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01 September 2020
Phil Hebborn, Baptiste Lambin, Gregor Leander, Yosuke Todo
Only the method to estimate the upper bound of the algebraic degree on block ciphers is known so far, but it is not useful for the designer to guarantee the security. In this paper we provide meaningful lower bounds on the algebraic degree of modern block ciphers.
Arpita Patra, Divya Ravi, Swati Singla
The two traditional streams of multiparty computation (MPC) protocols consist of-- (a) protocols achieving guaranteed output delivery (god) or fairness (fn) in the honest-majority setting and (b) protocols achieving unanimous or selective abort (ua, sa) in the dishonest-majority setting. The favorable presence of honest majority amongst the participants is necessary to achieve the stronger notions of god or fn. While the constructions of each type are abound in the literature, one class of protocols does not seem to withstand the threat model of the other. For instance, the honest-majority protocols do not guarantee privacy of the inputs of the honest parties in the face of dishonest majority and likewise the dishonest-majority protocols cannot achieve god and fn, tolerating even a single corruption, let alone dishonest minority. The promise of the unconventional yet much sought-after species of MPC, termed as `Best-of-Both-Worlds' (BoBW), is to offer the best possible security depending on the actual corruption scenario.
This work nearly settles the exact round complexity of two classes of BoBW protocols differing on the security achieved in the honest-majority setting, namely god and fn respectively, under the assumption of no setup (plain model), public setup (CRS) and private setup (CRS + PKI or simply PKI). The former class necessarily requires the number of parties to be strictly more than the sum of the bounds of corruptions in the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting, for a feasible solution to exist. Demoting the goal to the second-best attainable security in the honest-majority setting, the latter class needs no such restriction.
Assuming a network with pair-wise private channels and a broadcast channel, we show that 5 and 3 rounds are necessary and sufficient for the class of BoBW MPC with fn under the assumption of `no setup' and `public and private setup' respectively. For the class of BoBW MPC with god, we show necessity and sufficiency of 3 rounds for the public setup case and 2 rounds for the private setup case. In the no setup setting, we show the sufficiency of 5 rounds, while the known lower bound is 4. All our upper bounds are based on polynomial-time assumptions and assume black-box simulation. With distinct feasibility conditions, the classes differ in terms of the round requirement. The bounds are in some cases different and on a positive note at most one more, compared to the maximum of the needs of the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting. Our results remain unaffected when security with abort and fairness are upgraded to their identifiable counterparts.
This work nearly settles the exact round complexity of two classes of BoBW protocols differing on the security achieved in the honest-majority setting, namely god and fn respectively, under the assumption of no setup (plain model), public setup (CRS) and private setup (CRS + PKI or simply PKI). The former class necessarily requires the number of parties to be strictly more than the sum of the bounds of corruptions in the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting, for a feasible solution to exist. Demoting the goal to the second-best attainable security in the honest-majority setting, the latter class needs no such restriction.
Assuming a network with pair-wise private channels and a broadcast channel, we show that 5 and 3 rounds are necessary and sufficient for the class of BoBW MPC with fn under the assumption of `no setup' and `public and private setup' respectively. For the class of BoBW MPC with god, we show necessity and sufficiency of 3 rounds for the public setup case and 2 rounds for the private setup case. In the no setup setting, we show the sufficiency of 5 rounds, while the known lower bound is 4. All our upper bounds are based on polynomial-time assumptions and assume black-box simulation. With distinct feasibility conditions, the classes differ in terms of the round requirement. The bounds are in some cases different and on a positive note at most one more, compared to the maximum of the needs of the honest-majority and dishonest-majority setting. Our results remain unaffected when security with abort and fairness are upgraded to their identifiable counterparts.
Stefano Barbero, Emanuele Bellini, Rusydi Makarim
We show that the underlying permutation of ChaCha20 stream cipher does not behave as a random permutation for up to 17 rounds with respect to rotational cryptanalysis. In particular, we derive a lower and an upper bound for the rotational probability through ChaCha quarter round, we show how to extend the bound to a full round and then to the full permutation. The obtained bounds show that the probability to find what we call a parallel rotational collision is, for example, less than $2^{-488}$ for 17 rounds of ChaCha permutation, while for a random permutation of the same input size, this probability is $2^{-511}$. We remark that our distinguisher is not an attack to ChaCha20 stream cipher, but rather a theoretical analysis of its internal permutation from the point of view of rotational cryptanalysis.
