International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Event date: 5 April 2024
Submission deadline: 2 February 2024
Notification: 5 March 2024

Event date: 30 July to 2 August 2024
Submission deadline: 28 February 2024
Notification: 3 May 2024

Event date: 1 July 2024
Submission deadline: 1 July 2024

POSITION OVERVIEW Position title: Assistant Professor, Security and Privacy Salary range: The salary range for this position is $115,000 - $125,000 academic year (nine-month basis) for Assistant Professors. Starting salary is commensurate with qualifications and experience. The posted UC salary scales set the minimum pay determined by rank and/or step at appointment. “Off-scale salaries” and other components of pay, i.e., a salary that is higher than the published system-wide salary at the designated rank and step, are offered when necessary to meet competitive conditions. See salary scales titled (Faculty--Ladder Ranks-- Business/Economics/Engineering) Percent time: Full-time, 100% Anticipated start: July 1, 2024, with the academic year beginning in September 2024. Degree requirements must be met by June 30, 2025 for employment beyond that date.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Ioannis Demertzis or Alvaro Cardenas

More information: https://recruit.ucsc.edu/JPF01635

AIT is Austria's s largest research and technology organisation for applied research, located in Vienna.
The cryptography team is conducting research in the domain of public key cryptography, including secure communication, privacy-enhancing technologies, and long-term and post-quantum security. Our research covers the full spectrum from idea creation to the development of prototypes and demonstrators.

The team is seeking to grow, and is therefore looking for a PhD-student in the fields of privacy and security in distributed systems.

Through our AIT-PhD programme with 150 internationals students, conducted in collaboration with renowned universities, applicants will have the opportunity to conduct their PhD thesis in collaboration with our experts and our national and international project partners from industry or other research institutions.

Requirements:

• Applicants are required to hold a MSc degree (or equivalent) in computer science, mathematics, or a related field
• Basic knowledge of cryptography (at least one course specializing on cryptography) is expected
• Special interest in applied research and the solution of practical problems, in particular in the areas of cryptography and information security
• High level of commitment and ability to work in a team
• Good knowledge of a programming language (e.g., C/C++, Rust, Java, Python) and software development is a plus
• Very good written and oral English skills; knowledge of German is not a requirement

AIT values diversity and is committed to equality.

The minimum gross annual salary on a full-time basis (38,5 h / week) according to the collective agreement is EUR 53.578,--. The actual salary will be determined individually, based on your qualifications and experience. In addition, we offer company benefits, flexible working conditions, individual training and career opportunities.

All applications (including cover letter and full CV) need to be submitted using the following link: https://jobs.ait.ac.at/Job/224352

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Stephan Krenn (stephan.krenn[at]ait.ac.at)

More information: https://jobs.ait.ac.at/Job/224352

The School of Cyber Science and Engineering (formerly known as the School of Information Security Engineering) of Shanghai Jiao Tong University was founded in October 2000. It was the first school-level training base for high-level information security professionals in China and was jointly established by the Ministry of Education of China, the Ministry of Science and Technology of China, and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government. The undergraduate and postgraduate students of the school mainly come from the top 100 key high schools and 985/double first-class universities in China. The school is ranked among the best cyberspace security nationwide every year. The school has a solid foundation and strength in the field of academic research and technological innovation on cyberspace security. The school is committed to building a world-class academic research center, cultivating the talents of the country and society. The school is in great demand of a number of world renowned professors, outstanding young researchers, full-time research fellows and post-doctors. The school now has a few positions available at the rank of tenure-track Assistant/Associate Professors, tenured Full Professors as well as Research Assistants/Associates and Post-Doctors in theory and practice of cyberspace security.

Applicants should have (a) a doctoral degree in Computer Science, Electronic Engineering, Communication, Mathematics or Statistics; (b) an established track record in research and scholarship; (c) expertise in the cryptographic and security research areas; and (d) a demonstrated commitment to excellence in teaching.

The school will provide highly competitive remuneration packages and assist applicants to apply for various national, provincial and ministerial level talent programs such as “Outstanding Youth Talents Program”, Shanghai “Talents Program”,etc. We will also assist on employment of spouses, schooling for children and medical care.

