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17 May 2021
Simin Ghesmati, Walid Fdhila, Edgar Weippl
Blockchain is a disruptive technology that promises a multitude of benefits such as transparency, traceability, and immutability. However, this unique bundle of key characteristics rapidly proved to be a double-edged sword that can put user privacy at risk.
Unlike traditional systems, Bitcoin transactions are publicly and permanently recorded, and anyone can access the full history of the records. Despite using pseudonymous identities, an adversary can undermine the financial privacy of users and reveal their actual identities using advanced heuristics and techniques to identify eventual links between transactions, senders, receivers, and consumed services (e.g., online purchases). In this regard, a multitude of approaches has been proposed in an attempt to overcome financial transparency and enhance user anonymity. These techniques range from using mixing services to off-chain transactions and address different privacy issues. In this survey, we particularly focus on comparing and evaluating mixing techniques in the Bitcoin blockchain, present their limitations, and highlight the new challenges.
Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse
Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols are traditionally developed to support reliable distributed computing. For applications where the protocol participants are economic agents, recent works highlighted the importance of accountability: the ability to identify participants who provably violate the protocol. We propose to evaluate the security of an accountable protocol in terms of its liveness resilience, the minimum number of Byzantine nodes when liveness is violated, and its accountable safety resilience, the minimum number of accountable Byzantine nodes when safety is violated. We characterize the optimal tradeoffs between these two resiliences in different network environments, and identify an availability-accountability dilemma: in an environment with dynamic participation, no protocol can simultaneously be accountably-safe and live. We provide a resolution to this dilemma by constructing an optimally-resilient accountability gadget to checkpoint a longest chain protocol, such that the full ledger is live under dynamic participation and the checkpointed prefix ledger is accountable. Our accountability gadget construction is black-box and can use any BFT protocol which is accountable under static participation. Using HotStuff as the black box, we implemented our construction as a protocol for the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, and our Internet-scale experiments with more than 4000 nodes show that the protocol can achieve the required scalability and has better latency than the current solution Gasper, while having the advantage of being provably secure. To contrast, we demonstrate a new attack on Gasper.
Nirvan Tyagi, Ben Fisch, Joseph Bonneau, Stefano Tessaro
Verifiable registries allow clients to securely access a key-value mapping maintained by an untrusted server. Applications include distribution of public keys, routing information or software binaries. Existing proposals for verifiable registries rely on global invariants being audited whenever the registry is updated. Clients typically rely on trusted third-party auditors, as large registries become expensive to audit.
We propose several new protocols for client-auditable registries that enable efficient verification of many updates to the registry, removing the need for third-party auditors. Our solutions use incrementally-verifiable computation (IVC) and/or RSA accumulators. Our evaluation shows that our constructions meet practical throughput requirements ($60$ updates / second), which is $100\times$ faster than naive solutions using IVC. Clients save $100$--$10^4\times$ bandwidth and computation costs over prior solutions requiring auditing every update.
We propose several new protocols for client-auditable registries that enable efficient verification of many updates to the registry, removing the need for third-party auditors. Our solutions use incrementally-verifiable computation (IVC) and/or RSA accumulators. Our evaluation shows that our constructions meet practical throughput requirements ($60$ updates / second), which is $100\times$ faster than naive solutions using IVC. Clients save $100$--$10^4\times$ bandwidth and computation costs over prior solutions requiring auditing every update.
Jan Wichelmann, Sebastian Berndt, Claudius Pott, Thomas Eisenbarth
In response to ongoing discussions about data usage by companies and governments, and its implications for privacy, there is a growing demand for secure communication techniques. While during their advent, most messenger apps focused on features rather than security, this has changed in the recent years: Since then, many have adapted end-to-end encryption as a standard feature. One of the most popular solutions is the Signal messenger, which aims to guarantee forward secrecy (i.e. security of previous communications in case of leakage of long-term secrets) and future secrecy (i.e. security of future communications in case of leakage of short-term secrets).
If every user uses exactly one device, it is known that Signal achieves forward secrecy and even post-compromise security (i.e. security of future communications in case of leakage of long-term secrets).
But the Signal protocol also allows for the use of multiple devices via the Sesame protocol.
This multi-device setting is typically ignored in the security analysis of Signal.
