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25 November 2022
Shresth Agrawal, Joachim Neu, Ertem Nusret Tas, Dionysis Zindros
Popular Ethereum wallets (e.g., MetaMask) entrust centralized infrastructure providers (e.g., Infura) to run the consensus client logic on their behalf. As a result, these wallets are light-weight and high-performant, but come with security risks. A malicious provider can mislead the wallet, e.g., fake payments and balances, or censor transactions. On the other hand, light clients, which are not in popular use today, allow decentralization, but at inefficient linear bootstrapping complexity. This poses a dilemma between decentralization and performance. In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate a new proof-of-stake (PoS) superlight client with logarithmic bootstrapping complexity. These proofs of proof-of-stake (PoPoS) take the form of a Merkle tree of PoS epochs. The verifier enrolls the provers in a bisection game, in which the honest prover is destined to win once an adversarial Merkle tree is challenged at sufficient depth. We evaluate our superlight protocol by providing a client implementation that is compatible with mainnet PoS Ethereum: compared to the state-of-the-art light client construction proposed for PoS Ethereum, our client improves time-to-completion by $9\times$, communication by $180\times$, and energy usage by $30\times$ (when bootstrapping after $10$ years of consensus execution). We prove our construction is secure and show how to employ it for other PoS systems such as Cardano (with full adaptivity), Algorand, and Snow White.
Huina Li, Guozhen Liu, Haochen Zhang, Kai Hu, Jian Guo, Weidong Qiu
A good differential is a start for a successful differential attack. However, a differential might be invalid, i.e., there is no right pair following the differential1, due to some complicated contradictions that are hard to be considered. In this paper, we present a novel and handy method to search and verify a differential characteristic (DC) based on a recently proposed algebraic perspective on the differential(-linear) cryptanalysis (CRYPTO 2021).
From this algebraic perspective, exact Boolean expressions of differentials over a cryptographic primitive can be conveniently established, thus verifying a given DC is naturally a Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT problem). With this observation, our approach simulates the round function of the target cipher symbolically and derives a set of Boolean equations in Algebraic Normal Form (ANF). These Boolean equations can be solved by off-the-shelf SAT solvers such as Bosphorus, which accept ANFs as their input.
To demonstrate the power of our new tool, we apply it to Gimli, Ascon, and Xoodoo. For Gimli, we improve the efficiency of searching for a valid 8-round colliding DC compared with the previous MILP model (CRYPTO 2020). Our approach takes about one minute to find a valid 8-round DC, while the previous MILP model could not find any such DCs in practical time. Based on this DC, a practical semi-free-start collision attack on the intermediate 8-round Gimli-Hash is thus successfully mounted, i.e., a colliding message pair is found. For Ascon, we check several DCs reported at FSE 2021. Firstly, we verify a 2-round DC used in the collision attack on Ascon-Hash by giving a right pair (such a right pair requires $2^{156}$ attempts to find in a random search). Secondly, a 4-round differential used in the forgery attack on Ascon-128’s iteration phase is proven invalid, as a result, the corresponding forgery attack is invalid, too. For Xoodoo, we verify tens of thousands of 3-round DCs and two 4-round DCs extended from the so-called differential trail cores found by the designers or our search tool. We find all of these DCs are valid, which well demonstrates the sound independence of the differential propagation over Xoodoo’s round functions. Besides, as an independent interest, we develop a SAT-based automatic search toolkit called XoodooSat to search for 2-, 3-, and 4-round differential trail cores of Xoodoo. Our toolkit finds two more 3-round differential trail cores of weight 48 that were missed by the designers which enhance the security analysis of Xoodoo.
Christina Boura, Nicolas David, Patrick Derbez, Gregor Leander, María Naya-Plasencia
In this paper we introduce the differential-meet-in-the-middle framework, a new cryptanalysis technique against symmetric primitives. The idea of this new cryptanalysis method consists in combining into one attack techniques from both meet-in-the-middle and differential cryptanalysis. The introduced technique can be seen as a way of extending meet-in-the-middle attacks and their variants but also as a new way to perform the key recovery part in differential attacks. We provide a simple tool to search, given a differential, for efficient applications of this new attack and apply our approach, in combination with some additional techniques, to SKINNY-128-384. Our attack on SKINNY-128-384 permits to break 25 out of the 56 rounds of this variant and improves by two rounds the previous best known attacks in the single key model.
