International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Selective opening (SO) security is one of the most important security notions of public key encryption (PKE) in a multi-user setting. Even though messages and random coins used in some ciphertexts are leaked, SO security guarantees the confidentiality of the other ciphertexts. Actually, it is shown that there exist PKE schemes which meet the standard security such as indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA security) but do not meet SO security against chosen ciphertext attacks. Hence, it is important to consider SO security in the multi-user setting. On the other hand, many researchers have studied cryptosystems in the security model where adversaries can submit quantum superposition queries (i.e., quantum queries) to oracles. In particular, IND-CCA secure PKE and KEM schemes in the quantum random oracle model have been intensively studied so far. In this paper, we show that two kinds of constructions of hybrid encryption schemes meet simulation-based SO security against chosen ciphertext attacks (SIM-SO-CCA security) in the quantum random oracle model or the quantum ideal cipher model. The first scheme is constructed from any IND-CCA secure KEM and any simulatable data encapsulation mechanism (DEM). The second one is constructed from any IND-CCA secure KEM based on Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and any strongly unforgeable message authentication code (MAC). We can apply any IND-CCA secure KEM scheme to the first one if the underlying DEM scheme meets simulatability, whereas we can apply strongly unforgeable MAC to the second one if the underlying KEM is based on Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation.

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) is a cryptographic protocol to share a common session key among multiple parties. Usually, PKI-based AKE schemes are designed to guarantee secrecy of the session key and mutual authentication. However, in practice, there are many cases where mutual authentication is undesirable such as in anonymous networks like Tor and Riffle, or difficult to achieve due to the certificate management at the user level such as the Internet. Goldberg et al. formulated a model of anonymous one-sided AKE which guarantees the anonymity of the client by allowing only the client to authenticate the server, and proposed a concrete scheme. However, existing anonymous one-sided AKE schemes are only known to be secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose generic constructions of anonymous one-sided AKE in the random oracle model and in the standard model, respectively. Our constructions allow us to construct the first post-quantum anonymous one-sided AKE scheme from isogenies in the standard model.

In this article we revisit smoothing bounds in parallel between lattices \emph{and} codes. Initially introduced by Micciancio and Regev, these bounds were instantiated with Gaussian distributions and were crucial for arguing the security of many lattice-based cryptosystems. Unencumbered by direct application concerns, we provide a systematic study of how these bounds are obtained for both lattices \emph{and} codes, transferring techniques between both areas. We also consider various spherically symmetric noise distributions. We found that the best strategy for a worst-case bound combines Parseval's Identity, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and the second linear programming bound, and this for both codes and lattices, and for all noise distributions at hand. For an average-case analysis, the linear programming bound can be replaced by a tight average count. This alone gives optimal results for spherically uniform noise over random codes and random lattices. This also improves previous Gaussian smoothing bound for worst-case lattices, but surprisingly this provides even better results for uniform noise than for Gaussian (or Bernouilli noise for codes). This counter-intuitive situation can be resolved by adequate decomposition and truncation of Gaussian and Bernouilli distribution into a superposition of uniform noise, giving further improvement for those cases, and putting them on par with the uniform cases.

Privacy preserving keyword search (PPKS) is investigated in this paper, which aims to ensure the privacy of clients and servers when a database is accessed. Range query has been recognized as a common operation in databases. In this paper, a formal definition of PPKS supporting range query is given, a scheme (PPRKS) is presented in accordance with Paillier’s cryptosystem. To the best of our knowledge, PPRKS has been the only existing scheme that can effectively preserve the privacy of range keyword search. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the security of PPRKS is dependent on the semantic security of Paillier’s cryptosystem. A detailed performance analysis and a simulation are conducted to verify the practicality of PPRKS. As revealed by the theoretical analysis and the experimental results, the proposed scheme is practical.

Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption is a versatile primitive that has been considered extensively to securely manage data in practice. Especially completely unbounded schemes are attractive, because they do not restrict the sets of attributes and policies. So far, any such schemes that support negations in the access policy or that have online/offline extensions have an inefficient decryption algorithm.

In this work, we propose GLUE (Generalized, Large-universe, Unbounded and Expressive), which is a novel scheme that allows for the efficient implementation of the decryption while allowing the support of both negations and online/offline extensions. We achieve these properties simultaneously by uncovering an underlying dependency between encryption and decryption, which allows for a flexible trade-off in their efficiency. For the security proof, we devise a new technique that enables us to generalize multiple existing schemes. As a result, we obtain a completely unbounded scheme supporting negations that, to the best of our knowledge, outperforms all existing schemes in the decryption algorithm.