Closing date for applications:

Contact:
Chaoping Xing, emial: xingcp@sjtu.edu.cn; Ni Liang, email: liangni@sjtu.edu.cn

The Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST) is a Research and Technology Organization (RTO) active in the fields of materials, environment and IT. By transforming scientific knowledge into technologies, smart data and tools, LIST empowers citizens in their choices, public authorities in their decisions and businesses in their strategies.

How will you contribute? Your specific mission includes, but is not limited to, participating into the following activities along with the project partners:

• To design and develop privacy-preserving federated data management technologies
• To prototype privacy-preserving technologies for cyberthreat intelligence, data analysis or cybersecurity
• To develop open-source software
• To validate the effectiveness of developed technologies You are in charge of disseminating and promoting the research activities that will be carried out, whether through publications, prototype development or technical reports

You’re highly motivated and have proven skills in federated data processing such as applying simple statistics or advanced machine learning tools, to improve the utility of the obtained information. You have already good experience in collaborative cyber threat intelligence systems that use advanced analytics solutions an can offer significant advantages over the local systems by detecting cyberattacks early and promptly responding to them. And last, but not least, you’re a great practitioner of privacy-enhancing techniques such as secure multiparty computation, homomorphic encryption, and anonymization. Is Your profile described below? Are you our future colleague? Apply now! As to join us, you:

• Hold a PhD. degree in Computer Science or related disciplines
• Have good programming skills (particularly experience on Python and C++)
• Have good track record on applied cryptography, such as secure multiparty computation and homomorphic encryption. Knowledge on secure aggregation techniques or zero-knowledge proofs is a plus.
• Demonstrate strong interest and experience in anonymization techniques such as differential privacy, Google’s RAPPOR

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Orhan Ermis

More information: https://app.skeeled.com/offer/6554879c69ccf56b0c1432df?utm_id=60fed4c509c80d16d1bbe536&utm_medium=OFFERS_PORTAL&language=en&show_description=true

Salary: GBP 36,024 to 41,732 per annum depending on experience

Fixed Term Contract until 30th September 2025

Closing Date: Monday 15th January

This post will work on challenges around decentralized identity and personal data, and approaches across distributed platforms such as Distributed Ledgers.

The Computer Science Research Centre at the University of Surrey is seeking to recruit a full-time researcher to the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security (SCCS). The successful candidate will join the DECaDE Next Stage Digital Economy Centre for the Decentralised Digital Economy (http://decade.ac.uk), a multidisciplinary UKRI-funded Centre with the University of Surrey, the University of Edinburgh, and the Digital Catapult.

The Centre is initially focused on three themes: value co-creation in the digital economy, data trusts for identity and data, and the world of work and the gig economy.

Surrey is recognized by the National Cyber Security Centre as an Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research, and offers a thriving research environment with world leading researchers. We were also recognised as Cyber University of the Year 2023 in the National Cyber Awards. Our research includes security and privacy, verification, cryptography, distributed systems, and networked systems.

The position offers the platform for the research fellow to develop skills to become an independent researcher and to contribute to the DECaDE vision. The successful candidate will work within a team under the direction of Professor Steve Schneider. Significant interaction with project partners is encouraged, and the dissemination strategy may involve national and international travel, with many personal development opportunities.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Contact: Professor Steve Schneider: s.schneider@surrey.ac.uk

More information: https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/Vacancy.aspx?id=13775

The existence of "unstructured" hard languages in $\mathsf{NP} \,\cap\,\mathsf{coNP}$ is an intriguing open question. Bennett and Gill (SICOMP, 1981) asked whether $\mathsf{P}$ is separated from $\mathsf{NP} \cap \mathsf{coNP}$ relative to a random oracle, a question that remained open ever since. While a hard language in $\mathsf{NP} \,\cap\,\mathsf{coNP}$ can be constructed in a black-box way from a one-way permutation, for which only few (structured) candidates exist, Bitansky et al. (SICOMP, 2021) ruled out such a construction based on an injective one-way function, an unstructured primitive that is easy to instantiate heuristically. In fact, the latter holds even with a black-box use of indistinguishability obfuscation.

