International Association
for Cryptologic Research

We study the problem of private set union in the two-party setting, providing several new constructions. We consider the case where one party is designated to receive output. In the semi-honest setting, we provide two protocols. Our four-round protocol out-performs the state-ofthe-art in both communication and computation, and has a runtime that is 1.3X-2X faster than existing protocols. Our two-round protocol is only slightly more expensive, but it is still faster than existing protocols and has the property that the receiver message can be re-used across multiple executions. All our semi-honest protocols are post-quantum secure.

In the setting where the sender is malicious, we provide the first protocols that avoid the use of expensive zero-knowledge proofs. We estimate (conservatively) that our constructions are less than 2X more expensive than the best known semi-honest constructions. As in the semi-honest setting, we describe two protocols: a faster one that requires four rounds of communication, and a slightly more expensive protocol that allows the receiver message to be re-used.

Our work draws on several techniques from the literature on private set intersection, and helps clarify how these techniques generalize (and don’t generalize) to the problem of PSU.

The learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption has been widely studied and used in cryptography. It was recently brought to new prosperity since Boyle et al. (CCS 2018), putting LPN to a central role in designing secure multi-party computation, zero-knowledge proofs, private set intersection, and many other protocols. Although most classical LPN cryptanalysis focuses on binary field $\mathbb{F}_2$, recent protocols often require LPN over larger finite fields or integer rings, which are much less studied. In this paper, we thoroughly studied the concrete security of LPN problems in these settings and how it affects the protocol design.

1. We are the first to study the security of LPN over a ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}$. Although existing protocols based on LPN over integer rings use parameters as if they are over finite fields, we found an attack that effectively reduces the weight of a noise by half compared to LPN over fields. Consequently, prior works that use LPN over integer rings overestimate up to 40 bits of security.

2. We provide a complete picture of the hardness of LPN over integer rings by showing: 1) the equivalence between its search and decisional versions; 2) an efficient reduction from LPN over $\mathbb{F}_{2}$ to LPN over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^\lambda}$; and 3) generalization of our results to any integer ring.

3. For LPN over finite fields, we found that prior analysis ignored some important differences between classical LPN cryptanalysis and the new settings, leading to overly conservative parameters. We show that even after bringing all classical LPN cryptanalysis to the setting over finite fields, much less weight of noises is needed for the same level of security.

To improve the use of LPN assumptions for a wide range of cryptographic protocols, we provide, and plan to open source, a script that estimates the concrete security of LPN over arbitrary integer rings and finite fields.

We present a new abstraction based on crusader agreement called $\textit{Binding Crusader Agreement}$ (BCA) for solving binary consensus in the $\textit{asynchronous}$ setting against an $\textit{adaptive}$ adversary. BCA has the validity, agreement, and termination properties of crusader agreement in addition to a new property called $\textit{binding}$. Binding states that before the first non-faulty party terminates, there is a value $v \in \{0,1\}$ such that no non-faulty party can output the value $v$ in any continuation of the execution. We believe that reasoning about binding explicitly, as a first order goal, greatly helps algorithm design, clarity, and analysis. Using our framework, we solve several versions of asynchronous binary agreement against an adaptive adversary in a simple and modular manner that either improves or matches the efficiency of state of the art solutions. We do this via new BCA protocols, given a strong common coin, and via new Graded BCA protocols given an $\epsilon$-good common coin. For crash failures, we reduce the expected time to terminate and we provide termination bounds that are linear in the goodness of the common coin. For Byzantine failures, we improve the expected time to terminate in the computational setting with threshold signatures, and match the state of the art in the information theoretic setting, both with a strong common coin and with an $\epsilon$-good common coin.

The LESS signature scheme, introduced in 2020, represented a fresh start for code-based signatures. In this paper we explore advanced functionalities for signature schemes, stemming from the work of LESS. First, we adapt a recent protocol of Beullens et al. to obtain a construction for (linkable) ring signatures. Then, we realize an identity-based signature scheme following the traditional approach by Joye and Neven. Our performance numbers confirm that signature schemes based on the code equivalence problem have considerable potential for practical applications.

