IACR News
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06 July 2020
Tim Beyne, Anne Canteaut, Gregor Leander, María Naya-Plasencia, Léo Perrin, Friedrich Wiemer
Willy Quach
Our main technical contribution is a public-key encryption scheme from LWE where messy public keys (under which encryptions hide the underlying message statistically) can be recognized in time essentially independent of the LWE modulus $q$.
Christian Badertscher, Alexandru Cojocaru, Léo Colisson, Elham Kashefi, Dominik Leichtle, Atul Mantri, Petros Wallden
Therefore the question becomes relevant whether it is possible to rely solely on classical channels between client and server and yet benefit from its quantum capabilities while retaining privacy. Classical-client remote state preparation ($\sf{RSP}_{CC}$) is one of the promising candidates to achieve this because it enables a client, using only classical communication resources, to remotely prepare a quantum state. However, the privacy loss incurred by employing $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ as sub-module to avoid quantum channels is unclear.
In this work, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryptography framework by Maurer and Renner (ICS'11). We first identify the goal of $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ as the construction of ideal \RSP resources from classical channels and then reveal the security limitations of using $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ in general and in specific contexts:
1. We uncover a fundamental relationship between constructing ideal $\sf{RSP}$ resources (from classical channels) and the task of cloning quantum states with auxiliary information. Any classically constructed ideal $\sf{RSP}$ resource must leak to the server the full classical description (possibly in an encoded form) of the generated quantum state, even if we target computational security only. As a consequence, we find that the realization of common $\sf{RSP}$ resources, without weakening their guarantees drastically, is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem.
2. The above result does not rule out that a specific $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ protocol can replace the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such as the Universal Blind Quantum Computing ($\sf{UBQC}$) protocol of Broadbent et al. (FOCS 09). However, we show that the resulting $\sf{UBQC}$ protocol cannot maintain its proven composable security as soon as $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ is used as a subroutine.
3. We show that replacing the quantum channel of the above $\sf{UBQC}$ protocol by the $\sf{RSP}_{CC}$ protocol QFactory of Cojocaru et al. (Asiacrypt 19), preserves the weaker, game-based, security of $\sf{UBQC}$.
Osman Biçer, Alptekin Küpçü
Luka Music, Céline Chevalier, Elham Kashefi
However, the reality is much more complex. Security models dealing with superposition attacks only consider unconditional security. Conversely, security models considering computational security assume that all supposedly classical messages are measured, which forbids by construction the analysis of superposition attacks. Boneh and Zhandry have started to study the quantum computational security for classical primitives in their seminal work at Crypto'13, but only in the single-party setting. To the best of our knowledge, an equivalent model in the multiparty setting is still missing.
In this work, we propose the first computational security model considering superposition attacks for multiparty protocols. We show that our new security model is satisfiable by proving the security of the well-known One-Time-Pad protocol and give an attack on a variant of the equally reputable Yao Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computations. The post-mortem of this attack reveals the precise points of failure, yielding highly counter-intuitive results: Adding extra classical communication, which is harmless for classical security, can make the protocol become subject to superposition attacks. We use this newly imparted knowledge to construct the first concrete protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation that is resistant to superposition attacks. Our results show that there is no straightforward answer to provide for either the vulnerabilities of classical protocols to superposition attacks or the adapted countermeasures.
