International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The Department of Computer Science at New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT) seeks candidates to fill a University Lecturer/Senior University Lecturer position starting in Fall 2022. Candidates are expected to teach courses under the umbrella of Cybersecurity, in support of our graduate and undergraduate programs. Applicants must have at least an MS degree in Computer Science or in a related computing area. A PhD degree and prior university teaching experience are an advantage.

Successful candidates must have an expert grasp of knowledge of Cybersecurity at all levels, with an emphasis on hands-on applied cybersecurity skills, either through a demonstrated record of teaching excellence, or through industrial experience. The successful candidate will also be involved in creating course content and materials with a focus on hands-on experiential and project-based learning. Strong written, oral and interpersonal skills are required in order to communicate effectively with students in person and online. The formal education and experience prerequisites may be waived at the university's discretion if the candidate can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the university an equivalent combination of education and experience specifically preparing the candidate for success in the position.

Interested applicants should submit their CV by applying as soon as possible at: https://njit.csod.com/ux/ats/careersite/1/home/requisition/3493?c=njit

Work environment and location:

The Computer Science department, part of the Ying Wu College of Computing, is the largest at NJIT, comprising one-tenth of the student population. It is also the largest computer science department among all research universities in the New York metropolitan area.​ Located in Northern New Jersey, within the greater New York Metropolitan area, NJIT is part of a vibrant ecosystem of research universities and corporate research centers.

Diversity is a core value of NJIT and we are committed to make diversity, equity and inclusion, part of everything we do.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Reza Curtmola (reza.curtmola@njit.edu)

More information: https://njit.csod.com/ux/ats/careersite/1/home/requisition/3493?c=njit

Who We Are

Subspace Network is building a radically decentralized, next-generation blockchain which allows developers to easily run Web3 apps at Internet scale. Subspace is based on original research funded by the US National Science Foundation and planning to launch its Network later this year. Subspace Labs is an early-stage, venture-backed startup with a remote-first, globally distributed team. To learn more, visit our website and read the technical whitepaper.

We are seeking a Protocol Research Intern to join our rapidly growing team of Blockchain and Cryptocurrency enthusiasts and engineers. As a Research Intern you will be responsible for assisting in analyzing the security claims of the Subspace Network. Your goal is to work on proving these claims or suggesting improvement to the protocol as needed to support them.

Other Areas for Contribution: Research and review our solutions to some of the hardest problems in the blockchain space, as they relate to Nakamoto consensus, decentralized storage, decoupled execution, crypto-economic incentives, and the blockchain scalability trilemma; collaborate with our Research team to transform findings into peer-review quality specificaitons, publications, and presentations; work with our university partners, academic advisors, and third party engineering security partners on formal security analyses and audits.

Key Requirements: Currently enrolled in a graduate program in computer science, cryptography, or a related field, with the ability to dedicate at least 8 weeks to the internship Completed graduate level coursework in cryptography, distributed systems, peer-to-peer networking, or crypto-economic game theory; excellent written and verbal communication skills, and the ability to collaborate across our protocol and research teams; passion and curiosity for decentralized, peer-to-peer systems and Web3 technologies.

What We Offer: Competitive compensation and flexibility to work from anywhere in the world; a unique opportunity to shape the future of the Subspace Network and play a critical role in building the worlds most scalable blockchain.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Sky McWilliams, Director of People

More information: https://jobs.lever.co/subspacelabs/3594920a-d99c-40c0-9ca3-66c7eaf639da?lever-origin=applied&lever-source%5B%5D=IACR

Persistent Fault Analysis (PFA) is an innovative and powerful analysis technique in which fault persists throughout the execution. The prior prominent results on PFA were on SPN block ciphers, and the security of Feistel ciphers against this attack has received less attention. In this paper, we introduce a framework to utilize Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) in the persistent fault setting by proposing Statistical Ineffective Persistent Faults Analysis (SIPFA) that can be efficiently applied to Feistel ciphers in a variety of scenarios. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique, we apply SIFPA on three widely used Feistel schemes, DES, 3DES, and Camellia. Our analysis reveals that the secret key of these block ciphers can be extracted with a complexity of at most $2^{50}$ utilizing a single unknown fault. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the secret can be recovered in a fraction of a second by increasing the adversary's control over the injected faults. To evaluate SIPFA in a variety of scenarios, we conducted both simulations and real experiments utilizing electromagnetic fault injection on DES and 3DES.

