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27 February 2024
Augustin Bariant, Aurélien Boeuf, Axel Lemoine, Irati Manterola Ayala, Morten Øygarden, Léo Perrin, Håvard Raddum
In this paper, we present a new type of algebraic attack that applies to many recent arithmetization-oriented families of permutations, such as those used in Griffin, Anemoi, ArionHash, and XHash8, whose security relies on the hardness of the constrained-input constrained-output (CICO) problem. We introduce the FreeLunch approach: the monomial ordering is chosen so that the natural polynomial system encoding the CICO problem already is a Gröbner basis. In addition, we present a new dedicated resolution algorithm for FreeLunch systems of complexity lower than applicable state-of-the-art FGLM algorithms.
We show that the FreeLunch approach challenges the security of fullround instances of Anemoi, Arion and Griffin. We confirm these theoretical results with experimental results on those three permutations. In particular, using the FreeLunch attack combined with a new technique to bypass 3 rounds of Griffin, we recover a CICO solution for 7 out of 10 rounds of Griffin in less than four hours on one core of AMD EPYC 7352 (2.3GHz).
Maria Ferrara, Antonio Tortora, Maria Tota
Torus Fully Homomorphic Encryption (TFHE) is a probabilistic cryptosytem over the real torus which allows one to operate directly on encrypted data without first decrypting them. We present an aggregation protocol based on a variant of TFHE for computing the sum of sensitive data, working only with the corresponding ciphertexts. Our scheme is an ideal choice for a system of smart meters - electronic devices for measuring energy consumption - that demands consumers’
privacy. In contrast to some other solutions, our proposal does not require any communication among smart meters and it is quantum-safe.
Guoqing Zhou, Maozhi Xu
At EUROCRYPT’23, Castryck and Decru, Maino et al., and Robert present efficient attacks against supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (SIDH). Drawing inspiration from these attacks, Andrea Basso, Luciano Maino, and Giacomo Pope introduce FESTA, an isogeny-based trapdoor function, along with a corresponding IND-CCA secure public key encryption (PKE) protocol at ASIACRYPT’23. FESTA incorporates either a diagonal or circulant matrix into the secret key to mask torsion points.
In this paper, we employ a side-channel attack to construct an auxiliary verification oracle. By querying this oracle, we propose an adaptive attack strategy to recover the secret key in FESTA when the secret matrix is circulant. Compared with existing attacks, our strategy is more efficient and formal. Leveraging these findings, we implement our attack algorithms to recover the circulant matrix in secret key. Finally, we demonstrate that if the secret matrix is circulant, then the adversary can successfully recover FESTA’s secret key with a polynomial number of decryption machine queries. Consequently, our paper illustrates that FESTA PKE protocol with secret circulant matrix does not achieve IND-CCA security.
Ling Song, Qianqian Yang, Yincen Chen, Lei Hu, Jian Weng
In differential-like attacks, the process typically involves extending a distinguisher forward and backward with probability 1 for some rounds and recovering the key involved in the extended part. Particularly in rectangle attacks, a holistic key recovery strategy can be employed to yield the most efficient attacks tailored to a given distinguisher. In this paper, we treat the distinguisher and the extended part as an integrated entity and give a one-step framework for finding rectangle attacks with the purpose of reducing the overall complexity or attacking more rounds. In this framework, we propose to allow probabilistic differential propagations in the extended part and incorporate the holistic recovery strategy. Additionally, we introduce the ``split-and-bunch technique'' to further reduce the time complexity. Beyond rectangle attacks, we extend these foundational concepts to encompass differential attacks as well. To demonstrate the efficiency of our framework, we apply it to Deoxys-BC-384, SKINNY, ForkSkinny, and CRAFT, achieving a series of refined and improved rectangle attacks and differential attacks. Notably, we obtain the first 15-round attack on Deoxys-BC-384, narrowing its security margin to only one round. Furthermore, our differential attack on CRAFT extends to 23 rounds, covering two more rounds than the previous best attacks.