In this article, we generalize the works of Pan et al. (Eurocrypt’21) and Porter et al. (ArXiv’21) and provide a simple condition under which an ideal lattice defines an easy instance of the shortest vector problem. Namely, we show that the more automorphisms stabilize the ideal, the easier it is to find a short vector in it. This observation was already made for prime ideals in Galois fields, and we generalize it to any ideal (whose prime factors are not ramified) of any number field. We then provide a cryptographic application of this result by showing that particular instances of the partial Vandermonde knapsack problem, also known as partial Fourier recovery problem, can be solved classically in polynomial time. As a proof of concept, we implemented our attack and managed to solve those particular instances for concrete parameter settings proposed in the literature. For random instances, we can halve the lattice dimension with non-negligible probability.

The Multivariate Quadratic ($\mathcal{MQ}$) problem consists in finding the solutions of a given system of $m$ quadratic equations in $n$ unknowns over a finite field, and it is an NP-complete problem of fundamental importance in computer science. In particular, the security of some cryptosystems against the so-called algebraic attacks is usually given by the hardness of this problem. Many algorithms to solve the $\mathcal{MQ}$ problem have been proposed and studied. Estimating precisely the complexity of all these algorithms is crucial to set secure parameters for a cryptosystem. This work collects and presents the most important classical algorithms and the estimates of their computational complexities. Moreover, it describes a software that we wrote and that makes possible to estimate the hardness of a given instance of the $\mathcal{MQ}$ problem.

Physical side-channel analysis poses a huge threat to post-quantum cryptographic schemes implemented on embedded devices. Still, secure implementations are missing for many schemes. In this paper, we present an efficient solution for masked polynomial inversion, a main component of the key generation of multiple post-quantum KEMs. For this, we introduce a polynomial-multiplicative masking scheme with efficient arbitrary order conversions from and to additive masking. Furthermore, we show how to integrate polynomial inversion and multiplication into the masking schemes to reduce costs considerably. We demonstrate the performance of our algorithms for two different post-quantum cryptographic schemes on the Cortex-M4. For NTRU, we measure an overhead of 35% for the first-order masked inversion compared to the unmasked inversion while for BIKE the overhead is as little as 11%. Lastly, we verify the security of our algorithms for the first masking order by measuring and performing a TVLA based side-channel analysis.

The BGV scheme is a state-of-the-art fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. Encryption is based on the Learning with Errors over rings (RLWE) assumption and thus each ciphertext has an associated error that grows with each homomorphic operation. To avoid failure during decryption, the growing error, also called critical quantity, needs to stay below a certain threshold. This requires a trade-off between security and error margin that influences the parameters specific to each use case. Choosing such parameters, for example the polynomial degree or the ciphertext modulus, is a challenge and requires expert knowledge.

The main idea of our work is to improve the current state of BGV parameter selection. More specifically, we provide a parameter generator for the leveled BGV scheme using theoretical bounds on the error growth and an empirically derived formula for the security estimate. For the former, we combine previous analysis using the canonical embedding norm and analysis of the residue number system. For the latter, we develop a model based on data from the Lattice Estimator tool and coupled optimization. Finally, we provide the open-source generator which outputs easy-to-use code snippets for the BGV libraries HElib and PALISADE.

Vector commitments (VC) are a cryptographic primitive that allow one to commit to a vector and then “open” some of its positions efficiently. Vector commitments are increasingly recognized as a central tool to scale highly decentralized networks of large size and whose content is dynamic. In this work, we examine the demands on the properties that an ideal vector commitment should satisfy in the light of the emerging plethora of practical applications and propose new constructions that improve the state-of-the-art in several dimensions and offer new tradeoffs. We also propose a unifying framework that captures several constructions and show how to generically achieve some properties from more basic ones. On the practical side, we focus on building efficient schemes that do not require new trusted setup (we can reuse existing ceremonies for pairing-based “powers of tau” run by real-world systems such as ZCash or Filecoin). Our (in-progress) implementation demonstrates that our work over-performs in efficiency prior schemes with same properties.

