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12 February 2024
Julien Béguinot, Wei Cheng, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul
Masking is one of the most popular countermeasures to side-
channel attacks, because it can offer provable security. However, depend-
ing on the adversary’s model, useful security guarantees can be hard
to provide. At first, masking has been shown secure against t-threshold
probing adversaries by Ishai et al. at Crypto’03. It has then been shown
secure in the more generic random probing model by Duc et al. at Euro-
crypt’14. Prouff and Rivain have introduced the noisy leakage model to
capture more realistic leakage at Eurocrypt’13. Reduction from noisy
leakage to random probing has been introduced by Duc et al. at Euro-
crypt’14, and security guarantees were improved for both models by
Prest et al. at Crypto’19, Duc et al. in Eurocrypt’15/J. Cryptol’19,
and Masure and Standaert at Crypto’23. Unfortunately, as it turns out,
we found that previous proofs in either random probing or noisy leakage
models are flawed, and such flaws do not appear easy to fix.
In this work, we show that the Doeblin coefficient allows one to over-
come these flaws. In fact, it yields optimal reductions from noisy leakage
to random probing, thereby providing a correct and usable metric to
properly ground security proofs. This shows the inherent inevitable cost
of a reduction from the noisy leakages to the random probing model. We
show that it can also be used to derive direct formal security proofs using
the subsequence decomposition of Prouff and Rivain.
Sourav Das, Benny Pinkas, Alin Tomescu, Zhuolun Xiang
Generating and integrating shared randomness into a blockchain can expand applications and strengthen security. We aim to have validators generating blockchain randomness autonomously, and fresh shared randomness is generated for each block. We focus on proof-of-stake blockchains, where each validator has a different amount of stake (aka weight). Such chains introduce a weighted threshold setting where subset authorization relies on the cumulative weight of validators rather than the subset size.
We introduce three cryptographic protocols to enable generating shared randomness in a weighted setting: A publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme (PVSS) which is weighted and aggregatable, a weighted distributed key generation protocol (DKG), and a weighted verifiable unpredictable function (VUF). Importantly, in the VUF protocol, which is the protocol that is run most frequently, the computation and communication costs of participants are independent of their weight. This feature is crucial for scalability.
We implemented our schemes on top of Aptos blockchain, which is a proof-of-stake blockchain deployed in production. Our micro-benchmarks demonstrate that the signing and verification time, as well as the signature size, are independent of the total weight of the parties, whereas the signing time and signature size of the baseline (BLS with virtualization) increase significantly. For instance, our VUF reduces the signature size by factors of 7X and 34X for total weights of 821 and 4053, respectively. We also demonstrate the practicability of our design via an end-to-end evaluation.
We introduce three cryptographic protocols to enable generating shared randomness in a weighted setting: A publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme (PVSS) which is weighted and aggregatable, a weighted distributed key generation protocol (DKG), and a weighted verifiable unpredictable function (VUF). Importantly, in the VUF protocol, which is the protocol that is run most frequently, the computation and communication costs of participants are independent of their weight. This feature is crucial for scalability.
We implemented our schemes on top of Aptos blockchain, which is a proof-of-stake blockchain deployed in production. Our micro-benchmarks demonstrate that the signing and verification time, as well as the signature size, are independent of the total weight of the parties, whereas the signing time and signature size of the baseline (BLS with virtualization) increase significantly. For instance, our VUF reduces the signature size by factors of 7X and 34X for total weights of 821 and 4053, respectively. We also demonstrate the practicability of our design via an end-to-end evaluation.
Giulia Scaffino, Lukas Aumayr, Mahsa Bastankhah, Zeta Avarikioti, Matteo Maffei
Over the past decade, cryptocurrencies have garnered attention from academia and industry alike, fostering a diverse blockchain ecosystem and novel applications. The inception of bridges improved interoperability, enabling asset transfers across different blockchains to capitalize on their unique features. Despite their surge in popularity and the emergence of Decentralized Finance (DeFi), trustless bridge protocols remain inefficient, either relaying too much information (e.g., light-client-based bridges) or demanding expensive computation (e.g., zk-based bridges). These inefficiencies arise because existing bridges securely prove a transaction's on-chain inclusion on another blockchain. Yet this is unnecessary as off-chain solutions, like payment and state channels, permit safe transactions without on-chain publication. However, existing bridges do not support the verification of off-chain payments.