Alexandre Augusto Giron, João Pedro Adami do Nascimento, Ricardo Custódio, Lucas Pandolfo Perin
Adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in network protocols is a challenging subject. Larger PQC public keys and signatures can significantly slow the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In this context, KEMTLS is a promising approach that replaces the handshake signatures by using PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs), which have, in general, smaller sizes. However, for broad PQC adoption, hybrid cryptography has its advantages over PQC-only approaches, mainly about the confidence in the security of existing cryptographic schemes. This work brings hybrid cryptography to the KEMTLS and KEMTLS-PDK protocols. We analyze different network conditions and show that the penalty when using Hybrid KEMTLS over PQC-only KEMTLS is minor under certain security levels. We also compare Hybrid KEMTLS with a hybrid version of PQTLS. Overall, the benefits of using hybrid protocols outweigh the slowdown penalties in higher security parameters, which encourages its use in practice.
George Teseleanu
The study of symmetric structures based on quasigroups is relatively new and certain gaps can be found in the literature. In this paper, we want to fill one of these gaps. More precisely, in this work we study substitution permutation networks based on quasigroups that make use of permutation layers that are non-linear relative to the quasigroup operation. We prove that for quasigroups isotopic with a group $\mathbb{G}$, the complexity of mounting a differential attack against this type of substitution permutation network is the same as attacking another symmetric structure based on $\mathbb{G}$. The resulting structure is interesting and new, and we hope that it will form the basis for future secure block ciphers.
Aayush Jain, Huijia Lin, Paul Lou, Amit Sahai
Indistinguishability Obfuscation $(i\mathcal{O})$ is a highly versatile primitive implying a myriad advanced cryptographic applications. Up until recently, the state of feasibility of $i\mathcal{O}$ was unclear, which changed with works (Jain-Lin-Sahai STOC 2021, Jain-Lin-Sahai Eurocrypt 2022) showing that $i\mathcal{O}$ can be finally based upon well-studied hardness assumptions. Unfortunately, one of these assumptions is broken in quantum polynomial time. Luckily, the line work of Brakerski et al. Eurocrypt 2020, Gay-Pass STOC 2021, Wichs-Wee Eurocrypt 2021, Brakerski et al. ePrint 2021, Devadas et al. TCC 2021 simultaneously created new pathways to construct $i\mathcal{O}$ with plausible post-quantum security from new assumptions, namely a new form of circular security of LWE in the presence of leakages. At the same time, effective cryptanalysis of this line of work has also begun to emerge (Hopkins et al. Crypto 2021).
It is important to identify the simplest possible conjectures that yield post-quantum $i\mathcal{O}$ and can be understood through known cryptanalytic tools. In that spirit, and in light of the cryptanalysis of Hopkins et al., recently Devadas et al. gave an elegant construction of $i\mathcal{O}$ from a fully-specified and simple-to-state assumption along with a thorough initial cryptanalysis.
Our work gives a polynomial-time distinguisher on their "final assumption" for their scheme. Our algorithm is extremely simple to describe: Solve a carefully designed linear system arising out of the assumption. The argument of correctness of our algorithm, however, is nontrivial.
We also analyze the "T-sum" version of the same assumption described by Devadas et. al. and under a reasonable conjecture rule out the assumption for any value of $T$ that implies $i\mathcal{O}$.
It is important to identify the simplest possible conjectures that yield post-quantum $i\mathcal{O}$ and can be understood through known cryptanalytic tools. In that spirit, and in light of the cryptanalysis of Hopkins et al., recently Devadas et al. gave an elegant construction of $i\mathcal{O}$ from a fully-specified and simple-to-state assumption along with a thorough initial cryptanalysis.
Our work gives a polynomial-time distinguisher on their "final assumption" for their scheme. Our algorithm is extremely simple to describe: Solve a carefully designed linear system arising out of the assumption. The argument of correctness of our algorithm, however, is nontrivial.
We also analyze the "T-sum" version of the same assumption described by Devadas et. al. and under a reasonable conjecture rule out the assumption for any value of $T$ that implies $i\mathcal{O}$.