Yang Gao
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) is a trend in applied cryptography because it combine confidentiality, integrity, and authentication into one algorithm and is more efficient than using block ciphers and hash functions separately. The Ascon algorithm, as the winner in both the CAESAR competition and the NIST LwC competition, will soon become the AEAD standard for protecting the Internet of Things and micro devices with limited computing resources. We propose a partial differential fault analysis (PDFA) technology for the Ascon algorithm, using stuck-at fault and random-nibble fault models respectively. Theoretically, after 9.9 full-round fault injections or 263 single nibble fault injections, 128-bit key can be completely recovered. In addition, we conducted the first discussion of this analysis method under different nonce configurations. In the Nonce-respect case, an average of 130 additional Tag queries are required to complete the guessing of the faulty tag, afterwards equating this case with the Nonce-misuse case. Subsequent experimental results proved the correctness of the theoretical model. Finally we discuss some countermeasures against proposed attacks, and we propose a new S-box that can be used to replace the existing S-box in ASCON to render PDFA ineffective.
Jiahui He, Kai Hu, Hao Lei, Meiqin Wang
The cube attack extracts the information of secret key bits by recovering the coefficient called superpoly in the output bit with respect to a subset of plaintexts/IV, which is called a cube. While the division property provides an efficient way to detect the structure of the superpoly, superpoly recovery could still be prohibitively costly if the number of rounds is sufficiently high. In particular, Core Monomial Prediction (CMP) was proposed at ASIACRYPT 2022 as a scaled-down version of Monomial Prediction (MP), which sacrifices accuracy for efficiency but ultimately gets stuck at 848 rounds of \trivium.
In this paper, we provide new insights into CMP by elucidating the algebraic meaning to the core monomial trails. We prove that it is sufficient to recover the superpoly by extracting all the core monomial trails, an approach based solely on CMP, thus demonstrating that CMP can achieve perfect accuracy as MP does. We further reveal that CMP is still MP in essence, but with variable substitutions on the target function. Inspired by the divide-and-conquer strategy that has been widely used in previous literature, we design a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) framework, in which the CMP-based approach can be embedded to achieve a speedup.
To illustrate the power of these new techniques, we apply the MITM framework to \trivium, \grain and \kreyvium. As a result, not only can the previous computational cost of superpoly recovery be reduced (e.g., 5x faster for superpoly recovery on 192-round \grain), but we also succeed in recovering superpolies for up to 851 rounds of \trivium and up to 899 rounds of \kreyvium. This surpasses the previous best results by respectively 3 and 4 rounds. Using the memory-efficient M\"obius transform proposed at EUROCRYPT 2021, we can perform key recovery attacks on target ciphers, even though the superpoly may contain over $2^{40}$ monomials. This leads to the best cube attacks on the target ciphers.
In this paper, we provide new insights into CMP by elucidating the algebraic meaning to the core monomial trails. We prove that it is sufficient to recover the superpoly by extracting all the core monomial trails, an approach based solely on CMP, thus demonstrating that CMP can achieve perfect accuracy as MP does. We further reveal that CMP is still MP in essence, but with variable substitutions on the target function. Inspired by the divide-and-conquer strategy that has been widely used in previous literature, we design a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) framework, in which the CMP-based approach can be embedded to achieve a speedup.
To illustrate the power of these new techniques, we apply the MITM framework to \trivium, \grain and \kreyvium. As a result, not only can the previous computational cost of superpoly recovery be reduced (e.g., 5x faster for superpoly recovery on 192-round \grain), but we also succeed in recovering superpolies for up to 851 rounds of \trivium and up to 899 rounds of \kreyvium. This surpasses the previous best results by respectively 3 and 4 rounds. Using the memory-efficient M\"obius transform proposed at EUROCRYPT 2021, we can perform key recovery attacks on target ciphers, even though the superpoly may contain over $2^{40}$ monomials. This leads to the best cube attacks on the target ciphers.
Leo de Castro, Keewoo Lee
We present VeriSimplePIR, a verifiable version of the state-of-the-art semi-honest SimplePIR protocol. VeriSimplePIR is a stateful verifiable PIR scheme guaranteeing that all queries are consistent with a fixed, well-formed database. It is the first efficient verifiable PIR scheme to not rely on an honest digest to ensure security; any digest, even one produced by a malicious server, is sufficient to commit to some database. This is due to our extractable verification procedure, which can extract the entire database from the consistency proof checked against each response.
