International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Position is limited to 3 years, full time, with possibility for extension.

Tasks:

• Active research in the area of intrusion detection systems (IDS) for critical infrastructures, secure cyber-physical systems, and artificial intelligence / machine learning for traffic analysis
• Implementation and evaluation of new algorithms and methods
• Cooperation and knowledge transfer with industrial partners
• Publication of scientific results
• Assistance with teaching

Requirements:

• Master’s degree (or equivalent) and PhD degree (only for PostDocs) in Computer Science or related disciplines
• Strong interest in IT security and/or networking and distributed systems
• Knowledge of at least one programming language (C++, Java, etc.) and one scripting language (Perl, Python, etc.) or strong willingness to quickly learn new programming languages
• Linux/Unix skills
• Knowledge of data mining, machine learning, statistics and result visualization concepts is of advantage
• Excellent working knowledge of English; German is of advantage
• Excellent communication skills

For more information about the vacant position please contact Prof. A. Panchenko (E-Mail: itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de).

We value diversity and therefore welcome all applications – regardless of gender, nationality, ethnic and social background, religion/belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, and identity. The BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg strives for a balanced gender relation in all employee groups. Applicants with disabilities will be given preferential treatment if they are equally qualified.

Applications containing the following documents:

• A detailed Curriculum Vitae
• Transcript of records from your Master studies
• An electronic version of your Master thesis, if possible
should be sent in a single PDF file as soon as possible, but not later than 09.07.2023 at itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: For more information about the vacant position please contact Prof. A. Panchenko (E-Mail: itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de)

More information: https://www.b-tu.de/en/fg-it-sicherheit

Are you fascinated by security in theory and/or practice? Are you willing to take on the challenge of securing the next generation of computer systems and networks? Do you like to work in a team of young researchers? Join our dynamic team as a Postdoctoral Researcher and contribute to ground-breaking research at the forefront of quantum technology!

Quantum technologies are advancing at an unprecedented pace. On one hand, the progress in developing quantum computers poses a significant threat to our security infrastructure, particularly concerning public-key cryptography. On the other hand, the integration of quantum communication and quantum data into our networks presents novel opportunities that can enhance security functionalities. However, at present, quantum components predominantly exist in experimental stages, and their security requires in-depth study and assessment.

Among the prominent applications of quantum networks is quantum key distribution (QKD), which theoretically offers superior security guarantees compared to classical cryptographic schemes. However, does the utilization of QKD truly provide tangible benefits over post-quantum cryptography? In the realistic context of trusted-node QKD networks, what kind of security guarantees can be proven depending on the deployed key-management system?

At a broader level, this postdoc position aims to investigate the advantages of exploiting quantum effects within the domain of security and explore the integration of quantum and classical security guarantees both in theory and practice.

The fully funded postdoc position will be within the Theory of Computer Science (TCS) group but will be carried out in close collaboration with researchers at QuSoft. The position is a part of the Quantum Delta NL growth fund project CAT-2, which focuses on the development of a national quantum network, and it will likely involve collaboration with the experimental and theoretical partners of the CAT-2 project.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Christian Schaffner

More information: https://vacatures.uva.nl/UvA/job/PD/773632702/

Circuit-based Private Set Intersection (circuit-PSI) refers to cryptographic protocols that let two parties with input set $X$ and $Y$ compute a function $f$ over the intersection set $X \cap Y$, without revealing any other information. The research efforts for circuit-PSI mainly focus on the case where input set sizes $|X|$ and $|Y|$ are similar so far, and they scale poorly for extremely unbalanced set sizes $|X| \gg |Y|$. Recently, Lepoint \textit{et al.} (ASIACRYPT'21) proposed the first dedicated solutions for this problem, which has online cost only linear in the small set size $|Y|$. However, it requires an expensive setup phase that requires huge storage of about $O(|X|)$ on the small set holder side, which can be problematic in applications where the small set holder is assumed to have restricted equipment.

In this work, we suggest new efficient proposals for circuit-PSI tailored for unbalanced inputs, which feature {\emph{zero}} small set holder side storage, and comparable online phase performance to the previous work. At the technical core, we use homomorphic encryption (HE) based {\emph{plain}} PSI protocols of Cong \textit{et al.} (CCS'21), with several technically non-trivial arguments on algorithm and security.