Marc Abboud, Thomas Prest
Tal Moran, Daniel Wichs
The recent work of Damg\aa{}rd, Ganesh and Orlandi (CRYPTO '19) defined a variant of incompressible encodings as a building block for ``proofs of replicated storage''. They constructed incompressible encodings in an ideal permutation model, but it was left open if they can be constructed under standard assumptions, or even in the more basic random-oracle model. In this work, we undertake the comprehensive study of incompressible encodings as a primitive of independent interest and give new constructions, negative results and applications:
* We construct incompressible encodings in the common random string (CRS) model under either Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) or Learning with Errors (LWE). However, the construction has several drawbacks: (1) it is not composable, (2) it only achieves selective security, and (3) the CRS is as long as the data $m$. * We leverage the above construction to also get a scheme in the random-oracle model, under the same assumptions, that avoids all of the above drawbacks. Furthermore, it is significantly more efficient than the prior ideal-model construction. * We give black-box separations, showing that incompressible encodings in the plain model cannot be proven secure under any standard hardness assumption, and incompressible encodings in the CRS model must inherently suffer from all of the drawbacks above. * We give a new application to ``big-key cryptography in the bounded-retrieval model'', where secret keys are made intentionally huge to make them hard to exfiltrate. Using incompressible encodings, we can get all the security benefits of a big key without wasting storage space, by having the key to encode useful data.
Luca Frittoli, Matteo Bocchi, Silvia Mella, Diego Carrera, Beatrice Rossi, Pasqualina Fragneto, Ruggero Susella, Giacomo Boracchi
03 July 2020
KU Leuven, Belgium
The Innovation Manager will identify opportunities for bilateral projects and research platforms, technology transfer, and potentially spin-off companies, including the definition of licenses, patents or other forms of valorization. All these tasks are executed in coordination with KU Leuven Research and Development. In particular, the Innovation Manager will assist in defining and maintaining a strategic research agenda to create a continuum between fundamental research, strategic research and applied research.
The lndustrial Research Fund (lOF) of KU Leuven forms a bridge between strategic basic research, technological innovations and industrial collaborations. Based on cooperations with KU Leuven research groups and different stakeholders from industry and society, we aim to broaden our valorization portfolio and to increase the transfer of knowledge. We have a team of more than 40 experienced innovation managers involved in the development of practical and innovative technological solutions based on the expertise and infrastructure of the research groups within KU Leuven.
Profile
- PhD or equivalent research expertise in applied cryptography
- Preferably industrial experience
- At least a high level understanding or parts of MPC, FHE, PQC, TEE
- Experience in valorization of research results
- Creative, enthusiastic, with a strong commitment to research valorization
- Proactive, entrepreneurial mindset
- Strong communication skills, including international and intercultural
- Willing to travel globally
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Nigel Smart (nigel.smart@kuleuven.be) Ingrid Verbauwhede (ingrid.verbauwhede@kuleuven.be) Frederik Vercauteren (frederik.vercauteren@kuleuven.be)
More information: https://www.kuleuven.be/personeel/jobsite/jobs/55715055
01 July 2020
London, United Kingdom, 30 November - 1 December 2020
Submission deadline: 24 August 2020
Notification: 1 October 2020
Aizuwakamatsu, Japan, 30 January - 2 February 2020
Submission deadline: 20 July 2020
Notification: 15 September 2020
30 June 2020
Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Profile Description:
- Proven experience in production quality software development.
- Previous experience and code contributions to open source projects is a plus.
- Experience in implementation of cryptographic libraries.
- Graduate level knowledge of crypto theory. Familiarity with threshold cryptosystems and multiparty protocols (MPC). Academic publications in Crypto/Security is a plus.
- Experience in design and implementation of large software systems and writing secure code in C/C++/Rust/Golang.
- Familiarity with blockchain systems such as Hyperledger Fabric and/or Ethereum.
- Ability to meet deliverables and deadlines with minimal supervision.
- Fluent in written and spoken english.
Deadline for Application: Open until the position is filled.
Start Date: Immediate, but flexible.
Salary: Very attractive, depends on experience.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Avradip Mandal, Researcher. amandal@fujitsu.com
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
The Max Planck Institute (MPI) for Security and Privacy is looking for motivated students to apply for a Ph.D. program. The research will be conducted on the theory of cryptography and computer security and more specifically in one of the following topics:
The ideal candidate shall satisfy the following requirements:
The MPI for Security and Privacy is co-located with the Ruhr University of Bochum (Germany) and offers a vibrant atmosphere for research that spans across all aspects of computer security. The Ph.D. program is entirely in English and the knowledge of German is not required for a successful career at MPI.