We give the first evidence for the existence of unstructured hard languages in $\mathsf{NP} \,\cap\,\mathsf{coNP}$ by showing that if $\mathsf{UP} \not \subseteq \mathsf{RP}$, which follows from the existence of injective one-way functions, the answer to Bennett and Gill's question is affirmative: with probability 1 over a random oracle $\cal O$, we have that $\mathsf{P}^{\cal O} \neq \mathsf{NP}^{\cal O} \cap \mathsf{coNP}^{\cal O}$. Our proof gives a constructive non-black-box approach for obtaining candidate hard languages in $\mathsf{NP} \,\cap\,\mathsf{coNP}$ from cryptographic hash functions.

The above conditional separation builds on a new construction of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, with a computationally unbounded prover, to convert a hard promise problem into a hard language. We obtain such NIZK proofs for $\mathsf{NP}$, with a uniformly random reference string, from a special kind of hash function which is implied by (an unstructured) random oracle. This should be contrasted with previous constructions of such NIZK proofs that are based on one-way permutations or other structured primitives, as well as with (computationally sound) NIZK arguments in the random oracle model.

Quantum Fourier Transformation (QFT) plays a key role in quantum computation theory. But its transform size has never discussed. In practice, the Xilinx LogiCORE IP Fast Fourier Transform core has the maximum transform size $N=2^{16}$. Taking into account the Planck constant $\hbar=6.62607015\times 10^{-34}$ and the difficulty to physically implement basic operator {\footnotesize $\left[ \begin{array}{cc} 1& 0\\ 0 & \exp(-2\pi\,i/N)\\ \end{array} \right]$} on some qubits, we think $N=2^{120}$ could be an upper bound for the transform size of QFT.

Maiorana--McFarland type constructions are basically concatenating the truth tables of linear functions on a smaller number of variables to obtain highly nonlinear ones on larger inputs. Such functions and their different variants have significant applications in cryptology and coding theory. Straightforward hardware implementation of such functions may require exponential resources on the number of inputs. In this paper, we study such constructions in detail and provide implementation strategies for a selected subset of this class with polynomial many gates over the number of inputs. We demonstrate that such implementations cover the requirement of cryptographic primitives to a great extent. Several existing constructions are revisited in this direction and exact implementations are provided with specific depth and gate counts in the hardware implementation. Related combinatorial as well as circuit complexity-related results of theoretical nature are also analyzed in this regard. Finally we present a novel construction of a new class of balanced Boolean functions having very low absolute indicator and very high nonlinearity that can be implemented in polynomial circuit size over the number of inputs. In conclusion, we present that these constructions have immediate applications to resist the signature generation in Differential Fault Attack (DFA) and to implement functions on large number of variables in designing ciphers for the paradigm of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).

The popularity of cloud computing has made outsourced databases prevalent in real-world applications. To protect data security, numerous encrypted outsourced databases have been proposed for this paradigm. However, the maintenance of encrypted databases has scarcely been addressed. In this paper, we focus on a typical maintenance task --- functional dependency (FD) discovery. We develop novel FD protocols in encrypted databases while guaranteeing minimal leakages: nothing is revealed besides the database size and the actual discovered FDs. As far as we know, we are the first to formally define secure FD discovery with minimal leakage.

We present two oblivious FD protocols and prove them secure in the presence of the persistent adversary (monitoring processes on the server). The first protocol leverages Oblivious RAM (ORAM) and is suitable for dynamic databases. The second protocol relies on oblivious sorting and is more practical in static databases due to high parallelism. We also present a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed methods.

