International Association
for Cryptologic Research

This paper describes an ECC implementation computing the X25519 key-exchange protocol on the ARM-Cortex M4 microcontroller. This software comes with extensive mitigations against various side-channel and fault attacks and is, to our best knowledge, the first to claim affordable protection against multiple classes of attacks that are motivated by distinct real-world application scenarios. We also present the results of a comprehensive side-channel evaluation. We distinguish between X25519 with ephemeral keys and X25519 with static keys and show that the overhead to protect the two is about 36% and 239% respectively. While this might seem to be a high price to pay for security, we also show that even our (most protected) static implementation is more efficient than widely deployed ECC cryptographic libraries, which offer much fewer protections.

Event date: 7 February to 10 February 2022
Submission deadline: 13 September 2021
Notification: 11 November 2021

Event date: 2 November to 3 November 2021
Submission deadline: 7 August 2021
Notification: 1 October 2021

We are looking for a bright and motivated PhD student to work in the topics of information security and cryptography. The student is expected to work on topics that include security and privacy issues for resource-constrained devices (e.g., sensors) that rely on external untrusted servers in order to perform computations. More precisely, the student shall be working on investigating efficient authentication and verifiable delegation of computation mechanisms that provide: i) provable security guarantees, and ii) rigorous privacy guarantees. The overall aim of the PhD position will be to design and evaluate provably secure cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving authentication and verifiable delegation of computation protocols. The research shall also consider the case where multiple clients outsource jointly computations to untrusted cloud servers.

Key Responsibilities:

• Perform exciting and challenging research in the domain of information security and cryptography.
• Support and assist in teaching computer security and cryptography courses.

Your Profile:

• The PhD student is expected to have a MSc degree or equivalent, and strong background in cryptography, network security and mathematics.
• Experience in one or more domains such as cryptography, design of protocols, secure multi-party computation and differential privacy is beneficial.
• Excellent programming skills.

Deadline: 5 August 2021.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Katerina Mitrokotsa

More information: https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/phd-position-in-applied-cryptography-and-information-security-m-w-d/09f75f22-649c-48a6-9aa4-659bbd686a84

We are looking for an excellent and motivated cryptography research engineer to a group of researchers focusing in applied and theoretical cryptography, network and information security and privacy-preservation led by Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa. We are affiliated to the School of Computer Science (SCS) at the University of St.Gallen. The work is ideal for young professionals who want to boost their CV for applying for PhD positions or industrial jobs.

Responsibilities As a research engineer in the Cyber Security chair you will establish and work in a state-of-the-art IoT (Internet of Things) lab with smart devices ranging from Raspberry Pi's, sensors, smart microphones, toy cars, RFID tags, RFID readers, smart phones, biometric sensors and you will work with world-leading researchers to implement, test, and showcase secure and privacy-preserving protocols and algorithms. Many projects are done in collaboration with other academic and industrial partners. More specifically, the job includes:

• Development and implementation of concepts and research results, both individually and in collaboration with researchers and PhD students,
• Run of experiments and simulation of realistic conditions to test the performance of developed algorithms and protocols,
• Development, maintenance and organization of software,
• Support to BSc, MSc and PhD students, postdocs and researchers who use the lab,
• Responsibility for day routines in the lab, for example purchases, installations, bookings, inventory.

Your profile:

• The successful applicant is expected to hold or to be about to receive a M.Sc. degree in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Applied Mathematics or similar fields
• Good command of English is required.
• You should have a good academic track record and well developed analytical and problem solving skills.
• Excellent programming skills and familiarity with cryptographic libraries.
• Previous experience in implementation projects with C++, Matlab/Simulink, Python is desired.