The position is fully funded (100%) and paid according to the E-13 pay category. The starting date if flexible but ideally somewhere in fall 2020. To apply for the position, send an email to Giulio Malavolta (address below) including the following documents:If you have any question, don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Giulio Malavolta (giulio.malavolta@berkeley.edu)
More information: https://www.mpi-sp.org/
Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf Gmbh (Munich Research Center, Germany)
• Identifying weaknesses in existing 3GPP radio access network technologies including 4G and 5G (NR). • Develop and promote proposals to mitigate the security/privacy issues identified. • Cooperate with universities and other eco-system partners on security research and analysis • Help shape the industry with new innovation via standardization bodies e.g. 3GPP, ETSI, etc. • Engage with customers and regulators in order to help shape a secure ICT world. • Work with the world leading researchers across the world on the most advanced technologies including AI, IoT under the scope of 5G. • Help steer our 5G products and solutions security. • Provide analysis and insight of industry trends. • Generate product security roadmap recommendations.
Our requirements:• PhD in computer science or advanced PhD with focus on telecommunication security (preferably radio access technologies, the 3GPP air-interface protocol stack). • Several years of experience in network security research, specifically in the domains of protocol analysis, vulnerability detection, protocol correctness, protocol verification, etc. • Several years of experience researching and developing tools/demos/PoCs which demonstrate the impact of such security issues (vulnerabilities) on the network. • Several years of experience researching and implementing mitigation solutions (PoC/Demo level) for protocol vulnerabilities including algorithms development, performance/cost and impact analysis of algorithms implementation. • Openness to work in a diversified work environment with unique work cultures. • Experience in presenting technical information to both technical and non-technical audience. • Fluent in English (written and spoken).
Must be eligible to work in the EU to be considered for this position.
By applying to this position, you agree with our PRIVACY STATEMENT. You can read in full our privacy policy via the link below.
https://career.huawei.com/reccampportal/portal5/grcprivacy.html For further information on the requirements please click on the link below: https://apply.workaClosing date for applications:
Contact: Viet-Duc Benedikt Lai duc.lai.ext@huawei.com
More information: https://apply.workable.com/j/64698ECA7B
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (Workplace: IIT Bhilai, Raipur)
Funding Agency: Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
Tentative Duration: Upto:31/03/2021Qualifications: B. Tech. (with GATE qualification) / MSc. (with NET/SET qualification) / M.C.A. (with GATE* qualification) 1st class or equivalent in the appropriate discipline.
Desirables: Basic knowledge of cryptography or some experience with using RFID tags or experience on some Raspberry based project or using Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
Note: The requirement of qualifying NET/SET/GATE qualification may be relaxed by the Committee in case of highly meritorious candidates.
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
Dr. Dhiman Saha,
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
Indian Institute of Technology Bhilai.
email: dhiman [at] iitbhilai [dot] ac [dot] in
For more info about the research group and other opportunities visit: http://de.ci.phe.red
More information: http://ird.iitd.ac.in/sites/default/files/jobs/project/IITD-IRD-100-2020.pdf
Lior Rotem, Gil Segev
We prove sharp thresholds on the sequentiality of all generic-ring delay functions relative to an RSA modulus based on the hardness of factoring in the standard model. In particular, we show that generically speeding-up repeated squaring (even with a preprocessing stage and any polynomial number parallel processors) is equivalent to factoring.
More generally, based on the (essential) hardness of factoring, we prove that any generic-ring function is in fact a delay function, admitting a sharp sequentiality threshold that is determined by our notion of sequentiality depth. Moreover, we show that generic-ring functions admit not only sharp sequentiality thresholds, but also sharp pseudorandomness thresholds.