Dan Boneh, Chelsea Komlo
Existing threshold signature schemes come in two flavors: (i) fully private, where the signature reveals nothing about the set of signers that generated the signature, and (ii) accountable, where the signature completely identifies the set of signers. In this paper we propose a new type of threshold signature, called TAPS, that is a hybrid of privacy and accountability. A TAPS signature is fully private from the public's point of view. However, an entity that has a secret tracing key can trace a signature to the threshold of signers that generated it. A TAPS makes it possible for an organization to keep its inner workings private, while ensuring that signers are accountable for their actions. We construct a number of TAPS schemes. First, we present a generic construction that builds a TAPS from any accountable threshold signature. This generic construction is not efficient, and we next focus on efficient schemes based on standard assumptions. We build two efficient TAPS schemes (in the random oracle model) based on the Schnorr signature scheme. We conclude with a number of open problems relating to efficient TAPS.
Michiel Van Beirendonck, Jan-Pieter D'Anvers, Ingrid Verbauwhede
Fully Homomorphic Encryption is a technique that allows computation on encrypted data. It has the potential to drastically change privacy considerations in the cloud, but high computational and memory overheads are preventing its broad adoption. TFHE is a promising Torus-based FHE scheme that heavily relies on bootstrapping, the noise-removal tool that must be invoked after every encrypted gate computation.
We present FPT, a Fixed-Point FPGA accelerator for TFHE bootstrapping. FPT is the first hardware accelerator to heavily exploit the inherent noise present in FHE calculations. Instead of double or single-precision floating-point arithmetic, it implements TFHE bootstrapping entirely with approximate fixed-point arithmetic. Using an in-depth analysis of noise propagation in bootstrapping FFT computations, FPT is able to use noise-trimmed fixed-point representations that are up to 50% smaller than prior implementations using floating-point or integer FFTs.
FPT's microarchitecture is built as a streaming processor inspired by traditional streaming DSPs: it instantiates high-throughput computational stages that are directly cascaded, with simplified control logic and routing networks. We explore different throughput-balanced compositions of streaming kernels with a user-configurable streaming width in order to construct a full bootstrapping pipeline. FPT's streaming approach allows 100% utilization of arithmetic units and requires only small bootstrapping key caches, enabling an entirely compute-bound bootstrapping throughput of 1 BS / 35$\mu$s. This is in stark contrast to the established classical CPU approach to FHE bootstrapping acceleration, which tends to be heavily memory and bandwidth-constrained.
FPT is fully implemented and evaluated as a bootstrapping FPGA kernel for an Alveo U280 datacenter accelerator card. FPT achieves almost three orders of magnitude higher bootstrapping throughput than existing CPU-based implementations, and 2.5$\times$ higher throughput compared to recent ASIC emulation experiments.
We present FPT, a Fixed-Point FPGA accelerator for TFHE bootstrapping. FPT is the first hardware accelerator to heavily exploit the inherent noise present in FHE calculations. Instead of double or single-precision floating-point arithmetic, it implements TFHE bootstrapping entirely with approximate fixed-point arithmetic. Using an in-depth analysis of noise propagation in bootstrapping FFT computations, FPT is able to use noise-trimmed fixed-point representations that are up to 50% smaller than prior implementations using floating-point or integer FFTs.
FPT's microarchitecture is built as a streaming processor inspired by traditional streaming DSPs: it instantiates high-throughput computational stages that are directly cascaded, with simplified control logic and routing networks. We explore different throughput-balanced compositions of streaming kernels with a user-configurable streaming width in order to construct a full bootstrapping pipeline. FPT's streaming approach allows 100% utilization of arithmetic units and requires only small bootstrapping key caches, enabling an entirely compute-bound bootstrapping throughput of 1 BS / 35$\mu$s. This is in stark contrast to the established classical CPU approach to FHE bootstrapping acceleration, which tends to be heavily memory and bandwidth-constrained.
FPT is fully implemented and evaluated as a bootstrapping FPGA kernel for an Alveo U280 datacenter accelerator card. FPT achieves almost three orders of magnitude higher bootstrapping throughput than existing CPU-based implementations, and 2.5$\times$ higher throughput compared to recent ASIC emulation experiments.