Furthermore, VeriSimplePIR ensures this strong security guarantee without compromising the performance of SimplePIR. The online communication overhead is roughly $1.1$-$1.5\times$ SimplePIR, and the online computation time on the server is essentially the same. We achieve this low overhead via a novel one-time preprocessing protocol that generates a reusable proof that can verify any number of subsequent query-response pairs as long as no malicious behavior is detected. As soon as the verification procedure rejects a response from the server, the offline phase must be rerun to compute a new proof. VeriSimplePIR represents an approach to maliciously secure cryptography that is highly optimized for honest parties while maintaining security even in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Furthermore, VeriSimplePIR ensures this strong security guarantee without compromising the performance of SimplePIR. The online communication overhead is roughly $1.1$-$1.5\times$ SimplePIR, and the online computation time on the server is essentially the same. We achieve this low overhead via a novel one-time preprocessing protocol that generates a reusable proof that can verify any number of subsequent query-response pairs as long as no malicious behavior is detected. As soon as the verification procedure rejects a response from the server, the offline phase must be rerun to compute a new proof. VeriSimplePIR represents an approach to maliciously secure cryptography that is highly optimized for honest parties while maintaining security even in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Brent Waters
We put forward a new approach for achieving non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIKZs) from the learning with errors (LWE) assumption (with subexponential modulus to noise ratio). We provide a LWE-based construction of a hidden bits generator that gives rise to a NIZK via the celebrated hidden bits paradigm. A noteable feature of our construction is its simplicity. Our construction employs lattice trapdoors, but beyond that uses only simple operations. Unlike prior solutions we do not rely on a correlation intractability argument nor do we utilize fully homomorphic encryption techniques. Our solution provides a new methodology that adds to the diversity of techniques for solving this fundamental problem.
Gianluca Brian, Stefan Dziembowski, Sebastian Faust
Side channel attacks are devastating attacks targeting cryptographic implementations. To protect against these attacks, various countermeasures have been proposed -- in particular, the so-called masking scheme. Masking schemes work by hiding sensitive information via secret sharing all intermediate values that occur during the evaluation of a cryptographic implementation. Over the last decade, there has been broad interest in designing and formally analyzing such schemes. The random probing model considers leakage where the value on each wire leaks with some probability $\epsilon$. This model is important as it implies security in the noisy leakage model via a reduction by Duc et al. (Eurocrypt 2014). Noisy leakages are considered the "gold-standard" for analyzing masking schemes as they accurately model many real-world physical leakages. Unfortunately, the reduction of Duc et al. is non-tight, and in particular requires that the amount of noise increases by a factor of $|\mathbb{F}|$ for circuits that operate over $\mathbb{F}$ (where $\mathbb{F}$ is a finite field). In this work, we give a generic transformation from random probing to average probing, which avoids this loss of $|\mathbb{F}|$. Since the average probing is identical to the noisy leakage model (Eurocrypt 2014), this yields for the first time a security analysis of masked circuits where the noise parameter $\delta$ in the noisy leakage model is independent of $|\mathbb{F}|$. The latter is particularly important for cryptographic schemes operating over large fields, e.g., the AES or the recently standardized post-quantum schemes.
Tight Indistinguishability Bounds for the XOR of Independent Random Permutations by Fourier Analysis
Itai Dinur
The XOR of two independent permutations (XoP) is a well-known construction for achieving security beyond the birthday bound when implementing a pseudorandom function using a block cipher (i.e., a pseudorandom permutation). The idealized construction (where the permutations are uniformly chosen and independent) and its variants have been extensively analyzed over nearly 25 years.
The best-known information-theoretic indistinguishability bound for the XoP construction (due to Dutta, Nandi and Saha~[IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory]) is about $q^2/2^{2n}$, where $q$ is the number of queries and $n$ is the block length. The XoP construction has also been recently analyzed in the multi-user setting and the best known bound for it (by Chen, Choi, and Lee~[CRYPTO'23]) is about $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2n}$, where $u$ is the number of users and $q_{\max}$ is the number of queries per user.
