International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The Cryptography and Privacy Engineering Group (ENCRYPTO) @Department of Computer Science @Technical University of Darmstadt offers a full position for a Postdoctoral Researcher in Cryptography & Privacy Engineering, available immediately and for initially until 31.1.2025.

Our mission is to demonstrate that privacy can be efficiently protected in real-world applications via cryptographic protocols.

TU Darmstadt is a top research university for IT security, cryptography and computer science in Europe. The position is based in the City of Science Darmstadt, which is very international, livable and well-connected in the Rhine-Main area around Frankfurt. Knowledge of German is helpful, but not required, and TU Darmstadt offers a Welcome Center and language courses.

Job description

As postdoc @ENCRYPTO, you conduct research, build prototype implementations, and publish and present the results at top venues. You are involved in project management, teaching, co-advise PhD students and supervise thesis students & student research assistants. The position is co-funded by the ERC Starting Grant “Privacy-preserving Services on the Internet” (PSOTI), where we build privacy-preserving services on the Internet, which includes designing protocols for privately processing data among untrusted service providers using secure multi-party computation and implementing a scalable framework.

Your profile

• Completed PhD degree (or equivalent) at a top university in IT security, computer science, applied mathematics, electrical engineering, or a similar area
• Publications at top venues (CORE rank A*/A) for IT security/applied cryptography (e.g., EUROCRYPT, S&P, CCS, NDSS, USENIX SEC), ideally on cryptographic protocols and secure computation
• Experience in software development, project management and supervising students
• Self-motivated, reliable, creative, can work in a team, and want to do excellent research on challenging scientific problems with practical relevance
• The working language at ENCRYPTO is English, so you must be able to discuss/write/present scientific results in English.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Thomas Schneider (application@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de)

More information: https://encrypto.de/POSTDOC

Would you like to work in the 2nd most happy country in the world? We are offering several fully funded PhD and PostDoc opportunities in St.Gallen and can offer you one of Europes most attractive working conditions. Living in Switzerland you can enjoy a high quality of life, a great international environment and an amazing public transport infrastructure allowing you easy access to many interesting European cities.

For more information about the open positions, please visit our job links. Please also apply via these links.
PhD:
https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/funded-phd-student-in-applied-cryptography-privacy-preserving-biometric-authentication-m-f-d/e7a9e90b-02cd-45d0-ad4f-fc02131eaf86
PostDoc:
https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/postdoc-fellow-in-cryptography-information-security-m-f-d/c35410fb-40bb-41f2-b298-8be150d8f9b6

If you are interested in a slightly different topic for your phd than listed in the job ad, please check out our research areas and state your research proposal in your motivation letter when applying for the job. We are happy to receive your application via the same job link as above.

Our group web page:
https://cybersecurity.unisg.ch

Closing date for applications:

Contact:
Eriane Breu, eriane.breu@unisg.ch (Administrative matters)
Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa, katerina.mitrokotsa@unisg.ch (Research related questions)

More information: https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/funded-phd-student-in-applied-cryptography-privacy-preserving-biometric-authentication-m-f-d/e7a9e90b-02cd-45d0-ad4f-fc02131eaf86

Authentication is the first, crucial step in securing digital assets like cryptocurrencies and online services like banking and social networks. It relies on principals maintaining exclusive access to credentials like cryptographic signing keys, passwords, and physical devices. But both individuals and organizations struggle to manage their credentials, resulting in loss of assets and identity theft. Multi-factor authentication improves security, but its analysis and design are mostly limited to one-shot mechanisms, which decide immediately.

In this work, we study mechanisms with back-and-forth interaction with the principals. For example, a user receives an email notification about sending money from her bank account and is given a period of time to abort the operation.

We formally define the authentication problem, where an authentication mechanism interacts with a user and an attacker and tries to identify the user. A mechanism's success depends on the scenario~-- whether the user / attacker know the different credentials; each credential can be safe, lost, leaked, or stolen. The profile of a mechanism is the set of all scenarios in which it succeeds. Thus, we have a partial order on mechanisms, defined by the subset relation on their profiles.

We find an upper bound on the profile size and discover three types of $n$-credential mechanisms (for any $n$) that are maximally secure, meeting this bound. We show these are all the unique maximal mechanisms for $n \le 3$.

We show the efficacy of our model by analyzing existing mechanisms, both theoretical and deployed in widely-used systems, and make concrete improvement proposals. We demonstrate the practicality of our mechanisms by implementing a maximally-secure cryptocurrency wallet.

Post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) has reached the verge of standardization competition, with Kyber as a winning candidate. In this work, we demonstrate practical backdoor insertion in Kyber through kleptrography. The backdoor can be inserted using classical techniques like ECDH or post-quantum Classic Mceliece. The inserted backdoor targets the key generation procedure where generated output public keys subliminally leak information about the secret key to the owner of the backdoor. We demonstrate first practical instantiations of such attack at the protocol level by validating it on TLS 1.3.

Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) forms the core of much of symmetric cryptography, yet the standard techniques for modeling AEAD assume recipients have no ambiguity about what secret key to use for decryption. This is divorced from what occurs in practice, such as in key management services, where a message recipient can store numerous keys and must identify the correct key before decrypting. To date there has been no formal investigation of their security properties or efficacy, and the ad hoc solutions for identifying the intended key deployed in practice can be inefficient and, in some cases, vulnerable to practical attacks.

We provide the first formalization of nonce-based AEAD that supports key identification (AEAD-KI). Decryption now takes in a vector of secret keys and a ciphertext and must both identify the correct secret key and decrypt the ciphertext. We provide new formal security definitions, including new key robustness definitions and indistinguishability security notions. Finally, we show several different approaches for AEAD-KI and prove their security.

{We investigate the problem of recovering integer inputs (up to an affine scaling) when given only the integer monotonic polynomial outputs. Given $n$ integer outputs of a degree-$d$ integer monotonic polynomial whose coefficients and inputs are integers within known bounds and $n \gg d$, we give an algorithm to recover the polynomial and the integer inputs (up to an affine scaling). A heuristic expected time complexity analysis of our method shows that it is exponential in the size of the degree of the polynomial but polynomial in the size of the polynomial coefficients. We conduct experiments with real-world data as well as randomly chosen parameters and demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm over a wide range of parameters.

Using only the polynomial evaluations at specific integer points, the apparent hardness of recovering the input data served as the basis of security of a recent protocol proposed by Kesarwani et al. for secure $k$-nearest neighbour computation on encrypted data that involved secure sorting. The protocol uses the outputs of randomly chosen monotonic integer polynomial to hide its inputs except to only reveal the ordering of input data. Using our integer polynomial recovery algorithm, we show that we can recover the polynomial and the inputs within a few seconds, thereby demonstrating an attack on the protocol of Kesarwani et al.

Distributed key generation (DKG) allows bootstrapping threshold cryptosystems without relying on a trusted party, nowadays enabling fully decentralized applications in blockchains and multiparty computation (MPC). While we have recently seen new advancements for asynchronous DKG (ADKG) protocols, their performance remains the bottleneck for many applications, with only one protocol being implemented (DYX+ ADKG, IEEE S&P 2022). DYX+ ADKG relies on the Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption (expensive to instantiate) and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, incurring a high latency (more than 100s with a failure threshold of 16). Moreover, the security of DYX+ ADKG is based on the random oracle model (ROM) which takes hash function as an ideal function; assuming the existence of random oracle is a strong assumption and up to now we cannot find any theoretically-sound implementation. Furthermore, the ADKG protocol needs public key infrastructure (PKI) to support the trustworthiness of public keys. The strong models (ROM and PKI) further limit the applicability of DYX+ ADKG, as they would add extra and strong assumptions to underlying threshold cryptosystems. For instance, if the original threshold cryptosystem works in the standard model, then the system using DYX+ ADKG would need to use ROM and PKI.

In this paper, we design and implement a modular ADKG protocol that offers improved efficiency and stronger security guarantees. We explore a novel and much more direct reduction from ADKG to the underlying blocks, reducing both the computational overhead and communication rounds of ADKG in the normal case. Our protocol works for both the low-threshold and high-threshold scenarios, being secure under the standard assumption (the well-established discrete logarithm assumption only) in the standard model (no trusted setup, ROM, or PKI).

It is an involutory (self-reciprocal) quagmire 4 cipher. Furthermore, it is isomorphic to a Beaufort. Explicit keys and transformations are provided.

Many applications of blind signatures, such as those for blockchains, require the resulting signatures to be compatible with the existing system. This makes schemes that produce Schnorr signatures, which are now supported by major cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, desirable. Unfortunately, the existing blind-signing protocol has been shown insecure when users can open signing sessions concurrently (Eurocrypt'21). On the other hand, only allowing sequential sessions opens the door to denial-of-service attacks.

We present the first concurrently secure blind-signing protocol for Schnorr signatures, using the standard primitives NIZK and PKE and assuming that Schnorr signatures themselves are unforgeable. We cast our scheme as a generalization of blind and partially blind signatures. We formally define the notion of predicate blind signatures, in which the signer can define a predicate that the blindly signed message must satisfy.

