IACR News
If you have a news item you wish to distribute, they should be sent to the communications secretary. See also the events database for conference announcements.
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
26 May 2022
Copenhagen, Denmark, 1 August - 4 August 2022
25 May 2022
Peeter Laud, Nikita Snetkov, and Jelizaveta Vakarjuk
In this work, we propose a new version of the two-party Crystals-Dilithium signature scheme. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness of Module-LWE and Module-SIS problems. In our construction, we follow a similar logic as Damgård et al. (PKC 2021) and use an additively homomorphic commitment scheme. However, compared to them, our protocol uses signature compression techniques from the original Crystals-Dilithium signature scheme which makes it closer to the version submitted to the NIST PQC
Seonggyeom Kim, Deukjo Hong, Jaechul Sung, and Seokhie Hong
Navid Vafaei, Sara Zarei, Nasour Bagheri, Maria Eichlseder, Robert Primas, and Hadi Soleimany
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Submission deadline: 1 September 2022
Notification: 15 January 2023
Nancy, France, 4 July - 8 July 2022
Koç University, İstanbul, Turkey
Your duties include performing research on cryptography, security, and privacy in line with our research group's focus, as well as directing graduate and undergraduate students in their research and teaching. The project funding is related to cryptography, game theory and mechanism design, and blockchain technologies.
Applicants are expected to have already obtained their Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science or related discipline with a thesis topic related to the duties above.
For more information about joining our group and projects, visit
https://crypto.ku.edu.tr/work-with-us/
Submit your application via email including
- full CV,
- transcripts of all universities attended,
- 1-3 sample publications where you are the main author,
- a detailed research proposal,
- 2-3 reference letters sent directly by the referees.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Assoc. Prof. Alptekin Küpçü
https://member.acm.org/~kupcu
More information: https://crypto.ku.edu.tr/work-with-us/
Koç University, İstanbul, Turkey
Your duties include performing research on cryptography, security, and privacy in line with our research group's focus, assist teaching, as well as collaborating with other graduate and undergraduate students. Computer Science, Mathematics, Cryptography, or related background is necessary.
For applying online, and questions about the application-process for M.Sc. and Ph.D. positions, visit
https://gsse.ku.edu.tr/en/admissions/application-requirements
All applications must be completed online. Applications with missing documents will not be considered. Applications via e-mail will not be considered. Application Requirements:
- CV
- Recommendation Letters (2 for MSc, 3 for PhD)
- TOEFL (for everyone whose native language is not English, Internet Based: Minimum Score 80)
- GRE score
- Official transcripts from all the universities attended
- Statement of Purpose
- Area of Interest Form filled online
We also have a non-thesis paid Cyber Security M.Sc. program:
https://cybersecurity.ku.edu.tr/
For more information about joining our group and projects, visit
https://crypto.ku.edu.tr/work-with-us/
Closing date for applications:
Contact: https://gsse.ku.edu.tr/en/admissions/how-to-apply/
More information: https://gsse.ku.edu.tr/en/prospective-students/how-to-apply/
Heliax (Anoma)
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Heliax HR
More information: https://heliax.dev/jobs/zero-knowledge-cryptographer-protocol-developer/
Heliax (Anoma)
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Heliax HR Team
More information: https://heliax.dev/jobs/research-cryptographer-FHE/
24 May 2022
Mateus Simoes, Lilian Bossuet, Nicolas Bruneau, Vincent Grosso, Patrick Haddad
This work shows how to create register-free masking schemes that avoid the early evaluation effect with the help of the dual-rail logic. Moreover, we employ monotonic functions with the purpose of eliminating the occurrence of glitches in combinational circuits. Finally, we evaluate different 2-share masked implementations of the PRESENT and AES S-boxes in a noiseless scenario in order to detect potential first-order leakages and to determine data propagation profiles correlated to the secret variables.
Tadas Vaitiekūnas
Giuseppe Persiano, Duong Hieu Phan, Moti Yung
However, in recent years, there is an overgrowing pressure from many governments to allow the government itself access to keys and messages of encryption systems (under various names: escrow encryption, emergency access, communication decency acts, etc.). Numerous non-direct arguments against such policies have been raised, such as "the bad guys can utilize other encryption system" so all other cryptosystems have to be declared illegal, or that "allowing the government access is an ill-advised policy since it creates a natural weak systems security point, which may attract others (to masquerade as the government)." It has remained a fundamental open issue, though, to show directly that the above mentioned efforts by a government (called here “a dictator” for brevity) which mandate breaking of the basic operational assumption (and disallowing other cryptosystems), is, in fact, a futile exercise. This is a direct technical point which needs to be made and has not been made to date.
In this work, as a technical demonstration of the futility of the dictator’s demands, we invent the notion of “Anamorphic Encryption” which shows that even if the dictator gets the keys and the messages used in the system (before anything is sent) and no other system is allowed, there is a covert way within the context of well established public-key cryptosystems for an entity to immediately (with no latency) send piggybacked secure messages which are, in spite of the stringent dictator conditions, hidden from the dictator itself! We feel that this may be an important direct technical argument against the nature of governments’ attempts to police the use of strong cryptographic systems, and we hope to stimulate further works in this direction.
Matteo Campanelli, Chaya Ganesh, Hamidreza Khoshakhlagh, Janno Siim
23 May 2022
Lisha Yao, Jian Weng, Bimei Wang
Vlad-Florin Dragoi, Brice Colombier, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Vincent Grosso
Joppe W. Bos, Brian Carlson, Joost Renes, Marius Rotaru, Daan Sprenkels, Geoffrey P. Waters
Shweta Agrawal, Damien Stehle, Anshu Yadav
• Efficiency. We reduce the amount of noise flooding used in the construction from $2^{\Omega(\lambda)}$ down to $\sqrt{Q}$, where $Q$ is the bound on the number of generated signatures and $\lambda$ is the security parameter. By using lattice hardness assumptions over polynomial rings, this allows to decrease the signature bit-lengths from $\widetilde{O}(\lambda^3)$ to~$\widetilde{O}(\lambda)$, bringing them significantly closer to practice. Our improvement relies on a careful analysis using Rényi divergence rather than statistical distance in the security proof.
• Instantiation. The construction of Boneh et al requires a standard signature scheme to be evaluated homomorphically. To instantiate this, we provide a homomorphism-friendly variant of Lyubashevsky’s signature [EUROCRYPT ’12] which achieves low circuit depth by being “rejection-free” and uses an optimal, moderate noise flooding of $\sqrt{Q}$, matching the above.
• Towards Adaptive Security. The construction of Boneh et al satisfies only selective security, where all the corrupted parties must be announced before any signing query is made. We improve this in two ways: in the Random Oracle Model, we obtain partial adaptivity where signing queries can be made before the corrupted parties are announced but the set of corrupted parties must be announced all at once. In the standard model, we obtain full adaptivity, where parties can be corrupted at any time but this construction is in a weaker pre-processing model where signers must be provided correlated randomness of length proportional to the number of signatures, in an offline preprocessing phase.