International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

IACR News

Updates on the COVID-19 situation are on the Announcement channel.

Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:

RSS symbol icon
via RSS feed
Twitter bird icon
via Twitter
Weibo icon
via Weibo
Facebook icon
via Facebook

04 March 2024

Truman Welling, Onur Gunlu, Aylin Yener
ePrint Report ePrint Report
This work models a secure integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) system as a broadcast channel with action-dependent channel states and output feedback. The transmitted message is split into a common and a secure message, both of which must be recovered at the legitimate receiver, while the secure message needs to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The transmitter actions, such as beamforming vector design, affect the corresponding state distribution at each channel use. The action sequence is modeled to depend on both the transmitted message and channel output feedback. For perfect channel output feedback, the secrecy-distortion regions are provided for physically-degraded and reversely-physically-degraded secure ISAC channels with transmitter actions. The corresponding rate regions when the entire message should be kept secret are also provided. We illustrate the results by characterizing the secrecy-distortion region of a binary example.
Expand
Anasuya Acharya, Carmit Hazay, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Manoj Prabhakaran
ePrint Report ePrint Report
SCALES (Small Clients And Larger Ephemeral Servers) model is a recently proposed model for MPC (Acharya et al., TCC 2022). While the SCALES model offers several attractive features for practical large-scale MPC, the result of Acharya et al. only offered semi-honest secure protocols in this model.

We present a new efficient SCALES protocol secure against malicious adversaries, for general Boolean circuits. We start with the base construction of Acharya et al. and design and use a suite of carefully defined building blocks that may be of independent interest. The resulting protocol is UC-secure without honest majority, with a CRS and bulletin-board as setups, and allows publicly identifying deviations from correct execution.
Expand
Chirag Madaan, Rohan Agarwal, Vipul Saini, Ujjwal Kumar
ePrint Report ePrint Report
With the rapidly evolving landscape of cryptography, blockchain technology has advanced to cater to diverse user requirements, leading to the emergence of a multi-chain ecosystem featuring various use cases characterized by distinct transaction speed and decentralization trade-offs. At the heart of this evolution lies digital signature schemes, responsible for safeguarding blockchain-based assets such as ECDSA, Schnorr, and EdDSA, among others.

However, a critical gap exists in the current landscape — there is no solution empowering a consortium of entities to collectively manage or generate digital signatures for diverse digital assets in a distributed manner with dynamic threshold settings, all while mitigating counter-party risks. Existing threshold signature schemes impose a fixed threshold during the key generation phase, limiting the adaptability of threshold settings for the subsequent signature phase. Attempts to address this challenge often involve relinquishing signature generation control either partially or entirely from the participating parties, introducing vulnerabilities that could jeopardize digital assets in the event of network disruptions.

Addressing this gap, our work introduces an innovative infrastructure that allows a group of users to programmatically define and manage access control policies, supported by a blockchain network dedicated to policy enforcement. This network is uniquely designed to prevent any entity, including itself, from autonomously generating digital signatures, thereby mitigating counter-party risks and enhancing asset security. This system is particularly suited for enterprise contexts, where collaborative asset oversight and policy adherence are essential. Our solution marks a significant stride in the realm of blockchain technology, paving the way for more sophisticated and secure digital asset management in a rapidly evolving digital landscape.
Expand
Haotian Shi, Xiutao Feng
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In recent years quantum computing has developed rapidly. The security threat posed by quantum computing to cryptography makes it necessary to better evaluate the resource cost of attacking algorithms, some of which require quantum implementations of the attacked cryptographic building blocks. In this paper we manage to optimize quantum circuits of AES in several aspects. Firstly, based on de Brugière \textit{et al.}'s greedy algorithm, we propose an improved depth-oriented algorithm for synthesizing low-depth CNOT circuits with no ancilla qubits. Our algorithm finds a CNOT circuit of AES MixColumns with depth 10, which breaks a recent record of depth 16. In addition, our algorithm gives low-depth CNOT circuits for many MDS matrices and matrices used in block ciphers studied in related work. Secondly, we present a new structure named compressed pipeline structure to synthesize quantum circuits of AES, which can be used for constructing quantum oracles employed in quantum attacks based on Grover and Simon's algorithms. When the number of ancilla qubits required by the round function and its inverse is not very large, our structure will have a better trade-off of $D$-$W$ cost. We then give detailed quantum circuits of AES-128 under the guidance of our structure and make some comparisons with other circuits. Finally, our encryption circuit and key schedule circuit have their own application scenarios. The Encryption oracle used in Simon's algorithm built with the former will have smaller depth. For example, we can construct an AES-128 Encryption oracle with $T$-depth 33, while the previous best result is 60. A small variant of the latter, along with our method to make an Sbox input-invariant, can avoid the allocation of extra ancilla qubits for storing key words in the shallowed pipeline structure. Based on this, we achieve a quantum circuit of AES-128 with the lowest $TofD$-$W$ cost 130720 to date.
Expand