Deadline: 10 August

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Katerina Mitrokotsa

More information: https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/cryptography-engineer-m-w-d/634aea27-37d2-4f1f-ab25-2d3c0a622fc0

In this work, we characterize online linear extractors. In other words, given a matrix $A \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n}$, we study the convergence of the iterated process $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow A\mathbf{S} \oplus \mathbf{X} $, where $\mathbf{X} \sim D$ is repeatedly sampled independently from some fixed (but unknown) distribution $D$ with (min)-entropy at least $k$. Here, we think of $\mathbf{S} \in \{0,1\}^n$ as the state of an online extractor, and $\mathbf{X} \in \{0,1\}^n$ as its input.

As our main result, we show that the state $\mathbf{S}$ converges to the uniform distribution for all input distributions $D$ with entropy $k > 0$ if and only if the matrix $A$ has no non-trivial invariant subspace (i.e., a non-zero subspace $V \subsetneq \mathbb{F}_2^n$ such that $AV \subseteq V$). In other words, a matrix $A$ yields an online linear extractor if and only if $A$ has no non-trivial invariant subspace. For example, the linear transformation corresponding to multiplication by a generator of the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ yields a good online linear extractor. Furthermore, for any such matrix convergence takes at most $\widetilde{O}(n^2(k+1)/k^2)$ steps.

We also study the more general notion of condensing---that is, we ask when this process converges to a distribution with entropy at least $\ell$, when the input distribution has entropy greater than $k$. (Extractors corresponding to the special case when $\ell = n$.) We show that a matrix gives a good condenser if there are relatively few vectors $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ such that $\mathbf{w}, A^T\mathbf{w}, \ldots, (A^T)^{n-k-1} \mathbf{w}$ are linearly dependent. As an application, we show that the very simple cyclic rotation transformation $A(x_1,\ldots, x_n) = (x_n,x_1,\ldots, x_{n-1})$ condenses to $\ell = n-1$ bits for any $k > 1$ if $n$ is a prime satisfying a certain simple number-theoretic condition.

Our proofs are Fourier-analytic and rely on a novel lemma, which gives a tight bound on the product of certain Fourier coefficients of any entropic distribution.

In classical commitments, statistical binding means that for almost any commitment transcript there is at most one possible opening. While quantum commitments (for classical messages) sometimes have benefits over their classical counterparts (e.g.\ in terms of assumptions), they provide a weaker notion of binding. Essentially that the sender cannot open a given commitment to a random value with probability noticeably greater than $1/2$.

We introduce a notion of classical binding for quantum commitments which provides guarantees analogous to the classical case. In our notion, the receiver performs a (partial) measurement of the quantum commitment string, and the outcome of this measurement determines a single value that the sender may open. We expect that our notion can replace classical commitments in various settings, leaving the security proof essentially unchanged. As an example we show a soundness proof for the GMW zero-knowledge proof system.

We construct a non-interactive quantum commitment scheme which is classically statistically-binding and has a classical opening, based on the existence of any post-quantum one-way function. Prior candidates had inherently quantum openings and were not classically binding. In contrast, we show that it is impossible to achieve classical binding for statistically hiding commitments, regardless of assumption or round complexity.

Our scheme is simply Naor's commitment scheme (which classically requires a common random string, CRS), but executed in superposition over all possible values of the CRS, and repeated several times. We hope that this technique for using quantum communication to remove a CRS may find other uses.

The multisignature schemes are attracted to utilize in some cryptographic applications such as the blockchain. Though the lattice-based constructions of multisignature schemes exist as quantum-secure multisignature, a multisignature scheme whose security is proven in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), rather than the classical random oracle model (CROM), is not known. In this paper, we propose a first lattice-based multisignature scheme whose security is proven in QROM. Although our proposed scheme is based on the Dilithium-QROM signature, whose security is proven in QROM, their proof technique cannot be directly applied to the multisignature setting. The difficulty of proving the security in QROM is how to program the random oracle in the security proof. To solve the problems in the security proof, we develop several proof techniques in QROM. First, we employ the searching query technique by Targi and Unruh to convert the Dilithium-QROM into the multisignature setting. For the second, we develop a new programming technique in QROM since the conventional programming techniques seem not to work in the multisignature setting of QROM. We combine the programming technique by Unruh with the one by Liu and Zhandry. The new technique enables us to program the random oracle in QROM and construct the signing oracle in the security proof.