Kai Hu, Siwei Sun, Meiqin Wang, Qingju Wang
Since it was proposed in 2015 as a generalization of integral properties, the division property has evolved into a powerful tool for probing the structures of Boolean functions whose algebraic normal forms are not available.
We capture the most essential elements for the detection of division properties from a pure algebraic perspective, proposing a technique named as monomial prediction, which can be employed to determine the presence or absence of a monomial in any product of the coordinate functions of a vectorial Boolean function $\boldsymbol f$ by counting the number of the so-called monomial trails across a sequence of simpler functions whose composition is $\boldsymbol f$.
Under the framework of the monomial prediction, we formally prove that most algorithms for detecting division properties in literature raise no false alarms but may miss.
We also establish the equivalence between the monomial prediction and the three-subset bit-based division property without unknown subset presented at EUROCRYPT 2020, and show that these two techniques are perfectly accurate.
The monomial prediction technique can be regarded as a purification of the definitions of the division properties without resorting to external multisets. This algebraic formulation gives more insights into division properties and inspires new search strategies. With the monomial prediction, we obtain the exact algebraic degrees of TRIVIUM up to 834 rounds for the first time. In the context of cube attacks, we are able to explore a larger search space in limited time and recover the exact algebraic normal forms of complex superpolies with the help of a divide-and-conquer strategy. As a result, we identify more cubes with smaller dimensions, leading to improvements of some near-optimal attacks against 840-, 841- and 842-round TRIVIUM.
The monomial prediction technique can be regarded as a purification of the definitions of the division properties without resorting to external multisets. This algebraic formulation gives more insights into division properties and inspires new search strategies. With the monomial prediction, we obtain the exact algebraic degrees of TRIVIUM up to 834 rounds for the first time. In the context of cube attacks, we are able to explore a larger search space in limited time and recover the exact algebraic normal forms of complex superpolies with the help of a divide-and-conquer strategy. As a result, we identify more cubes with smaller dimensions, leading to improvements of some near-optimal attacks against 840-, 841- and 842-round TRIVIUM.
Gao, Yiwen, Zhou, Yongbin
Side-channel attacks are one of the greatest practical threats to security-related applications, because they are capable of breaking ciphers that are assumed to be mathematically secure. Lots of studies have been devoted to power or electro-magnetic (EM) analysis against desktop CPUs, mobile CPUs (including ARM, MSP, AVR, etc) and FPGAs, but rarely targeted modern GPUs. Modern GPUs feature their special and specific single instruction multiple threads (SIMT) execution fashion, which makes their power/EM leakage more sophisticated in practical scenarios. In this paper, we study side-channel attacks with leakage from SIMT systems, and propose leakage models suited to any SIMT systems and specifically to CUDA-enabled GPUs. Afterwards, we instantiate the models with a GPU AES implementation, which is also used for performance evaluations. In addition to the models, we provide optimizations on the attacks that are based on the models. To evaluate the models and optimizations, we run the GPU AES implementation on a CUDA-enabled GPU and, at the same time, collect its EM leakage. The experimental results show that the proposed models are more efficient and the optimizations are effective as well. Our study suggests that GPU-based cryptographic implementations may be much vulnerable to microarchitecture-based side-channel attacks. Therefore, GPU-specific countermeasures should be considered for GPU-based cryptographic implementations in practical applications.
ZUC Design Team
At FSE 2020, a linear distinguishing attack is presented against the ZUC-256 stream cipher based on the $32$-bit word with a data/time complexity of about $2^{236.38}$. In this paper, we re-evaluate the complexity of this attack and discuss the applicability of such a distinguishing attack in 5G application scenarios, where each keystream frame is limited to $20000$, and up to $2^{32}$ bits. To assure a high success probability close to $1$, it is shown that the precise time complexity of the distinguishing attack is $2^{253.93}$ basic operations with a data complexity of $2^{241.38}$ bits keystream, which is far beyond the keystream length limit in 5G application settings in the single-frame setting. Besides, we also consider the multiple-frame scenario where a long keystream could be formed by concatenating many short keystream frames generated from different (Key, IV) pairs. We show that even in such a strong model of distinguishing attacks, the reported bias will not exist in 5G application scenarios and the linear distinguishing attack will not work due to the fact that the long linear combination relation derived from the polynomial multiple of the LFSR in ZUC-256 over $\mbox{GF}(2^{31}-1)$, which has been verified in experiments. It is concluded that the ZUC-256 stream cipher offers the full $256$-bit security in 5G application scenarios.