Tianyu Zhaolu, Zhiguo Wan, Huaqun Wang
Recently, fast advances in decentralized blockchains have led to the rapid development of decentralized payment systems and finance. In decentralized anonymous payment systems such as Monero, Zerocash and Zether, payment amounts and traders' addresses are confidential to other users. Therefore, cryptocurrency may be used for illegal activities such as money laundering, bribery and blackmails. To solve this problem, some decentralized anonymous payment schemes supporting regulation have been proposed. Unfortunately, most solutions have no restriction on the regulator's power, which may lead to abuse of power and disclosure of privacy. In this paper, we propose a decentralized anonymous payment scheme supporting collaborative regulation. Different from existing solutions, our scheme prevents abuse of power by dividing the regulatory power into two regulatory authorities. These two regulatory authorities, namely Filter and Supervisor, can cooperate to recover payment amounts and traders' addresses from suspicious transactions. However, neither Filter nor Supervisor alone can decode transactions to obtain transaction privacy. Our scheme enjoys three major advantages over others: 1) We design a generic transaction structure using zk-SNARK, 2) divide regulatory power using the regulation label, 3) and achieve aggregability of transaction amounts using the amount label. The experimental result shows that the time cost of generating a transaction is about 11 s and the transaction fee is about 12,183k gas, which is acceptable.
Alexandre Belling, Azam Soleimanian
We present the first transparent and plausibly post-quantum SNARK relying on the Ring Short Integer Solution problem (Ring-SIS), a well-known assumption from lattice-based cryptography. At its core, our proof system relies on a new linear-commitment scheme named Vortex which is inspired from the work of Orion and Brakedown. Vortex uses a hash function based on Ring-SIS derived from “SWIFFT" (Lyubashevsky et al., FSE08). We take advantage of the linear structure of this particular hash function to craft an efficient self-recursion technique. Although Vortex proofs have $O(\sqrt{n})$ size in the witness size, we show how our self-recursion technique can be used to build a SNARK scheme based on Vortex. The resulting SNARK works over any field with reasonably large 2-adicity (also known as FFT-friendly fields). Moreover, we introduce Wizard-IOP, an extension of the concept of polynomial-IOP. Working with Wizard-IOP rather than separate polynomial-IOPs provides us with a strong tool for handling a wide class of queries, needed for proving the correct executions of the complex state machines (e.g., zk-EVM as our use-case) efficiently and conveniently.
Sanjam Garg, Abhishek Jain, Pratyay Mukherjee, Rohit Sinha, Mingyuan Wang, Yinuo Zhang
The security of several cryptosystems rests on the trust assumption that a certain fraction of the parties are honest. This trust assumption has enabled a diverse of cryptographic applications such as secure multiparty computation, threshold encryption, and threshold signatures. However, current and emerging practical use cases suggest that this paradigm of
one-person-one-vote is outdated.
In this work, we consider {\em weighted} cryptosystems where every party is assigned a certain weight and the trust assumption is that a certain fraction of the total weight is honest. This setting can be translated to the standard setting (where each party has a unit weight) via virtualization. However, this method is quite expensive, incurring a multiplicative overhead in the weight.
We present new weighted cryptosystems with significantly better efficiency. Specifically, our proposed schemes incur only an {\em additive} overhead in weights.
\begin{itemize} \item We first present a weighted ramp secret-sharing scheme where the size of the secret share is as short as $O(w)$ (where $w$ corresponds to the weight). In comparison, Shamir's secret sharing with virtualization requires secret shares of size $w\cdot\lambda$, where $\lambda=\log |\mathbb{F}|$ is the security parameter. \item Next, we use our weighted secret-sharing scheme to construct weighted versions of (semi-honest) secure multiparty computation (MPC), threshold encryption, and threshold signatures. All these schemes inherit the efficiency of our secret sharing scheme and incur only an additive overhead in the weights. \end{itemize}
Our weighted secret-sharing scheme is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. Interestingly, this secret-sharing scheme is {\em non-linear} and only achieves statistical privacy. These distinct features introduce several technical hurdles in applications to MPC and threshold cryptosystems. We resolve these challenges by developing several new ideas.
In this work, we consider {\em weighted} cryptosystems where every party is assigned a certain weight and the trust assumption is that a certain fraction of the total weight is honest. This setting can be translated to the standard setting (where each party has a unit weight) via virtualization. However, this method is quite expensive, incurring a multiplicative overhead in the weight.
