IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
15 December 2023
Lund University, Faculty of Engineering (LTH), Department of Electrical and Information Technology
The research topics include side-channel attacks on symmetric and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, the mathematical foundations of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and its safe implementation, and security for dynamic resource allocation in next-generation mobile networks. Senior researchers will be active in the projects and provide supervision.
The main duties of doctoral students are to devote themselves to their research studies, which includes participating in research projects and third cycle courses. The work duties will also include teaching and other departmental duties (no more than 20%).
Third-cycle studies at LTH consist of full-time studies for 4 years. A doctoral studentship is a fixed-term employment of a maximum of 5 years (including 20% departmental duties).
More information can be found in: https://lu.varbi.com/what:job/jobID:679799/
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Christian Gehrmann (christian.gehrmann@eit.lth.se); Thomas Johansson (thomas.johansson@eit.lth.se)
More information: https://lu.varbi.com/what:job/jobID:679799/
Rochester Institute of Technology, Department of Cybersecurity, Rochester, New York, USA
- side-channel analysis
- applied cryptography
- software security
- hardware-assisted security
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Billy Brumley (bbbics at rit dot edu)
KISON Research group, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
KISON is a research group focused on creating technologies for the protection of the security of networks, the information transmitted through them and the privacy of their users. The KISON group research lines focus on the compatibility of the security of decentralized networks (e.g. ad-hoc, IoT networks, 5G/6G) and the protection of information in the Internet (especially multimedia contents) with users' rights to privacy.
Applications are invited for a 3-year predoctoral grant in the Network and Information Technologies doctoral programme. Reserach lines are:
More details on research lines:
https://www.uoc.edu/portal/en/escola-doctorat/linies-recerca/linies-nit/information-network/index.html
The candidate should have completed his/her master´s degree by July 2024 in computer science, telecommunications, or a related area.
The starting date will be Sept. 2024.
Full details:
https://www.uoc.edu/portal/en/escola-doctorat/beques/beques-uoc-escola-doctorat/index.html
Deadline: 12/02/2024
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Helena Rifà-Pous
More information: https://www.uoc.edu/en/studies/doctorates/doctorate-technologies-information-networks
Aalto University, Finland
Broadly, the PhD study may include the following depending on the skills and interests of the candidate: studying the hardness and relations of underlying mathematical problems, constructing and analysing lattice-based cryptographic schemes, proving theoretical impossibilities, implementing software libraries, performing concrete efficiency evaluation, etc.
We are looking for candidates who have recently completed, or will soon complete, a Master’s degree in cryptography, mathematics, computer science, or other relevant fields of studies. The success candidate will have strong background in mathematics and computer science, especially in areas relevant to the position. Good communication skills and fluent written and spoken English are required.
To apply, please visit:
https://aalto.wd3.myworkdayjobs.com/aalto/job/Otaniemi-Espoo-Finland/Doctoral-Researcher-in-Lattice-based-Cryptography_R38062
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
Russell Lai, e-mail "firstname.lastname@aalto.fi" (research related information)
Susanna Holma, e-mail "firstname.lastname@aalto.fi" (recruitment process)
More information: https://aalto.wd3.myworkdayjobs.com/aalto/job/Otaniemi-Espoo-Finland/Doctoral-Researcher-in-Lattice-based-Cryptography_R38062
Najwa Aaraj, Abdelrahaman Aly, Tim Güneysu, Chiara Marcolla, Johannes Mono, Rogerio Paludo, Iván Santos-González, Mireia Scholz, Eduardo Soria-Vazquez, Victor Sucasas, Ajith Suresh
FANNG goes beyond SCALE-MAMBA by decoupling offline and online phases and materializing the dealer model in software, enabling a separate set of entities to produce offline material. The framework incorporates database support, a new instruction set for pre-processed material, including garbled circuits and convolutional and matrix multiplication triples. FANNG also implements novel private comparison protocols and an optimized library supporting Neural Network functionality. All our theoretical claims are substantiated by an extensive evaluation using an open-sourced implementation, including the private evaluation of popular neural networks like LeNet and VGG16.
Toluwani Aremu
Victor Shoup
Poulami Das, Andreas Erwig, Michael Meyer, Patrick Struck
In this work, we advance the study on post-quantum secure signature and wallet schemes. That is, we provide the first formal model for deterministic threshold wallets and we show a generic post-quantum secure construction from any post-quantum secure threshold signature scheme with rerandomizable keys. We then instantiate our construction from the isogeny-based signature scheme CSI-FiSh and we show that our instantiation significantly improves over prior work.