This paper fills this gap by introducing the concept of Pay2Chain bridges that leverage the advantages of off-chain solutions like payment channels to overcome current bridges' limitations. Our proposed Pay2Chain bridge, named Alba, facilitates the efficient, secure, and trustless execution of conditional payments or smart contracts on a target blockchain based on off-chain events. Alba, besides its technical advantages, enriches the source blockchain's ecosystem by facilitating DeFi applications, multi-asset payment channels, and optimistic stateful off-chain computation.
We formalize the security of Alba against Byzantine adversaries in the UC framework and complement it with a game theoretic analysis. We further introduce formal scalability metrics to demonstrate Alba’s efficiency. Our empirical evaluation confirms Alba efficiency in terms of communication complexity and on-chain costs, with its optimistic case incurring only twice the cost of a standard Ethereum transaction of token ownership transfer.
This paper fills this gap by introducing the concept of Pay2Chain bridges that leverage the advantages of off-chain solutions like payment channels to overcome current bridges' limitations. Our proposed Pay2Chain bridge, named Alba, facilitates the efficient, secure, and trustless execution of conditional payments or smart contracts on a target blockchain based on off-chain events. Alba, besides its technical advantages, enriches the source blockchain's ecosystem by facilitating DeFi applications, multi-asset payment channels, and optimistic stateful off-chain computation.
We formalize the security of Alba against Byzantine adversaries in the UC framework and complement it with a game theoretic analysis. We further introduce formal scalability metrics to demonstrate Alba’s efficiency. Our empirical evaluation confirms Alba efficiency in terms of communication complexity and on-chain costs, with its optimistic case incurring only twice the cost of a standard Ethereum transaction of token ownership transfer.
Pierre Pébereau
In this note, we show that some of the parameters of the Quotient-Ring transform proposed for VOX are vulnerable.
More precisely, they were chosen to defeat an attack in the field extension $\mathbb F_{q^l}$ obtained by quotienting $\mathbb F_q[X]$ by an irreducible polynomial of degree $l$.
We observe that we may use a smaller extension $\mathbb F_{q^{l'}}$ for any $l'|l$, in which case the attacks apply again.
We also introduce a simple algebraic attack without the use of the MinRank problem to attack the scheme.
These attacks concern a subset of the parameter sets proposed for VOX: I, Ic, III, IIIa, V, Vb.
We estimate the cost of our attack on these parameter sets and find costs of at most $2^{67}$ gates, and significantly lower in most cases.
In practice, our attack requires $0.3s, 1.35s, 0.56s$ for parameter sets I,III,V for the initial VOX parameters, and $56.7s, 6.11s$ for parameter sets IIIa, Vb proposed after the rectangular MinRank attack.
09 February 2024
Décio Luiz Gazzoni Filho, Guilherme Brandão, Gora Adj, Arwa Alblooshi, Isaac A. Canales-Martínez, Jorge Chávez-Saab, Julio López
As CPU performance is unable to keep up with the dramatic growth of the past few decades, CPU architects are looking into domain-specific architectures to accelerate certain tasks. A recent trend is the introduction of matrix-multiplication accelerators to CPUs by manufacturers such as IBM, Intel and ARM, some of which have not launched commercially yet. Apple's systems-on-chip (SoCs) for its mobile phones, tablets and personal computers include a proprietary, undocumented CPU-coupled matrix multiplication coprocessor called AMX. In this paper, we leverage AMX to accelerate the post-quantum lattice-based cryptosystems Saber and FrodoKEM, and benchmark their performance on Apple M1 and M3 SoCs. We propose a variant of the Toeplitz Matrix-Vector Product algorithm for polynomial multiplication, which sets new speed records for Saber using AMX (up to 13% for the main KEM operations, and 151% for matrix-vector multiplication of polynomials). For FrodoKEM, we set new speed records with our AMX implementation (up to 21% for the main KEM operations, and 124% for matrix multiplication, with even greater improvements for $4 \times$-batching). Such speedups are relative to our optimized NEON implementation, also presented here, which improves upon the state-of-the-art implementation for ARMv8 CPUs.
