IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
23 December 2022
Kyoto, Japan, 19 June - 22 June 2023
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 20 March 2023
Notification: 19 April 2023
University of York, UK
Job PostingThe University of York is recruiting a Post-Doctoral Research Associate to work on the Protecting Minority Ethnic Communities Online (PRIME) project for 2 years starting April 2023.
We are seeking candidates with expertise and experience in one or more areas of cyber security and privacy research, preferably in designing and implementing privacy-enhancing technologies and applied cryptography. Other desirable areas of expertise include threat modelling, web and mobile security, usable security & privacy, and formal methods for security.
PRIME is part of the UK's National Research Centre on Privacy, Harm Reduction and Adversarial Influence Online (REPHRAIN).
For the full job description please refer to the following vacancy page: https://jobs.york.ac.uk/vacancy/research-associate-506049.html
Closing date for applications:
Contact: For informal enquiries please contact Dr. Siamak F. Shahandashti at siamak.shahandashti@york.ac.uk.
More information: https://jobs.york.ac.uk/vacancy/research-associate-506049.html
Cryspen
Job PostingClosing date for applications:
Contact: Franziskus Kiefer
More information: https://join.com/companies/cryspen/6605587-software-verification-engineer?widgetv2=true&pid=d73d1a20e99ab4ced633
Cryspen
Job PostingClosing date for applications:
Contact: Franziskus Kiefer
More information: https://join.com/companies/cryspen/6604973-r-and-d-cryptography-engineer?widgetv2=true&pid=d73d1a20e99ab4ced633
Virtual event, Anywhere on Earth, 19 June - 22 June 2023
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 20 March 2023
Notification: 19 April 2023
Copenhagen, Denmark, 21 August - 23 August 2023
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 24 April 2023
Notification: 9 June 2023
Seoul, South Korea, 23 March - 24 March 2023
Event CalendarBol, Croatia, 5 May 2023
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 17 February 2023
Notification: 10 March 2023
19 December 2022
Markus Krausz, Georg Land, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Tim Güneysu
ePrint ReportAlexandra Babueva, Liliya Akhmetzyanova, Evgeny Alekseev, Oleg Taraskin
ePrint ReportJulien Béguinot, Wei Cheng, Sylvain Guilley, Yi Liu, Loïc Masure, Olivier Rioul, François-Xavier Standaert
ePrint ReportAzade Rezaeezade, Lejla Batina
ePrint ReportMaria Corte-Real Santos, Craig Costello, Sam Frengley
ePrint ReportXianrui Qin, Shimin Pan, Arash Mirzaei, Zhimei Sui, Oğuzhan Ersoy, Amin Sakzad, Muhammed F. Esgin, Joseph K. Liu, Jiangshan Yu, Tsz Hon Yuen
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose $\textit{BlindChannel}$, a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where {one of the channel parties} is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose $\textit{BlindHub}$, a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely $\textit{Blind Adaptor Signature}$(BAS), and $\textit{Flexible Blind Conditional Signature}$. BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. Flexible Blind Conditional Signature is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality.
Thomas Peyrin, Quan Quan Tan
ePrint ReportBenoît Libert, Alain Passelègue, Mahshid Riahinia
ePrint ReportThéophile Wallez, Jonathan Protzenko, Benjamin Beurdouche, Karthikeyan Bhargavan
ePrint ReportWe present a precise, executable, machine-checked formal specification of TreeSync, and show how it can be composed with other components to implement the full MLS protocol. Our specification is written in F* and serves as a reference implementation of MLS; it passes the RFC test vectors and is interoperable with other MLS implementations. Using the DY* symbolic protocol analysis framework, we formalize and prove the integrity and authentication guarantees of TreeSync, under minimal security assumptions on the rest of MLS. Our analysis identifies a new attack and we propose several changes that have been incorporated in the latest MLS draft. Ours is the first testable, machine-checked, formal specification for MLS, and should be of interest to both developers and researchers interested in this upcoming standard.