Until recently lattice reduction attacks on NTRU lattices were thought to behave similar as on (ring-)LWE lattices with the same parameters. However several works (Albrecht-Bai-Ducas 2016, Kirchner-Fouque 2017) showed a significant gap for large moduli $q$, the so-called overstretched regime of NTRU.

With the NTRU scheme being a finalist to the NIST PQC competition it is important to understand ---both asymptotically and concretely--- where the fatigue point lies exactly, i.e. at which $q$ the overstretched regime begins. Unfortunately the analysis by Kirchner and Fouque is based on an impossibility argument, which only results in an asymptotic upper bound on the fatigue point. It also does not really {\em explain} how lattice reduction actually recovers secret-key information.

We propose a new analysis that asymptotically improves on that of Kirchner and Fouque, narrowing down the fatigue point for ternary NTRU from $q \leq n^{2.783+o(1)}$ to $q=n^{2.484+o(1)}$, and finally explaining the mechanism behind this phenomenon. We push this analysis further to a concrete one, settling the fatigue point at $q \approx 0.004 \cdot n^{2.484}$, and allowing precise hardness predictions in the overstretched regime. These predictions are backed by extensive experiments.

High-degree, low-precision polynomial arithmetic is a fundamental computational primitive underlying structured lattice based cryptography. Its algorithmic properties and suitability for implementation on different compute platforms is an active area of research, and this article contributes to this line of work: Firstly, we present memory-efficiency and performance improvements for the Toom-Cook/Karatsuba polynomial multiplication strategy. Secondly, we provide implementations of those improvements on Arm® Cortex®-M4 CPU, as well as the newer Cortex-M55 processor, the first M-profile core implementing the M-profile Vector Extension (MVE), also known as Arm® Helium™ technology. We also implement the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) on the Cortex-M55 processor. We show that despite being single issue, in-order and offering only 8 vector registers compared to 32 on A-profile SIMD architectures like Arm® Neon™ technology and the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE), by careful register management and instruction scheduling, we can obtain a 3× to 5× performance improvement over already highly optimized implementations on Cortex-M4, while maintaining a low area and energy profile necessary for use in embedded market. Finally, as a real-world application we integrate our multiplication techniques to post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism Saber.

Masking using randomised lookup tables is a popular countermeasure for side-channel attacks, particularly at small masking orders. An advantage of this class of countermeasures for masking S-boxes compared to ISW-based masking is that it supports pre-processing and thus significantly reducing the amount of computation to be done after the unmasked inputs are available. Indeed, the online computation can be as fast as just a table lookup. But the size of the randomised lookup table increases linearly with the masking order, and hence the RAM memory required to store pre-processed tables becomes infeasible for higher masking orders. Hence demonstrating the feasibility of full pre-processing of higher-order lookup table-based masking schemes on resource-constrained devices has remained an open problem.

In this work, we solve the above problem by implementing a higher-order lookup table-based scheme using an amount of RAM memory that is essentially independent of the masking order. More concretely, we reduce the amount of RAM memory needed for the table-based scheme of Coron et al. (TCHES 2018) approximately by a factor equal to the number of shares. Our technique is based upon the use of PRG to minimise the randomness complexity of ISW-based masking schemes proposed by Ishai et al. (ICALP 2013) and Coron et al. (Eurocrypt 2020). Hence we show that for lookup table-based masking schemes, the use of a PRG not only reduces the randomness complexity (now logarithmic in the size of the S-box) but also the memory complexity, and without any significant increase in the overall running time. We have implemented in software the higher-order table-based masking scheme of Coron et al. (TCHES 2018) at tenth order with full pre-processing of a single execution of all the AES S-boxes on a ARM Cortex-M4 device that has 256 KB RAM memory. Our technique requires only 41.2 KB of RAM memory, whereas the original scheme would have needed 440 KB. Moreover, our 8-bit implementation results demonstrate that the online execution time of our variant is about 1.5 times faster compared to the 8-bit bitsliced masked implementation of AES-128.