Christian Mouchet, Sylvain Chatel, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso
We introduce Helium, a novel framework that supports scalable secure multiparty computation for lightweight participants and tolerates churn.
Helium relies on multiparty homomorphic encryption (MHE) as its core building block.
While MHE schemes have been well studied in theory, prior works fall short of addressing critical considerations paramount for adoption such as supporting resource-constrained participants and ensuring liveness and security under network churn.
In this work, we systematize the requirements of MHE-based MPC protocols from a practical lens, and we propose a novel execution mechanism, that addresses those considerations.
We implement this execution in Helium, which makes it the first implemented solution that effectively supports sub-linear-cost MPC among lightweight participants and under churn.
This represents a significant leap in applied MPC, as most previously proposed frameworks require the participants to have high bandwidth and to be consistently online.
We show that a Helium network of $30$ parties connected with a $100$Mbits/s link and experiencing a system-wide churn rate of $40$ failures per minute can compute the product of a fixed secret $512\times512$ matrix (e.g., a collectively trained model) with an input secret vector (e.g., a feature vector) $8.3$ times per second.
This is $\sim1500$ times faster than a state-of-the art MPC implementation without churn.
Laura Maddison
The submission of the Triangular Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (TUOV) digital signature scheme to the NIST competition in 2023 claims that if the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem (with suitable parameters) is hard, then the TUOV problem must also be hard. We show why the proof fails and why the claimed theorem cannot be true in general.
Elette Boyle, Lisa Kohl, Zhe Li, Peter Scholl
Function secret sharing (FSS) for a class $\cal{F}$ allows to split a secret function $f \in \cal{F}$ into (succinct) secret shares $f_0,f_1$, such that for all $x\in \{0,1\}^n$ it holds $f_0(x)-f_1(x)=f(x)$. FSS has numerous applications, including private database queries, nearest neighbour search, private heavy hitters and secure computation in the preprocessing model, where the supported class $\cal{F}$ translates to richness in the application. Unfortunately, concretely efficient FSS constructions are only known for very limited function classes.
In this work we introduce the notion of pseudorandom generators with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRGs), and give direct FSS constructions for bit-fixing predicates, branching programs and more based on this primitive. Further, we give constructions of FSS for deterministic finite automatas (DFAs) from a KDM secure variant of EOH-PRGs.
- New abstractions. Following the work of Alamati et al.(EUROCRYPT '19), who classify minicrypt primitives with algebraic structure and their applications, we capture the essence of our FSS constructions in the notion of EOH-PRG, paving the road towards future efficiency improvements via new instantiations of this primitive. The abstraction of EOH-PRG and its instantiations may be of independent interest, as it is an approximate substitution of an ideal homomorphic PRG. - Better efficiency. We show that EOH-PRGs can be instantiated from LWE and a small-exponent variant of the DCR assumption. A theoretical analysis of our instantiations suggest efficiency improvements over the state of the art both in terms of key size and evaluation time: We show that our FSS instantiations lead to smaller key sizes, improving over previous constructions by a factor of $3.5$ and more. While for bit-fixing predicates our FSS constructions show comparable or mildly improved run time (depending on the instantiation), we achieve considerable improvements for branching programs by avoiding the expensive generic transformation via universal circuits, shaving off a factor of $w$ and more in the number of abstract operations, where $w$ corresponds to an upper bound on the width of the underlying class of branching programs. - New constructions. We show that our instantiations of EOH-PRGs additionally support a form of KDM-security, without requiring an additional circular-security assumption. Based on this, we give the first FSS construction for DFAs which supports the evaluation of inputs of a-priori unbounded length without relying on FHE. - Applications. We outline applications of our FSS constructions including pattern matching with wild cards, image matching, nearest neighbor search and regular expression matching.
