IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
15 October 2021
Tim Beyne, Siemen Dhooghe, Amir Moradi, Aein Rezaei Shahmirzadi
ePrint Report14 October 2021
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany
Job PostingTopic: Lattice-based Vector Commitments
Requirements:
- Have working knowledge in constructing and analysing public-key cryptographic primitives
- Are familiar with mathematical proofs
- Are fluent in spoken and written English
- Have basic understanding of lattice-based cryptography
- Have basic understanding of vector commitments
- Have experience in prototyping cryptographic primitives
Start Date: As soon as possible
Duration: 3 to 6 months
Application Deadline: December 31, 2021, or when a suitable candidate has been found
To apply for the position, send an email to Giulio Malavolta (address below) including the following documents:
- A curriculum vitae
- A brief cover letter (half page at most), e.g. describing your research interests
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Giulio Malavolta (giulio.malavolta@mpi-sp.org)
ENS Lyon
Job PostingThe ENS Lyon crypto group is opening several post-doc positions. Duration and starting dates are flexible. Salary takes seniority into account.
Topics of interest:Applicants should have expertise in at least one of the following topics:
- Cryptographic protocols
- Lattice-based cryptography
- Lattice algorithms or hardness of lattice problems (quantum/classical)
- Foundational aspects of cryptography
- Computing on encrypted data
- Implementation of cryptographic primitives
How to apply:
Interested applicants should provide a detailed resume and two references. Applications should be sent directly to {benoit.libert,alain.passelegue, damien.stehle}@ens-lyon.fr by Dec. 31, 2021.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Benoît Libert, Alain Passelègue, and Damien Stehlé
{benoit.libert,
alain.passelegue, damien.stehle}@ens-lyon.fr
More information: https://www.ens-lyon.fr/LIP/AriC/crypto
Heliax, Anoma
Job PostingClosing date for applications:
Contact: jobs@heliax.dev
More information: https://heliax.dev/
12 October 2021
University of Connecticut, Computer Science and Engineering Dept.
Job PostingThe positions provide a great opportunity for students with interest in interdisciplinary projects that combine knowledge from various fields towards the design of secure systems and protocols. We target real-world timely problems and aim to provide secure and practical solutions backed by rigorous foundations and efficient implementations/thorough performance testing. We are also interested in conceptual projects that contribute in bridging the gap between theory and practice of Cryptography.
For more information about our current and previous projects please check https://ghadaalmashaqbeh.github.io/research/. For interested students, please send your CV to ghada@uconn.edu and provide any relevant information about the topics you want to work on and the skills/related background you have.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Ghada Almashaqbeh
More information: https://ghadaalmashaqbeh.github.io/
Campus George Charpak Provence, Mines Saint Etienne, Gardanne, France
Job PostingDepartment:
R&D – Product Security Location / Working place Meyreuil, France
SAS Campus George Charpak Provence, Gardanne, France
Mission:
Participate in security certifications: hardware and software platforms
Porting post-quantum cryptographic libraries to Wisekey’s components
Implement side channel / deep learning attacks in Wisekey’s security lab
Maintain Wisekey’s attack benches
Main responsabilities:
Standardization follow-up on post-quantum algorithms
Implement an attack bench on component using post-quantum cryptographic libraries
Keep abreast of new attacks (conferences, fairs, scientific articles)
Requirements:
Educational background / diplomas: PhD
Skills: Cryptography, Safety of embedded systems, Security certifications (CC, EMVCo, FIPS), Development on embedded systems
Starting date: ASAP
To apply please send your CV, a cover letter, and contact information of 2 references
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Nadia EL Mrabet (EMSE Gardanne), nadia.el-mrabet@emse.fr
Jean-Pierre Enguent (VP-R&D Wisekey), jpenguent@WISEKEY.COM
CryptoLux Group, University of Luxembourg
Job Posting
Area (potential topics of the thesis)
- Cryptanalysis and design of cryptographic primitives, ex. Lightweight block ciphers, hash functions, authenticated encryption schemes
- Privacy Enhancing Technology (Tor-like networks, privacy for cryptocurrencies)
- Cryptography for blockchains
- White-box cryptography
Starting date 1-Jan-2022 or later upon agreement. Early submission is encouraged; applications will be processed upon receipt.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Alex Biryukov
More information: https://cryptolux.org
Thomas Attema, Serge Fehr, Michael Klooß
ePrint ReportIn this work, we give positive and negative results on this question. On the positive side, we show that for $(k_1, \ldots, k_\mu)$-special-sound protocols (which cover a broad class of use cases), the knowledge error degrades linearly in $Q$ (instead of $Q^\mu$). On the negative side, we show that for $t$-fold parallel repetitions of typical $(k_1, \ldots, k_\mu)$-special-sound protocols, there is an attack which results in a security loss of about $(Q/\mu)^\mu \mu^{-t}$, assuming for simplicity that $t$ is an integer multiple of $\mu$.