31 August 2020
ASIACRYPT 2020 is the 26th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security and one of the three general conferences of the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR). It was originally scheduled to take place in Daejeon, Korea, December 6-10.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ASIACRYPT 2020 has been converted into an all-digital event with slightly changed dates. It is now scheduled to take place online Monday-Friday, December 7-11. The conference proceedings will be published according to the original schedule.
Details about the new all-digital event, including its scientific program and registration process, will be communicated at a later time via the usual IACR channels and the conference website.
The board wishes safety and health to all our members during these challenging times.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ASIACRYPT 2020 has been converted into an all-digital event with slightly changed dates. It is now scheduled to take place online Monday-Friday, December 7-11. The conference proceedings will be published according to the original schedule.
Details about the new all-digital event, including its scientific program and registration process, will be communicated at a later time via the usual IACR channels and the conference website.
The board wishes safety and health to all our members during these challenging times.
Gaithersburg, USA, 19 October - 21 October 2020
Event date: 19 October to 21 October 2020
Submission deadline: 14 September 2020
Notification: 28 September 2020
Submission deadline: 14 September 2020
Notification: 28 September 2020
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Event date: to
Submission deadline: 31 March 2021
Submission deadline: 31 March 2021
Dhiman Saha, Yu Sasaki, Danping Shi, Ferdinand Sibleyras, Siwei Sun, Yingjie Zhang
This paper presents the first third-party security analysis of \tinyjambu, which is one of 32 second-round candidates in NIST's lightweight cryptography standardization process. TinyJAMBU adopts an NLFSR based keyed-permutation that computes only a single NAND gate as a non-linear component per round. The designers evaluated the minimum number of active AND gates, however such a counting method neglects the dependency between multiple AND gates. There also exist previous works considering such dependencies with stricter models, however those are known to be too slow. In this paper, we present a new model that provides a good balance of efficiency and accuracy by only taking into account the first-order correlation of AND gates that frequently occurs in TinyJAMBU. With the refined model, we show a 338-round differential with probability $2^{-62.68}$ that leads to a forgery attack breaking 64-bit security. This implies that the security margin of TinyJAMBU with respect to the number of unattacked rounds is approximately 12%. We also show a differential on full 384 rounds with probability $2^{-70.64}$, thus the security margin of full rounds with respect to the data complexity, namely the gap between the claimed security bits and the attack complexity, is less than 8 bits. Our attacks also point out structural weaknesses of the mode that essentially come from the minimal state size to be lightweight.
CHES 2020 will be held from September 14 to 17 as a virtual event.
To register for CHES 2020, please visit the CHES 2020 registration site. Registration for CHES 2020 is free for IACR members; non-IACR members will be asked to pay the IACR membership fee (USD 50 regular, USD 25 for students) during registration.
You can follow any updates on twitter @2020CHES.
To register for CHES 2020, please visit the CHES 2020 registration site. Registration for CHES 2020 is free for IACR members; non-IACR members will be asked to pay the IACR membership fee (USD 50 regular, USD 25 for students) during registration.
You can follow any updates on twitter @2020CHES.
28 August 2020
Benjamin Dowling, Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, Douglas Stebila
We analyze the handshake protocol of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. We address both the full TLS 1.3 handshake (the one round-trip time mode, with signatures for authentication and (elliptic curve) DiffieHellman ephemeral ((EC)DHE) key exchange), and the abbreviated resumption/"PSK" mode which uses a pre-shared key for authentication (with optional (EC)DHE key exchange and zero round-trip time key establishment). Our analysis in the reductionist security framework uses a multi-stage key exchange security model, where each of the many session keys derived in a single TLS 1.3 handshake is tagged with various properties (such as unauthenticated versus unilaterally authenticated versus mutually authenticated, whether it is intended to provide forward security, how it is used in the protocol, and whether the key is protected against replay attacks). We show that these TLS 1.3 handshake protocol modes establish session keys with their desired security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Ian McQuoid, Mike Rosulek, Lawrence Roy
Symmetric password-authenticated key exchange (sPAKE) can be seen as an extension of traditional key exchange where two parties agree on a shared key if and only if they share a common secret (possibly low-entropy) password.