In this work, we discuss the security of the Signal messenger in this multi-device setting. We show that the current implementation of the device registration allows an attacker to register an own, malicious device, which gives them unrestricted access to all future communication of their victim, and even allows full impersonation. This directly shows that the current Signal implementation does not guarantee post-compromise security. We discuss several countermeasures, both simple ones aiming to increase detectability of our attack, as well as a broader approach that seeks to solve the root issue, namely the weak device registration flow.
In this work, we discuss the security of the Signal messenger in this multi-device setting. We show that the current implementation of the device registration allows an attacker to register an own, malicious device, which gives them unrestricted access to all future communication of their victim, and even allows full impersonation. This directly shows that the current Signal implementation does not guarantee post-compromise security. We discuss several countermeasures, both simple ones aiming to increase detectability of our attack, as well as a broader approach that seeks to solve the root issue, namely the weak device registration flow.
Daniel R. L. Brown
Plactic key agreement is a new key agreement scheme that uses Knuths multiplication of semistandard tableaus from combinatorial algebra. The security of plactic key agreement relies on the difficulty of some computational problems, such as division of semistandard tableaus.
Division by erosion uses backtracking to divide tableaus. Division by erosion is estimated to be infeasible against public keys of 768 or more bytes. If division by erosion is the best attack against plactic key agreement, then secure plactic key agreement could be practical.
Division by erosion uses backtracking to divide tableaus. Division by erosion is estimated to be infeasible against public keys of 768 or more bytes. If division by erosion is the best attack against plactic key agreement, then secure plactic key agreement could be practical.
Guru-Vamsi Policharla, Manoj Prabhakaran, Rajeev Raghunath, Parjanya Vyas
Correlated random variables are a key tool in cryptographic applications like secure multi-party computation. We investigate the power of a class of correlations that we term group correlations: A group correlation is a uniform distribution over pairs $(x,y) \in G^2$ such that $x+y\in S$, where $G$ is a (possibly non-abelian) group and $S$ is a subset of $G$. We also introduce bi-affine correlations and show how they relate to group correlations. We present several structural results, new protocols, and applications of these correlations. The new applications include a completeness result for black-box group computation, perfectly secure protocols for evaluating a broad class of black box ``mixed-groups'' circuits with bi-affine homomorphism, and new information-theoretic results. Finally, we uncover a striking structure underlying OLE: In particular, we show that OLE over $\mathrm{GF}(2^n)$, is isomorphic to a group correlation over $\mathbb{Z}_4^n$.
Aggelos Kiayias, Nikos Leonardos, Dionysis Zindros
Blockchains maintain two types of data: Application data and consensus data. Towards long-term blockchain scalability, both of these must be pruned. While a large body of literature has explored the pruning of application data (UTXOs, account balances, and contract state), little has been said about the permanent pruning of consensus data (block headers). We present a protocol which allows pruning the blockchain by garbage collecting old blocks as they become unnecessary. These blocks can simply be discarded and are no longer stored by any miner. We show that all miners can be light miners with no harm to security. Our protocol is based on the notion of superblocks, blocks that have achieved an unusually high difficulty. We leverage them to represent underlying proof-of-work without ever illustrating it, storing it, or transmitting it. After our pruning is applied, the storage and communication requirements for consensus data is reduced exponentially.
We develop new probabilistic mathematical methods to analyze our protocol in the random oracle model. We prove our protocol is both secure and succinct under an uninterrupted honest majority assumption for $1/3$ adversaries. Our protocol is the first to achieve always secure, always succinct, and online Non-Interactive Proofs of Proof-of-Work, all necessary components for a logarithmic space mining scheme. Our work has applications beyond mining and also constitutes an improvement in state-of-the-art superlight clients and cross-chain bridges.
We develop new probabilistic mathematical methods to analyze our protocol in the random oracle model. We prove our protocol is both secure and succinct under an uninterrupted honest majority assumption for $1/3$ adversaries. Our protocol is the first to achieve always secure, always succinct, and online Non-Interactive Proofs of Proof-of-Work, all necessary components for a logarithmic space mining scheme. Our work has applications beyond mining and also constitutes an improvement in state-of-the-art superlight clients and cross-chain bridges.
