International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The substitution box (S-box) is an important nonlinear component in most symmetric cryptosystems and thus should have good properties. Its difference distribution table (DDT) and linear approximation table (LAT) affect the security of the cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis. In most previous work, differential uniformity and linearity of an S-box are two primary cryptographic properties to impact the resistance against differential and linear attacks. In some cases, the branch number and fixed point are also be considered. However, other important cryptographic properties such as the frequency of differential uniformity (resp. linearity) and the number of Bad Input and Bad Output (BIBO) patterns in DDT (resp. LAT) are often ignored. These properties substantially affect lightweight cryptography based on substitution bit permutation networks (SbPN) such as PRESENT, GIFT and RECTANGLE. This paper introduces a new method to search for S-boxes satisfying all above criteria simultaneously. In our strategy, we transform the process of searching for S-boxes under certain constraints on cryptographic properties into a satisfiability (SAT) problem. As applications, we use our new approach to search out 4-bit and 5-bit S-boxes with the same or better cryptographic properties compared with the S-boxes from well-known ciphers. Finally, we also utilize our method to verify a conjecture proposed by Boura et al. in the case of all 3-bit and 4-bit S-boxes. We propose a proposition and two corollaries to reduce the search space in this verification.

Zero-knowledge middleboxes (ZKMBs) are a recent paradigm in which clients get privacy while middleboxes enforce policy: clients prove in zero knowledge that the plaintext underlying their encrypted traffic complies with network policies, such as DNS filtering. However, prior work had impractically poor performance and was limited in functionality.

This work presents Zombie, the first system built using the ZKMB paradigm. Zombie introduces techniques that push ZKMBs to the verge of practicality: preprocessing (to move the bulk of proof generation to idle times between requests), asynchrony (to remove proving and verifying costs from the critical path), and batching (to amortize some of the verification work). Zombie’s choices, together with these techniques, provide a factor of 3.5$\times$ speedup in total computation done by client and middlebox, lowering the critical path overhead for a DNS filtering application to less than 300ms (on commodity hardware) or (in the asynchronous configuration) to 0.

As an additional contribution that is likely of independent interest, Zombie introduces a portfolio of techniques to efficiently encode regular expressions in probabilistic (and zero knowledge) proofs; these techniques offer significant asymptotic and constant factor improvements in performance over a standard baseline. Zombie builds on this portfolio to support policies based on regular expressions, such as data loss prevention.

Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) enable a party to cryptographically prove a statement regarding a computation to another party that has constrained resources. Practical use of SNARKs often involves a Zero-Knowledge Virtual Machine (zkVM) that receives an input program and input data, then generates a SNARK proof of the correct execution of the input program. Most zkVMs emulate the von Neumann architecture and must prove relations between a program's execution and its use of Random Access Memory. However, there are conceptually simpler models of computation that are naturally modeled in a SNARK yet are still practical for use. Nock is a minimal, homoiconic combinator function, a Turing-complete instruction set that is practical for general computation, and is notable for its use in Urbit.

We introduce Eden, an Efficient Dyck Encoding of Nock that serves as a practical, SNARK-friendly combinator function and instruction set architecture. We describe arithmetization techniques and polynomial equations used to represent the Eden ISA in an Interactive Oracle Proof. Eden provides the ability to prove statements regarding the execution of any program that compiles down to the Eden ISA. We present the Eden zkVM, a particular instantiation of Eden as a zk-STARK.

Since the pioneering work of Gentry, Halevi, and Smart in 2012, the state of the art on transciphering has moved away from work on AES to focus on new symmetric algorithms that are better suited for a homomorphic execution. Yet, with recent advances in homomorphic cryptosystems, the question arises as to where we stand today. Especially since AES execution is the application that may be chosen by NIST in the FHE part of its future call for threshold encryption. In this paper, we propose an AES implementation using TFHE programmable bootstrapping which runs in less than a minute on an average laptop. We detail the transformations carried out on the original AES code to lead to a more efficient homomorphic evaluation and we also give several execution times on different machines, depending on the type of execution (sequential or parallelized). These times vary from 4.5 minutes (resp. 54 secs) for sequential (resp. parallel) execution on a standard laptop down to 28 seconds for a parallelized execution over 16 threads on a multi-core workstation.