In this work we introduce the notion of pseudorandom generators with encoded-output homomorphism (EOH-PRGs), and give direct FSS constructions for bit-fixing predicates, branching programs and more based on this primitive. Further, we give constructions of FSS for deterministic finite automatas (DFAs) from a KDM secure variant of EOH-PRGs.
- New abstractions. Following the work of Alamati et al.(EUROCRYPT '19), who classify minicrypt primitives with algebraic structure and their applications, we capture the essence of our FSS constructions in the notion of EOH-PRG, paving the road towards future efficiency improvements via new instantiations of this primitive. The abstraction of EOH-PRG and its instantiations may be of independent interest, as it is an approximate substitution of an ideal homomorphic PRG. - Better efficiency. We show that EOH-PRGs can be instantiated from LWE and a small-exponent variant of the DCR assumption. A theoretical analysis of our instantiations suggest efficiency improvements over the state of the art both in terms of key size and evaluation time: We show that our FSS instantiations lead to smaller key sizes, improving over previous constructions by a factor of $3.5$ and more. While for bit-fixing predicates our FSS constructions show comparable or mildly improved run time (depending on the instantiation), we achieve considerable improvements for branching programs by avoiding the expensive generic transformation via universal circuits, shaving off a factor of $w$ and more in the number of abstract operations, where $w$ corresponds to an upper bound on the width of the underlying class of branching programs. - New constructions. We show that our instantiations of EOH-PRGs additionally support a form of KDM-security, without requiring an additional circular-security assumption. Based on this, we give the first FSS construction for DFAs which supports the evaluation of inputs of a-priori unbounded length without relying on FHE. - Applications. We outline applications of our FSS constructions including pattern matching with wild cards, image matching, nearest neighbor search and regular expression matching.
Steven Galbraith, Yi-Fu Lai, Hart Montgomery
Abelian group actions appear in several areas of cryptography, especially isogeny-based post-quantum cryptography. A natural problem is to relate the analogues of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and discrete logarithm (DLog) problems for abelian group actions.
Galbraith, Panny, Smith and Vercauteren (Mathematical Cryptology '21) gave a quantum reduction of DLog to CDH, assuming a CDH oracle with perfect correctness. Montgomery and Zhandry (Asiacrypt '22, best paper award) showed how to convert an unreliable CDH oracle into one that is correct with overwhelming probability. However, while a theoretical breakthrough, their reduction is quite inefficient: if the CDH oracle is correct with probability $\epsilon$ then their algorithm to amplify the success requires on the order of $1/\epsilon^{21}$ calls to the CDH oracle.
We revisit this line of work and give a much simpler and tighter algorithm. Our method only takes on the order of $1/\epsilon^{4}$ CDH oracle calls and is conceptually simpler than the Montgomery-Zhandry reduction. Our algorithm is also fully black-box, whereas the Montgomery-Zhandry algorithm is slightly non-black-box. Our main tool is a thresholding technique that replaces the comparison of distributions in Montgomery-Zhandry with testing equality of thresholded sets.
We revisit this line of work and give a much simpler and tighter algorithm. Our method only takes on the order of $1/\epsilon^{4}$ CDH oracle calls and is conceptually simpler than the Montgomery-Zhandry reduction. Our algorithm is also fully black-box, whereas the Montgomery-Zhandry algorithm is slightly non-black-box. Our main tool is a thresholding technique that replaces the comparison of distributions in Montgomery-Zhandry with testing equality of thresholded sets.
