International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In this paper, we propose the first generic framework for attribute-based encryptions (ABE) with master-secret-key-dependent-message security (mKDM security) for affine functions via predicate encodings by Chen, Gay and Wee [Eurocrypt 2015]. The construction is adaptively secure under standard $k$-Lin assumption in prime-order bilinear groups. By this, we obtain a set of new mKDM-secure ABE schemes with high expressiveness that have never been reached before: we get the first hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme and the first ABE scheme for arithmetic branching program (ABP) with mKDM security for affine functions. Thanks to the expressiveness (more concretely, delegability like HIBE), we can obtain mKDM-secure ABE against chosen-ciphertext attack (i.e., CCA security) via a classical CPA-to-CCA transformation that works well in the context of mKDM.

Any non-zero ideal in a number field can be factored into a product of prime ideals. In this paper we report a surprising connection between the complexity of the shortest vector problem (SVP) of prime ideals in number fields and their decomposition groups. When applying the result to number fields popular in lattice based cryptosystems, such as power-of-two cyclotomic fields, we show that a majority of rational primes lie under prime ideals admitting a polynomial time algorithm for SVP. Although the shortest vector problem of ideal lattices underpins the security of the Ring-LWE cryptosystem, this work does not break Ring-LWE, since the security reduction is from the worst case ideal SVP to the average case Ring-LWE, and it is one-way.

In this paper, we study forward secret encrypted RAMs (FS eRAMs) which enable clients to outsource the storage of an n-entry array to a server. In the case of a catastrophic attack where both client and server storage are compromised, FS eRAMs guarantee that the adversary may not recover any array entries that were deleted or overwritten prior to the attack. A simple folklore FS eRAM construction with O(log n) overhead has been known for at least two decades. Unfortunately, no progress has been made since then. We show the lack of progress is fundamental by presenting an Ω(log n) lower bound for FS eRAMs proving that the folklore solution is optimal. To do this, we introduce the symbolic model for proving cryptographic data structures lower bounds that may be of independent interest.

Given this limitation, we investigate applications where forward secrecy may be obtained without the additional O(log n) overhead. We show this is possible for oblivious RAMs, memory checkers, and multicast encryption by incorporating the ideas of the folklore FS eRAM solution into carefully chosen constructions of the corresponding primitives.

Private set intersection reveals the intersection of two private sets, but many real-world applications require the parties to learn $\textit{only}$ partial information about the intersection. In this paper we introduce a new approach for computing arbitrary functions of the intersection, provided that it is safe to also reveal the cardinality of the intersection. In the most general case, our new protocol provides the participants with secret shares of the intersection, which can be fed into any generic 2PC protocol. Certain computations on the intersection can also be done even more directly and efficiently, avoiding this secret-sharing step. These cases include computing only the cardinality of intersection, or the ``cardinality-sum'' application proposed in Ion et al. (ePrint 2017). Compared to the state-of-the-art protocol for computing on intersection (Pinkas et al., Eurocrypt 2019), our protocol has about $2.5-3\times$ less communication, and has faster running time on slower (50Mbps) networks. Our new techniques can also be used to privately compute the {\em union} of two sets as easily as computing the intersection. Our protocol concretely improves the leading private set union protocol (Kolesnikov et al., Asiacrypt 2020) by a factor of $2-2.5\times$, depending on the network speed. We then show how private set union can be used in a simple way to realize the ``Private-ID'' functionality suggested by Buddhavarapu et al.~(ePrint 2020). Our protocol is significantly faster than the prior Private-ID protocol, especially on fast networks. All of our protocols are in the two-party setting and are secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Recently, Machine Learning (ML) is widely investigated in the side-channel analysis (SCA) community. As an artificial neural network can extract the feature without preprocessing, ML-based SCA methods relatively less rely on the attacker's ability. Consequently, they outperform traditional methods. Hiding is a countermeasure against SCA that randomizes the moments of manipulating sensitive data. Since hiding could disturb the neural network's learning, an attacker should design a proper architecture against hiding. In this paper, we propose inherently robust architecture against every kind of desynchronization. We demonstrated the proposed method with plenty of datasets, including open datasets. As a result, our method outperforms state-of-the-art on every dataset.

We study the problem of secure multiparty computation for functionalities where only one party receives the output, to which we refer as solitary MPC. Recently, Halevi et al. (TCC 2019) studied fully secure (i.e., with guaranteed output delivery) solitary MPC and showed impossibility of such protocols for certain functionalities when there is no honest majority among the parties.

