IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
18 March 2022
Youssef El Housni, Aurore Guillevic, Thomas Piellard
ePrint ReportAndreas Hülsing, Matthias Meijers, Pierre-Yves Strub
ePrint ReportBruno Mazorra, Victor Adan, Vanesa Daza
ePrint Report15 March 2022
Beijing Institute of Technology
Job PostingPostdoc: Competitive salary. Housing/renting covered. The postdoc position is for two years and has flexible starting time. After two years, the candidates may be offered a tenure-track position at Beijing Institute of Technology.
Tenure-track professors: housing covered; salary is really competitive, can advise PhD students and postdocs; startup package included; etc.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Please apply with a CV. Person in contact: Prof. Haibin Zhang: haibin at bit dot edu dot cn
More information: https://bchainzhang.github.io/hbzhang/
University of Birmingham, UK
Job PostingThis is a time of significant opportunity for Computer Science at Birmingham, with a growing number of outstanding students, world- leading research, the establishment of new institutes, and a growing transnational education and industrial engagement. We are investing in the growth of the senior leadership of the school in a number of key research and education area, including but not limited to all areas of Cyber Security.
The Centre for Cyber Security and Privacy has 14 permanent academics as well as 21 postdocs/PhD students. Our expertise is established on a historic strength in the analysis of security systems using formal methods, and we broadened our scope to cover all aspects of cyber security. We have built an international reputation for our expertise areas such as applied cryptography, automotive security and secure infrastructure, hardware security and the security of IoT devices (https://www.bham.ac.uk/research/centre-for-cyber-security-and-privacy/index.aspx).
We have 3 distinct academic pathways, Research & Education, Education, and Enterprise, Engagement and Impact, and have opportunities in all of these pathways.
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
For informal information about Cyber Security at Birmingham, please contact Prof David Oswald, d.f.oswald@bham.ac.uk
For a confidential and informal discussion about details of the post, please contact Dr Mark Lee, m.g.lee@bham.ac.uk
More information: https://bham.taleo.net/careersection/external/jobdetail.ftl?job=220000G4&tz=GMT%2B00%3A00&tzname=Europe%2FLondon
14 March 2022
Antoine Leudière, Pierre-Jean Spaenlehauer
ePrint ReportYu Dai, Kaizhan Lin, Zijian Zhou, Chang-An Zhao
ePrint ReportTaechan Kim, Hyesun Kwak, Dongwon Lee, Jinyeong Seo, Yongsoo Song
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we propose a new notion of the gadget decomposition, which enables arithmetic operations to be performed on the decomposed vectors with guarantee of functionality and noise bound. We redesign the multi-key multiplication algorithm of Chen et al. (ACM CCS 2019) using the homomorphic property of gadget decomposition and thereby reduce the complexity significantly from quadratic to linear in the number of parties involved. Finally, we implement our MKHE schemes and provide benchmarks which outperform the previous results.
Andreas Hülsing, Mikhail Kudinov
ePrint ReportWouter Castryck, Marc Houben, Frederik Vercauteren, Benjamin Wesolowski
ePrint ReportWilliam Wang
ePrint ReportYuval Ishai, Alexis Korb, Paul Lou, Amit Sahai
ePrint ReportWiretap coding is clearly impossible when chB is a degraded version of chE, in the sense that the output of chB can be simulated using only the output of chE. A classic work of Csiszár and Körner (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 1978) shows that the converse does not hold. This follows from their full characterization of the channel pairs (chB, chE) that enable information-theoretic wiretap coding. In this work, we show that in fact the converse does hold when considering computational security; that is, wiretap coding against a computationally bounded Eve is possible if and only if chB is not a degraded version of chE. Our construction assumes the existence of virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation of specific classes of ``evasive'' functions that generalize fuzzy point functions, and can be heuristically instantiated using indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, our solution has the appealing feature of being universal in the sense that Alice's algorithm depends only on chB and not on chE.
Lorenzo Grassi, Morten Øygarden, Markus Schofnegger, Roman Walch
ePrint ReportNicoleta-Norica Băcuieți, Lejla Batina, Stjepan Picek
ePrint ReportAzade Rezaeezade, Guilherme Perin, Stjepan Picek
ePrint ReportUsually, overfitting or poor generalization would be mitigated by adding more measurements to the profiling phase to reduce estimation errors. This paper provides a detailed analysis of different deep learning model behaviors and shows that adding more profiling traces as a single solution does not necessarily help improve generalization. In fact, we recognize the main problem to be the sub-optimal selection of hyperparameters, which is then difficult to resolve by simply adding more measurements. Instead, we propose to use small hyperparameter tweaks or regularization as techniques to resolve the problem.
Igor Semaev
ePrint ReportKoji Chida, Koki Hamada, Atsunori Ichikawa, Masanobu Kii, Junichi Tomida
ePrint ReportOur protocol is built on a new variant of oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF), and we construct the new variant of OPRF from the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. We implement both our PIW-Sum protocol and the the most efficient PI-Sum protocol by Ion et al.~and compare their performance in the same environment. This shows that both communication cost and computational cost of our protocol are only about 2 times greater than those of the PI-Sum protocol in the case where $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y}$ are column vectors, i.e., the number of columns of $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y}$ is one.
Matthias J. Kannwischer, Peter Schwabe, Douglas Stebila, Thom Wiggers
ePrint ReportWe do not mean to criticize cryptographers who submitted proposals, including software implementations, to NIST PQC: after all, it cannot reasonably be expected from every cryptographer to also have expertise in software engineering. Instead, we suggest how standardization bodies like NIST can improve the software-submission process in future efforts to avoid such issues with submitted software. More specifically, we present PQClean, an extensive (continuous-integration) testing framework for PQC software, which now also contains "clean" implementations of the NIST round 3 candidate schemes. We argue that the availability of such a framework---either in an online continuous-integration setup, or just as an offline testing system---long before the submission deadline would have resulted in much better implementations included in NIST PQC submissions and overall would have saved the community and probably also NIST a lot of time and effort.
Brent Waters, David J. Wu
ePrint ReportIn this work, we give the first construction of a non-interactive batch argument for NP from standard assumptions on groups with bilinear maps (specifically, from either the subgroup decision assumption in composite-order groups or from the $k$-Lin assumption in prime-order groups for any $k \ge 1$). Previously, batch arguments for NP were only known from LWE, or a combination of multiple assumptions, or from non-standard/non-falsifiable assumptions. Moreover, our work introduces a new direct approach for batch verification and avoids heavy tools like correlation-intractable hash functions or probabilistically-checkable proofs common to previous approaches.
As corollaries to our main construction, we also obtain the first publicly-verifiable non-interactive delegation scheme for RAM programs with a CRS of sublinear size (in the running time of the RAM program), as well as the first aggregate signature scheme (supporting bounded aggregation) from standard assumptions on bilinear maps.