Ripon Patgiri
Symmetric key cryptography is applied in almost all secure communications to protect all sensitive information from attackers, for instance, banking, and thus, it requires extra attention due to diverse applications. Moreover, it is vulnerable to various attacks, for example, cryptanalysis attacks. Cryptanalysis attacks are possible due to a single-keyed encryption system. The state-of-the-art symmetric communication protocol uses a single secret key to encrypt/decrypt the entire communication to exchange data/message that poses security threats. Therefore, in this paper, we present a new secure communication protocol based on Diffie-Hellman cryptographic algorithms, called Stealth. It is a symmetric-key cryptographic protocol to enhance the security of modern communication with truly random numbers. Additionally, it applies a pseudo-random number generator. Initially, Stealth uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to compute four shared secret keys. These shared secret keys are used to generate four different private keys to encrypt for the first block of the message for symmetric communication. Stealth changes its private keys in each communication, making it very hard to break the security protocol. Moreover, the four shared secret keys create additional complexity for the adversary to overcome, and hence, it can provide highly tight security in communications. Stealth neither replaces the existing protocol nor authentication mechanism, but it creates another security layer to the existing protocol to ensure the security measurement's tightness.
Léonard Lys, Arthur Micoulet, Maria Potop-Butucaru
In this paper, we consider the problem of cross-chain transactions where parties that do not trust each other safely exchange digital assets across blockchains. Open blockchains models are decentralized ledgers that keep records of transactions. They are comparable with distributed account books. While they have proven their potential as a store of value, exchanging assets across several blockchains remains a challenge. Our paper proposes a new protocol, R-SWAP, for cross-chain swaps that outperforms existing solutions. Our protocol is built on top of two abstractions: relays and adapters that we formalize for the first time in this paper. Furthermore, we prove the correctness of R-SWAP and analytically evaluate its performances, in terms of cost and latency. Moreover, we evaluate the performances of R-SWAP in two case studies showing the generality of our approach: atomic swaps between Ethereum and Bitcoin (two popular permissionless blockchains) and atomic swaps between Ethereum and Tendermint (one permissionless and one permissioned blockchain).
Elżbieta Burek, Michał Misztal, Michał Wroński
This paper presents method for transformation of algebraic equations of symmetric cipher into the QUBO problem. After transformation of given equations $f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n$ to equations over integers $f'_1, f'_2, \dots, f'_n$, one has to linearize each, obtaining $f'_{lin_i}=lin(f'_i)$, where $lin$ denotes linearization operation. Finally, one can obtain problem in the QUBO form as $\left( f'_{lin_1} \right)^2+\dots+\left( f'_{lin_n} \right)^2+Pen$, where $Pen$ denotes penalties obtained during linearization of equations and $n$ is the number of equations.
In this paper, we show examples of the transformation of some block ciphers to the QUBO problem. What is more, we present the results of the transformation of the full AES-128 cipher to the QUBO problem, where the number of variables of equivalent QUBO problem is equal to $237,915$, which means, at least theoretically, that problem may be solved using the D-Wave Advantage quantum annealing computer. Unfortunately, it is hard to estimate the time this process would require.
In this paper, we show examples of the transformation of some block ciphers to the QUBO problem. What is more, we present the results of the transformation of the full AES-128 cipher to the QUBO problem, where the number of variables of equivalent QUBO problem is equal to $237,915$, which means, at least theoretically, that problem may be solved using the D-Wave Advantage quantum annealing computer. Unfortunately, it is hard to estimate the time this process would require.
Jiabo Wang, Cong Ling
Cryptographic constructions based on $\textit{ring learning with errors}$ (RLWE) have emerged as one of the front runners for the standardization of post quantum public key cryptography. As the standardization process continues, optimizing specific parts of proposed schemes becomes a worthwhile endeavor. In this work we focus on using error correcting codes to alleviate a natural trade-off present in most schemes; namely, we would like a wider error distribution to increase security, but a wider error distribution comes at the cost of an increased probability of decryption error. The motivation of this work is to improve the security level of RLWE-based public key encryption (PKE) while keeping the target decryption failure rate (DFR) achievable using error-correcting codes. Specifically, we explore how to implement a family member of error correcting codes, known as polar codes, in RLWE-based PKE schemes in order to effectively lower the DFR. The dependency existing in the additive noise term is handled by mapping every error term (e.g., $e,t,s,e_1,e_2$) under canonical embedding to the space $H$ where a product in the number field $K$ gives rise to a coordinate-wise product in $H$. An attempt has been made to make the modulation constellation (message basis) fit in with the canonical basis. Furthermore, we exploit the actuality of some error terms known by the decoder to further lower the DFR. Using our method, the DFR is expected to be as low as $2^{-298}$ for code rate 0.25, $n=1024,q=12289$ and binomial parameter $k=8$ as is exactly the setting of the post-quantum scheme NewHope; DFR is $2^{-156}$ for code rate 0.25, $n=1024,q=12289,k=16$. This new DFR margin enables us to improve the security level by $9.4\%$ compared with NewHope. Moreover, polar encoding and decoding have quasi-linear complexity $O(N\log N)$ and they can be implemented in constant time.