Fault injection attacks have caused implementations to behave unexpectedly, leading to the extraction of cryptographic keys and the spectacular bypass of security features. Understandably, developers want to ensure the robustness of the software against faults and eliminate during production weaknesses that could lead to exploitation. Several open-source fault simulation tools have recently been released to the public, promising cost-effective fault evaluations. In this paper, we set out to discover how suitable such tools are for a developer who wishes to create robust software. The four fault simulation tools available to us employ different techniques to navigate faults and present varying difficulty levels to the user. We objectively compare the available open-source tools and discuss their benefits and drawbacks.

In this work, we introduce a lightweight communication-efficient multi-key approach suitable for the Federated Averaging rule. By combining secret-key RLWE-based HE, additive secret sharing and PRFs, we reduce approximately by a half the communication cost per party when compared to the usual public-key instantiations, while keeping practical homomorphic aggregation performances. Additionally, for LWE-based instantiations, our approach reduces the communication cost per party from quadratic to linear in terms of the lattice dimension.

The biometric system has become the desired alternative to a knowledge-based authentication system. An authentication system does not provide uniqueness, as a single user can create multiple registrations with different identities for authentication. Biometric authentication identifies users based on physical traits (fingerprint, iris, face, voice), which allows the system to detect multiple authentications from the same user. The biometric templates must be encrypted or hidden to preserve users' privacy. Moreover, we need a system to perform the matching process over encrypted data without decrypting templates to preserve the users' privacy. For the euclidean distance-based matching process, centralized server-based authentication leads to possible privacy violations of biometric templates since the power of computing inner product value over any two encrypted templates allows the server to retrieve the plain biometric template by computing a few inner products. To prevent this, we considered a decentralized system called collective authority, which is a part of a public network. The collective authority computes the collective public key with contributions from all nodes in the collective authority. It also performs a matching process over encrypted biometric templates in a decentralized manner where each node performs partial matching. Then the leader of the collective authority combines it to get the final value. We further provide a lattice-based verification system for each operation. Every time a node performs some computations, it needs to provide proof of the correctness of the computation, which is publicly verifiable. We finally make the system dynamics using Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In dynamic collective authority, only $k$ nodes out of the total $n$ nodes are required to perform the matching process. We further show that the security of the proposed system relies on the security of the underlying encryption scheme and the secret sharing scheme.

Blockchain exposes all users’ transaction data to the public, including account balances, asset holdings, trading history, etc. Such data exposure leads to potential security and personal privacy risks that restrict blockchain from broader adoption. Although some existing projects focus on single-chain confidential payment, no existing cross-chain system supports private transactions yet, which is incompatible with privacy regulations such as GDPR. Also, current confidential payment systems require users to pay high extra fees. However, a private and anonymous protocol encrypting all transaction data raises concerns about malicious and illegal activities since the protocol is difficult to audit. We need to balance privacy and auditability in blockchain.

We propose an auditable and affordable protocol for cross-chain and single-chain transactions. This protocol leverages zero-knowledge proofs to encrypt transactions and perform validation without disclosing sensitive users' data. To meet regulations, each auditor from an auditing committee will have an encrypted secret share of the transaction data. Auditors may view the private transaction data only if a majority of the committee agrees to decrypt the data. We employ a ZK-rollup scheme by processing multiple transactions in batches, which reduces private transaction costs to 90\% lower compared with solutions without ZK-rollup. We implemented the proposed scheme using Zokrates and Solidity and evaluated the protocol on the Ethereum test network, and the total one-to-one private transactions cost only 5 seconds. We also proved the security of the protocol utilizing the standard real/ideal world paradigm.

Differential cryptanalysis is a block cipher analysis technology that infers a key by using the difference characteristics. Input differences can be distinguished using a good difference characteristic, and this distinguishing task can lead to key recovery. Artificial neural networks are a good solution for distinguishing tasks. For this reason, recently, neural distinguishers have been actively studied. We propose a distinguisher based on a quantum-classical hybrid neural network by utilizing the recently developed quantum neural network. To our knowledge, we are the first attempt to apply quantum neural networks for neural distinguisher. The target ciphers are simplified ciphers (S-DES, S-AES, S-PRESENT-[4]), and a quantum neural distinguisher that classifies the input difference from random data was constructed using the Pennylane library. Finally, we obtained quantum advantages in this work: improved accuracy and reduced number of parameters. Therefore, our work can be used as a quantum neural distinguisher with high reliability for simplified ciphers.

Facebook introduced message franking to enable users to report abusive content verifiably in end-to-end encrypted messaging. Grubbs et al. formalized the underlying primitive called compactly committing authenticated encryption with associated data (ccAEAD) and presented schemes with provable security. Dodis et al. proposed a core building block called encryptment and presented a generic construction of ccAEAD with encryptment and standard AEAD. This paper first proposes to use a tweakable block cipher instead of AEAD for the generic construction of Dodis et al. In the security analysis of the proposed construction, its ciphertext integrity is shown to require a new but feasible assumption on the ciphertext integrity of encryptment. Then, this paper formalizes remotely keyed ccAEAD (RK ccAEAD) and shows that the proposed construction works as RK ccAEAD. Finally, the confidentiality of the proposed construction as RK ccAEAD is shown to require a new variant of confidentiality for encryptment. The problem of remotely keyed encryption was posed by Blaze in 1996. It is now related to the problem of designing a cryptographic scheme using a trusted module and/or with leakage resiliency.