We present new weighted cryptosystems with significantly better efficiency. Specifically, our proposed schemes incur only an {\em additive} overhead in weights.
\begin{itemize} \item We first present a weighted ramp secret-sharing scheme where the size of the secret share is as short as $O(w)$ (where $w$ corresponds to the weight). In comparison, Shamir's secret sharing with virtualization requires secret shares of size $w\cdot\lambda$, where $\lambda=\log |\mathbb{F}|$ is the security parameter. \item Next, we use our weighted secret-sharing scheme to construct weighted versions of (semi-honest) secure multiparty computation (MPC), threshold encryption, and threshold signatures. All these schemes inherit the efficiency of our secret sharing scheme and incur only an additive overhead in the weights. \end{itemize}
Our weighted secret-sharing scheme is based on the Chinese remainder theorem. Interestingly, this secret-sharing scheme is {\em non-linear} and only achieves statistical privacy. These distinct features introduce several technical hurdles in applications to MPC and threshold cryptosystems. We resolve these challenges by developing several new ideas.
Charanjit S Jutla, Chengyu Lin
In this work we extend the known pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE (RLWE) to be based on ideal lattices of non Dedekind domains. In earlier works of Lyubashevsky et al (EUROCRYPT 2010) and Peikert et al (STOC 2017), the hardness of RLWE was based on ideal lattices of ring of integers of number fields, which are known to be Dedekind domains. While these works extended Regev's (STOC 2005) quantum polynomial-time reduction for LWE, thus allowing more efficient and more structured cryptosystems, the additional algebraic structure of ideals of Dedekind domains leaves open the possibility that such ideal lattices are not as hard as general lattices.
We now show that for any number field $\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(X))$, for all prime integers $p$ such that the factorization of $f(X)$ modulo $p$ passes the Dedekind index theorem criterion, which is almost all $p$, we can base $p$-power RLWE in the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(f(X))$ itself and its hardness on hardness of ideal lattices of this ring. This ring can potentially be a strict sub-ring of the ring of integers of the field, and hence not be a Dedekind domain. We also give natural examples, and prove that certain ideals require at least three generators, as opposed to two sufficient for Dedekind domains. Such rings also do not satisfy many other algebraic properties of Dedekind domains such as ideal invertibility. Our proof technique is novel as it builds an algebraic theory for general such rings that also include cyclotomic rings.
We now show that for any number field $\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(X))$, for all prime integers $p$ such that the factorization of $f(X)$ modulo $p$ passes the Dedekind index theorem criterion, which is almost all $p$, we can base $p$-power RLWE in the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(f(X))$ itself and its hardness on hardness of ideal lattices of this ring. This ring can potentially be a strict sub-ring of the ring of integers of the field, and hence not be a Dedekind domain. We also give natural examples, and prove that certain ideals require at least three generators, as opposed to two sufficient for Dedekind domains. Such rings also do not satisfy many other algebraic properties of Dedekind domains such as ideal invertibility. Our proof technique is novel as it builds an algebraic theory for general such rings that also include cyclotomic rings.
23 November 2022
Marcel Nageler, Felix Pallua, Maria Eichlseder
Romulus-H is a hash function that currently competes as a finalist in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography competition. It is based on the Hirose DBL construction which is provably secure when used with an ideal block cipher. However, in practice, ideal block ciphers can only be approximated. The security of concrete instantiations must be cryptanalyzed carefully; the security margin may be higher or lower than in the secret-key setting. So far, the Hirose DBL construction has been studied with only a few other block ciphers, like IDEA and AES. However, Romulus-H uses Hirose DBL with the SKINNY block cipher where no dedicated analysis has been published so far.
In this work, we present the first third-party analysis of Romulus-H. We propose a new framework for finding collisions in hash functions based on the Hirose DBL construction. This is in contrast to previous work that only focused on free-start collisions. Our framework is based on the idea of joint differential characteristics which capture the relationship between the two block cipher calls in the Hirose DBL construction. To identify good joint differential characteristics, we propose a combination of a MILP and CP model. Then, we use these characteristics in another CP model to find collisions. Finally, we apply this framework to Romulus-H and find practical collisions of the hash function for 10 out of 40 rounds and practical semi-free-start collisions up to 14 rounds.
In this work, we present the first third-party analysis of Romulus-H. We propose a new framework for finding collisions in hash functions based on the Hirose DBL construction. This is in contrast to previous work that only focused on free-start collisions. Our framework is based on the idea of joint differential characteristics which capture the relationship between the two block cipher calls in the Hirose DBL construction. To identify good joint differential characteristics, we propose a combination of a MILP and CP model. Then, we use these characteristics in another CP model to find collisions. Finally, we apply this framework to Romulus-H and find practical collisions of the hash function for 10 out of 40 rounds and practical semi-free-start collisions up to 14 rounds.