Patrick Struck, Maximiliane Weishäupl
The main goal of this work is to construct authenticated encryption (AE) that is both committing and leakage-resilient. As a first approach for this we consider generic composition as a well-known method for constructing AE schemes. While the leakage resilience of generic composition schemes has already been analyzed by Barwell et al. (AC'17), for committing security this is not the case. We fill this gap by providing a separate analysis of the generic composition paradigms with respect to committing security, giving both positive and negative results: By means of a concrete attack, we show that Encrypt-then-MAC is not committing. Furthermore, we prove that Encrypt-and-MAC is committing, given that the underlying schemes satisfy security notions we introduce for this purpose. We later prove these new notions achievable by providing schemes that satisfy them. MAC-then-Encrypt turns out to be more difficult due to the fact that the tag is not outputted alongside the ciphertext as it is done for the other two composition methods. Nevertheless, we give a detailed heuristic analysis of MAC-then-Encrypt with respect to committing security, leaving a definite result as an open task for future work. Our results, in combination with the fact that only Encrypt-then-MAC yields leakage-resilient AE schemes, show that one cannot obtain AE schemes that are both committing and leakage-resilient via generic composition. As a second approach for constructing committing and leakage-resilient AE, we develop a generic transformation that turns an arbitrary AE scheme into one that fulfills both properties. The transformation relies on a keyed function that is both binding, i.e., it is hard to find key-input pairs that result in the same output, and leakage-resilient pseudorandom.
Haoqian Zhang, Michelle Yeo, Vero Estrada-Galinanes, Bryan Ford
Auctions, a long-standing method of trading goods and services, are a promising use case for decentralized finance. However, due to the inherent transparency property of blockchains, current sealed-bid auction implementations on smart contracts requires a bidder to send at least two transactions to the underlying blockchain: a bidder must first commit their bid in the first transaction during the bidding period and reveal their bid in the second transaction once the revealing period starts. In addition, the smart contract often requires a deposit to incentivize bidders to reveal their bids, rendering unnecessary financial burdens and risks to bidders. We address these drawbacks by enforcing delayed execution in the blockchain execution layer to all transactions. In short, the blockchain only accepts encrypted transactions, and when the blockchain has finalized an encrypted transaction, the consensus group decrypts and executes it. This architecture enables ZeroAuction, a sealed-bid auction smart contract with zero deposit requirement. ZeroAuction relies on the blockchain enhanced with delayed execution to hide and bind the bids within the encrypted transactions and, after a delay period, reveals them automatically by decrypting and executing the transactions. Because a bidder only needs to interact with the blockchain once instead of two times to participate in the auction, ZeroAuction significantly reduces the latency overhead along with eliminating the deposit requirement.
Yanxue Jia, Varun Madathil, Aniket Kate
In the realm of privacy-preserving blockchain applications such as Zcash, oblivious message retrieval (OMR) enables recipients to privately access messages directed to them on blockchain nodes (or bulletin board servers). OMR prevents servers from linking a message and its corresponding recipient's address, thereby safeguarding recipient privacy. Several OMR schemes have emerged recently to meet the demands of these privacy-centric blockchains; however, we observe that existing solutions exhibit shortcomings in various critical aspects and may only achieve certain objectives inefficiently, sometimes relying on trusted hardware, thereby impacting their practical utility. This work introduces a novel OMR protocol, HomeRun, that leverages two semi-honest, non-colluding servers to excel in both performance and security attributes as compared to the current state-of-the-art.
HomeRun stands out by providing unlinkability across multiple requests for the same recipient's address. Moreover, it does not impose a limit on the number of pertinent messages that can be received by a recipient, which thwarts ``message balance exhaustion'' attacks and enhances system usability. HomeRun also empowers servers to regularly delete the retrieved messages and the associated auxiliary data, which mitigates the constantly increasing computation costs and storage costs incurred by servers. Remarkably, none of the existing solutions offer all of these features collectively. Finally, thanks to its judicious use of highly efficient cryptographic building blocks, HomeRun is highly performant: Specifically, the total runtime of servers in HomeRun is $3830 \times$ less than that in the work by Liu et al. (CRYPTO '22) based on fully-homomorphic encryption, and at least $1459 \times$ less than that in the design by Madathil et al. (USENIX Security '22) based on two semi-honest and non-colluding servers, using a single thread in a WAN setting.