We demonstrate the superiority of our proposals in several input set sizes by an implementation. As a representative example, for input sets of size $2^{24}$ and $2^{12}$, our proposals require {\emph{zero}} storage on the small set holder whereas Lepoint \textit{et al.} requires over $7$GB. The online phase remains similar; over LAN network setting, ours takes $7.5$ (or $20.9$s) seconds with $45$MB (or $11.7$MB) communication, while Lepoint \textit{et al.} requires $4.2$ seconds with $117$MB communication.

In this work, we introduce a new attack for the Loidreau scheme [PQCrypto 2017] and its more recent variant LowMS. This attack is based on a constrained linear system for which we provide two solving approaches: - The first one is an enumeration algorithm inspired from combinatorial attacks on the Rank Decoding (RD) Problem. While the attack technique remains very simple, it allows us to obtain the best known structural attack on the parameters of these two schemes. - The second one is to rewrite it as a bilinear system over Fq. Even if Gröbner basis techniques on this second system seem infeasible, we provide a detailed analysis of the first degree fall polynomials which arise when applying such algorithms.

Incompressibility is a popular security notion for white-box cryptography and captures that a large encryption program cannot be compressed without losing functionality. Fouque, Karpman, Kirchner and Minaud (FKKM) defined strong incompressibility, where a compressed program should not even help to distinguish encryptions of two messages of equal length. Equivalently, the notion can be phrased as indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks and key-leakage (LK-IND-CPA), where the leakage rate is high.

In this paper, we show that LK-IND-CPA security with superlogarithmic-length leakage, and thus strong incompressibility, cannot be proven under standard (i.e. single-stage) assumptions, if the encryption scheme is key-fixing, i.e. a polynomial number of message-ciphertext pairs uniquely determine the key with high probability.

Our impossibility result refutes a claim by FKKM that their big-key generation mechanism achieves strong incompressibility when combined with any PRG or any conventional encryption scheme, since the claim is not true for encryption schemes which are key-fixing (or for PRGs which are injective). In particular, we prove that the cipher block chaining (CBC) block cipher mode is key-fixing when modelling the cipher as a truly random permutation for each key. Subsequent to and inspired by our work, FKKM prove that their original big-key generation mechanism can be combined with a random oracle into an LK-IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme, circumventing the impossibility result by the use of an idealised model.

Along the way, our work also helps clarifying the relations between incompressible white-box cryptography, big-key symmetric encryption, and general leakage resilient cryptography, and their limitations.

Consider the standard setting of two-party computation where the sender has a secret function $f$ and the receiver has a secret input $x$ and the output $f(x)$ is delivered to the receiver at the end of the protocol. Let us consider the unidirectional message model where only one party speaks in each round. In this setting, Katz and Ostrovsky (Crypto 2004) showed that at least four rounds of interaction between the parties are needed in the plain model (i.e., no trusted setup) if the simulator uses the adversary in a black-box way (a.k.a. black-box simulation). Suppose the sender and the receiver would like to run multiple sequential iterations of the secure computation protocol on possibly different inputs. For each of these iterations, do the parties need to start the protocol from scratch and exchange four messages?

In this work, we explore the possibility of \textit{amortizing} the round complexity or in other words, \textit{reusing} a certain number of rounds of the secure computation protocol in the plain model. We obtain the following results.

1. Under standard cryptographic assumptions, we construct a four-round two-party computation protocol where (i) the first three rounds of the protocol could be reused an unbounded number of times if the receiver input remains the same and only the sender input changes, and (ii) the first two rounds of the protocol could be reused an unbounded number of times if the receiver input needs to change as well. In other words, the sender sends a single additional message if only its input changes, and in the other case, we need one message each from the receiver and the sender. The number of additional messages needed in each of the above two modes is optimal and, additionally, our protocol allows arbitrary interleaving of these two modes. 2. We also extend these results to the multiparty setting (in the simultaneous message exchange model) and give round-optimal protocols such that (i) the first two rounds could be reused an unbounded number of times if the inputs of the parties need to change and (ii) the first three rounds could be reused an unbounded number of times if the inputs remain the same but the functionality to be computed changes. As in the two-party setting, we allow arbitrary interleaving of the above two modes of operation.