In theory, Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes allow to compute any operation over encrypted data. However in practice, one of the major difficulties lies into determining secure cryptographic parameters that reduce the computational cost of evaluating a circuit. In this paper, we propose a framework of optimization to solve this open problem. Even though it mainly focuses on TFHE, the method is generic enough to be adapted to any FHE scheme. As an application, this framework allows us to design solutions to efficiently increase the precision initially supported by the TFHE scheme to large integers. Beyond the classical radix encoding of plaintexts, we propose an alternative representation making use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which is particularly suited for parallel computation. We show how to evaluate operations on these new ciphertext types, from basic arithmetic operations, to more complex ones, such as the evaluation of a generic look-up table. The latter relies on a new efficient way to evaluate a programmable bootstrapping. Finally, we propose a plethora of applications of the optimization framework, such as true comparisons between bootstrapping operators, i.e. not only on the computation time but also on the amount of output error and more importantly the probability of failure all at once.

Certificate authorities in public key infrastructures typically require entities to prove possession of the secret key corresponding to the public key they want certified. While this is straightforward for digital signature schemes, the most efficient solution for public key encryption and key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) requires an interactive challenge-response protocol, requiring a departure from current issuance processes. In this work we investigate how to non-interactively prove possession of a KEM secret key, specifically for lattice-based KEMs, motivated by the recently proposed KEMTLS protocol which replaces signature-based authentication in TLS 1.3 with KEM-based authentication. Although there are various zero-knowledge (ZK) techniques that can be used to prove possession of a lattice key, they yield large proofs or are inefficient to generate. We propose a technique called verifiable generation, in which a proof of possession is generated at the same time as the key itself is generated. Our technique is inspired by the Picnic signature scheme and uses the multi-party-computation-in-the-head (MPCitH) paradigm; this similarity to a signature scheme allows us to bind attribute data to the proof of possession, as required by certificate issuance protocols. We show how to instantiate this approach for two lattice-based KEMs in Round 3 of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project, Kyber and FrodoKEM, and achieve reasonable proof sizes and performance. Our proofs of possession are faster and an order of magnitude smaller than the previous best MPCitH technique for knowledge of a lattice key, and in size-optimized cases can be comparable to even state-of-the-art direct lattice-based ZK proofs for Kyber. Our approach relies on a new result showing the uniqueness of Kyber and FrodoKEM secret keys, even if the requirement that all secret key components are small is partially relaxed, which may be of independent interest for improving efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs for other lattice-based statements.

We introduce a new efficient, transparent setup, polynomial commitment scheme that runs on efficient groups with logarithmic verifier and communication costs. Existing group based polynomial commitment schemes must run on costly groups such as class groups with unknown order or pairing based groups to achieve transparency (no trusted setup), making them slow in practice, and non-group based schemes such as Reed-Soloman based schemes has its own set of pros and cons compared to group based schemes.

We offer the first group based polynomial commitment scheme that does not rely on expensive pairing based groups or class groups with unknown order to achieve transparency while still providing logarithmic verifier and communication costs. While the asymptotic performance of our protocol is comparable to the current state of art, its concrete verifier and communication costs are about one order of magnitude more efficient than the current state of art schemes.

The asymptotic costs of our new transparent scheme is dominated by $3n \,\mathbb{G}$ exponential prover cost, 3 log $n \, \mathbb{G}$ exponential verifier cost and 3 log $n \, \mathbb{G}$ communication cost. Running with one thread and evaluating a polynomial of $n=2^{20}$ degree terms, the verifier cost of our protocol is $\approx 2.5 ms$, and the communication cost is $\approx 2 KB$, giving approximately 11X and 9X improvement over the current state of art.