HomeRun stands out by providing unlinkability across multiple requests for the same recipient's address. Moreover, it does not impose a limit on the number of pertinent messages that can be received by a recipient, which thwarts ``message balance exhaustion'' attacks and enhances system usability. HomeRun also empowers servers to regularly delete the retrieved messages and the associated auxiliary data, which mitigates the constantly increasing computation costs and storage costs incurred by servers. Remarkably, none of the existing solutions offer all of these features collectively. Finally, thanks to its judicious use of highly efficient cryptographic building blocks, HomeRun is highly performant: Specifically, the total runtime of servers in HomeRun is $3830 \times$ less than that in the work by Liu et al. (CRYPTO '22) based on fully-homomorphic encryption, and at least $1459 \times$ less than that in the design by Madathil et al. (USENIX Security '22) based on two semi-honest and non-colluding servers, using a single thread in a WAN setting.
Anna-Maurin Graner, Björn Kriepke, Lucas Krompholz, Gohar M. Kyureghyan
We prove that for $n>1$ the map $\chi:\mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$, defined by $y=\chi(x)$ with $y_i = x_i + x_{i+2}\cdot(1+x_{i+1})$ for $1\leq i \leq n$, is bijective if and only if
$q=2$ and $n$ is odd, as it was conjectured by Schoone and Daemen in 2023.
Daniel Dobkin, Nimrod Cever, Itamar Levi
High-performance and energy-efficient encryption engines have become crucial components in modern System-On-Chip (SoC) architectures across multiple platforms, including servers, desktops, mobile devices, and IoT edge devices. Alas, the secure operation of cryptographic engines faces a significant obstacle caused by information leakage through various side-channels. Adversaries can exploit statistical analysis techniques on measured (e.g.,) power and timing signatures generated during (e.g.,) encryption process to extract secret material. Countermeasures against such side-channel attacks often impose substantial power, area, and performance overheads. Consequently, designing side-channel secure encryption engines becomes a critical challenge when ensuring high-performance and energy-efficient operations. In this paper we will suggest a novel technique for low cost, high impact, easily scalable protection based on Adaptive Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (A-DVFS) capabilities in ultra-low-power (ULP) sub-threshold chips. We review the improvement of using integrated voltage regulators and DVFS, normally used for efficient power management, towards increasing side-channel resistance of encryption engines; Pushing known prior-art in the topic to ULP-regime. The hardware measurements were performed on PLS15 test-chip fabricated in ULP 40nm process going down from nominal voltage to 580 mV power-supply. Various results and detailed analysis is presented to demonstrate the impact of power management circuits on side-channel security, performance-impact and comparison to prior-art. Importantly, we highlight security sensitivities DVFS embeds in terms of software side-channels such as timing, and their mitigation with our proposed technique, successfully masking the time signature introduced by DVFS.
Alexandre Belling, Azam Soleimanian, Bogdan Ursu
A list polynomial commitment scheme (LPC) is a polynomial commitment scheme with a relaxed binding property. Namely, in an LPC setting, a commitment to a function $f(X)$ can be opened to a list of low-degree polynomials close to $f(X)$ (w.r.t. the relative Hamming distance and over a domain $D$). The scheme also allows opening one of the polynomials of the list at an arbitrary point $x$ and convincing a verifier that one of the polynomials in the list evaluates to the purported value.
Vortex is a list polynomial commitment, obtained through a modification of Ligero (CCS 2017), inspired by the schemes of Brakedown (Crypto 2023), batch-FRI (FOCS 2020), and RedShift (CCS 2022). Concerning one application of Vortex, for a witness of size $N$, the messages between the prover and the verifier are of size $O(N^{1/2})$. Vortex is a core component of the SNARK used by the prover of Linea (Consensys). This paper provides a complete security analysis for Vortex. We use a general compiler to build an Argument of Knowledge (AoK) by combining our list polynomial commitment and a polynomial-IOP (PIOP).
The approach is similar to combining a PIOP with a polynomial commitment scheme and has a soundness loss only linear in the list size. This overcomes a previous limitation in the standard compiler from a generic PIOP and a list polynomial commitment scheme to an interactive argument of knowledge, which suffers from a soundness loss of $\mathcal{O}(|L|^r)$ (where $|L|$ is the list size and $r$ is the number of interactions between the prover and the verifier in the PIOP).