Vehicular Social Networks (VSNs) rely on data shared by users to provide convenient services. Data is outsourced to the cloud server and the distributed roadside unit in VSNs. However, roadside unit has limited resources, so that data sharing process is inefficient and is vulnerable to security threats, such as illegal access, tampering attack and collusion attack. In this article, to overcome the shortcomings of security, we define a chain tolerance semi-trusted model to describe the credibility of distributed group based on the anti tampering feature of blockchain. We further propose a Blockchain-based Lightweight Access Control scheme in VSNs that resist tampering and collusion attacks, called BLAC. To overcome the shortcomings of efficiency, we design a ciphertext piece storage algorithm and a recovery one to achieve lightweight storage cost. In the decryption operation, we separate a pre-decryption algorithm based on outsourcing to achieve lightweight decryption computation cost on the user side. Finally, we present the formal security analyses and the simulation experiments for BLAC, and compare the results of experiments with existing relevant schemes. The security analyses show that our scheme is secure, and the results of experiments show that our scheme is lightweight and practical.

ECVRF is a verifiable random function (VRF) scheme used in multiple cryptocurrency systems. It has recently been proven to satisfy the notion of non-malleability which is useful in applications to blockchains (Peikert and Xu, CT-RSA 2023); however, the existing proof uses the rewinding technique and has a quadratic security loss. In this work, we re-analyze the non-malleability of ECVRF in the algebraic group model (AGM) and give a tight proof. We also compare our proof with the unforgeability proof for the Schnorr signature scheme in the AGM (Fuchsbauer, Plouviez and Seurin, EUROCRYPT 2020).

It is well known that without randomization, Byzantine agreement (BA) requires a linear number of rounds in the synchronous setting, while it is flat out impossible in the asynchronous setting. The primitive which allows to bypass the above limitation is known as oblivious common coin (OCC). It allows parties to agree with constant probability on a random coin, where agreement is oblivious, i.e., players are not aware whether or not agreement has been achieved.

The starting point of our work is the observation that no known protocol exists for information-theoretic multi-valued OCC---i.e., OCC where the coin might take a value from a domain of cardinality larger than 2---with optimal resiliency in the asynchronous (with eventual message delivery) setting. This apparent hole in the literature is particularly problematic, as multi-valued OCC is implicitly or explicitly used in several constructions. (In fact, it is often falsely attributed to the asynchronous BA result by Canetti and Rabin [STOC ’93], which, however, only achieves binary OCC and does not translate to a multi-valued OCC protocol.)

In this paper, we present the first information-theoretic multi-valued OCC protocol in the asynchronous setting with optimal resiliency, i.e., tolerating $t
We then turn to the problem of round-preserving parallel composition of asynchronous BA. A protocol for this task was proposed by Ben-Or and El-Yaniv [Distributed Computing ’03]. Their construction, however, is flawed in several ways: For starters, it relies on multi-valued OCC instantiated by Canetti and Rabin's result (which, as mentioned above, only provides binary OCC). This shortcoming can be repaired by plugging in our above multi-valued OCC construction. However, as we show, even with this fix it remains unclear whether the protocol of Ben-Or and El-Yaniv achieves its goal of expected-constant-round parallel asynchronous BA, as the proof is incorrect. Thus, as a second contribution, we provide a simpler, more modular protocol for the above task. Finally, and as a contribution of independent interest, we provide proofs in Canetti's Universal Composability framework; this makes our work the first one offering composability guarantees, which are important as BA is a core building block of secure multi-party computation protocols.

The relationship between oblivious transfer (OT) and public-key encryption (PKE) has been studied by Gertner et al. (FOCS 2000). They showed that OT can be constructed from special types of PKE, i.e., PKE with oblivious sampleability of public keys or ciphertexts. In this work, we give new black-box constructions of OT from PKE without any oblivious sampleability. Instead, we require that the PKE scheme is rerandomizable, meaning that one can use the public key to rerandomize a ciphertext into a fresh ciphertext. We give two different OT protocols with different efficiency features based on rerandomizable PKE. For $1$-out-of-$n$ OT, in our first OT protocol, the sender has sublinear (in $n$) cost, and in our second OT protocol, the cost of the receiver is independent of $n$. As a comparison, in the PKE-based OT protocols of Gertner et al., both the sender and receiver have linear cost.

