International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Junzuo Lai

ORCID: 0000-0001-5780-8463

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2024
ASIACRYPT
Mild Asymmetric Message Franking: Illegal-Messages-Only and Retrospective Content Moderation
In these years, many messaging platforms have integrated end-to-end (E2E) encryption into their services. This widespread adoption of E2E encryption has triggered a technical tension between user privacy and illegal content moderation. The existing solutions either support only unframeability or deniability, or they are prone to abuse (the moderator can perform content moderation for all messages, whether illegal or not), or they lack mechanisms for retrospective content moderation. To address the above issues, we introduce a new primitive called \emph{mild asymmetric message franking} (MAMF) to establish illegal-messages-only and retrospective content moderation for messaging systems, supporting unframeability and deniability simultaneously. We provide a framework to construct MAMF, leveraging two new building blocks, which might be of independent interest.
2023
EUROCRYPT
Asymmetric Group Message Franking: Definitions & Constructions
As online group communication scenarios become more and more common these years, malicious or unpleasant messages are much easier to spread on the internet. Message franking is a crucial cryptographic mechanism designed for content moderation in online end-to-end messaging systems, allowing the receiver of a malicious message to report the message to the moderator. Unfortunately, the existing message franking schemes only consider 1-1 communication scenarios. In this paper, we systematically explore message franking in group communication scenarios. We introduce the notion of asymmetric group message franking (AGMF), and formalize its security requirements. Then, we provide a framework of constructing AGMF from a new primitive, called $\textup{HPS-KEM}^{\rm{\Sigma}}$. We also give a construction of $\textup{HPS-KEM}^{\rm{\Sigma}}$ based on the DDH assumption. Plugging the concrete $\textup{HPS-KEM}^{\rm{\Sigma}}$ scheme into our AGMF framework, we obtain a DDH-based AGMF scheme, which supports message franking in group communication scenarios.
2023
ASIACRYPT
Robust Publicly Verifiable Covert Security: Limited Information Leakage and Guaranteed Correctness with Low Overhead
Protocols with \emph{publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security} offer high efficiency and an appealing feature: a covert party may deviate from the protocol, but with a probability (e.g., $90\%$, referred to as the \emph{deterrence factor}), the honest party can identify this deviation and expose it using a publicly verifiable certificate. These protocols are particularly suitable for practical applications involving reputation-conscious parties. However, in the cases where misbehavior goes undetected (e.g., with a probability of $10\%$), \emph{no security guarantee is provided for the honest party}, potentially resulting in a complete loss of input privacy and output correctness. In this paper, we tackle this critical problem by presenting a highly effective solution. We introduce and formally define an enhanced notion called \emph{robust PVC security}, such that even if the misbehavior remains undetected, the malicious party can only gain an additional $1$-bit of information about the honest party's input while maintaining the correctness of the output. We propose a novel approach leveraging \emph{dual execution} and \emph{time-lock puzzles} to design a robust PVC-secure two-party protocol with \emph{low overhead} (depending on the deterrence factor). For instance, with a deterrence factor of $90\%$, our robust PVC-secure protocol incurs \emph{only additional ${\sim}10\%$ overhead} compared to the state-of-the-art PVC-secure protocol. Given the stronger security guarantees with low overhead, our protocol is highly suitable for practical applications of secure two-party computation.
2023
ASIACRYPT
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Functional Proofs
In this paper, we consider to generalize NIZK by empowering a prover to share a witness in a fine-grained manner with verifiers. Roughly, the prover is able to authorize a verifier to obtain extra information of witness, i.e., besides verifying the truth of the statement, the verifier can additionally obtain certain function of the witness from the accepting proof using a secret key provided by the prover. To fulfill these requirements, we introduce a new primitive called \emph{non-interactive zero-knowledge functional proofs (fNIZKs)}, and formalize its security notions. We provide a generic construction of fNIZK for any $\NP$ relation $\R$, which enables the prover to share any function of the witness with a verifier. For a widely-used relation about set membership proof (implying range proof), we construct a concrete and efficient fNIZK, through new building blocks (set membership encryption and dual inner-product encryption), which might be of independent interest.
