IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
06 October 2020
Ph.D. position (full scholarship) on Side-Channel Attack at Villanova University (USA)
Job PostingInterested ones are warmly welcomed to send their resume/CV to Dr. Xie through email: jiafeng.xie@villanova.edu
Requirements: preferred to be at the majors of Computer Science or Computer Engineering. Familiar with FPGA board related side-channel attack and analysis will be desirable. Proficiency in programming languages such as C/C++ and HDLs. Good at English communication and writing. Great enthusiasm of doing research oriented tasks. Excellent team work member.
Degree: both B.S. and M.S. graduates or similar are warmly welcomed to apply.
Deadline: better to start at Spring 2021, though Fall 2021 is also ok. It is always better to apply as early as possible. Position is open until it is filled.
The 2021 U.S. News & World Report ranks Villanova as tied for the 53th best National University in the U.S.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Jiafeng Harvest Xie (jiafeng.xie@villanova.edu)
More information: https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/engineering/departments/ece/facultyStaff/biodetail.html?mail=jiafeng.xie@villanova.edu&xsl=bio_long
Charles Sturt University, New South Wales, Australia
Job PostingThis PhD position will be supported by the CSCRC with excellent scholarship. The CSCRC aims to inspire the next generation of cyber security professionals through working with some of the best cyber security researchers in Australia, and engagement with the CSCRC Industry & Government Participants. Further details of the CSCRC Government and Industry Participants may be found at: https://www.cybersecuritycrc.org.au (Cyber Security Research Scholarships of up to AU$50,000 a year for outstanding PhD students; these scholarships are limited to Australian nationals or candidates from other 5-Eyes countries (US, UK, Canada, New Zealand); candidates from NATO countries will be considered on a case by case basis. Successful candidates must be eligible to obtain Australian Government Cyber Security Clearance (where appropriate).)
In order to be considered for the position, the candidate must:
• Hold a Master's degree in mathematics, computer science, cryptography or related fields with strong grades;
• Show strong background in mathematics, computer science and cryptography;
• Demonstrate experience in C/C++ or Java.
Having prior publications in security and privacy is highly desirable.
Please send (by e-mail) to below contact information:
• Transcripts,
• Curriculum vitae,
• Statement of Purpose, and
• Academic IELTS Test Report (or equivlent qualification).
In addition, three reference letters are required by e-mail from referees.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Tanveer Zia (tzia@csu.edu.au)
Xiao Chen
ePrint ReportCertificateless public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (CLPAEKS) is first formally proposed by He et al. as combination of the PAEKS and the certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC). Lin et al. revised He's work and re-formalize the security requirements for CLPAEKS in terms of trapdoor privacy and ciphertext indistinguishability. However, how to achieve both MCI and MTP security in a CLPAEKS scheme is still unknown.
In this paper, we initially propose a CLPAEKS scheme with both MCI security and MTP security simultaneously. We provide formal proof of our schemes in the random oracle model.
Zhaohua Chen, Guang Yang
ePrint ReportColin O'Flynn
ePrint ReportThis work demonstrates that BBI (and indeed many other backside attacks) can be trivially performed on Wafer-Level Chip-Scale Packaging (WLCSP), which inherently expose the die backside. A low-cost ($15) design for the BBI tool is introduced, and validated with faults introduced on a STM32F415OG against code flow, RSA, and some initial results on various hardware block attacks are discussed.
Muhammad ElSheikh, Amr M. Youssef
ePrint ReportChen-Da Liu-Zhang, Ueli Maurer
ePrint ReportAs a second, independent contribution we demonstrate how secure (synchronous) multi-party computation protocols can be understood as constructing a computer that allows a set of parties to perform an arbitrary, on-going computation. An interesting aspect is that the instructions of the computation need not be fixed before the protocol starts but can also be determined during an on-going computation, possibly depending on previous outputs.
Arpita Patra, Thomas Schneider, Ajith Suresh, Hossein Yalame
ePrint ReportWe propose an efficient mixed-protocol framework, outperforming the state-of-the-art 2PC framework of ABY. Moreover, we extend our techniques to multi- input multiplication gates without inflating the online communication, i.e., it remains independent of the fan-in. Along the way, we construct efficient protocols for several primitives such as scalar product, matrix multiplication, comparison, maxpool, and equality testing. The online communication of our scalar product is two ring elements irrespective of the vector dimension, which is a feature achieved for the first time in the 2PC literature.
The practicality of our new set of protocols is showcased with four applications: i) AES S-box, ii) Circuit-based Private Set Intersection, iii) Biometric Matching, and iv) Privacy- preserving Machine Learning (PPML). Most notably, for PPML, we implement and benchmark training and inference of Logistic Regression and Neural Networks over LAN and WAN networks. For training, we improve online runtime (both for LAN and WAN) over SecureML (Mohassel et al., IEEE S&P17) in the range 1.5x-6.1x, while for inference, the improvements are in the range of 2.5x-754.3x.
Alexandros Bakas, Antonis Michalas
ePrint ReportJonathan Takeshita, Dayane Reis, Ting Gong, Michael Niemier, X. Sharon Hu, Taeho Jung
ePrint ReportMuhammed F. Esgin, Veronika Kuchta, Amin Sakzad, Ron Steinfeld, Zhenfei Zhang, Shifeng Sun, Shumo Chu
ePrint ReportIn order to design a practical scheme, we need to restrict the number of VRF outputs per key pair, which makes our construction few-time. Despite this restriction, we show how our few-time LB-VRF can be used in practice and, in particular, we estimate the performance of Algorand using LB-VRF. We find that, due to the significant increase in the communication size in comparison to classical constructions, which is inherent in all existing lattice-based schemes, the throughput in LB-VRF-based consensus protocol is reduced, but remains practical. In particular, in a medium-sized network with 100 nodes, our platform records a 1.16x to 4x reduction in throughput, depending on the accompanying signature used. In the case of a large network with 500 nodes, we can still maintain at least 66 transactions per second. This is still much better than Bitcoin, which processes only about 5 transactions per second.
Tatsuya Suzuki, Keita Emura, Toshihiro Ohigashi, Kazumasa Omote
ePrint ReportHassan Jameel Asghar, Slawomir Matelski, Josef Pieprzyk
ePrint ReportShingo Sato, Junji Shikata, Tsutomu Matsumoto
ePrint ReportShingo Sato, Junji Shikata
ePrint ReportPedro Hecht
ePrint ReportErdem Alkim, Dean Yun-Li Cheng, Chi-Ming Marvin Chung, Hülya Evkan, Leo Wei-Lun Huang, Vincent Hwang, Ching-Lin Trista Li, Ruben Niederhagen, Cheng-Jhih Shih, Julian Wälde, Bo-Yin Yang
ePrint ReportSteve Babbage, Alexander Maximov
ePrint ReportMajid Mumtaz, Ping Luo
ePrint ReportJoseph Jaeger, Stefano Tessaro
ePrint ReportAs our second contribution, we use these results to derive concrete bounds on the soundness of public-coin proofs and arguments of knowledge. Under the lens of concrete security, we revisit a paradigm by Bootle at al. (EUROCRYPT '16) that proposes a general Forking Lemma for multi-round protocols which implements a rewinding strategy with expected-time guarantees. We give a tighter analysis, as well as a modular statement. We adopt this to obtain the first quantitative bounds on the soundness of Bulletproofs (Bünz et al., S&P 2018), which we instantiate with our expected-time generic-group analysis to surface inherent dependence between the concrete security and the statement to be proved.