A generalization of the XoP construction outputs the XOR of $r \geq 2$ independent permutations, and has also received significant attention. In this paper, we improve all previous bounds obtained in the literature for the (generalized) XoP construction when $q > 2^{n/2}$ (assuming $q < 2^{n}/2$). Specifically, for the basic XoP construction with $r=2$, we obtain an indistinguishability bound of $q/2^{1.5n}$ in the single-user setting and $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{1.5n}$ in the multi-user setting. Hence, if $q_{\max} = \Theta(2^{n})$ (and $q_{\max} < 2^{n}/2$), then our bound of $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{1.5n}$ implies that the adversary's advantage remains negligible as long as $u = o(2^n)$. On the other hand, with the previous bound of $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2n}$, the adversary's advantage may already be a constant with a single user ($u=1$).
For the generalized XoP construction, we obtain a bound of $q/2^{(r - 0.5)n}$ in the single-user setting and $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{(r - 0.5)n}$ in the multi-user setting. Consequently, the gap between our results and the best previous ones increases sharply with $r$. For example, the best-known bound for $r = 3$, obtained by Choi et al. [ASIACRYPT'22] (in the multi-user setting), is about $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2.5 n}$, while we obtain $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{2.5 n}$.
Since all of our bounds are matched (up to constant factors) for $q > 2^{n/2}$ by attacks published by Patarin in 2008 (and their generalizations to the multi-user setting), they are all tight. We obtain our results by Fourier analysis of Boolean functions. Yet, most of our technical work is not directly related to the analyzed cryptosystems. It rather involves analyzing fundamental Fourier properties of the density function associated with sampling without replacement from the domain $\{0,1\}^n$. We believe that this analysis is of broad interest.
The best-known information-theoretic indistinguishability bound for the XoP construction (due to Dutta, Nandi and Saha~[IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory]) is about $q^2/2^{2n}$, where $q$ is the number of queries and $n$ is the block length. The XoP construction has also been recently analyzed in the multi-user setting and the best known bound for it (by Chen, Choi, and Lee~[CRYPTO'23]) is about $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2n}$, where $u$ is the number of users and $q_{\max}$ is the number of queries per user.
A generalization of the XoP construction outputs the XOR of $r \geq 2$ independent permutations, and has also received significant attention. In this paper, we improve all previous bounds obtained in the literature for the (generalized) XoP construction when $q > 2^{n/2}$ (assuming $q < 2^{n}/2$). Specifically, for the basic XoP construction with $r=2$, we obtain an indistinguishability bound of $q/2^{1.5n}$ in the single-user setting and $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{1.5n}$ in the multi-user setting. Hence, if $q_{\max} = \Theta(2^{n})$ (and $q_{\max} < 2^{n}/2$), then our bound of $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{1.5n}$ implies that the adversary's advantage remains negligible as long as $u = o(2^n)$. On the other hand, with the previous bound of $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2n}$, the adversary's advantage may already be a constant with a single user ($u=1$).
For the generalized XoP construction, we obtain a bound of $q/2^{(r - 0.5)n}$ in the single-user setting and $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{(r - 0.5)n}$ in the multi-user setting. Consequently, the gap between our results and the best previous ones increases sharply with $r$. For example, the best-known bound for $r = 3$, obtained by Choi et al. [ASIACRYPT'22] (in the multi-user setting), is about $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}^2/2^{2.5 n}$, while we obtain $\sqrt{u} q_{\max}/2^{2.5 n}$.
Since all of our bounds are matched (up to constant factors) for $q > 2^{n/2}$ by attacks published by Patarin in 2008 (and their generalizations to the multi-user setting), they are all tight. We obtain our results by Fourier analysis of Boolean functions. Yet, most of our technical work is not directly related to the analyzed cryptosystems. It rather involves analyzing fundamental Fourier properties of the density function associated with sampling without replacement from the domain $\{0,1\}^n$. We believe that this analysis is of broad interest.
Valerie Gilchrist, Laurane Marco, Christophe Petit, Gang Tang
The Tensor Isomorphism Problem (TIP) has been shown to be equivalent to the matrix code equivalence problem, making it an interesting candidate on which to build post-quantum cryptographic primitives. These hard problems have already been used in protocol development. One of these, MEDS, is currently in Round 1 of NIST's call for additional post-quantum digital signatures.