Vortex is a list polynomial commitment, obtained through a modification of Ligero (CCS 2017), inspired by the schemes of Brakedown (Crypto 2023), batch-FRI (FOCS 2020), and RedShift (CCS 2022). Concerning one application of Vortex, for a witness of size $N$, the messages between the prover and the verifier are of size $O(N^{1/2})$. Vortex is a core component of the SNARK used by the prover of Linea (Consensys). This paper provides a complete security analysis for Vortex. We use a general compiler to build an Argument of Knowledge (AoK) by combining our list polynomial commitment and a polynomial-IOP (PIOP).
The approach is similar to combining a PIOP with a polynomial commitment scheme and has a soundness loss only linear in the list size. This overcomes a previous limitation in the standard compiler from a generic PIOP and a list polynomial commitment scheme to an interactive argument of knowledge, which suffers from a soundness loss of $\mathcal{O}(|L|^r)$ (where $|L|$ is the list size and $r$ is the number of interactions between the prover and the verifier in the PIOP).
Rafael del Pino, Shuichi Katsumata, Mary Maller, Fabrice Mouhartem, Thomas Prest, Markku-Juhani Saarinen
Threshold signatures improve both availability and security of digital signatures by splitting the signing key into $N$ shares handed out to different parties. Later on, any subset of at least $T$ parties can cooperate to produce a signature on a given message. While threshold signatures have been extensively studied in the pre-quantum setting, they remain sparse from quantum-resilient assumptions.
We present the first efficient lattice-based threshold signatures with signature size 13 KiB and communication cost 40 KiB per user, supporting a threshold size as large as 1024 signers. We provide an accompanying high performance implementation. The security of the scheme is based on the same assumptions as Dilithium, a signature recently selected by NIST for standardisation which, as far as we know, cannot easily be made threshold efficiently.
All operations used during signing are due to symmetric primitives and simple lattice operations; in particular our scheme does not need heavy tools such as threshold fully homomorphic encryption or homomorphic trapdoor commitments as in prior constructions. The key technical idea is to use one-time additive masks to mitigate the leakage of the partial signing keys through partial signatures.
We present the first efficient lattice-based threshold signatures with signature size 13 KiB and communication cost 40 KiB per user, supporting a threshold size as large as 1024 signers. We provide an accompanying high performance implementation. The security of the scheme is based on the same assumptions as Dilithium, a signature recently selected by NIST for standardisation which, as far as we know, cannot easily be made threshold efficiently.
All operations used during signing are due to symmetric primitives and simple lattice operations; in particular our scheme does not need heavy tools such as threshold fully homomorphic encryption or homomorphic trapdoor commitments as in prior constructions. The key technical idea is to use one-time additive masks to mitigate the leakage of the partial signing keys through partial signatures.
Balthazar Bauer, Georg Fuchsbauer
Equivalence class signatures (EQS), introduced by Hanser and Slamanig (AC'14), sign vectors of elements from a bilinear group. Signatures can be ``adapted'', meaning that anyone can transform a signature on a vector to a (random) signature on any multiple of that vector. (Signatures thus authenticate equivalence classes.) A transformed signature/message pair is then indistinguishable from a random signature on a random message. EQS have been used to efficiently instantiate (delegatable) anonymous credentials, (round-optimal) blind signatures, ring and group signatures and anonymous tokens.
The original EQS construction (J.Crypto'19) is only proven in the generic group model, while the first construction from standard assumptions (PKC'18) only yields security guarantees insufficient for most applications. Two works (AC'19, PKC'22) propose applicable schemes which assume the existence of a common reference string for the anonymity notion. Their unforgeability is argued via a security proof from standard (or non-interactive) assumptions.
In this work we show that their security proof is flawed and explain the subtle issue.
The original EQS construction (J.Crypto'19) is only proven in the generic group model, while the first construction from standard assumptions (PKC'18) only yields security guarantees insufficient for most applications. Two works (AC'19, PKC'22) propose applicable schemes which assume the existence of a common reference string for the anonymity notion. Their unforgeability is argued via a security proof from standard (or non-interactive) assumptions.
In this work we show that their security proof is flawed and explain the subtle issue.