Recently, a number of highly optimized threshold signing protocols for Schnorr signatures have been proposed. A key feature of these protocols is that they produce so-called "presignatures" in a "offline" phase (using a relatively heavyweight, high-latency subprotocol), which are then consumed in an "online" phase to generate signatures (using a relatively lightweight, low-latency subprotocol). The idea is to build up a large cache of presignatures in periods of low demand, so as to be able to quickly respond to bursts of signing requests in periods of high demand. Unfortunately, it is well known that using such presignatures naively leads to subexponential attacks. Thus, any protocols based on presignatures must mitigate against these attacks.

One such notable protocol is FROST, which provides security even with an unlimited number of presignatures; moreover, assuming unused presignatures are available, signing requests can be processed concurrently with minimal latency. Unfortunately, FROST is not a robust protocol, at least in the asynchronous communication model (arguably the most realistic model for such a protocol). Indeed, a single corrupt party can prevent any signatures from being produced. Recently, a protocol called ROAST was developed to remedy this situation. Unfortunately, ROAST is significantly less efficient that FROST (each signing request runs many instances of FROST concurrently).

A more recent protocol is SPRINT, which provides robustness without synchrony assumptions, and actually provides better throughput than FROST. Unfortunately, SPRINT is only secure in very restricted modes of operation. Specifically, to avoid a subexponential attack, only a limited number of presignatures may be produced in advance of signing requests, which somewhat defeats the purpose of presignatures.

Our main new result is to show how to securely combine the techniques used in FROST and SPRINT, allowing one to build a threshold Schnorr signing protocol that (i) is secure and robust without synchrony assumptions (like SPRINT), (ii) provides security even with an unlimited number of presignatures, and (assuming unused presignatures are available) signing requests can be processed concurrently with minimal latency (like FROST), (iii) achieves high throughput (like SPRINT), and (iv) achieves optimal resilience.

Besides achieving this particular technical result, one of our main goals in this paper is to provide a unifying framework in order to better understand the techniques used in various protocols. To that end, we attempt to isolate and abstract the main ideas of each protocol, stripping away superfluous details, so that these ideas can be more readily combined and implemented in different ways. More specifically, to the extent possible, we try to avoid talking about distributed protocols at all, and rather, we examine the security of the ordinary, non-threshold Schnorr scheme in "enhanced" attack modes that correspond to attacks on various types of threshold signing protocols.

Another one of our goals to carry out a security analysis of these enhanced attack modes in the Generic Group Model (GGM), sometimes in conjunction with the Random Oracle Model (ROM). Despite the limitations of these models, we feel that giving security proofs in the GGM or GGM+ROM provides useful insight into the concrete security of the various enhanced attack modes we consider.

At Asiacrypt 2021, Baksi et al. proposed DEFAULT, the first block cipher which provides differential fault attack (DFA) resistance at the algorithm level, with 64-bit DFA security. Initially, the cipher employed a simple key schedule where a single key was XORed throughout the rounds, and the key schedule was updated by incorporating round-independent keys in a rotating fashion. However, at Eurocrypt 2022, Nageler et al. presented a DFA that compromised the claimed DFA security of DEFAULT, reducing it by up to 20 bits for the simple key schedule and allowing for unique key recovery in the case of rotating keys. In this work, we present an enhanced differential fault attack (DFA) on the DEFAULT cipher, showcasing its effectiveness in uniquely recovering the encryption key. We commence by determining the deterministic computation of differential trails for up to five rounds. Leveraging these computed trails, we apply the DFA to the simple key schedule, injecting faults at different rounds and estimating the minimum number of faults required for successful key retrieval. Our attack achieves key recovery with minimal faults compared to previous approaches. Additionally, we extend the DFA attack to rotating keys, first recovering equivalent keys with fewer faults in the DEFAULT-LAYER, and subsequently applying the DFA separately to the DEFAULT-CORE. Furthermore, we propose a generic DFA approach for round-independent keys in the DEFAULT cipher. Lastly, we introduce a new paradigm of fault attack that combines SFA and DFA for any linear structured SBOX based cipher, enabling more efficient key recovery in the presence of both rotating and round-independent key configurations. We call this technique Statistical-Differential Fault Attack (SDFA). Our results shed light on the vulnerabilities of the DEFAULT cipher and highlight the challenges in achieving robust DFA protection for linear structure SBOX-based ciphers.