Tong Cao, Xin Li
As of 28 January 2022, Filecoin is ranked as the first capitalized storage-oriented cryptocurrency. In this system, miners dedicate their storage space to the network and verify transactions to earn rewards. Nowadays, Filecoin's network capacity has surpassed 15 exbibytes.
In this paper, we propose three temporary block withholding attacks to challenge Filecoin's expected consensus (EC). Specifically, we first deconstruct EC following old-fashioned methods (which have been widely developed since 2009) to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of EC's design. We then present three temporary block withholding schemes by leveraging the shortcomings of EC. We build Markov Decision Process (MDP) models for the three attacks to calculate the adversary's gains. We develop Monte Carlo simulators to mimic the mining strategies of the adversary and other miners and indicate the impacts of the three attacks on expectation. As a result, we show that our three attacks have significant impacts on Filecoin's mining fairness and transaction throughput. For instance, when honest miners who control more than half the global storage power assemble their tipsets after the default transmission cutoff time, an adversary with 1% of the global storage power is able to launch temporary block withholding attacks without a loss in revenue, which is rare in existing blockchains. Finally, we discuss the implications of our attacks and propose several countermeasures to mitigate them.
In this paper, we propose three temporary block withholding attacks to challenge Filecoin's expected consensus (EC). Specifically, we first deconstruct EC following old-fashioned methods (which have been widely developed since 2009) to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of EC's design. We then present three temporary block withholding schemes by leveraging the shortcomings of EC. We build Markov Decision Process (MDP) models for the three attacks to calculate the adversary's gains. We develop Monte Carlo simulators to mimic the mining strategies of the adversary and other miners and indicate the impacts of the three attacks on expectation. As a result, we show that our three attacks have significant impacts on Filecoin's mining fairness and transaction throughput. For instance, when honest miners who control more than half the global storage power assemble their tipsets after the default transmission cutoff time, an adversary with 1% of the global storage power is able to launch temporary block withholding attacks without a loss in revenue, which is rare in existing blockchains. Finally, we discuss the implications of our attacks and propose several countermeasures to mitigate them.
Corentin Verhamme, Gaëtan Cassiers, François-Xavier Standaert
We investigate the security of the NIST Lightweight Crypto Competition’s Finalists against side-channel attacks. We start with a mode-level analysis that allows us to put forward three candidates (As- con, ISAP and Romulus-T) that stand out for their leakage properties and do not require a uniform protection of all their computations thanks to (expensive) implementation-level countermeasures. We then implement these finalists and evaluate their respective performances. Our results confirm the interest of so-called leveled implementations (where only the key derivation and tag generation require security against differential power analysis). They also suggest that these algorithms differ more by their qualitative features (e.g., two-pass designs to improve confidentiality with decryption leakage vs. one-pass designs, flexible overheads thanks to masking vs. fully mode-level, easier to implement, schemes) than by their quantitative features, which all improve over the AES and are quite sensitive to security margins against cryptanalysis.
Siemen Dhooghe
In this work, we introduce a more advanced fault adversary inspired from the random probing model, called the random fault model, where the adversary can fault all values in the algorithm but where the probability for each fault to occur is limited. The new adversary model is used to evaluate the security of side-channel and fault countermeasures such as Boolean masking, inner product masking, error detection techniques, error correction techniques, multiplicative tags, and shuffling methods. The results of the security analysis reveal novel insights including: error correction providing little security when faults target more bits; the order between masking and duplication providing a trade-off between side-channel and fault security; and inner product masking and multiplicative masking providing exponential protection in the field size. Moreover, the results also explain the experimental results from CHES 2022 and find weaknesses in the shuffling method from SAMOS 2021.
Dmitry Khovratovich, Mary Maller, Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari
We present a candidate sequential function for a VDF protocol to be used within the Ethereum ecosystem. The new function, called MinRoot, is an optimized iterative algebraic transformation and is a strict improvement over competitors VeeDo and Sloth++. We analyze various attacks on sequentiality and suggest weakened versions for public scrutiny. We also announce bounties on certain research directions in cryptanalysis.
