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21 December 2020
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Job PostingSuccessful candidates must have an expert grasp of knowledge of Cybersecurity at all levels, with an emphasis on hands-on applied cybersecurity skills, either through a demonstrated record of teaching excellence, or through industrial experience. The successful candidate will also be involved in creating course content and materials with a focus on hands-on experiential and project-based learning. Strong written, oral and interpersonal skills are required in order to communicate effectively with students in person and online. The formal education and experience prerequisites may be waived at the university’s discretion if the candidate can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the university an equivalent combination of education and experience specifically preparing the candidate for success in the position.
Interested applicants should submit their CV and at least two references by applying as soon as possible at: https://njit.csod.com/ats/careersite/JobDetails.aspx?site=1&id=2600
Work environment and location: The Computer Science department, part of the Ying Wu College of Computing Sciences, is the largest at NJIT, comprising one tenth of the student population. It is also the largest computer science department among all research universities in the New York metropolitan area. Located in Northern New Jersey, within the greater New York Metropolitan area, NJIT is part of a vibrant ecosystem of research universities and corporate research centers.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: reza.curtmola@njit.edu
More information: https://njit.csod.com/ats/careersite/JobDetails.aspx?site=1&id=2600
Eindhoven University of Technology,, Eindhoven, the Netherlands,
Job PostingThe position will be part of the Coding Theory and Cryptology (CC) group, within the Discrete Mathematics (DM) cluster. The other group in DM is Discrete Algebra and Geometry. The CC group consists of one full professor (Lange), two associate professors (Schoenmakers and de Weger), and three assistant professors (Ashur, Hülsing and Ravagnani). CC provides undergraduate and graduate courses in cryptology, coding theory, algebra and number theory, as well as service teaching.
CC and the Security (SEC) group of Etalle form the Eindhoven Institute for the Protection of Systems and Information (Ei/ Ψ) which covers the whole technical spectrum of information security. Ei/ Ψ organizes the master's track Information Security Technology within the Computer Science program at TU/e.
The ideal candidate has research experience complementing the existing strengths in CC and SEC but candidates from all areas of cryptology including neighboring fields such as software security, side-channel attacks, reverse engineering, etc. are encouraged to apply.
The assistant professor is expected to
- perform outstanding research in the area of cryptology and security;
- establish research collaborations within the department and nternationally;
- take responsibility in coordinating and updating courses; advise BSc, MSc, and PhD students;
- initiate, acquire and coordinate research projects;
- perform managerial and/or administrative tasks for the cluster or department.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Tanja Lange tanja@hyperelliptic.org
More information: https://jobs.tue.nl/en/vacancy/assistant-professor-in-cryptology-868539.html
Adithya Bhat, Nibesh Shreshta, Aniket Kate, Kartik Nayak
ePrint ReportWe first design a new Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication protocol with $O(\kappa n^2)$ bits communication per consensus decision without using threshold signatures. Next, we design GRandPiper (Good Pipelined Random beacon), a random beacon protocol with bias-resistance and unpredictability, that uses PVSS and has a communication complexity of $O(\kappa n^2)$ always (best and worst cases), for a static adversary. However, GRandPiper allows an adaptive adversary to predict beacon values up to $t+1$ epochs into the future. Therefore, we design BRandPiper (Better RandPiper), that uses VSS and has a communication complexity of $O(\kappa fn^2)$, where $f$ is the actual number of faults, while offering a strong unpredictability with an advantage of only a single round even for an adaptive adversary.
Siyao Guo, Qian Li, Qipeng Liu, Jiapeng Zhang
ePrint ReportThe presampling technique, introduced by Unruh (CRYPTO' 07), generically reduces security proofs in the auxiliary-input models to a much simpler bit-fixing models. This technique has been further optimized by Coretti, Dodis, Guo, Steinberger (EUROCRYPT' 18), and generalized by Coretti, Dodis, Guo (CRYPTO' 18), resulting in powerful tools for proving non-uniform security bounds in various idealized models, including random oracle models (ROM), random permutation models (RPM), ideal cipher models (ICM) and generic group models (GGM). We study the possibility of unifying and leveraging the presampling technique to the quantum world. To this end,
* We show that such leveraging will resolve a major open problem in quantum computing, which is closely related with the famous Aaronson-Ambainis conjecture (ITCS' 11).
