IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
05 December 2022
Wei Dai, Tatsuaki Okamoto, Go Yamamoto
Ian Black, Emma McFall, Juliet Whidden, Bryant Xie, Ryann Cartor
Mastooreh Salajegheh, Shashank Agrawal, Maliheh Shirvanian, Mihai Christodorescu, Payman Mohassel
Chris Monico
Sourav Das, Zhuolun Xiang, Ling Ren
In this paper, we present Tauron, a distributed protocol to generate $q$-SDH parameters in an asynchronous network. In a network of $n$ parties, Tauron tolerates up to one-third of malicious parties. Each party incurs a communication cost of $O(q + n^2\log q)$ and the protocol finishes in $O(\log q + \log n)$ expected rounds. We provide a rigorous security analysis of our protocol. We implement Tauron and evaluate it with up to 128 geographically distributed parties. Our evaluation illustrates that Tauron is highly scalable and results in a 2-6$\times$ better runtime and 4-13$\times$ better per-party bandwidth usage.
Kyoto, Japan, 19 June - 22 June 2023
Submission deadline: 15 March 2023
Notification: 19 April 2023
Melbourne, Australia, 10 July 2023
Submission deadline: 30 January 2023
Notification: 15 March 2023
Mysten Labs
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Andrew St.Germain
More information: https://jobs.ashbyhq.com/mystenlabs/68644b6d-879b-4573-9310-29b2aba114f1
Mysten Labs
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Andrew St.Germain
More information: https://jobs.ashbyhq.com/mystenlabs/03e125fe-8f64-4da6-8b2d-267eb4398775
Aztec
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Travis
More information: https://boards.eu.greenhouse.io/aztec/jobs/4098527101
Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany
The Cryptography and Privacy Engineering Group (ENCRYPTO) @Department of Computer Science @Technical University of Darmstadt offers a full position for a Postdoctoral Researcher in Cryptography & Privacy Engineering, available immediately and for initially until 31.1.2025.
Our mission is to demonstrate that privacy can be efficiently protected in real-world applications via cryptographic protocols.TU Darmstadt is a top research university for IT security, cryptography and computer science in Europe. The position is based in the City of Science Darmstadt, which is very international, livable and well-connected in the Rhine-Main area around Frankfurt. Knowledge of German is helpful, but not required, and TU Darmstadt offers a Welcome Center and language courses.
Job descriptionAs postdoc @ENCRYPTO, you conduct research, build prototype implementations, and publish and present the results at top venues. You are involved in project management, teaching, co-advise PhD students and supervise thesis students & student research assistants. The position is co-funded by the ERC Starting Grant “Privacy-preserving Services on the Internet” (PSOTI), where we build privacy-preserving services on the Internet, which includes designing protocols for privately processing data among untrusted service providers using secure multi-party computation and implementing a scalable framework.
Your profile- Completed PhD degree (or equivalent) at a top university in IT security, computer science, applied mathematics, electrical engineering, or a similar area
- Publications at top venues (CORE rank A*/A) for IT security/applied cryptography (e.g., EUROCRYPT, S&P, CCS, NDSS, USENIX SEC), ideally on cryptographic protocols and secure computation
- Experience in software development, project management and supervising students
- Self-motivated, reliable, creative, can work in a team, and want to do excellent research on challenging scientific problems with practical relevance
- The working language at ENCRYPTO is English, so you must be able to discuss/write/present scientific results in English.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Thomas Schneider (application@encrypto.cs.tu-darmstadt.de)
More information: https://encrypto.de/POSTDOC
PhD's and PostDoc's in Applied Cryptography, Privacy-preserving authentication, Information Security
University of St.Gallen, Switzerland
For more information about the open positions, please visit our job links. Please also apply via these links.