In order to propagate transactions and blocks, today’s blockchain systems rely on unstructured peer-to-peer overlay networks. In such networks, broadcast is known to be an inefficient operation in terms of message complexity and overhead. In addition to the impact on the system performance, inefficient or delayed block propagation may have severe consequences regarding security and fairness of the consensus layer. In contrast, the Kadcast protocol is a structured peer-to-peer protocol for block and transaction propagation in blockchain networks. Kadcast utilizes the well-known overlay topology of Kademlia to realize an efficient broadcast operation with tunable overhead. We study the security and privacy of the Kadcast protocol based on probabilistic models and analyze its resilience to packet losses and node failures. Moreover, we evaluate Kadcast’s block delivery performance, broadcast reliability, efficiency, and security based on advanced network simulations. Lastly, we introduce a QUIC-based prototype implementation of the Kadcast protocol and show its merits through deployment in a large-scale cloud-based testbed.

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has designated ARM microcontrollers as an important benchmarking platform for its Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process (NISTPQC). In view of this, we explore the design space of the NISTPQC finalist Saber on the Cortex-M4 and its close relation, the Cortex-M3. In the process, we investigate various optimization strategies and memory-time tradeoffs for number-theoretic transforms (NTTs).

Recent work by Chung et al. has shown that NTT multiplication is superior compared to Toom--Cook multiplication for unprotected Saber implementations on the Cortex-M4 in terms of speed. However, it remains unclear if NTT multiplication can outperform Toom--Cook in masked implementations of Saber. Additionally, it is an open question if Saber with NTTs can outperform Toom--Cook in terms of stack usage. We answer both questions in the affirmative. Additionally, we present a Cortex-M3 implementation of Saber using NTTs outperforming an existing Toom--Cook implementation. Our stack-optimized unprotected M4 implementation uses around the same amount of stack as the most stack-optimized implementation using Toom--Cook while being 33%-41% faster. Our speed-optimized masked M4 implementation is 16% faster than the fastest masked implementation using Toom--Cook. For the Cortex-M3, we outperform existing implementations by 29%-35% in speed.

We conclude that for both stack- and speed-optimization purposes, one should base polynomial multiplications in Saber on the NTT rather than Toom--Cook for the Cortex-M4 and Cortex-M3. In particular, in many cases, composite moduli NTTs perform best.

We consider the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem with sparse secret, where the secret vector $\textbf{s}$ of dimension $n$ has Hamming weight at most $k$. We are interested in algorithms with asymptotic improvement in the $\textit{exponent}$ beyond the state of the art. Prior work in this setting presented algorithms with runtime $n^{c \cdot k}$ for constant $c < 1$, obtaining a constant factor improvement over brute force search, which runs in time ${n \choose k}$. We obtain the following results: - We first consider the $\textit{constant}$ error rate setting, and in this case present a new algorithm that leverages a subroutine from the acclaimed BKW algorithm [Blum, Kalai, Wasserman, J.~ACM '03] as well as techniques from Fourier analysis for $p$-biased distributions. Our algorithm achieves asymptotic improvement in the exponent compared to prior work, when the sparsity $k = k(n) = \frac{n}{\log^{1+ 1/c}(n)}$, where $c \in o(\log \log(n))$ and $c \in \omega(1)$. The runtime and sample complexity of this algorithm are approximately the same. - We next consider the $\textit{low noise}$ setting, where the error is subconstant. We present a new algorithm in this setting that requires only a $\textit{polynomial}$ number of samples and achieves asymptotic improvement in the exponent compared to prior work, when the sparsity $k = \frac{1}{\eta} \cdot \frac{\log(n)}{\log(f(n))}$ and noise rate of $\eta \neq 1/2$ and $\eta^2 = \left(\frac{\log(n)}{n} \cdot f(n)\right)$, for $f(n) \in \omega(1) \cap n^{o(1)}$. To obtain the improvement in sample complexity, we create subsets of samples using the $\textit{design}$ of Nisan and Wigderson [J.~Comput.~Syst.~Sci. '94], so that any two subsets have a small intersection, while the number of subsets is large. Each of these subsets is used to generate a single $p$-biased sample for the Fourier analysis step. We then show that this allows us to bound the covariance of pairs of samples, which is sufficient for the Fourier analysis. - Finally, we show that our first algorithm extends to the setting where the noise rate is very high $1/2 - o(1)$, and in this case can be used as a subroutine to obtain new algorithms for learning DNFs and Juntas. Our algorithms achieve asymptotic improvement in the exponent for certain regimes. For DNFs of size $s$ with approximation factor $\epsilon$ this regime is when $\log \frac{s}{\epsilon} \in \omega \left( \frac{c}{\log n \log \log c}\right)$, and $\log \frac{s}{\epsilon} \in n^{1 - o(1)}$, for $c \in n^{1 - o(1)}$. For Juntas of $k$ the regime is when $k \in \omega \left( \frac{c}{\log n \log \log c}\right)$, and $k \in n^{1 - o(1)}$, for $c \in n^{1 - o(1)}$.

