct function secret sharing and distributed pseudorandom functions for the aforementioned access structures. No such constructions were known prior to this work.
21 March 2017
Job Posting PhD student Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
We are looking for a PhD student in theoretical cryptography. The research focus will be the development and analysis of classical and new cryptographic building blocks (such as public-key encryption and obfuscation).

The research will take place in the cryptography and security group at KIT. The research position will be multi-year and fully funded, with a starting date as soon as possible (negotiable). There is no closing date; applications will be considered until the position is filled.

For more information about the position, contact Dennis (dot) Hofheinz (at) kit (dot) edu. Your application should include a CV, and a letter of motivation.

Closing date for applications:

Job Posting Postdoc Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany
We are looking for a postdoctoral researcher in theoretical cryptography. The research focus will be the development and analysis of classical and new cryptographic building blocks (such as public-key encryption or obfuscation).

The research will take place in the cryptography and security group at KIT. The research position will be multi-year and fully funded, with a starting date as soon as possible (negotiable). There is no closing date; applications will be considered until the position is filled.

For more information about the position, contact Dennis (dot) Hofheinz (at) kit (dot) edu. Your application should include a CV, and at least two references.

Closing date for applications:

Event date: 24 October to 27 October 2017
Submission deadline: 15 May 2017
Notification: 3 July 2017
Job Posting PhD Student Aarhus University, Denmark
The Cryptography and Security group of Aarhus University is looking for PhD students interested in working in the area of cryptographic protocols (secure two/multi party computation, zero-knowledge, ORAM, etc.) under the supervision of Associate Professor Claudio Orlandi. The PhD position is financed by a \"Sapere Aude\" starting grant (Danish Council for Independent Research).

Applicants who have completed (or are about to complete) a master in computer science, computer engineering, or math are welcome to apply by contacting me.

All applications will be processed by the Graduate School of Science and Technology of Aarhus University (follow the link for more information). The next deadlines for application is May 1st, (earliest start on August 1st).

Closing date for applications: 1 May 2017

Contact: Claudio Orlandi, Associate Professor

orlandi (at)

More information:

Fixed Term Contract 2 years (CDD), full-time 40 hrs/week Start day: July 2017 or later upon agreement.

The successful candidate will join the CryptoLUX group led by Prof. Alex Biryukov. He or she will contribute to a research project on future directions in symmetric cryptography in the areas of:

  • Lightweight block ciphers and hash functions
  • Side-channel attacks on symmetric cryptosystems and countermeasures
  • Design and security analysis of blockchain technologies
  • Proof-of-work schemes for use in digital currencies or denial-of-service prevention

The University offers a two-year employment contract which may be extended up to five years.

Closing date for applications: 30 April 2017

Contact: Alex Biryukov

More information:

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