In this work, we consider the TIP for a special class of tensors. The hardness of the decisional version of this problem is the foundation of a commitment scheme proposed by D'Alconzo, Flamini, and Gangemi (Asiacrypt 2023). We present polynomial-time algorithms for the decisional and computational versions of TIP for special orbits, which implies that the commitment scheme is not secure. The key observations of these algorithms are that these special tensors contain some low-rank points, and their stabilizer groups are not trivial.
With these new developments in the security of TIP in mind, we give a new commitment scheme based on the general TIP that is non-interactive, post-quantum, and statistically binding, making no new assumptions. Such a commitment scheme does not currently exist in the literature.
Khai Hanh Tang, Minh Pham, Chan Nam Ngo
Incremental Verifiable Computation (IVC) allows a prover to prove to a verifier the correct execution of a sequential computation. Recent works focus on improving the universality and efficiency of IVC Schemes, which can be categorized into Accumulation and Folding-based IVCs with Folding-based ones being more efficient (due to their deferred proof generation until the final step). Unfortunately, both approaches satisfy only heuristic security as they model the Random Oracle (RO) as a circuit in their non-constant depth recursive composition of the base Scheme. Such drawback is two-fold: to connect the consecutive execution step the RO is recursively modeled as a circuit during the folding or the accumulating process, and again in the final SNARK wrapper circuit (a common practice in Folding-based IVCs).
We revisit this problem, with a focus on the Folding-based IVCs due to their efficiency, and propose the detachment of RO invocation from the folding circuit. We can instead accumulate such invocations, yielding the so-called Conditional Folding (CF) Scheme to overcome the first drawback. One can consider our CF Scheme a hybrid Folding-Accumulation Scheme with provable security. We provide a non-trivial practical construction for our CF scheme that is natively parallelizable, which offers great efficiency. We rigorously prove the security of our CF scheme (also for the case of folding in parallel; and our scheme can be made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir). Our CF scheme is generic and does not require trusted setup. It can be adapted to construct the first IVC for RAM programs, i.e. Parallelizable Scalable Transparent Arguments of Knowledge for RAM Programs that we dub RAMenPaSTA, that can be used to build zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs). Both our CF Scheme and RAMenPaSTA can be of independent research interests.
We revisit this problem, with a focus on the Folding-based IVCs due to their efficiency, and propose the detachment of RO invocation from the folding circuit. We can instead accumulate such invocations, yielding the so-called Conditional Folding (CF) Scheme to overcome the first drawback. One can consider our CF Scheme a hybrid Folding-Accumulation Scheme with provable security. We provide a non-trivial practical construction for our CF scheme that is natively parallelizable, which offers great efficiency. We rigorously prove the security of our CF scheme (also for the case of folding in parallel; and our scheme can be made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir). Our CF scheme is generic and does not require trusted setup. It can be adapted to construct the first IVC for RAM programs, i.e. Parallelizable Scalable Transparent Arguments of Knowledge for RAM Programs that we dub RAMenPaSTA, that can be used to build zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs). Both our CF Scheme and RAMenPaSTA can be of independent research interests.
Naresh Goud Boddu, Vipul Goyal, Rahul Jain, João Ribeiro
Non-malleable codes are fundamental objects at the intersection of cryptography and coding theory. These codes provide security guarantees even in settings where error correction and detection are impossible, and have found applications to several other cryptographic tasks. One of the strongest and most well-studied adversarial tampering models is $2$-split-state tampering. Here, a codeword is split into two parts which are stored in physically distant servers, and the adversary can then independently tamper with each part using arbitrary functions. This model can be naturally extended to the secret sharing setting with several parties by having the adversary independently tamper with each share. Previous works on non-malleable coding and secret sharing in the split-state tampering model only considered the encoding of classical messages. Furthermore, until recent work by Aggarwal, Boddu, and Jain (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2024 & arXiv 2022), adversaries with quantum capabilities and shared entanglement had not been considered, and it is a priori not clear whether previous schemes remain secure in this model.