A cryptographic accumulator is a succinct set commitment scheme with efficient (non-)membership proofs that typically supports updates (additions and deletions) on the accumulated set. When elements are added to or deleted from the set, an update message is issued. The collection of all the update messages essentially leaks the underlying accumulated set which in certain applications is not desirable.

In this work, we define oblivious accumulators, a set commitment with concise membership proofs that hides the elements and the set size from every entity: an outsider, a verifier or other element holders. We formalize this notion of privacy via two properties: element hiding and add-delete indistinguishability. We also define almost-oblivious accumulators, that only achieve a weaker notion of privacy called add-delete unlinkability. Such accumulators hide the elements but not the set size. We consider the trapdoorless, decentralized setting where different users can add and delete elements from the accumulator and compute membership proofs.

We then give a generic construction of an oblivious accumulator based on key-value commitments (KVC). We also show a generic way to construct KVCs from an accumulator and a vector commitment scheme. Finally, we give lower bounds on the communication (size of update messages) required for oblivious accumulators and almost-oblivious accumulators.

In this paper, we present a novel method for timestamping and data notarisation on a distributed ledger. The problem with on-chain hashes is that a cryptographic hash is a deterministic function that it allows the blockchain be used as an oracle that confirms whether potentially leaked data is authentic (timestamped or notarised by the user). Instead, we suggest using on-chain Pedersen commitments and off-chain zero knowledge proofs (ZKP) for designated verifiers to prove the link between the data and the on-chain commitment.

Our technique maintains the privacy of the data, and retains control of who can access it and when they can access it. This holds true even on a public blockchain, and even if the data is leaked by authorised parties. Indeed, an authorised data consumer (a designated-verifier for the ZKP), who discloses the data publicly, cannot convince anyone about the legitimacy of the data (in the sense that it is consistent with the information uploaded to the blockchain), because the ZKP proof is valid only for them.

Our techniques can be used in scenarios where it is required to audit highly-sensitive data (e.g. application logs) by specific third parties, or to provide on-demand data certification by notaries

Event date: 27 May to 30 May 2024

With the advancement in technology, Cloud computing always amazes the world with revolutionizing solutions that automate and simplify complex computational tasks. The advantages like no maintenance cost, accessibility, data backup, pay-per-use models, unlimited storage, and processing power encourage individuals and businesses to migrate their workload to the cloud. Despite the numerous advantages of cloud computing, the geolocation of data in the cloud environment is a massive concern, which relates to the performance and government legislation that will be applied to data. The unclarity of data geolocation can cause compliance concerns. In this work, we have presented a technique that will allow users to restrict the geolocation of their data in the cloud environment. We have used trusted computing mechanisms to attest the host and its geolocation remotely. With this model, the user will upload the data whose decryption key will be shared with a third-party attestation server only. The decryption key will be sealed to the TPM of the host after successful attestation guaranteeing the authorized geolocation and platform state.

In the threshold version of Paillier's encryption scheme a set of parties hold a share of the secret decryption key. Whenever a ciphertext is to be decrypted, the parties sends their decryption shares, which are then verified for correctness and combined into the plaintext. The scheme has been widely adopted in various applications, from secure voting to general purpose MPC protocols. However, among handful proposals for a maliciously secure scheme, one must choose between an efficient implementation that relies on non-standard assumptions or an infeasible one that relies on widely acceptable assumptions.

In this work, we present a new protocol that combines the benefits of both worlds. We depart from the efficient scheme, which was proven secure relying on non-standard assumptions, and for the first time, prove that it is secure under standard assumptions only. This is possible thanks to a novel reduction technique, from the soundness of a zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete logs, to the factoring problem. Furthermore, our simple and efficient proof supports batching, and hence enables batched threshold Paillier decryption for the first time.

Until now, verifying that a decryption share is correct was the bottleneck of threshold Paillier schemes, and prevented its implementation in practice (unless one is willing to rely on a trusted dealer). Our new proof and batching techniques shift that bottleneck back to the plaintext reconstruction, just like in the semi-honest setting, and render threshold Paillier practical for the first time, supporting large scale deployments.