* Faced with this barrier, we give a new but equivalent bit-fixing model and a simple proof of presampling techniques for arbitrary oracle distribution and access in the classical setting, including AI-ROM and AI-RPM. Our security loss matches the security loss of the best known presampling technique by Coretti et al. (EUROCRYPT' 18) for both indistinguishability and unpredictability applications. Our new proof unifies previous results by Coretti et al. (EUROCRYPT' 18) and Coretti et al. (CRYPTO' 18).
* We leverage our new classical presampling techniques to a novel ``quantum bit-fixing version'' of presampling. The security loss of our quantum bit-fixing presampling also matches the optimal security loss of the classical presampling. Using our techniques, we give the first post-quantum non-uniform security bounds for salted Merkle-Damgard hash functions.
Shweta Agrawal, Shafi Goldwasser, Saleet Mossel
ePrint ReportIn contrast, all prior constructions even in the context of deniable public key encryption without homomorphic properties, encoded large messages bit by bit, where the ciphertext for each bit grew inversely with the faking probability. Indeed, all previous constructions from polynomial hardness assumptions have both the public key and ciphertext size that grows with the inverse of the faking probability achieved by the scheme. This limitation dates back to the seminal work of Canetti, Dwork, Naor and Ostrovsky (CRYPTO 1997) which introduced the notion of deniable encryption, and has been inherited by all subsequent work (excepting one by Sahai and Waters (STOC 2013) which is based on indistinguishability obfuscation. Indeed Canetti et al. argued that this dependence ``seems inherent''. Our constructions imply deniable public key encryption with deniability compactness, showing that this dependence is not inherent. However, the running time of our encryption algorithm does depend on the inverse of the faking probability, thus falling short of achieving simultaneously negligible deniability and polynomial encryption time.
At the heart of our constructions is a new way to use bootstrapping to obliviously generate FHE ciphertexts so that it supports faking under coercion.
Claude Carlet
ePrint ReportAlex Ozdemir, Fraser Brown, Riad S. Wahby
ePrint ReportTo make our approach concrete we create CirC, an infrastructure for building compilers to EQCs. CirC makes it easy to add support for new EQCs: we build support for two, one used by the PL community and one used by the cryptography community, in $\approx$2000 LOC. Its also easy to extend CirC to support new source languages: we build a feature complete compiler for a cryptographic language in one week and $\approx$700 LOC, whereas the reference compiler for the same language took years to write, comprises $\approx$24000 LOC, and produces worse-performing output than our compiler. Finally, CirC enables novel applications that combine multiple EQCs. For example, we build the first pipeline that (1) automatically identifies bugs in programs, then (2) automatically constructs cryptographic proofs of the bugs existence.
Timothy J. Hodges, Hari R. Iyer
ePrint ReportPanos Kampanakis, Peter Panburana, Michael Curcio, Chirag Shroff
ePrint ReportIraklis Symeonidis, Dragos Rotaru, Mustafa A. Mustafa, Bart Mennink, Panos Papadimitratos
ePrint ReportHangi Kim, Yongjin Jeon, Giyoon Kim, Jongsung Kim, Bo-Yeon Sim, Dong-Guk Han, Hwajeong Seo, Seonggyeom Kim, Seokhie Hong, Jaechul Sung, Deukjo Hong
ePrint ReportJung Hee Cheon, Seungwan Hong, and Duhyeong Kim
ePrint ReportConor McMenamin, Vanesa Daza, Matteo Pontecorvi
ePrint ReportHankyung Ko, Ingeun Lee, Seunghwa Lee, Jihye Kim, Hyunok Oh
ePrint ReportTung Chou
ePrint ReportAlessandro Baccarini, Marina Blanton, Chen Yuan
ePrint ReportChanghui Hu, Jin Li, Zheli Liu, Xiaojie Guo, Yu Wei, Xuan Guang, Grigorios Loukides, Changyu Dong
ePrint ReportLoïc Ferreira
ePrint Report20 December 2020
Daejeon, South Korea, 20 May - 22 May 2021
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 3 March 2021
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Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 8 March 2021