Threshold secret sharing allows a dealer to split a secret $s$ into $n$ shares, such that any $t$ shares allow for reconstructing $s$, but no $t-1$ shares reveal any information about $s$. Leakage-resilient secret sharing requires that the secret remains hidden, even when an adversary additionally obtains a limited amount of leakage from every share.

Benhamouda et al. (CRYPTO'18) proved that Shamir's secret sharing scheme is one bit leakage-resilient for reconstruction threshold $t\geq0.85n$ and conjectured that the same holds for $t=c\cdot n$ for any constant $0\leq c\leq1$. Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT'20) showed that this is the best one can hope for by proving that Shamir's scheme is not secure against one-bit leakage when $t=c\cdot n/\log(n)$.

In this work, we strengthen the lower bound of Nielsen and Simkin. We consider noisy leakage-resilience, where a random subset of leakages is replaced by uniformly random noise. We prove a lower bound for Shamir's secret sharing, similar to that of Nielsen and Simkin, which holds even when a constant fraction of leakages is replaced by random noise. To this end, we first prove a lower bound on the share size of any noisy-leakage-resilient sharing scheme. We then use this lower bound to show that there exist universal constants $c_1,c_2$, such that for infinitely many $n$, it holds that Shamir's secret sharing scheme is not noisy-leakage-resilient for $t\leq c_1\cdot n/\log(n)$, even when a $c_2$ fraction of leakages are replaced by random noise.

Anonymous credentials (AC) have emerged as a promising privacy-preserving solu- tion for user-centric identity management. They allow users to authenticate in an anonymous and unlinkable way such that only required information (i.e., attributes) from their credentials are re- vealed. With the increasing push towards decentralized systems and identity, e.g., self-sovereign identity (SSI) and the concept of verifiable credentials, this also necessitates the need for suit- able AC systems. For instance, when relying on existing AC systems, obtaining credentials from different issuers requires the presentation of independent credentials, which can become cum- bersome. Consequently, it is desirable for AC systems to support the so-called multi-authority (MA) feature. It allows a compact and efficient showing of multiple credentials from different is- suers. Another important property is called issuer hiding (IH). This means that showing a set of credentials is not revealed which issuer has issued which credentials but only whether a verifier- defined policy on the acceptable set of issuers is satisfied. This issue becomes particularly acute in the context of MA, where a user could be uniquely identified by the combination of issuers in their showing. Unfortunately, there are no AC schemes that satisfy both these properties simul- taneously. To close this gap, we introduce the concept of Issuer-Hiding Multi-Authority Anonymous Cre- dentials (IhMA). Our proposed solution involves the development of two new signature primi- tives with versatile randomization features which are independent of interest: 1) Aggregate Sig- natures with Randomizable Tags and Public Keys (AtoSa) and 2) Aggregate Mercurial Signatures (ATMS), which extend the functionality of AtoSa to additionally support the randomization of messages and yield the first instance of an aggregate (equivalence-class) structure-preserving sig- nature. These primitives can be elegantly used to obtain IhMA with different trade-offs but have applications beyond. We formalize all notations and provide rigorous security definitions for our proposed primi- tives. We present provably secure and efficient instantiations of the two primitives as well as corresponding IhMA systems. Finally, we provide benchmarks based on an implementation to demonstrate the practical efficiency of our constructions

Private computation on (labeled) set intersection (PCSI/PCLSI) is a secure computation protocol that allows two parties to compute fine-grained functions on set intersection, including cardinality, cardinality-sum, secret shared intersection and arbitrary functions. Recently, some computationally efficient PCSI protocols have emerged, but a limitation on these protocols is the communication complexity, which scales (super)-linear with the size of the large set. This is of particular concern when performing PCSI in the unbalanced case, where one party is a constrained device with a small set, and the other is a service provider holding a large set.