01 March 2024

Jan Buzek, Stefano Tessaro
ePrint Report ePrint Report
A $t$-multi-collision-resistant hash function ($t$-MCRH) is a family of shrinking functions for which it is computationally hard to find $t$ distinct inputs mapping to the same output for a function sampled from this family. Several works have shown that $t$-MCRHs are sufficient for many of the applications of collision-resistant hash functions (CRHs), which correspond to the special case of $t = 2$.

An important question is hence whether $t$-MCRHs for $t > 2$ are fundamentally weaker objects than CRHs. As a first step towards resolving this question, Rothblum and Vasudevan (CRYPTO '22) recently gave non-black-box constructions of infinitely-often secure CRHs from $t$-MCRHs for $t \in \{3,4\}$ assuming the MCRH is sufficiently shrinking. Earlier on, Komargodski and Yogev (CRYPTO '18) also showed that $t$-MCRHs for any constant $t$ imply the weaker notion of a distributional CRH.

In this paper, we remove the limitations of prior works, and completely resolve the question of the power of $t$-MCRHs for constant $t$ in the infinitely-often regime, showing that the existence of such a function family always implies the existence of an infinitely-often secure CRH. As in the works mentioned above, our construction is non-blackbox and non-constructive. We further give a new domain extension result for MCRHs that enables us to show that the underlying MCRH need only have arbitrarily small linear shrinkage (mapping $(1 + \epsilon)n$ bits to $n$ bits for any fixed $\epsilon > 0$) to imply the existence of CRHs.
Expand
Elizabeth Crites, Aggelos Kiayias, Amirreza Sarencheh
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We introduce a new cryptographic primitive, called Sybil-Resilient Anonymous (SyRA) signature, which enables users to generate, on demand, unlinkable pseudonyms tied to any given context, and issue digital signatures on their behalf. Concretely, given a personhood relation, an issuer (who may be a distributed entity) enables users to prove their personhood and extract an associated long-term key, which can then be used to issue signatures for any given context and message. Sybil-resilient anonymous signatures achieve two key security properties: 1) Sybil resilience: ensures that every user is entitled to at most one pseudonym per context, and 2) anonymity: requires that no information about the user is leaked through their various pseudonyms or the signatures they issue on their pseudonyms’ behalf. We conceptualize SyRA signatures as an ideal functionality in the Universal Composition (UC) setting and realize the functionality via an efficient, pairing-based construction that utilizes two levels of verifiable random functions (VRFs) and which may be of independent interest. A key feature of this approach is the statelessness of the issuer: we achieve the core properties of Sybil resilience and anonymity without requiring the issuer to retain any information about past user interactions. SyRA signatures have various applications in multiparty systems, such as e-voting (e.g., for decentralized governance) and cryptocurrency airdrops, making them an attractive option for deployment in decentralized identity (DID) systems.
Expand
Wolfgang Stefani, Fynn Kappelhoff, Martin Gruber, Yu-Neng Wang, Sara Achour, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Ulrich Rührmair
ePrint Report ePrint Report