Srinidhi Hari Prasad, Florian Mendel, Martin Schläffer, Rishub Nagpal
Prasanna Ravi, Arpan Jati, Shivam Bhasin
Upon bypassing RSA authentication, an attacker can mount any unauthenticated software application on the target device to mount a variety of attacks. Among the several possible attacks, we are interested to perform recovery of the encrypted bitstream in the target boot image of the Zynq-7000 device. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any prior work that has reported a practical bitstream recovery attack on the Zynq-7000 device. In the context of bitstream recovery, Ender et al. in 2020 proposed the Starbleed attack that is applicable to standalone Virtex-6 and 7-series Xilinx FPGAs. The design advisory provided by Xilinx as a response to the Starbleed attack claims that the Zynq-7000 SoC is resistant “due to the use of asymmetric and/or symmetric authentication in the boot/configuration process that ensures configuration is authenticated prior to use". Due to the security flaw found in the FSBL, we managed to identify a novel approach to mount the Starbleed attack on the Zynq-7000 device for full bitstream recovery. Thus, as a second contribution of our work, we present the first practical demonstration of the Starbleed attack on the Zynq-7000 SoC. We perform experimental validation of our proposed attacks on the PYNQ-Z1 platform based on the Zynq-7000 SoC.
Hongqing Liu, Chaoping Xing, Chen Yuan, Taoxu Zou
Nai-Hui Chia, Shih-Han Hung
Previous results for separating hybrid quantum-classical computers with various quantum depths require either quantum access to oracles or interactions between the classical verifier and the quantum prover. However, instantiating oracle separations can significantly increase the quantum depth in general, and interaction challenges the quantum device to keep the qubits coherent while waiting for the verifier's messages. These requirements pose barriers to implementing the protocols on near-term devices.
In this work, we present a two-message protocol under the quantum hardness of learning with errors and the random oracle heuristic. An honest prover only needs classical access to the random oracle, and therefore any instantiation of the oracle does not increase the quantum depth. To our knowledge, our protocol is the first non-interactive CVQD, the instantiation of which using concrete hash functions, e.g., SHA-3, does not require additional quantum depth.
Our second protocol seeks to explore the minimality of cryptographic assumptions and the tightness of the separations. To accomplish this, we introduce an untrusted quantum machine that shares entanglements with the target machine. Utilizing a robust self-test, our protocol certifies the depth of the target machine with information-theoretic security and nearly optimal separation.
Daniel R. L. Brown
Yunqi Li, Kyle Soska, Zhen Huang, Sylvain Bellemare, Mikerah Quintyne-Collins, Lun Wang, Xiaoyuan Liu, Dawn Song, Andrew Miller
Amirreza Sarencheh, Aggelos Kiayias, Markulf Kohlweiss
Tim Beyne, Michiel Verbauwhede
Andrea Basso, Mingjie Chen, Tako Boris Fouotsa, Péter Kutas, Abel Laval, Laurane Marco, Gustave Tchoffo Saah
12 December 2023
Scott Fluhrer
Sulaiman Alhussaini, Craig Collett, Serge˘ı Sergeev
Céline Chevalier, Guirec Lebrun, Ange Martinelli
Most research on CGKAs has focused on how to improve these two security properties. However, post-compromise security and forward secrecy require the active participation of respectively all compromised users and all users within the group. Inactive users – who remain offline for long periods – do not update anymore their encryption keys and therefore represent a vulnerability for the entire group. This issue has already been identified in the MLS standard, but no solution, other than expelling these inactive users after some disconnection time, has been found.
We propose here a CGKA protocol based on TreeKEM and fully compatible with the MLS standard, that implements a “quarantine” mechanism for the inactive users in order to mitigate the risk induced by these users without removing them from the group. That mechanism indeed updates the inactive users’ encryption keys on their behalf and secures these keys with a secret sharing scheme. If some of the inactive users eventually reconnect, their quarantine stops and they are able to recover all the messages that were exchanged during their offline period. Our “Quarantined-TreeKEM” protocol thus offers a good trade-off between security and functionality, with a very limited – and sometimes negative – communication overhead.