2022
ASIACRYPT
DAG-$\Sigma$: A DAG-based Sigma Protocol for Relations in CNF 📺
At CRYPTO 1994, Cramer, Damg{\aa}rd and Schoenmakers proposed a general method to construct proofs of knowledge (PoKs), especially for $k$-out-of-$n$ partial knowledge, of which relations can be expressed in disjunctive normal form (DNF). Since then, proofs of $k$-out-of-$n$ partial knowledge have attracted much attention and some efficient constructions have been proposed. However, many practical scenarios require efficient PoK protocols for partial knowledge in other forms. In this paper, we mainly focus on PoK protocols for $k$-conjunctive normal form ($k$-CNF) relations, which have $n$ statements and can be expressed as follows: (i) $k$ statements constitute a clause via ``OR'' operations, and (ii) the relation consists of multiple clauses via ``AND'' operations. We propose an alternative Sigma protocol (called DAG-$\Sigmaup$ protocol) for $k$-CNF relations, by turning these relations into directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). Our DAG-$\Sigmaup$ protocol achieves less communication cost and smaller computational overhead compared with Cramer et al.'s general method.
2022
ASIACRYPT
Anonymous Public Key Encryption under Corruptions 📺
Anonymity of public key encryption (PKE) requires that, in a multi-user scenario, the PKE ciphertexts do not leak information about which public keys are used to generate them. Corruptions are common threats in the multi-user scenario but anonymity of PKE under corruptions is less studied in the literature. In TCC 2020, Benhamouda et al. first provide a formal characterization for anonymity of PKE under a specific type of corruption. However, no known PKE scheme is proved to meet their characterization. To the best of our knowledge, all the PKE application scenarios which require anonymity also require confidentiality. However, in the work by Benhamouda et al., different types of corruptions for anonymity and confidentiality are considered, which can cause security pitfalls. What's worse, we are not aware of any PKE scheme which can provide both anonymity and confidentiality under the same types of corruptions. In this work, we introduce a new security notion for PKE called ANON-RSO$_{k}\&$C security, capturing anonymity under corruptions. We also introduce SIM-RSO$_{k}\&$C security which captures confidentiality under the same types of corruptions. We provide a generic framework of constructing PKE scheme which can achieve the above two security goals simultaneously based on a new primitive called key and message non-committing encryption (KM-NCE). Then we give a general construction of KM-NCE utilizing a variant of hash proof system (HPS) called Key-Openable HPS. We also provide Key-Openable HPS instantiations based on the matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Therefore, we can obtain various concrete PKE instantiations achieving the two security goals in the standard model with \emph{compact} ciphertexts. Furthermore, for some PKE instantiation, its security reduction is \emph{tight}.
2021
ASIACRYPT
Simulation-Based Bi-Selective Opening Security for Public Key Encryption 📺
Selective opening attacks (SOA) (for public-key encryption, PKE) concern such a multi-user scenario, where an adversary adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to break into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts, and tries to learn the information on the messages of some unopened (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Until now, the notion of selective opening attacks is only considered in two settings: sender selective opening (SSO), where part of senders are corrupted and messages together with randomness for encryption are revealed; and receiver selective opening (RSO), where part of receivers are corrupted and messages together with secret keys for decryption are revealed. In this paper, we consider a more natural and general setting for selective opening security. In the setting, the adversary may adaptively corrupt part of senders and receivers \emph{simultaneously}, and get the plaintext messages together with internal randomness for encryption and secret keys for decryption, while it is hoped that messages of uncorrupted parties remain protected. We denote it as Bi-SO security since it is reminiscent of Bi-Deniability for PKE. We first formalize the requirement of Bi-SO security by the simulation-based (SIM) style, and prove that some practical PKE schemes achieve SIM-Bi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security in the random oracle model. Then, we suggest a weak model of Bi-SO security, denoted as SIM-wBi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security, and argue that it is still meaningful and useful. We propose a generic construction of PKE schemes that achieve SIM-wBi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security in the standard model and instantiate them from various standard assumptions. Our generic construction is built on a newly presented primitive, namely, universal$_{\kappa}$ hash proof system with key equivocability, which may be of independent interest.