We implemented our scheme and report our evaluation with up to 1000 parties, in the dishonest majority setting. For instance, over an EC2 C6i machine, we get a throughput of about 50 and 3.6 decryptions per second, when run over a network of 100 and 1000 parties, respectively.

In this article, we discuss the decoding of Gabidulin and related codes from a cryptographic point of view, and we observe that these codes can be decoded solely from the knowledge of a generator matrix. We then extend and revisit Gibson and Overbeck attacks on the generalized GPT encryption scheme (instantiated with the Gabidulin code) for different ranks of the distortion matrix. We apply our attack to the case of an instantiation with twisted Gabidulin codes.

We present a new method for transforming zero-knowledge protocols in the designated verifier setting into public-coin protocols, which can be made non-interactive and publicly verifiable. Our transformation applies to a large class of ZK protocols based on oblivious transfer. In particular, we show that it can be applied to recent, fast protocols based on vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE), with a technique we call VOLE-in-the-head, upgrading these protocols to support public verifiability. Our resulting ZK protocols have linear proof size, and are simpler, smaller and faster than related approaches based on MPC-in-the-head.

To build VOLE-in-the-head while supporting both binary circuits and large finite fields, we develop several new technical tools. One of these is a new proof of security for the SoftSpokenOT protocol (Crypto 2022), which generalizes it to produce certain types of VOLE correlations over large fields. Secondly, we present a new ZK protocol that is tailored to take advantage of this form of VOLE, which leads to a publicly verifiable VOLE-in-the-head protocol with only 2x more communication than the best, designated-verifier VOLE-based protocols.

We analyze the soundness of our approach when made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform, using round-by-round soundness. As an application of the resulting NIZK, we present FAEST, a post-quantum signature scheme based on AES. FAEST is the first AES-based signature scheme to be smaller than SPHINCS+, with signature sizes between 5.6 and 6.6kB at the 128-bit security level. Compared with the smallest version of SPHINCS+ (7.9kB), FAEST verification is slower, but the signing times are between 8x and 40x faster.

Consider the problem of efficiently evaluating isogenies $\phi: \mathcal{E} \to \mathcal{E}/H$ of elliptic curves over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$, where the kernel \(H = \langle{G}\rangle\) is a cyclic group of odd (prime) order: given \(\mathcal{E}\), \(G\), and a point (or several points) $P$ on $\mathcal{E}$, we want to compute $\phi(P)$. This problem is at the heart of efficient implementations of group-action- and isogeny-based post-quantum cryptosystems such as CSIDH. Algorithms based on Vélu's formul\ae{} give an efficient solution to this problem when the kernel generator $G$ is defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$. However, for general isogenies, \(G\) is only defined over some extension $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}$, even though $\langle{G}\rangle$ as a whole (and thus \(\phi\)) is defined over the base field $\mathbb{F}_q$; and the performance of Vélu-style algorithms degrades rapidly as $k$ grows. In this article we revisit the isogeny-evaluation problem with a special focus on the case where $1 \le k \le 12$. We improve Vélu-style isogeny evaluation for many cases where \(k = 1\) using special addition chains, and combine this with the action of Galois to give greater improvements when \(k > 1\).

Code-Based Cryptosystem, CBC, is one of the candidates for Post-Quantum Cryptosystems, PQCs. Its security primarily bases on the Syndrome Decoding Problem, SDP. In this paper, we focus on the rank CBC whose security relies on the rank SDP. The GRS (Gaborit-Ruatta-Schrek) algorithm is well known as the current best decoding algorithm for the rank SDP. We propose the quantum version of the GRS algorithm. Then, we introduce the attack strategy using that quantum algorithm for previous rank CBCs remained at the 2nd Round of the NIST's PQC standardization project, and consider the quantum security for those cryptosystems. We present a result that is effective for RQC by our attack method, so give new RQC's instances which is secure against that attack.

We show that the key agreement scheme [Multim. Tools Appl. 80:799-829, 2021] is flawed. (1) The scheme is a hybrid which piles up various tools such as public key encryption, signature, symmetric key encryption, hash function, cancelable templates from thumb fingerprints, and elliptic curve cryptography. These tools are excessively used because key agreement is just a simple cryptographic primitive in contrast to public key encryption. (2) The involved reliance is very intricate. Especially, the requirement for a secure channel between two parties is generally unavailable.