In this work, we study fully secure solitary MPC in the honest majority setting and focus on its round complexity. We note that a broadcast channel or public key infrastructure (PKI) setup is necessary for an $n$-party protocol against malicious adversaries corrupting up to $t$ parties where $n/3 \leq t < n/2$. Therefore, we study the following settings and ask the question: Can fully secure solitary MPC be achieved in fewer rounds than fully secure standard MPC in which all parties receive the output?

- When there is a broadcast channel and no PKI:

* We start with a negative answer to the above question. In particular, we show that the exact round complexity of fully secure solitary MPC is 3, which is the same as fully secure standard MPC.

* We then study the minimal number of broadcast rounds needed in the design of round-optimal fully secure solitary MPC. We show that both the first and second rounds of broadcast are necessary when $2 \lceil n/5 \rceil \leq t < n/2$, whereas pairwise-private channels suffice in the last round. Notably, this result also applies to fully secure standard MPC in which all parties receive the output.

- When there is a PKI and no broadcast channel, nevertheless, we show more positive results:

* We show an upper bound of 5 rounds for any honest majority. This is superior to the super-constant lower bound for fully secure standard MPC in the exact same setting.

* We complement this by showing a lower bound of 4 rounds when $3\lceil n/7 \rceil \leq t < n/2$.

* For the special case of $t=1,n=3$, when the output receiving party does not have an input to the function, we show an upper bound of $2$ rounds, which is optimal. When the output receiving party has an input to the function, we show a lower bound of 3, which matches an upper bound from prior work.

* For the special case of $t=2,n=5$, we show a lower bound of 3 rounds (an upper bound of 4 follows from prior work).

All our results also assume the existence of a common reference string (CRS) and pairwise-private channels. Our upper bounds use a decentralized threshold fully homomorphic encryption (dTFHE) scheme (which can be built from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption) as the main building block.

The random oracle, generic group, and generic bilinear map models (ROM, GGM, GBM, respectively) are fundamental heuristics used to justify new computational assumptions and prove the security of efficient cryptosystems. While known to be invalid in some contrived settings, the heuristics generally seem reasonable for real-world applications.

In this work, we ask: \emph{which heuristics are closer to reality?} Or conversely, which heuristics are a larger leap? We answer this question through the framework of computational indifferentiability, showing that the ROM is a strictly ``milder'' heuristic than the GGM, which in turn is strictly milder than the GBM. While this may seem like the expected outcome, we explain why it does not follow from prior works and is not the a priori obvious conclusion. In order to prove our results, we develop new ideas for proving computational indifferentiable separations.

Enforcement of policy regulations and availability of auditing mechanisms are crucial building blocks for the adoption of distributed payment systems. This paper reviews a number of existing proposals for distributed payment systems that offer some form of auditability for regulators. We identify two major distinct lines of work: payment systems that are not privacy-preserving such as Bitcoin, where regulation functionalities are typically tailored for organizations controlling many accounts, and privacy-preserving payment systems where regulation functionalities are typically targeted to user level. We provide a systematization methodology over several axes of characteristics and performance, while highlighting insights and research gaps that we have identified, such as lack of dispute-resolution solutions between the regulator and the entity under audit, and the incompatibility of ledger pruning or off-chain protocols with regulatory requirements. Based on our findings, we propose a number of exciting future research directions.

CRAFT is a lightweight tweakable Substitution-Permutation-Network (SPN) block cipher optimized for efficient protection of its implementations against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks. In this paper, we present an equivalent description of CRAFT up to a simple mapping on the plaintext, ciphertext and round tweakeys. We show that the new representation, for a sub-class of keys, leads to a new structure which is a Feistel network, i.e., with half state non-linear operation and half state key addition. This has two interesting consequences: First, the new structure of the cipher is less resistant against differential and linear cryptanalyses. Second, it allows a more efficient implementation of the cipher.

In this paper, we show that OAEP transform is indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attack in the quantum random oracle model if the underlying trapdoor permutation is quantum partial-domain one-way. The existing post-quantum security of OAEP (TCC 2016-B ) requires a modification to the OAEP transform using an extra hash function. We prove the security of the OAEP transform without any modification and this answers an open question in one of the finalists of NIST competition, NTRU submission, affirmatively.

In this paper we propose a faster variant of SNOW-V, called SNOW-Vi, that can perform fast enough not only in cloud settings but also on low grade CPUs. The increase in software performance is around 50% in average, up to 92 Gbps. This makes the applicability of the cipher much wider and it covers more use cases. SNOW-Vi differs in the way how the LFSR is updated and also introduces a new location of the tap $T2$ for a stronger security, while everything else is kept the same as in SNOW-V. The security analyses previously done for SNOW-V are not affected in most aspects, and SNOW-Vi provides the same 256-bit security level as SNOW-V.