Ivan Damgård, Daniel Escudero, Antigoni Polychroniadou
ePrint ReportWe study the settings of perfect, statistical and computational security and design MPC protocols in each of these scenarios. We assume that the intersection of online-and-honest parties from one round to the next is at least $2t+1$, $t+1$ and $1$ respectively, where $t$ is the number of (actively) corrupt parties. We show the intersection requirements to be optimal. Our (positive) results are obtained in a way that may be of independent interest: we implement a traditional stable network on top of the unstable one, which allows us to plug in \textit{any} MPC protocol on top. This approach adds a necessary overhead to the round count of the protocols, which is related to the maximal number of rounds an honest party can be offline. We also present a novel, perfectly secure MPC protocol that avoids this overhead by following a more ``direct'' approach rather than building a stable network on top. We introduce our network model in the UC-framework and prove the security of our protocols within this setting.
Elizabeth Crites, Chelsea Komlo, Mary Maller
ePrint ReportUsing our new techniques, we prove the concurrent security of a variant of the $\mathsf{MuSig2}$ multisignature scheme that includes proofs of possession as well as the $\mathsf{FROST}$ threshold signature scheme. These are currently the most efficient schemes in the literature for generating Schnorr signatures in a multiparty setting. Our variant of $\mathsf{MuSig2}$, which we call $\mathsf{SpeedyMuSig}$, has faster key aggregation due to the proofs of possession.
Marcel Nageler, Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we show that a DFA adversary can combine information across rounds to recover the full key, invalidating their security claim. In particular, we observe that such ciphers exhibit large classes of equivalent keys that can be represented efficiently in normalized form using linear equations. We exploit this in combination with the specifics of DEFAULT's strong key schedule to recover the key using less than 100 faulty computation and negligible time complexity. Moreover, we show that even an idealized version of DEFAULT with independent round keys is vulnerable to our information-combining attacks based on normalized keys.
Iftach Haitner, Nikolaos Makriyannis, Samuel Ranellucci, Eliad Tsfadia
ePrint ReportEugene Frimpong, Reyhaneh Rabbaninejad, Antonis Michalas
ePrint ReportKyoichi Asano, Keita Emura, Atsushi Takayasu, Yohei Watanabe
ePrint ReportDimitris Mouris, Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos
ePrint ReportWe present Masquerade, a novel protocol for computing private statistics, such as sum, average, and histograms without revealing anything about participants' data. We propose a tailored multiplicative commitment scheme to ensure the integrity of data aggregations and publish all the participants' commitments on a ledger to provide public verifiability. We complement our methodology with two zero-knowledge proof protocols that detect potentially untrusted participants who attempt to poison the aggregation results. Thus, Masquerade ensures the validity of shared data points before being aggregated, enabling a broad range of numerical and categorical. In our experiments, we evaluate our protocol's runtime and communication overhead using homomorphic ciphertexts and commitments for a variable number of participants.
Rami Elkhatib, Brian Koziel, Reza Azarderakhsh
ePrint ReportKai-Min Chung, Yao-Ching Hsieh, Mi-Ying Huang, Yu-Hsuan Huang, Tanja Lange, Bo-Yin Yang
ePrint ReportAvinash Vijayarangan, K.R. Sekar, R. Srikanth
ePrint ReportWard Beullens, Samuel Dobson, Shuichi Katsumata, Yi-Fu Lai, Federico Pintore
ePrint ReportOur group signatures satisfy more ideal security properties compared to previously known constructions, while simultaneously having an attractive signature size. The signature size of our isogeny-based construction is an order of magnitude smaller than all previously known post-quantum group signatures (e.g., 6.6 KB for 64 members). In comparison, our lattice-based construction has a larger signature size (e.g., either 126 KB or 89 KB for 64 members depending on the satisfied security property). However, since the $O(\cdot)$-notation hides a very small constant factor, it remains small even for very large group sizes, say $2^{20}$.