Digital Signature Schemes such as DSA, ECDSA, and RSA are widely deployed to protect the integrity of security protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPSec. In TLS, for instance, RSA and (EC)DSA are used to sign the state of the agreed upon protocol parameters during the handshake phase. Naturally, RSA and (EC)DSA implementations have become the target of numerous attacks, including powerful side-channel attacks. Hence, cryptographic libraries were patched repeatedly over the years.

Here we introduce Jolt, a novel attack targeting signature scheme implementations. Our attack exploits faulty signatures gained by injecting faults during signature generation. By using the signature verification primitive, we correct faulty signatures and, in the process deduce bits of the secret signing key. Compared to recent attacks that exploit single bit biases in the nonce that require $2^{45}$ signatures, our attack requires less than a thousand faulty signatures for a $256$-bit (EC)DSA. The performance improvement is due to the fact that our attack targets the secret signing key, which does not change across signing sessions. We show that the proposed attack also works on Schnorr and RSA signatures with minor modifications.

We demonstrate the viability of Jolt by running experiments targeting TLS handshakes in common cryptographic libraries such as WolfSSL, OpenSSL, Microsoft SymCrypt, LibreSSL, and Amazon s2n. On our target platform, the online phase takes less than 2 hours to recover $192$ bits of a $256$-bit ECDSA key, which is sufficient for full key recovery. We note that while RSA signatures are protected in popular cryptographic libraries, OpenSSL remains vulnerable to double fault injection. We have also reviewed their FIPS hardened versions which is slightly less efficient but still vulnerable to our attack. We found that (EC)DSA signatures remain largely unprotected against software-only faults, posing a threat to real-life deployments such as TLS, and potentially other security protocols such as SSH and IPSec. This highlights the need for a thorough review and implementation of faults checking in security protocol implementations.

Symbolic computations with usage of algebraic graphs A(n; F_q) and A(n;,F_q[x_1, x_2,..., x_n]) were used for the development of various cryptographic algorithms because the length of their minimal cycle (the girth) tends to infinity when n is growing. It was announced recently that for each commutative integrity ring the girth of A(n, K) is ≥ 2n. In this paper we present essentially shorter closed proof of this statement and evaluate the girth of some induced subgraphs of A(n; K[x_1, x_2, ..., x_n]).

This paper illustrates that masking the torsion point images does not guarantee Castryck-Decru attack does not apply. Our experiments over SIDH primes hint that any square root concerning the Weil pairing on the masked public key helps to recover Bob's private key via the Castryck-Decru attack.

Recently, F.Ivanov, E.Krouk and V.Zyablov proposed new cryptosystem based of Generalized Reed--Solomon (GRS) codes over field extensions. In their approach, the subfield images of GRS codes are masked by a special transform, so that the resulting public codes are not equivalent to subfield images of GRS code but burst errors still can be decoded. In this paper, we show that the complexity of message-recovery attack on this cryptosystem can be reduced due to using burst errors, and the secret key of Ivanov-Krouk-Zyablov cryptosystem can successfully recovered in polynomial time with a linear-algebra based attack and a square-based attack.

In 2009, Lyubashevsky proposed a lattice-based signature scheme by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation and proved its security under the generalized compact knapsack (GCK) problem. This scheme has a simple structure but has large signature and key sizes due to the security requirement of their security reduction. Dilithium, which was submitted to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization and selected as one of the final candidates, is an improvement of the Lyubashevsky's signature scheme and decreases key and signature sizes by modifying the form of a public key and including additional steps in key generation, signing, and verification algorithms. Thus, Dilithium has a more complex structure to implement compared to the Lyubashevsky's scheme. To combine the strength of both signature schemes, we modify the Lyubashevsky's signature scheme and present a new security proof that removes their security requirement. As a result, we propose a simple and practical GCKSign signature scheme based on the hardness of a new GCK assumption, called target-modified one-wayness of GCK function. The signature size of our signature scheme decreases 40 percent, the sum of signature and public key sizes decreases 25 percent, and the secret key size decreases 90 percent for the NIST security level III, compared to Dilithium. Furthermore, by the simplicity of our structure, the key generation, signing, and verification algorithms of our scheme run 2.4$\times$, 1.7$\times$, and 2.0$\times$ faster than those of Dilithium, respectively.