In this work, we first formalize a new ideal functionality called shared characteristic and its labeled variety called shared characteristic with labels, from which we propose the frameworks of PCSI/PCLSI protocols. By instantiating our frameworks, we obtain a series of efficient PCSI/PCLSI protocols, whose communication complexity is linear in the size of the small set, and logarithmic in the large set.

We demonstrate the practicality of our protocols with implementations. Experiment results show that our protocols outperform previous ones and the larger difference between the sizes of two sets, the better our protocols perform. For input set sizes $2^{10}$ and $2^{22}$ with items of length $128$ bits, our PCSI requires only $4.62$MB of communication to compute the cardinality; $4.71$MB of communication to compute the cardinality-sum. Compared with the state-of-the-art PCSI proposed by Chen et al., there are $ 58 \times$ and $77 \times$ reductions in the communication cost of computing cardinality and cardinality-sum.

We introduce a new data-independent priority queue which supports amortized polylogarithmic-time insertions and constant-time deletions, and crucially, (non-amortized) constant-time \textit{read-front} operations, in contrast with a prior construction of Toft (PODC'11). Moreover, we reduce the number of required comparisons. Data-independent data structures - first identified explicitly by Toft, and further elaborated by Mitchell and Zimmerman (STACS'14) - facilitate computation on encrypted data without branching, which is prohibitively expensive in secure computation. Using our efficient data-independent priority queue, we introduce a new privacy-preserving dark pool application, which significantly improves upon prior constructions which were based on costly sorting operations. Dark pools are securities-trading venues which attain ad-hoc order privacy, by matching orders outside of publicly visible exchanges. In this paper, we describe an efficient and secure dark pool (implementing a full continuous double auction), building upon our priority queue construction. Our dark pool's security guarantees are cryptographic - based on secure multiparty computation (MPC) - and do not require that the dark pool operators be trusted. Our approach improves upon the asymptotic and concrete efficiency attained by previous efforts. Existing cryptographic dark pools process new orders in time which grows linearly in the size of the standing order book; ours does so in polylogarithmic time. We describe a concrete implementation of our protocol, with malicious security in the honest majority setting. We also report benchmarks of our implementation, and compare these to prior works. Our protocol reduces the total running time by several orders of magnitude, compared to prior secure dark pool solutions.

This work introduces the notion of secure multiparty computation: MPC with fall-back security. Fall-back security for an $n$-party protocol is defined with respect to an adversary structure $\mathcal{Z}$ wherein security is guaranteed in the presence of both a computationally unbounded adversary with adversary structure $\mathcal{Z}$, and a computationally bounded adversary corrupting an arbitrarily large subset of the parties. This notion was considered in the work of Chaum (Crypto 89) via the Spymaster's double agent problem where he showed a semi-honest secure protocol for the honest majority adversary structure.

Our first main result is a compiler that can transform any $n$-party protocol that is semi-honestly secure with statistical security tolerating an adversary structure $\mathcal{Z}$ to one that (additionally) provides semi-honest fall-back security w.r.t $\mathcal{Z}$. The resulting protocol has optimal round complexity, up to a constant factor, and is optimal in assumptions and the adversary structure. Our second result fully characterizes when malicious fall-back security is feasible. More precisely, we show that malicious fallback secure protocol w.r.t $\mathcal{Z}$ exists if and only if $\mathcal{Z}$ admits unconditional MPC against a semi-honest adversary (namely, iff $\mathcal{Z} \in \mathcal{Q}^2$).

