IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
23 May 2022
Zhenyu Huang, Siwei Sun
Matthieu Rambaud, Antoine Urban
Adriano Koleci
Shingo Sato, Junji Shikata
Ren Ishibashi, Kazuki Yoneyama
Thomas Debris-Alazard, Léo Ducas, Nicolas Resch, Jean-Pierre Tillich
Yu Zhang, Zongbin Wang, Tihong Qin
Marloes Venema, Greg Alpár
In this work, we propose GLUE (Generalized, Large-universe, Unbounded and Expressive), which is a novel scheme that allows for the efficient implementation of the decryption while allowing the support of both negations and online/offline extensions. We achieve these properties simultaneously by uncovering an underlying dependency between encryption and decryption, which allows for a flexible trade-off in their efficiency. For the security proof, we devise a new technique that enables us to generalize multiple existing schemes. As a result, we obtain a completely unbounded scheme supporting negations that, to the best of our knowledge, outperforms all existing schemes in the decryption algorithm.
Raghvendra Rohit, Santanu Sarkar
Gongyu Shi, Geng Wang, Dawu Gu
Tingting Pang, Nian Li, Xiangyong Zeng
Mingxun Zhou, Wei-Kai Lin, Yiannis Tselekounis, Elaine Shi (random author ordering)
Chen-Da Liu-Zhang, Christian Matt, Ueli Maurer, Guilherme Rito, Søren Eller Thomsen
To close this apparent gap, we propose a flooding protocol that provably delivers sent messages to all honest parties after a logarithmic number of steps. We prove security in the setting where all parties are publicly assigned a positive weight and the adversary can corrupt parties accumulating up to a constant fraction of the total weight. This can directly be used in the proof-of-stake setting, but is not limited to it. To prove the security of our protocol, we combine known results about the diameter of Erdős–Rényi graphs with reductions between different types of random graphs. We further show that the efficiency of our protocol is asymptotically optimal.
The practicality of our protocol is supported by extensive simulations for different numbers of parties, weight distributions, and corruption strategies. The simulations confirm our theoretical results and show that messages are delivered quickly regardless of the weight distribution, whereas protocols that are oblivious of the parties' weights completely fail if the weights are unevenly distributed. Furthermore, the average message complexity per party of our protocol is within a small constant factor of such a protocol. Hence, security in a weighted setting essentially comes for free with our techniques.
Son Ho, Jonathan Protzenko, Abhishek Bichhawat, Karthikeyan Bhargavan
Li Duan, Yufan Jiang, Yong Li, Jörn Müller-Quade, Andy Rupp
Alexandru Ionita
Marcel Armour, Bertram Poettering
ASAs were initially introduced by Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway in light of revelations concerning mass surveillance, as a novel attack class against the confidentiality of encryption schemes. Such an attack replaces one or more of the regular scheme algorithms with a subverted version that aims to reveal information to an adversary (engaged in mass surveillance), while remaining undetected by users. Previous work looking at ASAs against encryption schemes can be divided into two groups. ASAs against PKE schemes target key generation by creating subverted public keys that allow an adversary to recover the secret key. ASAs against symmetric encryption target the encryption algorithm and leak information through a subliminal channel in the ciphertexts. We present a new class of attack that targets the decryption algorithm of an encryption scheme for symmetric encryption and public key encryption, or the verification algorithm for an authentication scheme. We present a generic framework for subverting a cryptographic scheme between a sender and receiver, and show how a decryption oracle allows a subverter to create a subliminal channel which can be used to leak secret keys. We then show that the generic framework can be applied to authenticated encryption with associated data, message authentication schemes, public key encryption and KEM/DEM constructions.
We consider practical considerations and specific conditions that apply for particular schemes, strengthening the generic approach. Furthermore, we show how the hybrid subversion of key generation and decryption algorithms can be used to amplify the effectiveness of our decryption attack. We argue that this attack represents an attractive opportunity for a mass surveillance adversary. Our work serves to refine the ASA model and contributes to a series of papers that raises awareness and understanding about what is possible with ASAs.
affiliated workshop at CHES 2022
https://ches.iacr.org/2022/affiliated.php
20 May 2022
KU Leuven, COSIC, Belgium
The COSIC Research group at the University of Leuven in Belgium is one of the largest groups in applied cryptography. We have a strong tradition in collaborating with industry and we provide an excellent level of base funding and support. We are looking for new research professors in the area of hardware security and applied cryptography; these are prestigious positions with a reduced teaching load.
Candidates are expected to have an excellent publication record. They should present an ambitious plan to develop their research area in the COSIC team.
Junior candidates can apply for a tenure track position (assistant professor); more experienced candidates can be appointed in a more senior position.
Candidates should send a motivation letter, a brief CV (2 pages), a research plan (2 pages) and a publication list by Monday June 20 2022 to Saartje Verheyen (firstname.lastname@kuleuven.be).
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Ingrid Verbauwhede and Prof. Bart Preneel (firstname.lastname@kuleuven.be).
Multiple academic teaching positions (Lecturer/ Assistant Professor/ Associate Professor/ Professor)
Xiamen University Malaysia, Sepang, Malaysia
Xiamen University Malaysia is now seeking highly motivated, committed and qualified individuals for academic teaching positions in computer science and cyber security.
Candidates in any areas of computer science and cyber security are welcome to apply. Preferences will be given to candidates with expertise in, but not limited to, cyber security, mathematics, cryptology, network security, digital forensics. Applicants must possess a PhD degree in a related discipline.
Applicants with specific teaching and research interests in TWO OR MORE of the following areas are encouraged to apply:
- Calculus
- Linear Algebra
- Discrete Mathematics
- Probability and Statistics
- Design & Analysis of Algorithms
- Computer Composition
- Operating Systems
- Cyber Security
- Modern Cryptography
- Digital Forensics and Investigation
- Network Attack and Defence Technology
- Big Data Analytics
- Malware Analysis
- Cryptanalysis
- ARM Assembly Language
HOW TO APPLY
Applicants are invited to submit a digital application packet to: iftekhar.salam@xmu.edu.my
The subject line of your email must include: your name, relevant academic discipline, and the specific position for which you are applying for. All application packets must include the following attachments:
- Your detailed and current CV with publication (*Asterisk to indicate corresponding author, include Indexing & Quartile);
- Cover letter;
- Evidence of academic qualifications (Bachelor, Master & PhD Certificate; Bachelor, Master & PhD Transcripts and Professional Certificates);
- 3-5 Full-Text publications (if applicable);
- Teaching evaluation (if applicable);
- Two academic references (at least one of them is the applicant’s current/most recent employer).
Closing date for applications:
Contact: iftekhar.salam@xmu.edu.my