We present the first sPAKE protocol to simultaneously achieve the following properties:
- only two exponentiations per party, the same as plain unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement (and likely optimal);
- optimal round complexity: a single flow (one message from each party that can be sent in parallel) to achieve implicit authentication, or two flows to achieve explicit mutual authentication;
- security in the random oracle model, rather than ideal cipher or generic group model;
- UC security, rather than game-based.
Our protocol is a generalization of the seminal EKE protocol of Bellovin & Merritt (S&P 1992).
We also present a UC-secure 1-out-of-$N$ oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, for random payloads. Its communication complexity is independent of $N$, meaning that $N$ can even be exponential in the security parameter. Such a protocol can also be considered a kind of oblivious PRF (OPRF). Our protocol improves over the leading UC-secure 1-out-of-$N$ OT construction of Masny & Rindal (CCS 2019) for all $N>2$, and has essentially the same cost for $N=2$.
The new technique underlying these results is a primitive we call programmable-once public function (POPF). Intuitively, a POPF is a function whose output can be programmed by one party on exactly one point. All other outputs of the function are outside of any party's control, in a provable sense.
- only two exponentiations per party, the same as plain unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement (and likely optimal);
- optimal round complexity: a single flow (one message from each party that can be sent in parallel) to achieve implicit authentication, or two flows to achieve explicit mutual authentication;
- security in the random oracle model, rather than ideal cipher or generic group model;
- UC security, rather than game-based.
Our protocol is a generalization of the seminal EKE protocol of Bellovin & Merritt (S&P 1992).
We also present a UC-secure 1-out-of-$N$ oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, for random payloads. Its communication complexity is independent of $N$, meaning that $N$ can even be exponential in the security parameter. Such a protocol can also be considered a kind of oblivious PRF (OPRF). Our protocol improves over the leading UC-secure 1-out-of-$N$ OT construction of Masny & Rindal (CCS 2019) for all $N>2$, and has essentially the same cost for $N=2$.
The new technique underlying these results is a primitive we call programmable-once public function (POPF). Intuitively, a POPF is a function whose output can be programmed by one party on exactly one point. All other outputs of the function are outside of any party's control, in a provable sense.
Hoeteck Wee, Daniel Wichs
We present a new, simple candidate construction of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Our scheme is inspired by lattices and learning-with-errors (LWE) techniques, but we are unable to prove security under a standard assumption. Instead, we formulate a new falsifiable assumption under which the scheme is secure. Furthermore, the scheme plausibly achieves post-quantum security.
Our construction is based on the recent "split FHE" framework of Brakerski, D\"ottling, Garg, and Malavolta (EUROCRYPT '20), and we provide a new instantiation of this framework. As a first step, we construct an iO scheme that is provably secure assuming that LWE holds \emph{and} that it is possible to obliviously generate LWE samples without knowing the corresponding secrets. We define a precise notion of oblivious LWE sampling that suffices for the construction. It is known how to obliviously sample from any distribution (in a very strong sense) using iO, and our result provides a converse, showing that the ability to obliviously sample from the specific LWE distribution (in a much weaker sense) already also implies iO. As a second step, we give a heuristic contraction of oblivious LWE sampling. On a very high level, we do this by homomorphically generating pseudoradnom LWE samples using an encrypted pseudorandom function.
Our construction is based on the recent "split FHE" framework of Brakerski, D\"ottling, Garg, and Malavolta (EUROCRYPT '20), and we provide a new instantiation of this framework. As a first step, we construct an iO scheme that is provably secure assuming that LWE holds \emph{and} that it is possible to obliviously generate LWE samples without knowing the corresponding secrets. We define a precise notion of oblivious LWE sampling that suffices for the construction. It is known how to obliviously sample from any distribution (in a very strong sense) using iO, and our result provides a converse, showing that the ability to obliviously sample from the specific LWE distribution (in a much weaker sense) already also implies iO. As a second step, we give a heuristic contraction of oblivious LWE sampling. On a very high level, we do this by homomorphically generating pseudoradnom LWE samples using an encrypted pseudorandom function.
Abraham Westerbaan, Bas Westerbaan
Often in cryptography one needs to make a consistent choice of square root in a finite field. We show that such a choice is equivalent to providing a reasonable sign function. Then we show that for $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ (with odd prime $p \neq 1$ and $k\neq 0$) such a sign function exists if and only if $k$ is odd.