The boomerang attack is a cryptanalysis technique that combines two short differentials instead of using a single long differential. It has been applied to many primitives, and results in the best known attacks against several AES-based ciphers (Kiasu-BC, Deoxys-BC). In this paper, we introduce a general framework for boomerang attacks with truncated differentials. While the underlying ideas are already known, we show that a careful analysis provides a significant improvement over the best boomerang attacks in the literature. In particular, we take into account structures on the plaintext and ciphertext sides, and include an analysis of the key recovery step. On 6-round AES, we obtain a structural distinguisher with complexity $2^{87}$ and a key recovery attack with complexity $2^{61}$. The truncated boomerang attacks is particularly effective against tweakable AES variants. We apply it to 8-round Kiasu-BC, resulting in the best known attack with complexity $2^{83}$ (rather than $2^{103}$). We also show an interesting use of the 6-round distinguisher on TNT-AES, a tweakable block-cipher using 6-round AES as a building block. Finally, we apply this framework to Deoxys-BC, using a MILP model to find optimal trails automatically. We obtain the best attacks against round-reduced versions of all variants of Deoxys-BC.

Horizen Labs is a blockchain technology company that designs, develops, and delivers powerful, scalable, and reliable distributed ledger solutions for business.

Our Core Engineering Team is an innovative and collaborative group of researchers and software engineers who are dedicated to the design and development of world-class blockchain-based products. We are working on cutting edge tech, including zkSNARKS, proof systems and zkVMs, to fundamentally change the way of building decentralized and scalable Web3 applications. We are looking for a Lead Zero-Knowledge Cryptographer for our cryptographic team distributed across the globe. Amongst other projects, the team is dedicated to the design of our Layer-2 scaling solution based on STARK-proven virtual machines. You will help our team grow, conduct research and lay out SNARK-based cryptographic protocols, working on related cutting-edge technologies such as zkVMs.

Requirements

You should be aware of state of the art proving systems such as Plonk and STARKs, and have a solid background in computational models and blockchain technologies. Additional requirements are represented by:

• Ph.D. in mathematics, computer science, or cryptography;
• Solid foundations in zero-knowledge and cryptographic protocols ;
• Publications in acknowledged venues on applied or theoretical cryptography, preferably cryptographic protocols, and PETs;
• Strong problem-solving skills;
• The ability to work in a team setting as well as autonomously

Experience in reading code (e.g. C++, Rust) though not mandatory, it is welcomed.

We offer:

• Competitive salary, yearly bonus, and stock options
• Flexible working hours, fully remote if preferred
• The opportunity to work with talented minds on innovative, high-quality open source solutions.

If you want to get more knowledge about our technology, read our Whitepapers at the website: https://www.horizen.io/research/

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Raffaella Lixi raffaella@horizenlabs.io

More information: https://horizenlabs.io/careers/job/?gh_jid=4536288004

Horizen Labs is a blockchain technology company that designs, develops, and delivers powerful, scalable, and reliable distributed ledger solutions for business.

We are looking for an engineer who will contribute in building the cryptographic infrastructure of our Web 3.0-enabled blockchain ecosystem. You will be involved in the design and implementation of our zero-knowledge Layer 2 scaling solution based on STARK-proven virtual machines. Our international team works in a stimulating and innovative environment, where people’s technical expertise and experience contribute to the development of cutting-edge blockchain technology.

Requirements

• Experience in implementing zero-knowledge proving systems or related cryptographic primitives;
• Comfortable in implementing low-level operations such as finite field arithmetics, hash functions, etc.;
• Enthusiastic about algorithmic improvements and code optimization.