In this work, we introduce the notions of split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages secure against quantum adversaries with shared entanglement. Then, we present explicit constructions of such schemes that achieve low-error non-malleability. More precisely, we construct efficiently encodable and decodable split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages preserving entanglement with external systems and achieving security against quantum adversaries having shared entanglement with codeword length $n$, any message length at most $n^{\Omega(1)}$, and error $\varepsilon=2^{-{n^{\Omega(1)}}}$. In the easier setting of average-case non-malleability, we achieve efficient non-malleable coding with rate close to $1/11$.
In this work, we introduce the notions of split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages secure against quantum adversaries with shared entanglement. Then, we present explicit constructions of such schemes that achieve low-error non-malleability. More precisely, we construct efficiently encodable and decodable split-state non-malleable codes and secret sharing schemes for quantum messages preserving entanglement with external systems and achieving security against quantum adversaries having shared entanglement with codeword length $n$, any message length at most $n^{\Omega(1)}$, and error $\varepsilon=2^{-{n^{\Omega(1)}}}$. In the easier setting of average-case non-malleability, we achieve efficient non-malleable coding with rate close to $1/11$.
Jeremiah Blocki, Blake Holman, Seunghoon Lee
The (parallel) classical black pebbling game is a helpful abstraction which allows us to analyze the resources (time, space, space-time, cumulative space) necessary to evaluate a function $f$ with a static data-dependency graph $G$ on a (parallel) computer. In particular, the parallel black pebbling game has been used as a tool to quantify the (in)security of Data-Independent Memory-Hard Functions (iMHFs). Recently Blocki et al. (TCC 2022) introduced the parallel reversible pebbling game as a tool to analyze resource requirements when we additionally require that computation is reversible. Intuitively, the parallel reversible pebbling game extends the classical parallel black pebbling game by imposing restrictions on when pebbles can be removed. By contrast, the classical black pebbling game imposes no restrictions on when pebbles can be removed to free up space. One of the primary motivations of the parallel reversible pebbling game is to provide a tool to analyze the full cost of quantum preimage attacks against an iMHF. However, while there is an extensive line of work analyzing pebbling complexity in the (parallel) black pebbling game, comparatively little is known about the parallel reversible pebbling game. Our first result is a lower bound of $\Omega\left(N^{1+1/\sqrt{\log N}} \right)$ on the reversible cumulative pebbling cost for a line graph on $N$ nodes. This yields a separation between classical and reversible pebbling costs demonstrating that the reversibility constraint can increase cumulative pebbling costs (and space-time costs) by a multiplicative factor of $\Omega\left(N^{1/\sqrt{\log N}} \right)$ --- the classical pebbling cost (space-time or cumulative) for a line graph is just $\mathcal{O}(N)$. On the positive side, we prove that any classical parallel pebbling can be transformed into a reversible pebbling strategy whilst increasing space-time (resp. cumulative memory) costs by a multiplicative factor of at most $\mathcal{O}\left(N^{2/\sqrt{\log N}}\right)$ (resp. $\mathcal{O}\left(N^{\mathcal{O}(1)/\sqrt[4]{\log N}}\right)$). We also analyze the impact of the reversibility constraint on the cumulative pebbling cost of depth-robust and depth-reducible DAGs exploiting reversibility to improve constant factors in a prior lower bound of Alwen et al. (EUROCRYPT 2017). For depth-reducible DAGs we show that the state-of-the-art recursive pebbling techniques of Alwen et al. (EUROCRYPT 2017) can be converted into a recursive reversible pebbling attack without any asymptotic increases in pebbling costs. Finally, we extend a result of Blocki et al. (ITCS 2020) to show that it is Unique Games hard to approximate the reversible cumulative pebbling cost of a DAG $G$ to within any constant factor.
Pierre Briaud, Maxime Bros, Ray Perlner, Daniel Smith-Tone
DME is a multivariate scheme submitted to the call for additional signatures recently launched by NIST. Its performance is one of the best among all the candidates. The public key is constructed from the alternation of very structured linear and non-linear components that constitute the private key, the latter being defined over an extension field. We exploit these structures by proposing an algebraic attack which is practical on all DME parameters.