Minghui Xu, Jiahao Zhang, Hechuan Guo, Xiuzhen Cheng, Dongxiao Yu, Qin Hu, Yijun Li, Yipu Wu
Decentralized Storage Network (DSN) is an emerging technology that challenges traditional cloud-based storage systems by consolidating storage capacities from independent providers and coordinating to provide decentralized storage and retrieval services. However, current DSNs face several challenges associated with data privacy and efficiency of the proof systems. To address these issues, we propose FileDES (Decentralized Encrypted Storage), which incorporates three essential elements: privacy preservation, scalable storage proof, and batch verification. FileDES provides encrypted data storage while maintaining data availability, with a scalable Proof of Encrypted Storage (PoES) algorithm that is resilient to Sybil and Generation attacks. Additionally, we introduce a rollup-based batch verification approach to simultaneously verify multiple files using publicly verifiable succinct proofs. We conducted a comparative evaluation on FileDES, Filecoin, Storj and Sia under various conditions, including a WAN composed of up to 120 geographically dispersed nodes. Our protocol outperforms the others in terms of proof generation/verification efficiency, storage costs, and scalability.
Dongwon Lee, Seonhong Min, Yongsoo Song
Fully Homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables the computation of an arbitrary function over encrypted data without decrypting them. In particular, bootstrapping is a core building block of FHE which reduces the noise of a ciphertext thereby recovering the computational capability.
This paper introduces a new bootstrapping framework for the Fan-Vercuteren (FV) scheme, called the functional bootstrapping, providing more generic and advanced functionality than the ordinary bootstrapping method. More specifically, the functional bootstrapping allows us to evaluate an arbitrary function while removing the error of an input ciphertext. Therefore, we achieve better depth consumption and computational complexity as the evaluation of a circuit can be integrated as part of the functional bootstrapping procedure. In particular, our approach extends the functionality of FV since it is even applicable to functions between different plaintext spaces.
At the heart of our functional bootstrapping framework is a novel homomorphic Look-Up Table (LUT) evaluation method where we represent any LUT using only the operations supported by the FV scheme. Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and present benchmarks. In concrete examples, such as delta and sign functions, our functional bootstrapping takes about 46.5s or 171.4s for 9-bit or 13-bit plaintext modulus, respectively.
This paper introduces a new bootstrapping framework for the Fan-Vercuteren (FV) scheme, called the functional bootstrapping, providing more generic and advanced functionality than the ordinary bootstrapping method. More specifically, the functional bootstrapping allows us to evaluate an arbitrary function while removing the error of an input ciphertext. Therefore, we achieve better depth consumption and computational complexity as the evaluation of a circuit can be integrated as part of the functional bootstrapping procedure. In particular, our approach extends the functionality of FV since it is even applicable to functions between different plaintext spaces.
At the heart of our functional bootstrapping framework is a novel homomorphic Look-Up Table (LUT) evaluation method where we represent any LUT using only the operations supported by the FV scheme. Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and present benchmarks. In concrete examples, such as delta and sign functions, our functional bootstrapping takes about 46.5s or 171.4s for 9-bit or 13-bit plaintext modulus, respectively.
Aya Fukami, Richard Buurke, Zeno Geradts
Embedded Multimedia Cards (eMMCs) provide a protected memory area called the Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB). eMMCs are commonly used as storage media in modern smartphones. In order to protect these devices from unauthorized access, important data is stored in the RPMB area in an authenticated manner. Modification of the RPMB data requires a pre-shared authentication key. An unauthorized user cannot change the stored data. On modern devices, this pre-shared key is generated and used exclusively within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) preventing attackers from access. In this paper, we investigate how the authentication key for RPMB is programmed on the eMMC. We found that this key can be extracted directly from the target memory chip. Once obtained, the authentication key can be used to manipulate stored data. In addition, poor implementation of certain security features, aimed at preventing replay attacks using RPMB on the host system can be broken by an attacker. We show how the authentication key can be extracted and how it can be used to break the anti-rollback protection to enable data restoration even after a data wipe operation has been completed. Our findings show that non-secure RPMB implementations can enable forensic investigators to break security features implemented on modern smartphones.