In the wake of recent progress on quantum computing hardware, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is standardizing cryptographic protocols that are resistant to attacks by quantum adversaries. The primary digital signature scheme that NIST has chosen is CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The hardness of this scheme is based on the hardness of three computational problems: Module Learning with Errors (MLWE), Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS), and SelfTargetMSIS. MLWE and MSIS have been well-studied and are widely believed to be secure. However, SelfTargetMSIS is novel and, though classically as hard as MSIS, its quantum hardness is unclear. In this paper, we provide the first proof of the hardness of SelfTargetMSIS via a reduction from MLWE in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM). Our proof uses recently developed techniques in quantum reprogramming and rewinding. A central part of our approach is a proof that a certain hash function, derived from the MSIS problem, is collapsing. From this approach, we deduce a new security proof for Dilithium under appropriate parameter settings. Compared to the only other rigorous security proof for a variant of Dilithium, Dilithium-QROM, our proof has the advantage of being applicable under the condition q = 1 mod 2n, where q denotes the modulus and n the dimension of the underlying algebraic ring. This condition is part of the original Dilithium proposal and is crucial for the efficient implementation of the scheme. We provide new secure parameter sets for Dilithium under the condition q = 1 mod 2n, finding that our public key sizes and signature sizes are about 2.5 to 2.8 times larger than those of Dilithium-QROM for the same security levels

A monotone policy batch $\mathsf{NP}$ language $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}, P}$ is parameterized by a monotone policy $P \colon \{0,1\}^k \to \{0,1\}$ and an $\mathsf{NP}$ relation $\mathcal{R}$. A statement $(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ is a YES instance if there exists $w_1, \ldots, w_k$ where $P(\mathcal{R}(x_1, w_1), \ldots, \mathcal{R}(x_k, w_k)) = 1$. For example, we might say that an instance $(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ is a YES instance if a majority of the statements are true. A monotone policy batch argument (BARG) for $\mathsf{NP}$ allows a prover to prove that $(x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{R}, P}$ with a proof of size $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda, |\mathcal{R}|, \log k)$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter, $|\mathcal{R}|$ is the size of the Boolean circuit that computes $\mathcal{R}$, and $k$ is the number of instances. Recently, Brakerski, Brodsky, Kalai, Lombardi, and Paneth (CRYPTO 2023) gave the first monotone policy BARG for $\mathsf{NP}$ from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption.

In this work, we describe a generic approach for constructing monotone policy BARGs from any BARG for $\mathsf{NP}$ together with an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. This yields the first constructions of monotone policy BARGs from the $k$-Lin assumption in prime-order pairing groups as well as the (subexponential) DDH assumption in pairing-free groups. Central to our construction is a notion of a zero-fixing hash function, which is a relaxed version of a predicate-extractable hash function from the work of Brakerski et al. Our relaxation enables a direct realization of zero-fixing hash functions from standard BARGs for $\mathsf{NP}$ and additively homomorphic encryption, whereas the previous notion relied on leveled homomorphic encryption, and by extension, the LWE assumption.

We investigate proof systems where security holds against rational parties instead of malicious ones. Our starting point is the notion of rational arguments}, a variant of rational proofs (Azar and Micali, STOC 2012) where security holds against rational adversaries that are also computationally bounded.

Rational arguments are an interesting primitive because they allow for sublinear verification and a more efficient protocol in general. In this paper we aim at narrowing the gap between literature on rational schemes and real world applications. Our contribution is two-fold.

We provide the first construction of rational arguments for the class of polynomial computations that is practical (i.e., it can be applied to real-world computations on reasonably common hardware) and with logarithmic communication. Techniques-wise, we obtain this result through a compiler from information-theoretic protocols and rational proofs for polynomial evaluation. The latter could be of independent interest.

As a second contribution, we propose a new notion of extractability for rational arguments. Through this notion we can obtain arguments where knowledge of a witness is incentivized (rather than incentivizing mere soundness). We show how our aforementioned compiler can also be applied to obtain efficient extractable rational arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$.

In this paper, we study the design of efficient signature and public-key encryption (PKE) schemes in the presence of both leakage and tampering attacks.

Firstly, we formalize the strong leakage and tamper-resilient (sLTR) security model for signature, which provides strong existential unforgeability, and deals with bounded leakage and restricted tampering attacks, as a counterpart to the sLTR security introduced by Sun et al. (ACNS 2019) for PKE.