We construct the currently most efficient signature schemes with tight multi-user security against adaptive corruptions. It is the first generic construction of such schemes, based on lossy identification schemes (Abdalla etal; JoC 2016), and the first to achieve strong existential unforgeability. It also has significantly more compact signatures than the previously most efficient construction by Gjosteen and Jager (CRYPTO 2018). When instantiated based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, a signature consists of only three exponents.

We propose a new variant of the generic construction of signatures from sequential OR-proofs by Abe, Ohkubo, and Suzuki (ASIACRYPT 2002) and Fischlin, Harasser, and Janson (EUROCRYPT 2020). In comparison to Fischlin etal, who focus on constructing signatures in the non-programmable random oracle model (NPROM), we aim to achieve tight security against adaptive corruptions, maximize efficiency, and to directly achieve strong existential unforgeability (also in the NPROM). This yields a slightly different construction and we use slightly different and additional properties of the lossy identification scheme.

Signatures with tight multi-user security against adaptive corruptions are a commonly-used standard building block for tightly-secure authenticated key exchange protocols. We also show how our construction improves the efficiency of all existing tightly-secure AKE protocols.

In this note, an LWE problem with a hidden trapdoor is introduced. It is used to construct an efficient public-key crypto-system EHT. The new system is significantly different from LWE based NIST candidates like FrodoKEM. The performance of EHT compares favorably with FrodoKEM.

Suppose that a problem $\Pi$ has a statistical zero-knowledge (SZK) proof with communication complexity $m$. The question of batch verification for SZK asks whether one can prove that $k$ instances $x_1,\ldots,x_k$ all belong to $\Pi$ with a statistical zero-knowledge proof whose communication complexity is better than $k \cdot m$ (which is the complexity of the trivial solution of executing the original protocol independently on each input).

In a recent work, Kaslasi et al. (TCC, 2020) constructed such a batch verification protocol for any problem having a non-interactive SZK (NISZK) proof-system. Two drawbacks of their result are that their protocol is private-coin and is only zero-knowledge with respect to the honest verifier.

In this work, we eliminate these two drawbacks by constructing a public-coin malicious-verifier SZK protocol for batch verification of NISZK. Similarly to the aforementioned prior work, the communication complexity of our protocol is $\big(k+poly(m) \big) \cdot polylog(k,m)$.

To factor an integer $N$ we construct $n$ triples of $p_n$-smooth integers $u,v,|u-vN|$ for the $n$-th prime $p_n$. Denote such triple a fac-relation. We get fac-relations from a nearly shortest vector of the lattice $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{R}_{n,f})$ with basis matrix $\mathbf{R}_{n,f} \in \mathbb{R}^{(n+1)\times (n+1)}$ where $f : [1,n] \rightarrow [1,n]$ is a permutation of $[1,2,...,n]$ and $(N f(1),...,N f(n))$ is the diagonal of $\mathbf{R}_{n,f}$. We get an independent fac-relation from an independent permutation $f'$. We find sufficiently short lattice vectors by strong primal-dual reduction of $\mathbf{R}_{n,f}$. We factor $N \approx 2^{400}$ by n = 47 and $N \approx 2^{800}$ by n = 95. Our accelerated strong primal-dual reduction of [Gama, Nguyen 2008] factors integers $N \approx 2^{400}$ and $N \approx 2^{800}$ by $4.2 \cdot 10^9$ and $8.4 \cdot 10^{10}$ arithmetic operations, much faster then the quadratic sieve {\bf QS} and the number field sieve {\bf NFS} and using much smaller primes $p_n$. This destroyes the RSA cryptosystem.

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) enables a user to read/write her outsourced cloud data without access-pattern leakage. Not all users want a fully functional ORAM all the time since it always creates inefficiency. We show that forward-private/backward-private (FP/BP) ORAMs are also good alternatives for reducing the search-pattern leakage of dynamic searchable encryption (DSE). We introduce the FP/BP-ORAM definitions and present LL-ORAM, the first FP/BP-ORAM that achieves near-zero client storage, single-round-trip read/write, worst-case sublinear search time, and an extremely simple implementation. LL-ORAM consists of a set of switchable protocols whose security can be switched among forward privacy, backward privacy, and perfect security at any time. The construction involves a novel tree data structure named LL-tree, whose advantage is that it supports fast computation in the cloud with an access-pattern-reduced leakage profile. LL-ORAM security is formally proven under forward and backward privacy. The experimental results demonstrate that LL-ORAM is efficient and can be practically employed by DSE applications.