This paper introduces arithmetic sketching, an abstraction of a primitive that several previous works use to achieve lightweight, low-communication zero-knowledge verification of secret-shared vectors. An arithmetic sketching scheme for a language $\mathcal{L} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ consists of (1) a randomized linear function compressing a long input x to a short “sketch,” and (2) a small arithmetic circuit that accepts the sketch if and only if $x \in \mathcal{L}$, up to some small error. If the language $\mathcal{L}$ has an arithmetic sketching scheme with short sketches, then it is possible to test membership in $\mathcal{L}$ using an arithmetic circuit with few multiplication gates. Since multiplications are the dominant cost in protocols for computation on secret-shared, encrypted, and committed data, arithmetic sketching schemes give rise to lightweight protocols in each of these settings.

Beyond the formalization of arithmetic sketching, our contributions are: – A general framework for constructing arithmetic sketching schemes from algebraic varieties. This framework unifies schemes from prior work and gives rise to schemes for useful new languages and with improved soundness error. – The first arithmetic sketching schemes for languages of sparse vectors: vectors with bounded Hamming weight, bounded $L_1$ norm, and vectors whose few non-zero values satisfy a given predicate. – A method for “compiling” any arithmetic sketching scheme for a language $\mathcal{L}$ into a low-communication malicious-secure multi-server protocol for securely testing that a client-provided secret-shared vector is in $\mathcal{L}$.

We also prove the first nontrivial lower bounds showing limits on the sketch size for certain languages (e.g., vectors of Hamming-weight one) and proving the non-existence of arithmetic sketching schemes for others (e.g., the language of all vectors that contain a specific value).

Statistical sender privacy (SSP) is the strongest achievable security notion for two-message oblivious transfer (OT) in the standard model, providing statistical security against malicious receivers and computational security against semi-honest senders. In this work we provide a novel construction of SSP OT from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumptions achieving (asymptotically) optimal amortized communication complexity, i.e. it achieves rate 1. Concretely, the total communication complexity for $k$ OT instances is $2k(1+o(1))$, which (asymptotically) approaches the information-theoretic lower bound. Previously, it was only known how to realize this primitive using heavy rate-1 FHE techniques [Brakerski et al., Gentry and Halevi TCC'19].

At the heart of our construction is a primitive called statistical co-PIR, essentially a a public key encryption scheme which statistically erases bits of the message in a few hidden locations. Our scheme achieves nearly optimal ciphertext size and provides statistical security against malicious receivers. Computational security against semi-honest senders holds under the DDH assumption.

Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) promises to train machine learning (ML) models by combining data spread across multiple data silos. Theoretically, secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows multiple data owners to train models on their joint data without revealing the data to each other. However, the prior implementations of this secure training using MPC have three limitations: they have only been evaluated on CNNs, and LSTMs have been ignored; fixed point approximations have affected training accuracies compared to training in floating point; and due to significant latency overheads of secure training via MPC, its relevance for practical tasks with streaming data remains unclear. The motivation of this work is to report our experience of addressing the practical problem of secure training and inference of models for urban sensing problems, e.g., traffic congestion estimation, or air pollution monitoring in large cities, where data can be contributed by rival fleet companies while balancing the privacy-accuracy trade-offs using MPC-based techniques. Our first contribution is to design a custom ML model for this task that can be efficiently trained with MPC within a desirable latency. In particular, we design a GCN-LSTM and securely train it on time-series sensor data for accurate forecasting, within 7 minutes per epoch. As our second contribution, we build an end-toend system of private training and inference that provably matches the training accuracy of cleartext ML training. This work is the first to securely train a model with LSTM cells. Third, this trained model is kept secret-shared between the fleet companies and allows clients to make sensitive queries to this model while carefully handling potentially invalid queries. Our custom protocols allow clients to query predictions from privately trained models in milliseconds, all the while maintaining accuracy and cryptographic security

We are looking for a PhD student with good background in maths and programming and with interest into side-channel attacks. The PhD student will explore the topic of combination of software countermeasures against side-channel attacks.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: PhD Nicolas BELLEVILLE, nicolas.belleville@cea.fr

More information: https://www.hipeac.net/jobs/14099/phd-combination-of-software-countermeasures-against-side-channel-attacks/

