IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
17 February 2021
Nicolas Resch, Chen Yuan
In this work we provide tight upper and lower bounds for the PSMT model when the length of the communicated secret $\ell$ is asymptotically large. Specifically, we first construct a protocol that allows Alice to communicate an $\ell$ symbol secret to Bob by transmitting at most $2(1+o(1))n\ell$ symbols. We complement this with a lower bound showing that $2n\ell$ symbols are necessary for Alice to privately and reliably communicate her secret. Thus, we completely determine the optimal transmission rate in this regime, even up to the leading constant.
Kalikinkar Mandal, Dhiman Saha, Sumanta Sarkar, Yosuke Todo
Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Adrien Koutsos, Pierre-Yves Strub
James Howe, Marco Martinoli, Elisabeth Oswald, Francesco Regazzoni
16 February 2021
Michael Kounavis, Shay Gueron
Shay Gueron, Michael Kounavis
Washington, USA, 5 December - 8 December 2021
Submission deadline: 27 April 2021
Notification: 15 June 2021
Huawei, Munich Research Center; Munich, Germany
Huawei’s Munich Research Center (MRC) in Munich is responsible for advanced technical research, architecture evolution design and strategic technical planning. For the Trustworthy Technology and Engineering Lab in Munich, we are looking for a (Senior) Security Research Engineer.
Responsibilities
- Research and analyze state of the art system security technologies for trusted computing and platform cyber resilience
- Design and implement technology prototypes for validating and demonstrating their feasibility, as well as support their integration into the products
- Write design documentation and publish the research results
- Participate in the industry analysis, strategic planning of new features and standardization
Requirements
- PhD in computer science or system security, with publications at top security conferences
- Solid understanding of computer architecture, from hardware to operating system
- Proven experience in designing and implementing system security technologies such as hardware-assisted security, trusted computing, TEEs, enclaves, runtime integrity
- Experience in programming with security protocols and crypto libraries
- Hands-on software development skills in some or all of
- Linux kernel and KVM hypervisor (e.g. security subsystem, memory management etc.)
- Microkernels and microvisors
- Embedded firmware development
- Active contributions to open-source projects are a big plus
- Excellent communication skills, teamwork spirit, initiative and autonomous working are required
- Proficiency in English and interest to work in a truly diverse cultural environment
Benefits
- Chance to work together with domain experts on cutting edge technologies
- Unique environment for bringing research concepts into actual products
- Position to influence and drive technology adoption across the entire company
If you want to have a high level of impact on future Huawei products and to design novel solutions together with a multicultural team of researchers and engineers in Huawei’s Munich Research Center in M
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Silviu Vlasceanu (first.last @ huawei.com)
More information: https://apply.workable.com/huawei-16/j/ED1F5C1EB1/
Selmer Center, University of Bergen, Norway
The Selmer Center in Secure Communication is looking for a PhD student to join us in our new research project Cryptographic Boolean Functions for Threshold Implementations, funded by the Norwegian Research Council. This study will be supervised by Prof. Budaghyan, Prof. Carlet and Prof. Rijmen.
Applicants interested in helping us over the next 3 years to study Boolean functions used as building blocks in cryptographic primitives and their Threshold Implementations in order to find efficient ways of preventing Side Channel Attacks, must have:
- obtained a master's degree in Mathematics or Computer Science by 01.11.2021 (the position's starting date),
- strong background in Discrete Mathematics or symmetric cryptography, and
- good programming skills
For further information and the online application form please follow the link in the title above.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Lilya Budaghyan
More information: https://www.jobbnorge.no/en/available-jobs/job/200521/phd-position-in-informatics-cryptography
Nagasaki, Japan, 30 May - 3 June 2022
12 February 2021
Bern, Switzerland, 19 May - 7 July 2021
Submission deadline: 15 March 2021
Notification: 15 April 2021
Generating cryptographically-strong random lattice bases and recognizing rotations of $\mathbb{Z}^n$
Tamar Lichter Blanks, Stephen D. Miller
Boris Fouotsa Tako, Péter Kutas, Simon-Philipp Merz
Lei Bi, Xianhui Lu, Junjie Luo, Kunpeng Wang, Zhenfei Zhang
Mark Simkin, Luisa Siniscalchi, and Sophia Yakoubov
In this work, we show that for $t \leq n - 2$ corruptions, oracles that return output to $n - 1$ parties are sufficient to obtain perfectly secure computation with identifiable abort. Using our construction recursively, we see that for $t \leq n - \ell - 2$ and $\ell \in \mathcal{O}(1)$, oracles that return output to $n - \ell - 1$ parties are sufficient.
For our construction, we introduce a new kind of secret sharing scheme which we call unanimously identifiable secret sharing with public and private shares (UISSwPPS). In a UISSwPPS scheme, each share holder is given a public and a private shares. Only the public shares are necessary for reconstruction, and the knowledge of a private share additionally enables the identification of at least one party who provided an incorrect share in case reconstruction fails. The important new property of UISSwPPS is that, even given all the public shares, an adversary should not be able to come up with a different public share that causes reconstruction of an incorrect message, or that avoids the identification of a cheater if reconstruction fails.
Andreas Erwig, Sebastian Faust, Kristina Hostáková, Monosij Maitra, Siavash Riahi
In this work, we address these two shortcomings. First, we show that signature schemes that are constructed from identification (ID) schemes, which additionally satisfy certain homomorphic properties, can generically be transformed into adaptor signature schemes. We further provide an impossibility result which proves that unique signature schemes (e.g., the BLS scheme) cannot be transformed into an adaptor signature scheme. In addition, we define two-party adaptor signature schemes with aggregatable public keys and show how to instantiate them via a generic transformation from ID-based signature schemes. Finally, we give instantiations of our generic transformations for the Schnorr, Katz-Wang and Guillou-Quisquater signature schemes.
Paul Frixons, André Schrottenloher
Liliya Akhmetzyanova, Evgeny Alekseev, Alexandra Babueva, Stanislav Smyshlyaev
In the current paper we investigate the opportunity of shortening the standard ElGamal-type signatures. We propose three methods of shortening signatures (for any ElGamal-type schemes such as ECDSA, GOST and SM2) and analyze how applying these methods affects the security. Applying all three methods to the GOST signature scheme with elliptic curve subgroup order $q$, $2^{255} < q < 2^{256}$, can reduce the signature size from $512$ to $320$ bits. The modified scheme provides sufficient security and acceptable (for non-interactive protocols) signing and verifying time.
Greg Morrisett, Elaine Shi, Kristina Sojakova, Xiong Fan, Joshua Gancher
Benjamin E. Diamond
We moreover study the concrete construction of compact coverings, and provide new geometric algorithms. Our logic synthesizer constructs affine coverings of cube subsets using a recursive backtracking procedure, and minimizes the total number of flats used; it may be of independent interest. This represents a new paradigm in boolean logic minimization. We relate this paradigm to classical logic synthesis.
Applying our paradigm, we present a general protocol for commitment-consistent secure two-party computation with an untrusted third party, generalizing a construction of Wagh, Gupta, and Chandran (PETS '19). Our generalization supports the secure evaluation of arbitrary boolean functionalities; we also add commitment-consistency and malicious security under one corruption. We report on a highly efficient implementation of a specialization of this general protocol to a certain natural boolean function.