SPEEDY is a family of ultra low latency block ciphers proposed by Leander, Moos, Moradi and Rasoolzadeh at TCHES 2021. Although the designers gave some differential/linear distinguishers for reduced rounds, a concrete cryptanalysis considering key recovery attacks on SPEEDY was completely missing. The latter is crucial to understand the security margin of designs like SPEEDY which typically use low number of rounds to have low latency. In this work, we present the first third-party cryptanalysis of SPEEDY-$r$-192, where $r \in \{5, 6, 7\}$ is the number of rounds and 192 is block and key size in bits. We identify cube distinguishers for 2 rounds with data complexities $2^{14}$ and $2^{13}$, while the differential/linear distinguishers provided by designers has a complexity of $2^{39}$. Notably, we show that there are several such cube distinguishers, and thus, we then provide a generic description of them. We also investigate the structural properties of 13-dimensional cubes and give experimental evidence that the partial algebraic normal form of certain state bits after two rounds is always the same. Next, we utilize the 2 rounds distinguishers to mount a key recovery attack on 3 rounds SPEEDY. Our attack require $2^{17.6}$ data, $2^{25.5}$ bits of memory and $2^{52.5}$ time. Our results show that the practical variant of SPEEDY, i.e., SPEEDY-5-192 has a security margin of only 2 rounds. We believe our work will bring new insights in understanding the security of SPEEDY.

To enhance the security or the efficiency of the standard RSA cryptosystem, some variants have been proposed based on elliptic curves, Gaussian integers or Lucas sequences. A typical type of these variants which we called Type-A variants have the specified modified Euler's totient function $\psi(N)=(p^2-1)(q^2-1)$. But in 2018, based on cubic Pell equation, Murru and Saettone presented a new RSA-like cryptosystem, and it is another type of RSA variants which we called Type-B variants, since their scheme has $\psi(N)=(p^2+p+1)(q^2+q+1)$. For RSA-like cryptosystems, four key-related attacks have been widely analyzed, e.g., the small private key attack, the multiple private keys attack, the partial key exposure attack and the small prime difference attack. These attacks are well-studied on both standard RSA and Type-A variants. Recently, the small private key attack on Type-B variants has also been analyzed. In this paper, we make further cryptanalysis of Type-B variants, that is, we propose the first theoretical results of multiple private keys attack, partial key exposure attack as well as small prime difference attack on Type-B variants, and the validity of our attacks are verified by experiments. Our results show that for all three attacks, Type-B variants are less secure than standard RSA.

In this paper, we investigate the cardinality, denoted by $(j_1,j_2,j_3,j_4)_2$, of the intersection of $(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{j_1}-1)\cap(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{j_2}-2)\cap(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{j_3}-3) \cap(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{j_4}-4)$ for $j_1,j_2,j_3,j_4\in\{0,1\}$, where $\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_0, \mathcal{C}^{(2)}_1$ are the cyclotomic classes of order two over the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$, $p$ is an odd prime and $n$ is a positive integer. By making most use of the results on cyclotomic classes of orders two and four as well as the cardinality of the intersection $(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{i_1}-1)\cap(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{i_2}-2)\cap(\mathcal{C}^{(2)}_{i_3}-3)$, we compute the values of $(j_1,j_2,j_3,j_4)_2$ in the case of $p=5$, where $i_1,i_2,i_3\in\{0,1\}$. As a consequence, the power function $x^{\frac{5^n-1}{2}+2}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{5^n}$ is shown to be differentially $3$-uniform and its differential spectrum is also completely determined.

We construct a single-server pre-processing Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme with optimal bandwidth and server computation (up to poly-logarithmic factors), assuming hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. Our scheme achieves amortized $\widetilde{O}_{\lambda}(\sqrt{n})$ server and client computation and $\widetilde{O}_\lambda(1)$ bandwidth per query, completes in a single roundtrip, and requires $\widetilde{O}_\lambda(\sqrt{n})$ client storage. In particular, we achieve a significant reduction in bandwidth over the state-of-the-art scheme by Corrigan-Gibbs, Henzinger, and Kogan (Eurocrypt'22): their scheme requires as much as $\widetilde{O}_{\lambda}(\sqrt{n})$ bandwidth per query, with comparable computational and storage overhead as ours.