This paper belongs to a sequence of manuscripts that discuss generic and easy-to-apply security metrics for Strong Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). These metrics cannot and shall not fully replace in-depth machine learning (ML) studies in the security assessment of Strong PUF candidates. But they can complement the latter, serve in initial complexity analyses, and allow simple iterative design optimization. Moreover, they are computationally more efficient and far easier to standardize than typical ML-studies. This manuscript treats one very natural, but also very impactful metric, and investigates the effects that the alteration of single challenge bits has on the associated PUF-responses. We define several concrete metric scores based on this idea, and demonstrate their predictive power by applying them to various popular Strong PUF design families as test cases. This includes XOR Arbiter PUFs, XOR Bistable Ring PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs, whose practical security is particularly well known after two decades of intense research. In passing, our manuscript also suggests techniques for representing our metric scores graphically, and for interpreting them in a meaningful manner. Our work demonstrates that if comparable methods had existed earlier, various Strong PUF candidates deemed secure and broken later could have been recognized and winnowed early on.
Expand
Sebastian Faust, Loïc Masure, Elena Micheli, Maximilian Orlt, François-Xavier Standaert
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Symmetric ciphers operating in (small or mid-size) prime fields have been shown to be promising candidates to maintain security against low-noise (or even noise-free) side-channel leakage. In order to design prime ciphers that best trade physical security and implementation efficiency, it is essential to understand how side-channel security evolves with the field size (i.e., scaling trends). Unfortunately, it has also been shown that such a scaling trend depends on the leakage functions and cannot be explained by the standard metrics used to analyze Boolean masking with noise. In this work, we therefore initiate a formal study of prime field masking for two canonical leakage functions: bit leakages and Hamming weight leakages. By leveraging theoretical results from the leakage-resilient secret sharing literature, we explain formally why (1) bit leakages correspond to a worst-case and do not encourage operating in larger fields, and (2) an opposite conclusion holds for Hamming weight leakages, where increasing the prime field modulus p can contribute to a security amplification that is exponential in the number of shares,with log(p) seen as security parameter like the noise variance in Boolean masking. We combine these theoretical results with experimental ones and show that the interest masking in larger prime fields can degrade gracefully when leakage functions slightly deviate from the Hamming weight abstraction, motivating further research towards characterizing (ideally wide) classes of leakage functions offering such guarantees.
Expand
Gilad Asharov, Anirudh Chandramouli
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We study broadcast protocols in the information-theoretic model under optimal conditions, where the number of corruptions $t$ is at most one-third of the parties, $n$. While worst-case $\Omega(n)$ round broadcast protocols are known to be impossible to achieve, protocols with an expected constant number of rounds have been demonstrated since the seminal work of Feldman and Micali [STOC'88]. Communication complexity for such protocols has gradually improved over the years, reaching $O(nL)$ plus expected $O(n^4\log n)$ for broadcasting a message of size $L$ bits.

This paper presents a perfectly secure broadcast protocol with expected constant rounds and communication complexity of $O(nL)$ plus expected $O(n^3 \log^2n)$ bits. In addition, we consider the problem of parallel broadcast, where $n$ senders, each wish to broadcast a message of size $L$. We show a parallel broadcast protocol with expected constant rounds and communication complexity of $O(n^2L)$ plus expected $O(n^3 \log^2n)$ bits. Moreover, we show a lower bound for parallel broadcast, showing that our protocol is optimal up to logarithmic factors and in expectation.