Sumit Kumar Debnath, Vikas Srivastava, Tapaswini Mohanty, Nibedita Kundu, Kouichi Sakurai
Contact tracing has emerged as a powerful and effective measure to curb the spread of
contagious diseases. It is a robust tool, but on the downside, it possesses a risk of privacy
violations as contact tracing requires gathering a lot of personal information. So there is
a need for a cryptographic primitive that obfuscate the personal data of the user. Taking
everything into account, private set intersection seems to be the natural choice to address
the problem. Nearly all of the existing PSI protocols are relying on the number theoretic
assumption based hard problems. However, these problems are not secure in quantum
domain. As a consequence, it becomes essential to designing PSI that can resist quantum
attack and provide long-term security. One may apply quantum cryptography to develop
such PSI protocol. This paper deals with the design of PSI using quantum cryptography
(QC), where the security depends on the principles of basic quantum mechanics. Our
scheme achieves long-term security and remains secure against quantum attacks due to the
use of QC. As opposed to the existing quantum PSI protocols, the communication and
computation costs of our scheme are independent of the size of universal set. In particular,
the proposed protocol achieves optimal communication and computation costs in the
domain of quantum PSI. Moreover, we require only single photon quantum resources and
simple single-particle projective measurements, unlike most of the existing quantum PSI
protocols.
Taiga Hiroka, Tomoyuki Morimae, Ryo Nishimaki, Takashi Yamakawa
Broadbent and Islam (TCC '20) proposed a quantum cryptographic primitive called quantum encryption with certified deletion.
In this primitive, a receiver in possession of a quantum ciphertext can generate a classical certificate that the encrypted message is deleted.
Although their construction is information-theoretically secure, it is limited to the setting of one-time symmetric key encryption (SKE), where a sender and receiver have to share a common key in advance and the key can be used only once. Moreover, the sender has to generate a quantum state and send it to the receiver over a quantum channel in their construction.
Although deletion certificates are privately verifiable, which means a verification key for a certificate has to be kept secret, in the definition by Broadbent and Islam, we can also consider public verifiability.
In this work, we present various constructions of encryption with certified deletion.
- Quantum communication case: We achieve (reusable-key) public key encryption (PKE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) with certified deletion. Our PKE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of IND-CPA secure PKE, and our ABE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way function. These two schemes are privately verifiable.
- Classical communication case: We also achieve PKE with certified deletion that uses only classical communication. We give two schemes, a privately verifiable one and a publicly verifiable one. The former is constructed assuming the LWE assumption in the quantum random oracle model. The latter is constructed assuming the existence of one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption.
In this work, we present various constructions of encryption with certified deletion.
- Quantum communication case: We achieve (reusable-key) public key encryption (PKE) and attribute-based encryption (ABE) with certified deletion. Our PKE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of IND-CPA secure PKE, and our ABE scheme with certified deletion is constructed assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way function. These two schemes are privately verifiable.
- Classical communication case: We also achieve PKE with certified deletion that uses only classical communication. We give two schemes, a privately verifiable one and a publicly verifiable one. The former is constructed assuming the LWE assumption in the quantum random oracle model. The latter is constructed assuming the existence of one-shot signatures and extractable witness encryption.
Keitaro Hashimoto, Shuichi Katsumata, Kris Kwiatkowski, Thomas Prest
The Signal protocol is a secure instant messaging protocol that underlies the security of numerous applications such as WhatsApp, Skype, Facebook Messenger among many others. The Signal protocol consists of two sub-protocols known as the X3DH protocol and the double ratchet protocol, where the latter has recently gained much attention. For instance, Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis~(Eurocrypt'19) provided a concrete security model along with a generic construction based on simple building blocks that are instantiable from versatile assumptions, including post-quantum ones. In contrast, as far as we are aware, works focusing on the X3DH protocol seem limited.