In recent years, permisionless blockchains have received a lot of attention both from industry and academia, where substantial effort has been spent to develop consensus protocols that are secure under the assumption that less than half (or a third) of a given resource (e.g., stake or computing power) is controlled by corrupted parties. The security proofs of these consensus protocols usually assume the availability of a network functionality guaranteeing that a block sent by an honest party is received by all honest parties within some bounded time. To obtain an overall protocol that is secure under the same corruption assumption, it is therefore necessary to combine the consensus protocol with a network protocol that achieves this property under that assumption. In practice, however, the underlying network is typically implemented by flooding protocols that are not proven to be secure in the setting where a fraction of the considered total weight can be corrupted. This has led to many so-called eclipse attacks on existing protocols and tailor-made fixes against specific attacks.

To close this apparent gap, we propose a flooding protocol that provably delivers sent messages to all honest parties after a logarithmic number of steps. We prove security in the setting where all parties are publicly assigned a positive weight and the adversary can corrupt parties accumulating up to a constant fraction of the total weight. This can directly be used in the proof-of-stake setting, but is not limited to it. To prove the security of our protocol, we combine known results about the diameter of Erdős–Rényi graphs with reductions between different types of random graphs. We further show that the efficiency of our protocol is asymptotically optimal.

The practicality of our protocol is supported by extensive simulations for different numbers of parties, weight distributions, and corruption strategies. The simulations confirm our theoretical results and show that messages are delivered quickly regardless of the weight distribution, whereas protocols that are oblivious of the parties' weights completely fail if the weights are unevenly distributed. Furthermore, the average message complexity per party of our protocol is within a small constant factor of such a protocol. Hence, security in a weighted setting essentially comes for free with our techniques.

The Noise protocol framework defines a succinct notation and execution framework for a large class of 59+ secure channel protocols, some of which are used in popular applications such as WhatsApp and WireGuard. We present a verified implementation of a Noise protocol compiler that takes any Noise protocol, and produces an optimized C implementation with extensive correctness and security guarantees. To this end, we formalize the complete Noise stack in F*, from the low-level cryptographic library to a high-level API. We write our compiler also in F*, prove that it meets our formal specification once and for all, and then specialize it on-demand for any given Noise protocol, relying on a novel technique called hybrid embedding. We thusa establish functional correctness, memory safety and a form of side-channel resistance for the generated C code for each Noise protocol. We propagate these guarantees to the high-level API, using defensive dynamic checks to prevent incorrect uses of the protocol. Finally, we formally state and prove the security of our Noise code, by building on a symbolic model of cryptography in F*, and formally link high-level API security goals stated in terms of security levels to low-level cryptographic guarantees. Ours are the first comprehensive verification results for a protocol compiler that targets C code and the first verified implementations of any Noise protocol. We evaluate our framework by generating implementations for all 59 Noise protocols and by comparing the size, performance, and security of our verified code against other (unverified) implementations and prior security analyses of Noise.

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows distrustful parties to jointly compute some functions while keeping their private secrets unrevealed. MPC adversaries are often categorized as semi-honest and malicious, depending on whether they follow the protocol specifications or not. Covert security was first introduced by Aumann and Lindell in 2007, which models a third type of active adversaries who cheat but can be caught with a probability. However, this probability is predefined externally, and the misbehavior detection must be made by other honest participants with cut-and-choose in current constructions. In this paper, we propose a new security notion called security against honorific adversaries, who may cheat during the protocol execution but are extremely unwilling to be punished. Intuitively, honorific adversaries can cheat successfully, but decisive evidence of misbehavior will be left to honest parties with a probability close to one. By introducing an independent but not trusted auditor to the MPC ideal functionality in the universal composability framework (UC), we avoid heavy cryptographic machinery in detection and complicated discussion about the probability of being caught. With this new notion, we construct new provably secure protocols without cut-and-choose for garbled circuits that are much more efficient than those in the covert and malicious model, with slightly more overhead than passively secure protocols.