We derive a tight upper bound on the probability over $\mathbf{x}=(x_1,\dots,x_\mu) \in \mathbb{Z}^\mu$ uniformly distributed in $ [0,m)^\mu$ that $f(\mathbf{x}) = 0 \bmod N$ for any $\mu$-linear polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}[X_1,\dots,X_\mu]$ co-prime to $N$. We show that for $N=p_1^{r_1},...,p_\ell^{r_\ell}$ this probability is bounded byb$\frac{\mu}{m} + \prod_{i=1}^\ell I_{\frac{1}{p_i}}(r_i,\mu)$ where $I$ is the regularized beta function. Furthermore, we provide an inverse result that for any target parameter $\lambda$ bounds the minimum size of $N$ for which the probability that $f(\mathbf{x}) \equiv 0 \bmod N$ is at most $2^{-\lambda} + \frac{\mu}{m}$. For $\mu =1$ this is simply $N \geq 2^\lambda$. For $\mu \geq 2$, $\log_2(N) \geq 8 \mu^{2}+ \log_2(2 \mu)\cdot \lambda$ the probability that $f(\mathbf{x}) \equiv 0 \bmod N$ is bounded by $2^{-\lambda} +\frac{\mu}{m}$. We also present a computational method that derives tighter bounds for specific values of $\mu$ and $\lambda$. For example, our analysis shows that for $\mu=20$, $\lambda = 120$ (values typical in cryptography applications), and $\log_2(N)\geq 416$ the probability is bounded by $ 2^{-120}+\frac{20}{m}$. We provide a table of computational bounds for a large set of $\mu$ and $\lambda$ values.

In CRYPTO'19, Gohr proposed a new cryptanalysis strategy using machine learning algorithms. Combining the differential-neural distinguisher with a differential path and integrating the advanced key recovery procedure, Gohr achieved a 12-round key recovery attack on Speck32/64. Chen and Yu improved prediction accuracy of differential-neural distinguisher considering derived features from multiple-ciphertext pairs instead of single-ciphertext pairs. By modifying the kernel size of initial convolutional layer to capture more dimensional information, the prediction accuracy of differential-neural distinguisher can be improved for for three reduced symmetric ciphers. For DES, we improve the prediction accuracy of (5-6)-round differential-neural distinguisher and train a new 7-round differential-neural distinguisher. For Chaskey, we improve the prediction accuracy of (3-4)-round differential-neural distinguisher. For PRESENT, we improve the prediction accuracy of (6-7)-round differential-neural distinguisher. The source codes are available in https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1i0RciZlGZsEpCyW-wQAy7zzJeOLJNWqL?usp=sharing.

Attribute based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic technique allowing fine-grained access control by enabling one-to-many encryption. Existing ABE constructions suffer from at least one of the following limitations. First, single point of failure on security meaning that, once an authority is compromised, an adversary can either easily break the confidentiality of the encrypted data or effortlessly prevent legitimate users from accessing data; second, the lack of user and/or attribute revocation mechanism achieving forward secrecy; third, a heavy computation workload is placed on data user; last but not least, the lack of adaptive security in standard models.

In this paper, we propose the first single-point-of-failure free multi-authority ciphertext-policy ABE that simultaneously (1) ensures robustness for both decryption key issuing and access revocation while achieving forward secrecy; (2) enables outsourced decryption to reduce the decryption overhead for data users that have limited computational resources; and (3) achieves adaptive (full) security in standard models. The provided theoretical complexity comparison shows that our construction introduces linear storage and computation overheads that occurs only once during its setup phase, which we believe to be a reasonable price to pay to achieve all previous features.