The CryptoLux group of the University of Luxembourg has a vacancy for a post-doctoral researcher in the area of security/privacy of blockchains and smart contracts. The successful candidate will contribute to a research project entitled Advanced Cryptography for Finance and Privacy (CryptoFin), which is funded by the Fonds National de la Recherche (FNR). Starting in September 2023, CryptoFin will run over a period of 3 years and be carried out in collaboration with the cryptography teams of Stanford University and Ethereum foundation. The mission of the CryptoFin project is to develop innovative solutions for some of the most pressing research problems in the blockchain domain, especially in the context of layer-2 protocols for off-chain transactions and the design of advanced cryptographic techniques like verifiable delay functions, proof-of-X systems with special features, and new MPC/SNARK-friendly primitives.

Candidates must hold a Ph.D. degree in cryptography, IT security, or a related field. Preference will be given to candidates with a strong publication record that includes at least one paper at an IACR conference/workshop or one of the top-4 security conferences. Experience in blockchains and/or smart contracts is a plus. Candidates with an interest to conduct research in one of the following areas are particularly encouraged to apply:

• Applied cryptography (especially design/analysis of symmetric cryptosystems)
• Cryptofinance and cryptoeconomics
• Privacy and anonymity on the Internet

The position is initially offered for 1 year, but an extension by 2 years is possible. The University of Luxembourg offers excellent working conditions and a highly competitive salary. Interested candidates are invited to send their application by email to Prof. Alex Biryukov before July 20, 2023 (early submission is encouraged). The application material should contain a cover letter explaining the candidate's research interests, a CV (incl. photo), a list of publications, scans of diploma certificates, and contact details of 3 references.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Alex Biryukov (alex.biryukov@uni.lu)

More information: https://cryptolux.org/index.php/Vacancies

The CryptoLux group of the University of Luxembourg has two vacancies for Ph.D. positions in the area of security/privacy of blockchains and smart contracts. The successful candidates will contribute to a research project entitled Advanced Cryptography for Finance and Privacy (CryptoFin), which is funded by the Fonds National de la Recherche (FNR). Starting in September 2023, CryptoFin will run over a period of 3 years and be carried out in collaboration with the cryptography teams of Stanford University and Ethereum foundation. The mission of the CryptoFin project is to develop innovative solutions for some of the most pressing research problems in the blockchain domain, especially in the context of layer-2 protocols for off-chain transactions and the design of advanced cryptographic techniques like verifiable delay functions, proof-of-X systems with special features, and new MPC/SNARK-friendly primitives.

Candidates must hold an M.Sc. degree (or earn an M.Sc. degree before September 2023) in computer science, mathematics, or a related field. Experience in blockchains and/or smart contracts is a plus. Candidates with an interest to conduct research in one of the following areas are particularly encouraged to apply:

• Applied cryptography (especially design/analysis of symmetric cryptosystems)
• Cryptofinance and cryptoeconomics
• Privacy and anonymity on the Internet

Both positions are fully funded and initially offered for 3 years, but an extension to a 4th year is possible. The University of Luxembourg offers excellent working conditions and a highly competitive salary. Interested candidates are invited to send their application by email to Prof. Alex Biryukov before July 20, 2023 (early submission is encouraged). The application material should contain a cover letter explaining the candidate's research interests, a CV (incl. photo), scans of diploma certificates, and contact details of 3 references.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Prof. Alex Biryukov (alex.biryukov@uni.lu)

More information: https://cryptolux.org/index.php/Vacancies

The newly stablished Cyber Security group is one of the core groups forming the faculty of Computer Science in the Technische Universität Darmstadt and National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity (ATHENE). The research focus of the group is on the security of implementations. A large part of our research is dedicated to hardware security, protection against physical attacks (side-channel analysis and fault-injection attacks), security analysis of real-world systems particularly internet of things, and efficient hardware and software implementation of cryptographic primitives. This includes various implementation platforms like ASICs, FPGAs, and micro-processors.