2020
ASIACRYPT
Possibility and Impossibility Results for Receiver Selective Opening Secure PKE in the Multi-Challenge Setting 📺
Public key encryption (PKE) schemes are usually deployed in an open system with numerous users. In practice, it is common that some users are corrupted. A PKE scheme is said to be receiver selective opening (RSO) secure if it can still protect messages transmitted to uncorrupted receivers after the adversary corrupts some receivers and learns their secret keys. This is usually defined by requiring the existence of a simulator that can simulate the view of the adversary given only the opened messages. Existing works construct RSO secure PKE schemes in a single-challenge setting, where the adversary can only obtain one challenge ciphertext for each public key. However, in practice, it is preferable to have a PKE scheme with RSO security in the multi-challenge setting, where public keys can be used to encrypt multiple messages. In this work, we explore the possibility for achieving PKE schemes with receiver selective opening security in the multi-challenge setting. Our contributions are threefold. First, we demonstrate that PKE schemes with RSO security in the single-challenge setting are not necessarily RSO secure in the multi-challenge setting. Then, we show that it is impossible to achieve RSO security for PKE schemes if the number of challenge ciphertexts under each public key is a priori unbounded. In particular, we prove that no PKE scheme can be RSO secure in the $k$-challenge setting (i.e., the adversary can obtain $k$ challenge ciphertexts for each public key) if its secret key contains less than $k$ bits. On the positive side, we give a concrete construction of PKE scheme with RSO security in the $k$-challenge setting, where the ratio of the secret key length to $k$ approaches the lower bound 1.
2019
ASIACRYPT
Collusion Resistant Watermarking Schemes for Cryptographic Functionalities
A cryptographic watermarking scheme embeds a message into a program while preserving its functionality. Recently, a number of watermarking schemes have been proposed, which are proven secure in the sense that given one marked program, any attempt to remove the embedded message will substantially change its functionality.In this paper, we formally initiate the study of collusion attacks for watermarking schemes, where the attacker’s goal is to remove the embedded messages given multiple copies of the same program, each with a different embedded message. This is motivated by practical scenarios, where a program may be marked multiple times with different messages.The results of this work are twofold. First, we examine existing cryptographic watermarking schemes and observe that all of them are vulnerable to collusion attacks. Second, we construct collusion resistant watermarking schemes for various cryptographic functionalities (e.g., pseudorandom function evaluation, decryption, etc.). To achieve our second result, we present a new primitive called puncturable functional encryption scheme, which may be of independent interest.
2018
PKC
Hedged Nonce-Based Public-Key Encryption: Adaptive Security Under Randomness Failures
Nowadays it is well known that randomness may fail due to bugs or deliberate randomness subversion. As a result, the security of traditional public-key encryption (PKE) cannot be guaranteed any more. Currently there are mainly three approaches dealing with the problem of randomness failures: deterministic PKE, hedged PKE, and nonce-based PKE. However, these three approaches only apply to different application scenarios respectively. Since the situations in practice are dynamic and very complex, it’s almost impossible to predict the situation in which a scheme is deployed, and determine which approach should be used beforehand.In this paper, we initiate the study of hedged security for nonce-based PKE, which adaptively applies to the situations whenever randomness fails, and achieves the best-possible security. Specifically, we lift the hedged security to the setting of nonce-based PKE, and formalize the notion of chosen-ciphertext security against chosen-distribution attacks (IND-CDA2) for nonce-based PKE. By presenting two counterexamples, we show a separation between our IND-CDA2 security for nonce-based PKE and the original NBP1/NBP2 security defined by Bellare and Tackmann (EUROCRYPT 2016). We show two nonce-based PKE constructions meeting IND-CDA2, NBP1 and NBP2 security simultaneously. The first one is a concrete construction in the random oracle model, and the second one is a generic construction based on a nonce-based PKE scheme and a deterministic PKE scheme.
2016
PKC
2014
EUROCRYPT
2011
PKC
2007
PKC