This paper explores a modular design architecture aimed at helping blockchains (and other SMR implementation) to scale to a very large number of processes. This comes in contrast to existing monolithic architectures that interleave transaction dissemination, ordering, and execution in a single functionality. To achieve this we first split the monolith to multiple layers which can use existing distributed computing primitives. The exact specification of the data dissemination are formally defined by the Proof of Availability & Retrieval (PoA&R) abstraction. Solutions to the PoA&R problem contain two related sub-protocols: one that ``pushes'' information into the network and another that ``pulls'' this information. Regarding the latter, there is a dearth of research literature which is rectified in this paper. We present a family of pulling sub-protocols and rigorously analyzing them. Extensive simulations support the theoretical claims of efficiency and robustness in case of a very large number of players. Finally, actual implementation and deployment on a small number of machines (roughly the size of several industrial systems) demonstrates the viability of the architecture's paradigm.

We present a novel compiler for transforming arbitrary, passively secure MPC protocols into efficient protocols with covert security and public verifiability in the honest majority setting. Our compiler works for protocols with any number of parties > 2 and treats the passively secure protocol in a black-box manner.

In multi-party computation (MPC), covert security provides an attractive trade-off between the security of actively secure protocols and the efficiency of passively secure protocols. In this security notion, honest parties are only required to detect an active attack with some constant probability, referred to as the deterrence rate. Extending covert security with public verifiability additionally ensures that any party, even an external one not participating in the protocol, is able to identify the cheaters if an active attack has been detected.

Recently, Faust et al. (EUROCRYPT 2021) and Scholl et al. (Pre-print 2021) introduced similar covert security compilers based on computationally expensive time-lock puzzles. At the cost of requiring an honest majority, our work avoids the use of time-lock puzzles completely. Instead, we adopt a much more efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme to achieve a similar functionality. This obviates the need for a trusted setup and a general-purpose actively secure MPC protocol. We show that our computation and communication costs are orders of magnitude lower while achieving the same deterrence rate.

Security concerns for IoT applications have been alarming because of their widespread use in different enterprise systems. The potential threats to these applications are constantly emerging and changing, and therefore, sophisticated and dependable defense solutions are necessary against such threats. With the rapid development of IoT networks and evolving threat types, the traditional machine learning-based IDS must update to cope with the security requirements of the current sustainable IoT environment. In recent years, deep learning, and deep transfer learning have progressed and experienced great success in different fields and have emerged as a potential solution for dependable network intrusion detection. However, new and emerging challenges have arisen related to the accuracy, efficiency, scalability, and dependability of the traditional IDS in a heterogeneous IoT setup. This manuscript proposes a deep transfer learning-based dependable IDS model that outperforms several existing approaches. The unique contributions include effective attribute selection, which is best suited to identify normal and attack scenarios for a small amount of labeled data, designing a dependable deep transfer learning-based ResNet model, and evaluating considering real-world data. To this end, a comprehensive experimental performance evaluation has been conducted. Extensive analysis and performance evaluation show that the proposed model is robust, more efficient, and has demonstrated better performance, ensuring dependability.

We present UnTraceable Transactions (UTT), a system for decentralized ecash with accountable privacy. UTT is the first ecash system that obtains three critical properties: (1) it provides decentralized trust by implementing the ledger, bank, auditor, and registration authorities via threshold cryptography and Byzantine Fault Tolerant infrastructure; (2) it balances accountability and privacy by implementing anonymity budgets: users can anonymously send payments, but only up to a limited amount of currency per month. Past this point, transactions can either be made public or subjected to customizable auditing rules; (3) by carefully choosing cryptographic building blocks and co-designing the cryptography and decentralization, UTT is tailored for high throughput and low latency. With a combination of optimized cryptographic building blocks and vertical scaling (optimistic concurrency control), UTT can provide almost 1,000 payments with accountable privacy per second, with latencies of around 100 milliseconds and less. Through horizontal scaling (multiple shards), UTT can scale to tens of thousands of such transactions per second. With 60 shards we measure over 10,000 transactions with accountable privacy per second.