The group is looking for excellent B.Sc. and M.Sc. graduates with outstanding grades and degrees in computer science, electrical engineering, and mathematics. In addition, we are looking for outstanding postdoctoral candidates from these fields. Initially, we offer three-year fully funded positions for B.Sc. and M.Sc. graduates. The expectation is to work towards a doctorate. Postdoctoral positions are initially offered a 2-year contract. Both PhD and Postdoctoral positions are subject to extensions. The salary will be according to the remuneration group E 13 TV-L (full time).

Our offerings:

• Excellent research environment with award-winning scientists,
• Open team culture,
• Programs designed to support parents,
• Support measures for women in IT security,
• Excellent support for doctoral and postdoctoral researchers,
• Opportunities for academic and professional development,
• Budget for courses, conferences, equipment and international exchange

Your application:

Are you interested? Please send your complete application documents in one single pdf file. The required documents are: Curriculum Vitae, transcript of records of BSc., transcript of records of MSc. (if applicable), two reference names (supervisors or other researchers with whom you worked).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Amir Moradi (amir.moradi@rub.de)

We have a postdoc position available at SandboxAQ[1]. We are looking for people broadly interested in post-quantum cryptography. The position is remote in Europe but we have funds to allow travel to meet other team members. The position is initially for one year, but with the option to extend it to up to 3 years, on mutual agreement.

You can learn more about what we’ve been doing so far by checking out our publications page [2] or the individual DBPL pages of our permanent researchers:

• Carlos Aguilar Melchor (PQC Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/71/4606.html
• Martin Albrecht (PQC Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/92/7397.html
• Nina Bindel (PQC Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/167/3021.html
• Nicolas Gama (Privacy Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/49/4575.html
• Sandra Guasch (Privacy Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/86/8292.html
• James Howe (PQC Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/163/8680.html
• David Joseph (PQC Team) https://dblp.uni-trier.de/pid/27/884.html

We are committed to creating an inclusive culture where we have zero tolerance for discrimination. We invest in our employees' personal and professional growth.

To apply, submit an application at https://www.sandboxaq.com/careers-list?gh_jid=4914493004 Please submit your application by 15 July.

[1] https://www.sandboxaq.com/ [2] https://pub.sandboxaq.com/

Closing date for applications:

Contact:

• Martin Albrecht <martin.albrecht@sandboxquantum.com>
• Nina Bindel <nina.bindel@sandboxquantum.com>

More information: https://www.sandboxaq.com/careers-list?gh_jid=4914493004

Position is limited to 3 years, full time, with possibility for extension.

Tasks:

• Active research in the area of intrusion detection systems (IDS) for critical infrastructures, secure cyber-physical systems, and artificial intelligence / machine learning for traffic analysis
• Implementation and evaluation of new algorithms and methods
• Cooperation and knowledge transfer with industrial partners
• Publication of scientific results
• Assistance with teaching

Requirements:

• Master’s degree (or equivalent) and PhD degree (only for PostDocs) in Computer Science or related disciplines
• Strong interest in IT security and/or networking and distributed systems
• Knowledge of at least one programming language (C++, Java, etc.) and one scripting language (Perl, Python, etc.) or strong willingness to quickly learn new programming languages
• Linux/Unix skills
• Knowledge of data mining, machine learning, statistics and result visualization concepts is of advantage
• Excellent working knowledge of English; German is of advantage
• Excellent communication skills

For more information about the vacant position please contact Prof. A. Panchenko (E-Mail: itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de).

We value diversity and therefore welcome all applications – regardless of gender, nationality, ethnic and social background, religion/belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, and identity. The BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg strives for a balanced gender relation in all employee groups. Applicants with disabilities will be given preferential treatment if they are equally qualified.

Applications containing the following documents:

• A detailed Curriculum Vitae
• Transcript of records from your Master studies
• An electronic version of your Master thesis, if possible
should be sent in a single PDF file as soon as possible, but not later than 09.07.2023 at itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: For more information about the vacant position please contact Prof. A. Panchenko (E-Mail: itsec-jobs.informatik@lists.b-tu.de)

More information: https://www.b-tu.de/en/fg-it-sicherheit