PhD:
https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/funded-phd-student-in-applied-cryptography-privacy-preserving-biometric-authentication-m-f-d/e7a9e90b-02cd-45d0-ad4f-fc02131eaf86
PostDoc:
https://jobs.unisg.ch/offene-stellen/postdoc-fellow-in-cryptography-information-security-m-f-d/c35410fb-40bb-41f2-b298-8be150d8f9b6
If you are interested in a slightly different topic for your phd than listed in the job ad, please check out our research areas and state your research proposal in your motivation letter when applying for the job. We are happy to receive your application via the same job link as above.
Our group web page:
https://cybersecurity.unisg.ch
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
Eriane Breu, eriane.breu@unisg.ch (Administrative matters)
Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa, katerina.mitrokotsa@unisg.ch (Research related questions)
03 December 2022
Deepak Maram, Mahimna Kelkar, Ittay Eyal
In this work, we study mechanisms with back-and-forth interaction with the principals. For example, a user receives an email notification about sending money from her bank account and is given a period of time to abort the operation.
We formally define the authentication problem, where an authentication mechanism interacts with a user and an attacker and tries to identify the user. A mechanism's success depends on the scenario~-- whether the user / attacker know the different credentials; each credential can be safe, lost, leaked, or stolen. The profile of a mechanism is the set of all scenarios in which it succeeds. Thus, we have a partial order on mechanisms, defined by the subset relation on their profiles.
We find an upper bound on the profile size and discover three types of $n$-credential mechanisms (for any $n$) that are maximally secure, meeting this bound. We show these are all the unique maximal mechanisms for $n \le 3$.
We show the efficacy of our model by analyzing existing mechanisms, both theoretical and deployed in widely-used systems, and make concrete improvement proposals. We demonstrate the practicality of our mechanisms by implementing a maximally-secure cryptocurrency wallet.
Prasanna Ravi, Shivam Bhasin, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Aikata Aikata, Sujoy Sinha Roy
Julia Len, Paul Grubbs, Thomas Ristenpart
We provide the first formalization of nonce-based AEAD that supports key identification (AEAD-KI). Decryption now takes in a vector of secret keys and a ciphertext and must both identify the correct secret key and decrypt the ciphertext. We provide new formal security definitions, including new key robustness definitions and indistinguishability security notions. Finally, we show several different approaches for AEAD-KI and prove their security.
Srinivas Vivek, Shyam Murthy, Deepak Kumaraswamy
Using only the polynomial evaluations at specific integer points, the apparent hardness of recovering the input data served as the basis of security of a recent protocol proposed by Kesarwani et al. for secure $k$-nearest neighbour computation on encrypted data that involved secure sorting. The protocol uses the outputs of randomly chosen monotonic integer polynomial to hide its inputs except to only reveal the ordering of input data. Using our integer polynomial recovery algorithm, we show that we can recover the polynomial and the inputs within a few seconds, thereby demonstrating an attack on the protocol of Kesarwani et al.
02 December 2022
Haibin Zhang, Sisi Duan, Chao Liu, Boxin Zhao, Xuanji Meng, Shengli Liu, Yong Yu, Fangguo Zhang, Liehuang Zhu
In this paper, we design and implement a modular ADKG protocol that offers improved efficiency and stronger security guarantees. We explore a novel and much more direct reduction from ADKG to the underlying blocks, reducing both the computational overhead and communication rounds of ADKG in the normal case. Our protocol works for both the low-threshold and high-threshold scenarios, being secure under the standard assumption (the well-established discrete logarithm assumption only) in the standard model (no trusted setup, ROM, or PKI).
Thomas Kaeding
Georg Fuchsbauer, Mathias Wolf
We present the first concurrently secure blind-signing protocol for Schnorr signatures, using the standard primitives NIZK and PKE and assuming that Schnorr signatures themselves are unforgeable. We cast our scheme as a generalization of blind and partially blind signatures. We formally define the notion of predicate blind signatures, in which the signer can define a predicate that the blindly signed message must satisfy.