IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
10 November 2021
University of Neuchatel, Switzerland
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Christos Dimitrakakis
More information: https://sites.google.com/site/christosdimitrakakis/positions
University of Southern Queensland
Closing date for applications:
Contact: To find out more about this opportunity, please contact Dr Zhaohui Tang on +61 7 4631 2464 or Zhaohui.Tang@usq.edu.au
More information: https://bit.ly/3GPW7qT
Università di Roma Tor Vergata
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Giulio Codogni
More information: https://web.uniroma2.it/it/contenuto/procedure_pubbliche_selettive_per_il_reclutamento_di_n__56_ricercatori_con_contratto_a_tempo_determinato_ai_sensi_dellra
Lund University, Sweden
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Christian Gehrmann
More information: https://lu.varbi.com/what:job/jobID:443090/
08 November 2021
Robin M. Berger, Marcel Tiepelt
Nan Li, Yingjiu Li, Atsuko Miyaji, Yangguang Tian, Tsz Hon Yuen
Meghal Gupta, Rachel Yun Zhang
In this work, we study the optimal error resilience of such a protocol in the face of adversarial bit flip or erasures. While the optimal error resilience of such a protocol over a large alphabet is well understood, the situation over the binary alphabet has remained open. In this work, we resolve this problem of determining the optimal error resilience over binary channels. In particular, we construct protocols achieving $\frac16$ error resilience over the binary bit flip channel and $\frac12$ error resilience over the binary erasure channel, for both of which matching upper bounds are known. We remark that the communication complexity of our binary bit flip protocol is polynomial in the size of the inputs, and the communication complexity of our binary erasure protocol is linear in the size of the minimal noiseless protocol computing $f$.
Meghal Gupta, Yael Tauman Kalai, Rachel Zhang
For adversarial erasure errors (over a binary channel) the maximal error resilience of an $\mathsf{ECC}$ is $\frac12$ of the communicated bits. In this work, we break this $\frac12$ barrier by introducing the notion of an interactive error correcting code ($\mathsf{iECC}$) and constructing an $\mathsf{iECC}$ that is resilient to adversarial erasure of $\frac35$ of the total communicated bits. We emphasize that the adversary can corrupt both the sending party and the receiving party, and that both parties' rounds contribute to the adversary's budget.
We also prove an impossibility (upper) bound of $\frac23$ on the maximal resilience of any binary $\mathsf{iECC}$ to adversarial erasures. In the bit flip setting, we prove an impossibility bound of $\frac27$.
Eldon Chung, Maciej Obremski, Divesh Aggarwal
(1) Constructions where one source has min-entropy rate about $1/2$, the other source can have small min-entropy rate, but the extractor doesn't guarantee non-malleability.
(2) Constructions where one source is uniform, and the other can have small min-entropy rate, and the extractor guarantees non-malleability when the uniform source is tampered.
(3) Constructions where both sources have entropy rate very close to $1$ and the extractor guarantees non-malleability against the tampering of both sources.
We introduce a new notion of collision resistant extractors and in using it we obtain a strong two source non-malleable extractor where we require the first source to have $0.8$ entropy rate and the other source can have min-entropy polylogarithmic in the length of the source.
We show how the above extractor can be applied to obtain a non-malleable extractor with output rate $\frac 1 2$, which is optimal. We also show how, by using our extractor and extending the known protocol, one can obtain a privacy amplification secure against memory tampering where the size of the secret output is almost optimal.
Amirhossein Ebrahimi, Francesco Regazzoni, Paolo Palmieri
sowle, koe
Karlsruhe, Deutschland, 5 April - 8 April 2022
Submission deadline: 12 November 2021
Notification: 22 December 2021
Smolenice, Slovakia, 26 June - 29 June 2022
Submission deadline: 8 April 2022
Notification: 29 April 2022
St. George's, Grenada, 18 February 2022
Submission deadline: 10 December 2021
Notification: 10 January 2022
06 November 2021
Ruslan Skuratovskii, Alexandr Kalenyk
Emile Hautefeuille
Leonie Reichert, Marcel Pazelt, Björn Scheuermann
Hao Chung, Elaine Shi
Since the TFM departs from classical mechanism design in modeling and assumptions, to date, our understanding of the design space is relatively little. In this paper, we further unravel the mathematical structure of transaction fee mechanism design by proving the following results: - Can we have a dream TFM? We prove a new impossibility result: assuming finite block size, no single-parameter, non-trivial, possibly randomized TFM can simultaneously satisfy UIC and 1-SCP. Consequently, no non-trivial TFM can satisfy all three desired properties simultaneously. This answers an important open question raised by Roughgarden in his recent work. - Rethinking the incentive compatibility notions. We observe that the prevalently adopted incentive compatibility notions may be too draconian and somewhat flawed. We rectify the existing modeling techniques, and suggest a relaxed incentive compatibility notion that captures additional hidden costs of strategic deviation. We construct a new mechanism called the “burning second-price auction”, and show that it indeed satisfies the new incentive compatibility notions. We additionally prove that the use of randomness is necessary under the new incentive compatibility notions for “useful” mechanisms that resist the coalitions of the miner and at least 2 users. - Do the new design elements make a difference? Unlike classical mechanisms, TFMs may employ a couple new design elements that are idiosyncratic to blockchains. For example, a burn rule (employed by Ethereum’s EIP-1559) allows part to all of the payment from the users to be burnt rather than paid to the miner. Some mechanisms also allow unconfirmed transactions to be included in the block, to set the price for others. Our work unveils how these new design elements actually make a difference in TFM design, allowing us to achieve incentive compatible properties that would otherwise be impossible.