\textit{Privacy} and \textit{Byzantine-robustness} are two major concerns of federated learning (FL), but mitigating both threats simultaneously is highly challenging: privacy-preserving strategies prohibit access to individual model updates to avoid leakage, while Byzantine-robust methods require access for comprehensive mathematical analysis. Besides, most Byzantine-robust methods only work in the \textit{honest-majority} setting.

We present $\mathsf{FLOD}$, a novel oblivious defender for private Byzantine-robust FL in dishonest-majority setting. Basically, we propose a novel Hamming distance-based aggregation method to resist $>1/2$ Byzantine attacks using a small \textit{root-dataset} and \textit{server-model} for bootstrapping trust. Furthermore, we employ two non-colluding servers and use additive homomorphic encryption ($\mathsf{AHE}$) and secure two-party computation (2PC) primitives to construct efficient privacy-preserving building blocks for secure aggregation, in which we propose two novel in-depth variants of Beaver Multiplication triples (MT) to reduce the overhead of Bit to Arithmetic ($\mathsf{Bit2A}$) conversion and vector weighted sum aggregation ($\mathsf{VSWA}$) significantly. Experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrate our effectiveness and efficiency: (\romannumeral1) $\mathsf{FLOD}$ defeats known Byzantine attacks with a negligible effect on accuracy and convergence, (\romannumeral2) achieves a reduction of $\approx 2\times$ for offline (resp. online) overhead of $\mathsf{Bit2A}$ and $\mathsf{VSWA}$ compared to $\mathsf{ABY}$-$\mathsf{AHE}$ (resp. $\mathsf{ABY}$-$\mathsf{MT}$) based methods (NDSS'15), (\romannumeral3) and reduces total online communication and run-time by $167$-$1416\times$ and $3.1$-$7.4\times$ compared to $\mathsf{FLGUARD}$ (Crypto Eprint 2021/025).

In recent years, the isogeny-based protocol, namely supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) has become highly attractive for its small public key size. In addition, the public-key compression makes supersingular isogeny key encapsulation scheme (SIKE) more competitive in the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization effort. However, compared to other post-quantum protocols, the computational cost of SIDH is relatively high, and so is the public-key compression. On the other hand, the storage for pairing computation and discrete logarithms to speed up the current implementation of the key compression is somewhat large.

In this paper, we mainly improve the performance of the public-key compression of SIDH, especially the efficiency and the storage of pairing computation involved. Our experimental results show that the memory requirement for pairing computation is reduced by a factor of about 1.31, and meanwhile, the instantiation of the key generation of SIDH is $3.99\%\sim 5.95\%$ faster than the current state-of-the-art. Besides, in the case of Bob, we present another method to further reduce storage cost, while the acceleration is not as obvious as the former. %achieves an acceleration factor of $1.10\sim1.17$.