Our main contribution is a framework for obtaining perfectly secure broadcast with an expected constant number of rounds from a statistically secure verifiable secret sharing. Moreover, we provide a new statistically secure verifiable secret sharing where the broadcast cost per participant is reduced from $O(n \log n)$ bits to only $O({\sf poly} \log n)$ bits. All our protocols are adaptively secure.
Expand
Reo Eriguchi, Kaoru Kurosawa, Koji Nuida
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Motivated by secure database search, we present secure computation protocols for a function $f$ in the client-servers setting, where a client can obtain $f(x)$ on a private input $x$ by communicating with multiple servers each holding $f$. Specifically, we propose generic compilers from passively secure protocols, which only keep security against servers following the protocols, to actively secure protocols, which guarantee privacy and correctness even against malicious servers. Our compilers are applied to protocols computing any class of functions, and are efficient in that the overheads in communication and computational complexity are only polynomial in the number of servers, independent of the complexity of functions. We then apply our compilers to obtain concrete actively secure protocols for various functions including private information retrieval (PIR), bounded-degree multivariate polynomials and constant-depth circuits. For example, our actively secure PIR protocols achieve exponentially better computational complexity in the number of servers than the currently best-known protocols. Furthermore, our protocols for polynomials and constant-depth circuits reduce the required number of servers compared to the previous actively secure protocols. In particular, our protocol instantiated from the sparse Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption is the first actively secure protocol for multivariate polynomials which has the minimum number of servers, without assuming fully homomorphic encryption.
Expand
You Lyu, Shengli Liu, Shuai Han
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In this paper, we construct the first password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) scheme from isogenies with Universal Composable (UC) security in the random oracle model (ROM). We also construct the first two PAKE schemes with UC security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), one is based on the learning with error (LWE) assumption, and the other is based on the group-action decisional Diffie- Hellman (GA-DDH) assumption in the isogeny setting. To obtain our UC-secure PAKE scheme in ROM, we propose a generic construction of PAKE from basic lossy public key encryption (LPKE) and CCA-secure PKE. We also introduce a new variant of LPKE, named extractable LPKE (eLPKE). By replacing the basic LPKE with eLPKE, our generic construction of PAKE achieves UC security in QROM. The LPKE and eLPKE have instantiations not only from LWE but also from GA-DDH, which admit four specific PAKE schemes with UC security in ROM or QROM, based on LWE or GA-DDH.
Expand
Edith Cohen, Xin Lyu, Jelani Nelson, Tamás Sarlós, Uri Stemmer
ePrint Report ePrint Report
One of the most basic problems for studying the "price of privacy over time" is the so called private counter problem, introduced by Dwork et al. (2010) and Chan et al. (2010). In this problem, we aim to track the number of events that occur over time, while hiding the existence of every single event. More specifically, in every time step $t\in[T]$ we learn (in an online fashion) that $\Delta_t\geq 0$ new events have occurred, and must respond with an estimate $n_t\approx\sum_{j=1}^t \Delta_j$. The privacy requirement is that all of the outputs together, across all time steps, satisfy event level differential privacy.

The main question here is how our error needs to depend on the total number of time steps $T$ and the total number of events $n$. Dwork et al. (2015) showed an upper bound of $O\left(\log(T)+\log^2(n)\right)$, and Henzinger et al. (2023) showed a lower bound of $\Omega\left(\min\{\log n, \log T\}\right)$. We show a new lower bound of $\Omega\left(\min\{n,\log T\}\right)$, which is tight w.r.t. the dependence on $T$, and is tight in the sparse case where $\log^2 n=O(\log T)$. Our lower bound has the following implications:

(1) We show that our lower bound extends to the online thresholds problem, where the goal is to privately answer many "quantile queries" when these queries are presented one-by-one. This resolves an open question of Bun et al. (2017).

(2) Our lower bound implies, for the first time, a separation between the number of mistakes obtainable by a private online learner and a non-private online learner. This partially resolves a COLT'22 open question published by Sanyal and Ramponi.