Unlike conventional ABE systems, which support Boolean attributes (with only 2 states: "1" and "0", or "Present" and "Absent"), weighted Attribute-based encryption schemes also support numerical values attached to attributes, and each terminal node of the access structure contains a threshold for a minimum weight. We propose a weighted ABE system, with access policy of logarithmic expansion, by dividing each weighted attribute in sub-attributes. On top of that, we show that the decryption can be parallelized, leading to a notable improvement in running time, compared to the serial version.

This work describes a class of Algorithm Substitution Attack (ASA) generically targeting the receiver of a communication between two parties. Our work provides a unified framework that applies to any scheme where a secret key is held by the receiver; in particular, message authentication schemes (MACs), authenticated encryption (AEAD) and public key encryption (PKE). Our unified framework brings together prior work targeting MAC schemes and AEAD schemes; we extend prior work by showing that public key encryption may also be targeted.

ASAs were initially introduced by Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway in light of revelations concerning mass surveillance, as a novel attack class against the confidentiality of encryption schemes. Such an attack replaces one or more of the regular scheme algorithms with a subverted version that aims to reveal information to an adversary (engaged in mass surveillance), while remaining undetected by users. Previous work looking at ASAs against encryption schemes can be divided into two groups. ASAs against PKE schemes target key generation by creating subverted public keys that allow an adversary to recover the secret key. ASAs against symmetric encryption target the encryption algorithm and leak information through a subliminal channel in the ciphertexts. We present a new class of attack that targets the decryption algorithm of an encryption scheme for symmetric encryption and public key encryption, or the verification algorithm for an authentication scheme. We present a generic framework for subverting a cryptographic scheme between a sender and receiver, and show how a decryption oracle allows a subverter to create a subliminal channel which can be used to leak secret keys. We then show that the generic framework can be applied to authenticated encryption with associated data, message authentication schemes, public key encryption and KEM/DEM constructions.

We consider practical considerations and specific conditions that apply for particular schemes, strengthening the generic approach. Furthermore, we show how the hybrid subversion of key generation and decryption algorithms can be used to amplify the effectiveness of our decryption attack. We argue that this attack represents an attractive opportunity for a mass surveillance adversary. Our work serves to refine the ASA model and contributes to a series of papers that raises awareness and understanding about what is possible with ASAs.

TASER: Topics in hArdware SEcurity and RISC-V
affiliated workshop at CHES 2022
https://ches.iacr.org/2022/affiliated.php

The COSIC Research group at the University of Leuven in Belgium is one of the largest groups in applied cryptography. We have a strong tradition in collaborating with industry and we provide an excellent level of base funding and support. We are looking for new research professors in the area of hardware security and applied cryptography; these are prestigious positions with a reduced teaching load.

Candidates are expected to have an excellent publication record. They should present an ambitious plan to develop their research area in the COSIC team.

Junior candidates can apply for a tenure track position (assistant professor); more experienced candidates can be appointed in a more senior position.

Candidates should send a motivation letter, a brief CV (2 pages), a research plan (2 pages) and a publication list by Monday June 20 2022 to Saartje Verheyen (firstname.lastname@kuleuven.be).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Ingrid Verbauwhede and Prof. Bart Preneel (firstname.lastname@kuleuven.be).

Xiamen University Malaysia is now seeking highly motivated, committed and qualified individuals for academic teaching positions in computer science and cyber security.

Candidates in any areas of computer science and cyber security are welcome to apply. Preferences will be given to candidates with expertise in, but not limited to, cyber security, mathematics, cryptology, network security, digital forensics. Applicants must possess a PhD degree in a related discipline.

Applicants with specific teaching and research interests in TWO OR MORE of the following areas are encouraged to apply:

• Calculus
• Linear Algebra
• Discrete Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Design & Analysis of Algorithms
• Computer Composition
• Operating Systems
• Cyber Security
• Modern Cryptography
• Digital Forensics and Investigation
• Network Attack and Defence Technology
• Big Data Analytics
• Malware Analysis
• Cryptanalysis
• ARM Assembly Language

HOW TO APPLY
Applicants are invited to submit a digital application packet to: iftekhar.salam@xmu.edu.my

The subject line of your email must include: your name, relevant academic discipline, and the specific position for which you are applying for. All application packets must include the following attachments:

1. Your detailed and current CV with publication (*Asterisk to indicate corresponding author, include Indexing & Quartile);
2. Cover letter;
3. Evidence of academic qualifications (Bachelor, Master & PhD Certificate; Bachelor, Master & PhD Transcripts and Professional Certificates);
4. 3-5 Full-Text publications (if applicable);
5. Teaching evaluation (if applicable);
6. Two academic references (at least one of them is the applicant’s current/most recent employer).