Furthermore, any experience with

• Plonk, STARKs, AIR circuits,
• EVM, zk-VMs,
• C/C++/Rust programming language

though not mandatory, it is welcomed. We offer

• Competitive salary, yearly bonus, and stock options
• Flexible working hours, fully remote if preferred
• The opportunity to work with talented minds on innovative, high-quality open source solutions.

If you want to get more knowledge about our technology, read our Whitepapers at the website: https://www.horizen.io/research/

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Raffaella Lixi raffaella@horizenlabs.io

Horizen Labs is a blockchain technology company that designs, develops, and delivers powerful, scalable, and reliable distributed ledger solutions for business.

Our Core Engineering Team is an innovative and collaborative group of researchers and software engineers who are dedicated to the design and development of world-class blockchain-based products. We are looking for a cryptographer, or applied cryptographer, to join our growing crypto team based in Milan, Italy. Currently, the team is developing a protocol suite for SNARK-based proof-composition, but its duties reach beyond that, developing privacy-enhancing solutions for our sidechain ecosystem.

Responsabilities

• Design privacy-enhancing technology built on SNARK-based protocols
• Perform collaborative research and assist technical colleagues in their development work
• Participate in standards-setting

Requirements

• Ph.D. in mathematics, computer science, or cryptography
• Solid foundations in zero-knowledge and cryptographic protocols
• Publications in acknowledged venues on applied or theoretical cryptography, preferably cryptographic protocols or PETs
• Strong problem-solving skills
• The ability to work in a team setting as well as autonomously
• Foundations in blockchain technology and experience in reading Rust are a plus

We offer

• A competitive salary plus pre-series A stock options
• Flexible working hours, including the possibility of remote working
• The opportunity to work with talented minds on challenging topics in this field, including the most recent advancements in zero-knowledge
• A nice and informal team setting to conduct research and development of high-quality open source solutions

If you are interested in this position, you might want to take a look at our recent publications (IACR eprints 2021/930, 2021/399, 2020/123) and our latest podcast on zeroknowledge.fm (Episode 178). For further questions, please contact the email below.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Raffaella Lixi raffaella@horizenlabs.io

The Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology at the University of Wollongong is a premier research institute that conducts research in cybersecurity and cryptology. We are seeking for a postdoctoral fellow to conduct research in the topic of "Secure Crowdsourcing". This position is supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project. It is expected that the candidate is proficient with cryptography research, in the area of pairing-based cryptography and/or lattice-based cryptography, security modelling and security proofs. This position is a research only position. The successful candidate is expected to contribute to the research at the Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology at the University of Wollongong. Closing Date: Wednesday 6 July 2022, 11:59 PM AEST Australian Time

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof Willy Susilo

More information: https://ejgl.fa.ap1.oraclecloud.com/hcmUI/CandidateExperience/en/sites/CX_1/job/2502/?mode=location

One Ph.D. position opening (post-quantum cryptography and related) at Dr. Jiafeng Harvest Xie's Security and Cryptography (SAC) Lab (https://www.ece.villanova.edu/~jxie02/lab/), Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Villanova University, Villanova, PA USA.

Villanova University ranks #49 National Universities in the USA (US News), is located in Villanova, west suburban of Philadelphia. Famous alumni include the current First Lady of the USA!

Requirements: Preferred to be in majors of CS/CE/EE, Applied Mathematics/Cryptography.

Skillful in programming Languages such as CC++, Python, VHDL/Verilog, and so on.

Deadline: better to start in Fall 2022/Spring 2023.

This research focuses on the security aspects of post-quantum cryptography and related implementations (or AI accelerator). Advisor and senior Ph.D. student will guide you to get started and work together on forthcoming challenges. You will not be fighting alone!!!

Contact email: jiafeng.xie@villanova.edu

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Jiafeng Harvest Xie

More information: https://www.ece.villanova.edu/~jxie02/lab/

Event date: 7 November to 9 November 2022
Submission deadline: 24 June 2022
Notification: 6 August 2022

Event date: 23 April to 27 April 2023