In this work, we cast the X3DH protocol as a specific type of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which we call a Signal-conforming AKE protocol, and formally define its security model based on the vast prior work on AKE protocols. We then provide the first efficient generic construction of a Signal-conforming AKE protocol based on standard cryptographic primitives such as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and signature schemes. Specifically, this results in the first post-quantum secure replacement of the X3DH protocol on well-established assumptions. Similar to the X3DH protocol, our Signal-conforming AKE protocol offers a strong (or stronger) flavor of security, where the exchanged key remains secure even when all the non-trivial combinations of the long-term secrets and session-specific secrets are compromised. Moreover, our protocol has a weak flavor of deniability and we further show how to strengthen it using ring signatures. Finally, we provide a full-fledged, generic C implementation of our (weakly deniable) protocol. We instantiate it with several Round 3 candidates (finalists and alternates) to the NIST post-quantum standardization process and compare the resulting bandwidth and computation performances. Our implementation is publicly available.
In this work, we cast the X3DH protocol as a specific type of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which we call a Signal-conforming AKE protocol, and formally define its security model based on the vast prior work on AKE protocols. We then provide the first efficient generic construction of a Signal-conforming AKE protocol based on standard cryptographic primitives such as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and signature schemes. Specifically, this results in the first post-quantum secure replacement of the X3DH protocol on well-established assumptions. Similar to the X3DH protocol, our Signal-conforming AKE protocol offers a strong (or stronger) flavor of security, where the exchanged key remains secure even when all the non-trivial combinations of the long-term secrets and session-specific secrets are compromised. Moreover, our protocol has a weak flavor of deniability and we further show how to strengthen it using ring signatures. Finally, we provide a full-fledged, generic C implementation of our (weakly deniable) protocol. We instantiate it with several Round 3 candidates (finalists and alternates) to the NIST post-quantum standardization process and compare the resulting bandwidth and computation performances. Our implementation is publicly available.
Rafael Pass
In this tutorial, we provide a brief overview of Concurrent Zero Knowledge and next present a simple proof of the existence of Concurrent Zero-knowledge arguments for N P based on one-way permutations.
Rafael Pass
In recent years, leakage-resilient cryptography---the design of cryptographic protocols resilient to bounded leakage of honest players' secrets---has received significant attention. A major limitation of known provably-secure constructions (based on polynomial hardness assumptions) is that they require the secrets to have sufficient actual (i.e., information-theoretic), as opposed to computational, min-entropy even after the leakage.
In this work, we present barriers to provably-secure constructions beyond the ``information-theoretic barrier'': Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. Then, no NP search problem with $(2^{n^{\epsilon}})$-bounded number of witnesses can be proven (even worst-case) hard in the presence of $O(n^{\epsilon})$ bits of computationally-efficient leakage of the witness, using a black-box reduction to any $O(1)$-round assumption. In particular, this implies that $O(n^{\epsilon})$-leakage resilient injective one-way functions, and more generally, one-way functions with at most $2^{n^{\epsilon}}$ pre-images, cannot be based on any ``standard'' complexity assumption using a black-box reduction.
In this work, we present barriers to provably-secure constructions beyond the ``information-theoretic barrier'': Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. Then, no NP search problem with $(2^{n^{\epsilon}})$-bounded number of witnesses can be proven (even worst-case) hard in the presence of $O(n^{\epsilon})$ bits of computationally-efficient leakage of the witness, using a black-box reduction to any $O(1)$-round assumption. In particular, this implies that $O(n^{\epsilon})$-leakage resilient injective one-way functions, and more generally, one-way functions with at most $2^{n^{\epsilon}}$ pre-images, cannot be based on any ``standard'' complexity assumption using a black-box reduction.