Yuval Ishai, Yifan Song
A leakage-resilient circuit for $f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}^m$ is a randomized Boolean circuit $C$ mapping a randomized encoding of an input $x$ to an encoding of $y=f(x)$, such that applying any leakage function $L\in \cal L$ to the wires of $C$ reveals essentially nothing about $x$. A leakage-tolerant circuit achieves the stronger guarantee that even when $x$ and $y$ are not protected by any encoding, the output of $L$ can be simulated by applying some $L'\in \cal L$ to $x$ and $y$ alone. Thus, $C$ is as secure as an ideal hardware implementation of $f$ with respect to leakage from $\cal L$.
Leakage-resilient circuits were constructed for low-complexity classes $\cal L$, including (length-$t$ output) $\mathcal{AC}0$ functions, parities, and functions with bounded communication complexity. In contrast, leakage-tolerant circuits were only known for the simple case of probing leakage, where $L$ outputs the values of $t$ wires in $C$.
We initiate a systematic study of leakage-tolerant circuits for natural classes $\cal L$ of global leakage functions, obtaining the following main results.
Leakage-tolerant circuits for depth-1 leakage. Every circuit $C_f$ for $f$ can be efficiently compiled into an $\cal L$-tolerant circuit $C$ for $f$, where $\cal L$ includes all leakage functions $L$ that output either $t$ parities or $t$ disjunctions (alternatively, conjunctions) of any number of wires or their negations. In the case of parities, our simulator runs in $2^{O(t)}$ time. We provide partial evidence that this may be inherent.
Application to stateful leakage-resilient circuits. Using a general transformation from leakage-tolerant circuits, we obtain the first construction of stateful $t$-leakage-resilient circuits that tolerate a continuous parity leakage, and the first such construction for disjunction/conjunction leakage in which the circuit size grows sub-quadratically with $t$. Interestingly, here we can obtain $\mathtt{poly}(t)$-time simulation even in the case of parities.
Leakage-resilient circuits were constructed for low-complexity classes $\cal L$, including (length-$t$ output) $\mathcal{AC}0$ functions, parities, and functions with bounded communication complexity. In contrast, leakage-tolerant circuits were only known for the simple case of probing leakage, where $L$ outputs the values of $t$ wires in $C$.
We initiate a systematic study of leakage-tolerant circuits for natural classes $\cal L$ of global leakage functions, obtaining the following main results.
Leakage-tolerant circuits for depth-1 leakage. Every circuit $C_f$ for $f$ can be efficiently compiled into an $\cal L$-tolerant circuit $C$ for $f$, where $\cal L$ includes all leakage functions $L$ that output either $t$ parities or $t$ disjunctions (alternatively, conjunctions) of any number of wires or their negations. In the case of parities, our simulator runs in $2^{O(t)}$ time. We provide partial evidence that this may be inherent.
Application to stateful leakage-resilient circuits. Using a general transformation from leakage-tolerant circuits, we obtain the first construction of stateful $t$-leakage-resilient circuits that tolerate a continuous parity leakage, and the first such construction for disjunction/conjunction leakage in which the circuit size grows sub-quadratically with $t$. Interestingly, here we can obtain $\mathtt{poly}(t)$-time simulation even in the case of parities.
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks (representing, for example, additional value derived from the application layer). The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial meanings of the phrase ``maximal extractable value (MEV).''
We first prove that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: With active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These impossibility results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as orderflow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques.
We then proceed to a more fine-grained model of block production that is inspired by current practice, in which we distinguish the roles of ``searchers'' (who actively identify opportunities for value extraction from the application layer and compete for the right to take advantage of them) and ``proposers'' (who participate directly in the blockchain protocol and make the final choice of the published block). Searchers can effectively act as an ``MEV oracle'' for a transaction fee mechanism, thereby enlarging the design space. Here, we first consider a transaction fee mechanism that resembles how searchers have traditionally been incorporated into the block production process, with each transaction effectively sold off to a searcher through a first-price auction. We then explore the design space with searchers more generally, and design a mechanism that circumvents our impossibility results for mechanisms without searchers. Our mechanism (the ``SAKA'' mechanism) is deterministic, incentive-compatible (for users, searchers, and the block producer), and sybil-proof, and it guarantees roughly 50% of the maximum-possible welfare when transaction sizes are small relative to block sizes. We conclude with a matching negative result: even when transactions are small relative to blocks, no incentive-compatible, sybil proof, and deterministic transaction fee mechanism can guarantee more than 50% of the maximum-possible welfare.