Restoring the security of maliciously implemented cryptosystems has been widely considered challenging due to the fact that the subverted implementation could arbitrarily deviate from the official specification. Achieving security against adversaries that can arbitrarily subvert implementations seems to inherently require trusted component assumptions and/or architectural properties. At ASIACRYPT 2016, Russell et al. proposed an attractive model where a watchdog is used to test and approve individual components of an implementation before or during deployment. Such a detection-based strategy has been useful for designing various cryptographic schemes that are provably resilient to subversion.

We consider Russell et al.'s watchdog model from a practical perspective regarding watchdog efficiency. We find that the asymptotic definitional framework, while permitting strong positive theoretical results, does not yet guarantee practical watchdogs, due to the fact that the running time of a watchdog is only bounded by an abstract polynomial. Hence, in the worst case, the running time of the watchdog might exceed the running time of the adversary, which seems impractical for most applications. We adopt Russell et al.'s watchdog model to the concrete security setting and design the first subversion-resilient public-key encryption scheme which allows for extremely efficient watchdogs with only linear running time.

At the core of our construction is a new variant of a combiner for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) by Giacon et al. (PKC'18). We combine this construction with a new subversion-resilient randomness generator that also can be checked by an efficient watchdog, even in constant time, which could be of independent interest for the design of other subversion-resilient cryptographic schemes. Our work thus shows how to apply Russell et al.'s watchdog model to design subversion-resilient cryptography with efficient watchdogs. We insist that this work does not intend to show that the watchdog model outperforms other defense approaches, but to demonstrate that practical watchdogs are practically achievable.

This research revisits the fundamental problem of processing privacy-preserving Boolean queries over outsourced databases on untrusted public clouds. Many current Searchable Encryption (SE) schemes try to seek an appropriate trade-off between security and efficiency, yet most of them suffer from an unacceptable query leakage due to their conjunctive/disjunctive terms that are processed individually. We show, however, this trade-off still can be deeply optimized for more security. We consider a Boolean formula as a set of deterministic finite automatons (DFAs) and propose a novel approach to running an encrypted DFA, which can be effectively and efficiently processed by the cloud. We give three constructions for conjunctive, disjunctive, and Boolean queries, respectively. Their notable advantages are single-round, highly-efficient, adaptively-secure, and leakage-minimized. A lot of experiments are made to evaluate overall efficiency. Testing results show that the schemes achieve enhanced security almost without sacrificing anything of search efficiency.

Constructing interactive zero-knowledge arguments from simple assumptions with small communication complexity and good computational efficiency is an important, but difficult problem. In this work, we study interactive arguments with noticeable soundness error in their full generality and for the specific purpose of constructing concretely efficient shuffle arguments.

To counterbalance the effects of a larger soundness error, we show how to transform such three-move arguments into publicly-accountable ones which allow the verifier to convince third parties of detected misbehavior by a cheating prover. This may be particularly interesting for applications where a malicious prover has to balance the profits it can make from cheating successfully and the losses it suffers from being caught. %In contrast to standard sequential repetition, our transformation increases the round and communication complexity by only a small additive factor.

We construct interactive, public-coin, zero-knowledge arguments with noticeable soundness error for proving that a target vector of commitments is a pseudorandom permutation of a source vector. Our arguments do not rely on any trusted setup and only require the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. The communication complexity of our arguments is \emph{independent} of the length of the shuffled vector. For a soundness error of $2^{-5}=1/32$, the communication cost is $153$ bytes without and $992$ bytes with public accountability, meaning that our arguments are shorter than shuffle arguments realized using Bulletproofs (IEEE S\&P 2018) and even competitive in size with SNARKs, despite only relying on simple assumptions.

In this work, we first present general methods to construct information rate-1 PKE that is $\KDM^{(n)}$-secure with respect to \emph{block-affine} functions for any unbounded polynomial $n$. To achieve this, we propose a new notion of extractor that satisfies \emph{reusability}, \emph{homomorphic}, and \emph{security against correlated-source attacks}, and show how to use this extractor to improve the information rate of the \KDM-secure PKE of Brakerski et al.~(Eurocrypt 18). Then, we show how to amplify \KDM~security from block-affine function class into general bounded size circuits via a variant of the technique of Applebaum (Eurocrypt 11), achieving better efficiency. Furthermore, we show how to generalize these approaches to the IBE setting.

Additionally, our PKE and IBE schemes are also leakage resilient, with leakage rates $1-o(1)$ against a slightly smaller yet still general class -- block leakage functions. We can instantiate the required building blocks from $\LWE$ or $\DDH$.