(3) Our lower bound also yields the first separation between the standard model of private online learning and a recently proposed relaxed variant of it, called private online prediction.
Expand
Pedro Branco, Nico Döttling, Akshayaram Srinivasan
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We give a construction of a two-round batch oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in the CRS model that is UC-secure against malicious adversaries and has (near) optimal communication cost. Specifically, to perform a batch of $k$ oblivious transfers where the sender's inputs are bits, the sender and the receiver need to communicate a total of $3k + o(k) \cdot \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ bits. We argue that $3k$ bits are required by any protocol with a black-box and straight-line simulator. The security of our construction is proven assuming the hardness of Quadratic Residuosity (QR) and the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN).
Expand
Seungjun Baek, Giyoon Kim, Jongsung Kim
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Ascon, a family of algorithms that supports authenticated encryption and hashing, has been selected as the new standard for lightweight cryptography in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography Project. Ascon’s permutation and authenticated encryption have been actively analyzed, but there are relatively few analyses on the hashing. In this paper, we concentrate on preimage attacks on Ascon-Xof. We focus on linearizing the polynomials leaked by the hash value to find its inverse. In an attack on 2-round Ascon-Xof, we carefully construct the set of guess bits using a greedy algorithm in the context of guess-and-determine. This allows us to attack Ascon-Xof more efficiently than the method in Dobraunig et al., and we fully implement our attack to demonstrate its effectiveness. We also provide the number of guess bits required to linearize one output bit after 3- and 4-round Ascon’s permutation, respectively. In particular, for the first time, we connect the result for 3-round Ascon to a preimage attack on Ascon-Xof with a 64-bit output. Our attacks primarily focus on analyzing weakened versions of Ascon-Xof, where the weakening involves setting all the IV values to 0 and omitting the round constants. Although our attacks do not compromise the security of the full Ascon-Xof, they provide new insights into their security.
Expand
Daniel Escudero, Yifan Song, Wenhao Wang
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Consider the task of secure multiparty computation (MPC) among $n$ parties with perfect security and guaranteed output delivery, supporting $t
In this work we provide an MPC protocol in this setting: perfect security, G.O.D. and $t
Expand
David Heath, Vladimir Kolesnikov, Lucien K. L. Ng
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Garbled Circuit (GC) is a basic technique for practical secure computation. GC handles Boolean circuits; it consumes significant network bandwidth to transmit encoded gate truth tables, each of which scales with the computational security parameter $\kappa$. GC optimizations that reduce bandwidth consumption are valuable.

It is natural to consider a generalization of Boolean two-input one-output gates (represented by $4$-row one-column lookup tables, LUTs) to arbitrary $N$-row $m$-column LUTs. Known techniques for this do not scale, with naive size-$O(Nm\kappa)$ garbled LUT being the most practical approach in many scenarios.

Our novel garbling scheme -- logrow -- implements GC LUTs while sending only a logarithmic in $N$ number of ciphertexts! Specifically, let $n = \lceil \log_2 N \rceil$. We allow the GC parties to evaluate a LUT for $(n-1)\kappa + nm\kappa + Nm$ bits of communication. logrow is compatible with modern GC advances, e.g. half gates and free XOR.

Our work improves state-of-the-art GC handling of several interesting applications, such as privacy-preserving machine learning, floating-point arithmetic, and DFA evaluation.
Expand
Anand Kumar Narayanan, Youming Qiao, Gang Tang
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We devise algorithms for finding equivalences of trilinear forms over finite fields modulo linear group actions. Our focus is on two problems under this umbrella, Matrix Code Equivalence (MCE) and Alternating Trilinear Form Equivalence (ATFE), since their hardness is the foundation of the NIST round-$1$ signature candidates MEDS and ALTEQ respectively.

We present new algorithms for MCE and ATFE, which are further developments of the algorithms for polynomial isomorphism and alternating trilinear form equivalence, in particular by Bouillaguet, Fouque, and Véber (Eurocrypt 2013), and Beullens (Crypto 2023). Key ingredients in these algorithms are new easy-to-compute distinguishing invariants under the respective group actions.

For MCE, we associate new isomorphism invariants to corank-$1$ points of matrix codes, which lead to a birthday-type algorithm. We present empirical justifications that these isomorphism invariants are easy-to-compute and distinguishing, and provide an implementation of this algorithm. This algorithm has some implications to the security of MEDS.

The invariant function for ATFE is similar, except it is associated with lower rank points. Modulo certain assumptions on turning the invariant function into canonical forms, our algorithm for ATFE improves on the runtime of the previously best known algorithm of Beullens (Crypto 2023).

Finally, we present quantum variants of our classical algorithms with cubic runtime improvements.
Expand
Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We report on efficient and secure hardware implementation techniques for the FIPS 205 SLH-DSA Hash-Based Signature Standard. SLotH supports all 12 parameter sets of SLH-DSA. The configurable architecture contains Keccak/SHAKE, SHA2-256, and SHA2-512 cores, and can protect secret key material with side-channel secure PRF and Winternitz chains. We demonstrate that very significant performance gains can be obtained from hardware features that facilitate hash padding formats and iterative hashing specific to SLH-DSA. These features make SLH-DSA on SLotH many times faster compared to similarly-sized general-purpose hash accelerators. A small RISC-V control core executes the drivers, as is typical in RoT systems such as OpenTitan or Caliptra.