Deep learning-based side-channel analysis performance heavily depends on the dataset size and the number of instances in each target class. Both small and imbalanced datasets might lead to unsuccessful side-channel attacks. The attack performance can be improved by generating traces synthetically from the obtained data instances instead of collecting them from the target device. Unfortunately, generating the synthetic traces that have characteristics of the actual traces using random noise is a difficult and cumbersome task. This research proposes a novel data augmentation approach based on conditional generative adversarial networks (cGAN) and Siamese networks, enhancing in this way the attack capability. We present a quantitative comparative machine learning-based side-channel analysis between a real raw signal leakage dataset and an artificially augmented leakage dataset. The analysis is performed on the leakage datasets for both symmetric and public-key cryptographic implementations. We also investigate non-convergent networks' effect on the generation of fake leakage signals using two cGAN based deep learning models. The analysis shows that the proposed data augmentation model results in a well-converged network that generates realistic leakage traces, which can be used to mount deep learning-based side-channel analysis successfully even when the dataset available from the device is not optimal. Our results show potential in breaking datasets enhanced with ``faked'' leakage traces, which could change the way we perform deep learning-based side-channel analysis.

We present a polynomial-time adaptive attack on the genus-2 variant of the SIDH protocol (G2SIDH) and describe an improvement to its secret selection procedure. G2SIDH is a generalisation of the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange into the genus-2 setting which was proposed by Flynn and Ti. G2SIDH is able to achieve the same security as SIDH while using fields a third of the size. We give a thorough analysis of the keyspace of G2SIDH and achieve an improvement to the secret selection by using symplectic bases for the torsion subgroups. This allows for the near uniform sampling of secrets without needing to solve multiple linear congruences as suggested by Flynn-Ti. The proposed adaptive attack on G2SIDH is able to recover the secret when furnished with an oracle that returns a single bit of information. We ensure that the maliciously generated information provided by the attacker cannot be detected by implementing simple countermeasures such as checking the Weil pairing or order of the given points. We demonstrate this attack and show that it is able to recover the secret isogeny in all cases of G2SIDH using a symplectic basis before extending the strategy to arbitrary bases.

A $(1,n)$-robust combiner combines $n$ cryptography primitives to construct a new primitive of the same type, and guarantees that if any of the ingredient primitive is secure, then the resulting primitive is secure. In recent two decades, robust combiners for various crypto primitives (e.g. public key encryption, oblivious transfer) have been proposed. Very recently, more works on robust combiners for post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism appear to achieve multi-layer of defence, to counter the future threat from Shor's algorithm running on powerful quantum computers. However, typically such combination of $n$ crypto primitives will sum up running times of all ingredient primitives and thus introduce linear overhead in time complexity, which may be a big burden on server side, since the server has to run key encapsulation mechanism (or key exchange protocol) with every online client.

We propose the very first robust combiner (of KEMs), with $O(1)$ \emph{amortized} complexity overhead, which not only breaks the linear boundary, but also achieves optimal complexity. Our experiments also confirm that the performance overhead of our robust combiner of $n$ KEMs is constant (i.e. $O(1)$) rather than linear (i.e. $O(n)$). Our cost is that, the resulting KEM has to maintain a secret dynamic state of fixed and linear size (i.e. $O(n)$) . We call such KEM as Stateful Key Encapsulation Mechanism (SKEM). SKEM is suitable for two users (or devices), who will have \emph{frequent} secure communications (e.g. via VPN or SSH). We also formally define the security formulation for SKEM and prove the security of our proposed SKEM scheme in standard model.

Concurrent signatures allow two entities to produce two ambiguous signatures that become binding once an extra piece of information (called the keystone) is released. Such a signature is developed by Chen \emph{et al.}, but it restricts signers to using the same public parameters. We describe and analyse a new concurrent signature that allows users to sign documents even if they use different underlying hard problems when generating their public parameters.