Then, we present direct constructions of signature and chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) secure PKE schemes in the sLTR model, based on the matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumptions (which covers the standard symmetric external DH (SXDH) and k-Linear assumptions) over asymmetric pairing groups. Our schemes avoid the use of heavy building blocks such as the true-simulation extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (tSE-NIZK) proposed by Dodis et al. (ASIACRYPT 2010), which are usually needed in constructing schemes with leakage and tamper-resilience. Especially, our SXDH-based signature and PKE schemes are more efficient than the existing schemes in the leakage and tamper-resilient setting: our signature scheme has only 4 group elements in the signature, which is about 5×~8× shorter, and our PKE scheme has only 6 group elements in the ciphertext, which is about 1.3×~3.3× shorter.

Finally, we note that our signature scheme is the {\it first} one achieving strong existential unforgeability in the leakage and tamper-resilient setting, where strong existential unforgeability has important applications in building more complex primitives such as signcryption and authenticated key exchange.

The Lightning Network (LN) is a second layer solution built on top of Bitcoin, aimed to solve Bitcoin's long transaction waiting times and high transaction fees. Empirical and theoretical studies show that the LN is tending towards the hub and spoke network topology. In this topology most of the nodes, the spokes, open a single channel to one of the few well-connected nodes, the hubs. This topology is known to be prone to failures, attacks, and privacy issues. In this work we introduce the Maypoles protocol in which most nodes open two channels instead of one. We show that this protocol benefits the network significantly by enhancing its stability, privacy, and resilience to attacks. We also examine the economic incentives of nodes to take part in Maypoles.

We find an efficient method to solve the semidirect discrete logarithm problem (SDLP) over finite nonabelian groups of order $p^3$ and exponent $p^2$ for certain exponentially large parameters. This implies an attack on SPDH-Sign, a signature scheme based on the SDLP, for such parameters. We also take a step toward proving the quantum polynomial time equivalence of SDLP and SCDH.

We survey various mathematical tools used in software works multiplying polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_q [x] / ⟨x^n −αx−β⟩$. In particular, we survey implementation works targeting polynomial multiplications in lattice-based cryptosystems Dilithium, Kyber, NTRU, NTRU Prime, and Saber with instruction set architectures/extensions Armv7-M, Armv7E-M, Armv8-A, and AVX2.

There are three emphases in this paper: (i) modular arithmetic, (ii) homomorphisms, and (iii) vectorization. For modular arithmetic, we survey Montgomery, Barrett, and Plantard multiplications. For homomorphisms, we survey (a) various homomorphisms such as Cooley–Tukey FFT, Bruun’s FFT, Rader’s FFT, Karatsuba, and Toom– Cook; (b) various algebraic techniques for adjoining nice properties to the coefficient rings, including injections, Schönhage’s FFT, Nussbaumer’s FFT, and localization; and (c) various algebraic techniques related to the polynomial moduli, including twisting, composed multiplication, evaluation at ∞, Good–Thomas FFT, truncation, incomplete transformation, and Toeplitz matrix-vector product. For vectorization, we survey the relations between homomorphisms and the support of vector arithmetic. We then go through several case studies: We compare the implementations of modular multiplications used in Dilithium and Kyber, explain how the matrix-to-vector structure was exploited in Saber, and review the design choices of transformations for NTRU and NTRU Prime with vectorization. Finally, we outline several interesting implementation projects.

The Fiat-Shamir transform is a classical technique for turning any zero-knowledge $\Sigma$-protocol into a signature scheme.

In essence, the idea underlying this transform is that deriving the challenge from the digest of the commitment suppresses simulatability and hence provides non-interactive proofs of interaction.

It follows from that observation that if one wishes to preserve deniability the challenge size (per round) must be kept low. For instance in the original Fiat-Shamir protocol the authors recommend 18 bits but suggest that the challenge size can be made larger to reduce communication overhead, e.g. the value of 20 is proposed in \cite{micali}.

We show that even with relatively small challenge sizes \textsl{practical} deniability can be destroyed by having the verifier artificially impose upon himself the use of slowed-down hash function or by resorting to a trusted agency proposing an on-line deniability enforcement service against the provers community's will.