Compared to unaccelerated microcontroller implementations, the performance of SLotH's SHAKE variants is up to $300\times$ faster; signature generation with 128f parameter set is is 4,903,978 cycles, while signature verification with 128s parameter set is only 179,603 cycles. The SLH-DSA-SHA2 parameter sets have approximately half of the speed. We observe that the signature verification performance of SLH-DSA's ``s'' parameter sets is generally better than that of accelerated ECDSA or Dilithium on similarly-sized RoT targets. The area of the full SLotH system is small, from 63 kGE (SHA2, Cat 1 only) to 155 kGe (all parameter sets). Keccak Threshold Implementation adds another 130 kGE.

We provide sensitivity analysis of SLH-DSA in relation to side-channel leakage. We show experimentally that an SLH-DSA implementation with CPU hashing will rapidly leak the SK.seed master key. We perform a 100,000-trace TVLA leakage assessment with a protected SLotH unit.
Expand
Dipayan Das, Antoine Joux
ePrint Report ePrint Report
The Partial Vandermonde (PV) Knapsack problem is an algebraic variant of the low-density inhomogeneous SIS problem. The problem has been used as a building block for various lattice-based constructions, including signatures (ACNS'14, ACISP'18), encryptions (DCC'15,DCC'20), and signature aggregation (Eprint'20). At Crypto'22, Boudgoust, Gachon, and Pellet-Mary proposed a key distinguishing attack on the PV Knapsack exploiting algebraic properties of the problem. Unfortunately, their attack doesn't offer key recovery, except for worst-case keys.

In this paper, we propose an alternative attack on the PV Knapsack problem, which provides key recovery for a much larger set of keys. Like the Crypto'22 attack, it is based on lattice reduction and uses a dimension reduction technique to speed-up the underlying lattice reduction algorithm and enhance its performance. As a side bonus, our attack transforms the PV Knapsack problem into uSVP instances instead of SVP instances in the Crypto'22 attack. This also helps the lattice reduction algorithm, both from a theoretical and practical point of view.

We use our attack to re-assess the hardness of the concrete parameters used in the literature. It appears that many contain a non-negligible fraction of weak keys, which are easily identified and extremely susceptible to our attack. For example, a fraction of $2^{-19}$ of the public keys of a parameter set from ACISP'18 can be solved in about $30$ hours on a moderate server using off-the-shelf lattice reduction. This parameter set was initially claimed to have a $129$-bit security against key recovery attack. Its security was reduced to $87$-bit security using the distinguishing attack from Crypto'22. Similarly, the ACNS'14 proposal also includes a parameter set containing a fraction of $2^{-19}$ of weak keys; those can be solved in about $17$ hours.
Expand
Jakob Feldtkeller, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Pascal Sasdrich, Tim Güneysu
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Physical security is an important aspect of devices for which an adversary can manipulate the physical execution environment. Recently, more and more attention has been directed towards a security model that combines the capabilities of passive and active physical attacks, i.e., an adversary that performs fault-injection and side-channel analysis at the same time. Implementing countermeasures against such a powerful adversary is not only costly but also requires the skillful combination of masking and redundancy to counteract all reciprocal effects.

In this work, we propose a new methodology to generate combined-secure circuits. We show how to transform TI-like constructions to resist any adversary with the capability to tamper with internal gates and probe internal wires. For the resulting protection scheme, we can prove the combined security in a well-established theoretical security model.

Since the transformation preserves the advantages of TI-like structures, the resulting circuits prove to be more efficient in the number of required bits of randomness (up to 100%), the latency in clock cycles (up to 40%), and even the area for pipelined designs (up to 40%) than the state of the art for an adversary restricted to manipulating a single gate and probing a single wire.
Expand
Next ►