The positions will remain open until filled.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: iftekhar.salam@xmu.edu.my

The University of Luxembourg invites applications for a Ph.D. position in the general area of symmetric cryptography. The successful candidate will join the CryptoLux group of Prof. Alex Biryukov, which is affiliated to both the Department of Computer Science (DCS) and the Interdisciplinary Center for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT).

Research Topics

• Cryptanalysis and design of cryptographic primitives, lightweight ciphers, hash functions
• Financial cryptography (security of distributed ledgers, smart contracts)
• Privacy-enhancing technologies (Tor-like networks, privacy for cryptocurrencies, blockchains)
• White-box cryptography

Candidate Profile

• M.Sc. degree in computer science or applied mathematics with outstanding grades (GPA >= 85%)
• Strong mathematical and/or algorithmic CS background
• Some background in cryptography or information security
• Good programming skills (C/C++, Python, math tools, etc.)
• Fluent written and verbal communication skills in English

The University of Luxembourg offers a Ph.D. study program with an initial contract of 36 months, with a further possible 1-year extension if required. The successful candidate will work in one of the most international universities in the world and will have a chance to participate in a well-known security research center. The position will be available from July 2022.

Applications, written in English, should be sent by email to alex.biryukov@uni.lu. The application material should include a curriculum vitae (with photo, educational background, work experience), a brief research statement and topics of particular interest to the candidate (max. 1 page), a transcript of all modules and results from university-level courses taken (with overall GPAs) and contact information for 2-3 references.

Application deadline: 1 June 2022. Early submission is encouraged; applications will be processed upon arrival.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Alex Biryukov (email: alex.biryukov@uni.lu)

There is a vacancy for up to 3 positions as PhD Research Fellow in Informatics – Cryptology at the Department of Informatics. The position is for a fixed-term period of 3 years with the possibility of a 4th year. Potential work tasks related to some of the topics: - Statistical and algebraic cryptanalysis of modern block and stream ciphers; - Cryptanalysis of lattice-based postquantum cryptography protocols; - Construction of cryptographically optimal functions and related objects.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Lilya Budaghyan, Head of the Selmer center at the Department of Informatics (firstname.surname@uib.no).

More information: https://www.jobbnorge.no/en/available-jobs/job/226570/phd-research-fellow-in-informatics-cryptology-up-to-3-positions

We offer a 3-year fully funded Ph.D. position starting fall 2022 at University of Rouen Normandie within the LITIS lab (https://www.litislab.fr/en/) with a focus on the design and cryptanalysis of code-based and multivariate cryptographic primitives. The goal is to focus more precisely on algebraic cryptanalysis which consists in building a system of multivariate equations such that the solution set contains (part of) the secret of a cryptographic primitive. Furthermore, the algebraic modeling of several problems, such as the MinRank problem or the Rank Decoding problem, have recently witnessed important progress in their analysis. The Ph.D. candidate will pursue the analysis of various algebraic modeling on code-based or multivariate schemes (e.g. Classic McEliece, GeMSS, Rainbow, DURANDAL, MQDSS, etc).

The candidate is expected to have a strong background in mathematics, computer algebra, in particular in polynomial system solving (e.g. Gröbner basis algorithms), and cryptography. She/he must have a Master degree or equivalent related to these areas.

Funding for attending international conferences, summer schools, and visiting other research centers will also be provided.

To apply, send the following documents to Magali Bardet (magali.bardet@univ-rouen.fr) and Ayoub Otmani (ayoub.otmani@univ-rouen.fr):

• Motivation letter
• CV
• Transcripts of marks
• Up to 3 reference letters

Applications will be considered until the position is filled but a first screening of candidates will take place by May 25, 2022. Interested applicants are therefore encouraged to send their documents before that date.

Keywords. Post-quantum cryptography, code-based cryptography, multivariate cryptography, MinRank problem, algebraic cryptanalysis, Gröbner basis.

Closing date for applications:

Contact:

• Magali Bardet (magali.bardet@univ-rouen.fr)
• Ayoub Otmani (ayoub.otmani@univ-rouen.fr)

More information: https://www.litislab.fr/en/