Xiaojian Liang, Jian Weng, Anjia Yang, Lisha Yao, Zike Jiang, Zhenghao Wu
Attribute-based conditional proxy re-encryption (AB-CPRE) allows delegators to carry out attribute-based control on the delegation of decryption by setting policies and attribute vectors. The fine-grained control of AB-CPRE makes it suitable for a variety of applications, such as cloud storage and distributed file systems. However, all existing AB-CPRE schemes are constructed under classical number-theoretic assumptions, which are vulnerable to quantum cryptoanalysis. Therefore, we propose the first AB-CPRE scheme based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Constructed from fully key-homomorphic encryption (FKHE) and key-switching techniques, our scheme is unidirectional, single-hop, and enables a polynomial-deep boolean circuit as its policy. Furthermore, we split the ciphertext into two independent parts to avoid two-level or multi-level encryption/decryption mechanisms. Taking advantage of it, we then extend our single-hop AB-CPRE into an efficient and concise multi-hop one. No matter how many transformations are performed, the re-encrypted ciphertext is in constant size, and only one encryption/decryption algorithm is needed. Both of our schemes are proved to be selective secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) in the standard model.
Beyza Bozdemir, Sébastien Canard, Orhan Ermis, Helen Möllering, Melek Önen, Thomas Schneider
Clustering is an unsupervised machine learning technique that outputs clusters containing similar data items. In this work, we investigate privacy-preserving density-based clustering which is, for example, used in financial analytics and medical diagnosis. When (multiple) data owners collaborate or outsource the computation, privacy concerns arise.
To address this problem, we design, implement, and evaluate the first practical and fully private density-based clustering scheme based on secure two-party computation. Our protocol privately executes the DBSCAN algorithm without disclosing any information (including the number and size of clusters). It can be used for private clustering between two parties as well as for private outsourcing of an arbitrary number of data owners to two non-colluding servers. Our implementation of the DBSCAN algorithm privately clusters data sets with 400 elements in 7 minutes on commodity hardware. Thereby, it flexibly determines the number of required clusters and is insensitive to outliers, while being only factor 19x slower than today's fastest private K-means protocol (Mohassel et al., PETS'20) which can only be used for specific data sets. We then show how to transfer our newly designed protocol to related clustering algorithms by introducing a private approximation of the TRACLUS algorithm for trajectory clustering which has interesting real-world applications like financial time series forecasts and the investigation of the spread of a disease like COVID-19.
Fatih Balli, Andrea Caforio, Subhadeep Banik
It is a well-known fact that the power consumption during certain
stages of a cryptographic algorithm exhibits a strong correlation
with the Hamming Weight of its underlying variables. This phenomenon
has been widely exploited in the cryptographic literature in various
attacks targeting a broad range of schemes such as block ciphers or public-key
cryptosystems.
A common way of breaking this correlation is through the inclusion of countermeasures involving additional randomness
into the computation in the form of hidden (undisclosed) component functions
or masking strategies that complicate the inference of any sensitive information from the
gathered power traces.
In this work, we revisit the tight correlation between the Hamming Weight
and the observed power consumption of an algorithm and demonstrate,
in the first part, a practical reverse-engineering attack of
proprietary AES-like constructions with secret internal components
like the SubBytes, MixColumns and ShiftRows functions.
This approach is used in some
commercial products such as the Dynamic Encryption
package from the communication services provider Dencrypt as an extra layer of security.
We recover the encryption key alongside
the hidden substitution and permutation layer as well as the
MixColumns matrix on both 8-bit and 32-bit architectures.
In a second effort, we shift our attention to a masked implementation of AES, specifically the secAES proposal put forward by the French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) that concisely combines several side-channel countermeasure techniques. We show its insecurity in a novel side-channel-assisted statistical key-recovery attack that only necessitates a few hundreds of collected power traces.
In a second effort, we shift our attention to a masked implementation of AES, specifically the secAES proposal put forward by the French National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) that concisely combines several side-channel countermeasure techniques. We show its insecurity in a novel side-channel-assisted statistical key-recovery attack that only necessitates a few hundreds of collected power traces.
Alexander Nilsson, Irina E. Bocharova, Boris D. Kudryashov, Thomas Johansson
A new ``Weighted Bit-flipping'' (WBF) iterative decoder is presented and analyzed with respect to its Decoding Failure Rate (DFR). We show that the DFR is indeed lower than that of the BGF decoder as suggested by the BIKE third round submission to the NIST PQC standardization process. The WBF decoder requires more iterations to complete than BGF, but by creating a hybrid decoder we show that a lower DFR compared to that of the BGF decoder can still be achieved while keeping the computational tradeoff to a minimum.