We formally define and prove the security of UTT using an MPC-style ideal functionality. Along the way, we define a new MPC framework that captures the security of reactive functionalities in a stand-alone setting, thus filling an important gap in the MPC literature. Our new framework is compatible with practical instantiations of cryptographic primitives and provides a trade-off between concrete efficiency and provable security that may be also useful for future work.

The stock markets have two primary functions, that of providing liquidity and price discovery. While the market micro-structure was mostly ignored or assumed to function ideally for the purpose of asset pricing, O'Hara (Journal of Finance, 2003) has established that both liquidity and price discovery affect asset pricing, and in particular asset returns. Easley and O'Hara (Journal of Finance 2004) have demonstrated that informed investors' private information is not reflected efficiently in price discovery. We argue that the periodic price discovery has both positive and negative consequences for asset returns. In particular, the inefficient reflection of investors' information during price discovery incentivizes them to conduct research. However, this requires that the auctioneer be ideal or fully trusted. In this work we propose using cryptography, and in particular multi-party secure computation, to setup a novel stock market structure that, to a large extent, removes the negative consequences of liquidity costs and periodic price discovery, as well as incentivizes investors to conduct research. Interestingly, the proposed market structure takes us back to the early days of stock markets, i.e. periodic call markets, but with the not so ``trusted'' auctioneer replaced by a decentralized set of parties where no individual party (or small coalition) gets to know the order book.

The increasing use of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin has run into inherent scalability limitations of blockchains. Payment channel networks, or PCNs, promise to greatly increase scalability by conducting the vast majority of transactions outside the blockchain while leveraging it as a final settlement protocol. Unfortunately, first-generation PCNs have significant privacy flaws. In particular, even though transactions are conducted off-chain, anonymity guarantees are very weak.

In this work, we present Astrape, a novel PCN construction that achieves strong security and anonymity guarantees with simple, black-box cryptography, given a blockchain with flexible scripting. Existing anonymous PCN constructions often integrate with specific, often custom-designed, cryptographic constructions. But at a slight cost to asymptotic performance, Astrape can use any generic public-key signature scheme and any secure hash function, modeled as a random oracle, to achieve strong anonymity, by using a unique construction reminiscent of onion routing. This allows Astrape to achieve provable security that is "generic" over the computational hardness assumptions of the underlying primitives. Astrape's simple cryptography also lends itself to more straightforward security proofs compared to existing systems. Furthermore, we evaluate Astrape's performance, including that of a concrete implementation on the Bitcoin Cash blockchain. We show that despite worse theoretical time complexity compared to state-of-the-art systems that use custom cryptography, Astrape operations on average have a very competitive performance of less than 10 milliseconds of computation and 1 KB of communication on commodity hardware. Astrape explores a new avenue to secure and anonymous PCNs that achieves similar or better performance compared to existing solutions.

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is vitally important to security and privacy online, yet currently under-defined. In this note, we map intuitive notions of end-to-end encryption to existing notions of encryption. In particular, we introduce the notion of endness as an notion which end-to-end systems must achieve in addition to traditional security notions associated with encryption, and provide formalizations to capture practical requirements. We demonstrate how the notion of encryption plus endness relates to a variety of case studies that either meet normative security understanding of E2EE or are considered normative failures. Finally, we extend these observations to authentication, and real-world authenticated channel use variants, including authenticated encryption with associated data and message franking.

This paper deals with white-box implementations of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA): First, we consider attack paths to break such implementations. In particular, we provide a systematic overview of various fault attacks, to which ECDSA white-box implementations are especially susceptible. Then, we propose different mathematical countermeasures, mainly based on masking/blinding of sensitive variables, in order to prevent or at least make such attacks more difficult. We also briefly mention some typical implementational countermeasures and their challenges in the ECDSA white-box scenario.

Our work has been initiated by the CHES challenge WhibOx Contest 2021, which consisted of designing and breaking white-box ECDSA implementations, so called challenges. We illustrate our results and findings by means of the submitted challenges and provide a comprehensive overview which challenge could be solved in which way. Furthermore, we analyze selected challenges in more details.

A multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) scheme allows a public server to evaluate arbitrary circuits over ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. One of the main drawbacks of MKFHE schemes is the need for a ciphertext expansion procedure prior to evaluation, which combines ciphertexts encrypted under different keys to a (much larger) ciphertext encrypted under a concatenated key. In this paper, we present a new (leveled) RLWE-based MKFHE scheme without ciphertext expansion.

In this paper, we present an efficient side-channel key recovery attack against Dumbo, the 160-bit variant of NIST lightweight cryptography contest candidate Elephant. We use Correlation Power Analysis to attack the first round of the Spongent permutation during the absorption of the first block of associated data. The full attack runs in about a minute on a common laptop and only requires around 30 power traces to recover the entire secret key on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller clocked at 7.4MHz. This is, to the best of our knoweledge, the first attack of this type presented against Elephant.

Blockchain ``on-chain'' oracles are critical to the functioning of many Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols. We analyze these oracles for manipulation resistance. Specifically, we analyze the cost of manipulating on-chain time-weighted average price (TWAP) oracles that use the arithmetic mean. It has been assumed that manipulating a TWAP oracle with the well-known multi-block attack is expensive and scales linearly with the length of the TWAP. We question this assumption with two novel results. First, we describe a single-block attack that works under the same setting as the multi-block attack but costs less to execute. Second, we describe a multi-block MEV (MMEV) style attack where the attacker colludes with a miner/proposer who can mine/propose two blocks in a row. This MMEV style attack makes oracle manipulation orders of magnitude cheaper than previously known attacks. In the proof-of-work setting, MMEV can be done by selfish mining even with very low shares of hashpower.

In 2002, Chow et al. initiated the formal study of white-box cryptography and introduced the CEJO framework. Since then, various white-box designs based on their framework have been proposed, all of them broken. Ranea and Preneel proposed a different method in 2020, called self-equivalence encodings and analyzed its security for AES. In this paper, we apply this method to generate the first academic white-box Speck implementations using self-equivalence encodings. Although we focus on Speck in this work, our design could easily be adapted to protect other add-rotate-xor (ARX) ciphers. Then, we analyze the security of our implementation against key-recovery attacks. We propose an algebraic attack to fully recover the master key and external encodings from a white-box Speck implementation, with limited effort required. While this result shows that the linear and affine self-equivalences of self-equivalence encodings are insecure, we hope that this negative result will spur additional research in higher-degree self-equivalence encodings for white-box cryptography. Finally, we created an open-source Python project implementing our design, publicly available at https://github.com/jvdsn/white-box-speck. We give an overview of five strategies to generate output code, which can be used to improve the performance of the white-box implementation. We compare these strategies and determine how to generate the most performant white-box Speck code. Furthermore, this project could be employed to test and compare the efficiency of attacks on white-box implementations using self-equivalence encodings.

We cryptanalyse the SHealS and HealS cryptosystems of Fouotsa and Petit from Asiacrypt 2021.

We proposed three general frameworks F1,F2, and F3 for n-to-n-bit PRFs with one, two parallel, and two serial public permutation calls respectively, where every permutation is preceded and followed by any bitwise linear mappings. We analyze them in the Q2 model where attackers have quantum-query access to PRFs and permutations. Our results show F1 is not secure with O(n) quantum queries while its PRFs achieve n/2-bit security in the classical setting, and F2,F3 are not secure with O(2^{n/2}n) quantum queries while their PRFs, such as SoEM, PDMMAC, and pEDM, achieve 2n/3-bit security in the classical setting. Besides, we attack three general instantiations XopEM, EDMEM, and EDMDEM of F2,F3, which derive from replacing the two PRPs in Xop, EDM, and EDMD with two independent EM constructions, and concrete PRF instantiations DS-SoEM, PDMMAC, and pEDM, SoKAC21 of F2,F3, with at most O(2^{n/2}n) quantum queries.