Hemi Leibowitz, Amir Herzberg, Ewa Syta, Sara Wrótniak
We present the Modular Specifications Security (MoSS) framework, where security specifications are defined with respect to a specific model predicate $\cal M$. This allows analysis of even complex schemes and protocols, e.g., PKI schemes, under well-defined adversary, communication and synchronization models, in a modular and flexible way, and allows to analyze such schemes in both simplified and realistic models.
The framework facilitates reuse of definitions, and, indeed, several of the model predicates and security specifications we define, seem `generic' and reusable in analysis of other practical protocols.
Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Alptekin Küpçü
Blockchain is a multiparty protocol to reach agreement on the order of events, and to record them consistently and immutably without centralized trust. In some cases, however, the blockchain can benefit from some controlled mutability. Examples include removing private information or unlawful content, and correcting protocol vulnerabilities which would otherwise require a hard fork. Two approaches to control the mutability are: moderation, where one or more designated administrators can use their private keys to approve a redaction, and voting, where miners can vote to endorse a suggested redaction. In this paper, we first present several attacks against existing redactable blockchain solutions. Next, we provide a definitional framework for moderated redactable blockchains. Finally, we propose a provable and efficient construct, which applies a single digital signature per redaction, achieving a much simpler and secure result compared to the prior art in the moderated setting.
Prasanna Ravi, Romain Poussier, Shivam Bhasin, Anupam Chattopadhyay
The Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is a critical sub-block used in several structured lattice-based schemes, including Kyber and Dilithium, which are finalist candidates in the NIST's standardization process for post-quantum cryptography. The NTT was shown to be susceptible to single trace side-channel attacks by Primas et al. in CHES 2017 and Pessl et al. in Latincrypt 2019 who demonstrated full key recovery from single traces on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. However, the cost of deploying suitable countermeasures to protect the NTT from these attacks on the same target platform has not yet been studied. In this work, we propose novel shuffling and masking countermeasures to protect the NTT from such single trace attacks. Firstly, we exploit arithmetic properties of twiddle constants used within the NTT computation to propose efficient and generic masking strategies for the NTT with configurable SCA resistance. Secondly, we also propose new variants of the shuffling countermeasure with varying granularity for the NTT. We perform a detailed comparative evaluation of the runtime performances for our proposed countermeasures within open source implementations of Kyber and Dilithium from the pqm4 library on the ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our proposed countermeasures yield a reasonable overhead in the range of 7%-78% across all procedures of Kyber, while the overheads are much more pronounced for Dilithium, ranging from 12%-197% for the key generation procedure and 32%-490% for the signing procedure.
Yihong Zhu, Min Zhu, Bohan Yang, Wenping Zhu, Chenchen Deng, Chen Chen, Shaojun Wei, Leibo Liu
Although large numbers of hardware and software implementations have been proposed to accelerate lattice-based cryptography, Saber, a module-LWR-based algorithm, which has advanced to second round of the NIST standardization process, has not been adequately supported by the current solutions. Based on these motivations, a high-performance crypto-processor is proposed based on an algorithm-hardware co-design in this paper.
First, a hierarchical Karatsuba calculating framework, a hardware-efficient Karatsuba scheduling strategy and an optimized circuit structure are utilized to enable high-throughput polynomial multiplication. Furthermore, a task-level pipeline and truncated multipliers are proposed to enable algorithm-specific fine-grained processing. Enabled by all of the above optimizations, Avalon takes 943, 1156, and 408 clock cycles for key generation, encryption, and decryption, respectively.
Enabled by these optimizations, our processor takes 943, 1156 and 408 clock cycles for key generation, encryption, and decryption of Saber768, achieving 5.4x, 5.2x and 4.2x reductions compared with the state-of-the-art FPGA solutions, respectively.
The post-layout simulation of our design is implemented with TSMC 40nm CMOS process within 0.35 mm2.
The throughput for Saber768 is up to 346k encryption operations per second and the energy efficiency is 0.12uJ/encryption while operating at 400MHz,
achieving nearly 52x improvement and 30x improvement, respectively compared with current PQC hardware solutions.
Arthur Van Der Merwe, David Paul, Jelena Schmalz, Timothy M. Schaerf
We examine the security of the Australian card payment system by analysing existing cryptographic protocols. In this analysis, we examine TDES and DES-V key derivation and the use of secure cryptographic devices, then contrast this with alternative mechanisms to enable secure card payments. We compare current Australian cryptographic methods with their international counterparts, such as the ANSI methods, and then motivate alternative methods for authenticated encryption
in card payment systems.