Siddhartha Chowdhury, Sayani Sinha, Animesh Singh, Shubham Mishra, Chandan Chaudhary, Sikhar Patranabis, Pratyay Mukherjee, Ayantika Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption (ThFHE) enables arbitrary computation over encrypted data while keeping the decryption key to be distributed across multiple parties at all time. ThFHE is a key enabler for threshold cryptography and, more generally, secure distributed computing. Existing ThFHE schemes inherently require highly inefficient parameters and are unsuitable for practical deployment. In this paper, we take the first step towards to make ThFHE practically usable by (i) proposing a novel ThFHE scheme with a new analysis resulting in significantly improved parameters; (ii) and providing the first ThFHE implementation benchmark based on Torus FHE.
• We propose the first ThFHE scheme with a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio that supports practically efficient parameters while retaining provable security based on standard quantum-safe assumptions. We achieve this via a novel Rényi divergence-based security analysis of our proposed threshold decryption mechanism.
• We present a highly optimized software implementation of our proposed ThFHE scheme that builds upon the existing Torus FHE library and supports (distributed) decryption on highly resource-constrained ARM-based handheld devices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practically efficient implementation of any ThFHE scheme. Along the way, we implement several extensions to the Torus FHE library, including a Torus-based linear integer secret sharing subroutine to support ThFHE key sharing and distributed decryption for any threshold access structure.
We illustrate the efficacy of our proposal via an end-to-end use case involving encrypted computations over a real medical database, and distributed decryptions of the computed result on resource-constrained handheld devices.
• We propose the first ThFHE scheme with a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio that supports practically efficient parameters while retaining provable security based on standard quantum-safe assumptions. We achieve this via a novel Rényi divergence-based security analysis of our proposed threshold decryption mechanism.
• We present a highly optimized software implementation of our proposed ThFHE scheme that builds upon the existing Torus FHE library and supports (distributed) decryption on highly resource-constrained ARM-based handheld devices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practically efficient implementation of any ThFHE scheme. Along the way, we implement several extensions to the Torus FHE library, including a Torus-based linear integer secret sharing subroutine to support ThFHE key sharing and distributed decryption for any threshold access structure.
We illustrate the efficacy of our proposal via an end-to-end use case involving encrypted computations over a real medical database, and distributed decryptions of the computed result on resource-constrained handheld devices.
Evgeny Alekseev, Andrey Bozhko
The task of ensuring the required level of security of information systems in the adversary models with additional data obtained through side channels (a striking example of implementing threats in such a model is a differential power analysis) has become increasingly relevant in recent years. An effective protection method against side-channel attacks is masking all intermediate variables used in the algorithm with random values. At the same time, many algorithms use masking of different kinds, for example, Boolean, byte-wise, and arithmetic; therefore, a problem of switching between masking of different kinds arises. Switching between Boolean and arithmetic masking is well studied, while no solutions have been proposed for switching between masking of other kinds. This article recalls the requirements for switching algorithms and presents algorithms for switching between block-wise and arithmetic masking, which includes the case of switching between byte-wise and arithmetic masking.
David Chaum, Mario Larangeira, Mario Yaksetig
The $\mathcal{S}_{leeve}$ construction proposed by Chaum et al. (ACNS'21) introduces an extra security layer for digital wallets by allowing users to generate a "back up key" securely nested inside the secret key of a signature scheme, i.e., ECDSA. The "back up key", which is secret, can be used to issue a "proof of ownership", i.e., only the real owner of this secret key can generate a single proof, which is based on the WOTS+ signature scheme. The authors of $\mathcal{S}_{leeve}$ proposed the formal technique for a single proof of ownership, and only informally outlined a construction to generalize it to multiple proofs. This work identifies that their proposed construction presents drawbacks, i.e., varying of signature size and signing/verifying computation complexity, limitation of linear construction, etc. Therefore we introduce WOTSwana, a generalization of $\mathcal{S}_{leeve}$, which is, more concretely, a more general scheme, i.e., an extra security layer that generates multiple proofs of ownership, and put forth a thorough formalization of two constructions: (1) one given by a linear concatenation of numerous WOTS+ private/public keys, and (2) a construction based on tree like structure, i.e., an underneath Merkle tree whose leaves are WOTS+ private/public key pairs. Furthermore, we present the security analysis for multiple proofs of ownership, showcasing that this work addresses the early mentioned drawbacks of the original construction. In particular, we extend the original security definition for $\mathcal{S}_{leeve}$. Finally, we illustrate an alternative application of our construction, by discussing the creation of an encrypted group chat messaging application.