We first prove that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: With active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These impossibility results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as orderflow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques.
We then proceed to a more fine-grained model of block production that is inspired by current practice, in which we distinguish the roles of ``searchers'' (who actively identify opportunities for value extraction from the application layer and compete for the right to take advantage of them) and ``proposers'' (who participate directly in the blockchain protocol and make the final choice of the published block). Searchers can effectively act as an ``MEV oracle'' for a transaction fee mechanism, thereby enlarging the design space. Here, we first consider a transaction fee mechanism that resembles how searchers have traditionally been incorporated into the block production process, with each transaction effectively sold off to a searcher through a first-price auction. We then explore the design space with searchers more generally, and design a mechanism that circumvents our impossibility results for mechanisms without searchers. Our mechanism (the ``SAKA'' mechanism) is deterministic, incentive-compatible (for users, searchers, and the block producer), and sybil-proof, and it guarantees roughly 50% of the maximum-possible welfare when transaction sizes are small relative to block sizes. We conclude with a matching negative result: even when transactions are small relative to blocks, no incentive-compatible, sybil proof, and deterministic transaction fee mechanism can guarantee more than 50% of the maximum-possible welfare.
Aron van Baarsen, Sihang Pu
Traditional private set intersection (PSI) involves a receiver and a sender holding sets $X$ and $Y$, respectively, with the receiver learning only the intersection $X\cap Y$.
We turn our attention to its fuzzy variant, where the receiver holds \(|X|\) hyperballs of radius \(\delta\) in a metric space and the sender has $|Y|$ points.
Representing the hyperballs by their center, the receiver learns the points $x\in X$ for which there exists $y\in Y$ such that $\mathsf{dist}(x,y)\leq \delta$ with respect to some distance metric.
Previous approaches either require general-purpose multi-party computation (MPC) techniques like garbled circuits or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), leak details about the sender’s precise inputs, support limited distance metrics, or scale poorly with the hyperballs' volume.
This work presents the first black-box construction for fuzzy PSI (including other variants such as PSI cardinality, labeled PSI, and circuit PSI), which can handle polynomially large radius and dimension (i.e., a potentially exponentially large volume) in two interaction messages, supporting general \(L_{p\in[1,\infty]}\) distance, without relying on garbled circuits or FHE. The protocol excels in both asymptotic and concrete efficiency compared to existing works. For security, we solely rely on the assumption that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) holds in the random oracle model.
This work presents the first black-box construction for fuzzy PSI (including other variants such as PSI cardinality, labeled PSI, and circuit PSI), which can handle polynomially large radius and dimension (i.e., a potentially exponentially large volume) in two interaction messages, supporting general \(L_{p\in[1,\infty]}\) distance, without relying on garbled circuits or FHE. The protocol excels in both asymptotic and concrete efficiency compared to existing works. For security, we solely rely on the assumption that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) holds in the random oracle model.
Houda Ferradi
This paper introduces \textsl{signature validation}, a primitive allowing any \underline{t}hird party $T$ (\underline{T}héodore) to verify that a \underline{v}erifier $V$ (\underline{V}adim) computationally verified a signature $s$ on a message $m$ issued by a \underline{s}igner $S$ (\underline{S}arah).
A naive solution consists in sending by Sarah $x=\{m,\sigma_s\}$ where $\sigma_s$ is Sarah's signature on $m$ and have Vadim confirm reception by a signature $\sigma_v$ on $x$.
Unfortunately, this only attests \textsl{proper reception} by Vadim, i.e. that Vadim \textsl{could have checked} $x$ and not that Vadim \textsl{actually verified} $x$. By ``actually verifying'' we mean providing a proof or a convincing argument that a program running on Vadim's machine checked the correctness of $x$.
This paper proposes several solutions for doing so, thereby providing a useful building-block in numerous commercial and legal interactions for proving informed consent.
A naive solution consists in sending by Sarah $x=\{m,\sigma_s\}$ where $\sigma_s$ is Sarah's signature on $m$ and have Vadim confirm reception by a signature $\sigma_v$ on $x$.
Unfortunately, this only attests \textsl{proper reception} by Vadim, i.e. that Vadim \textsl{could have checked} $x$ and not that Vadim \textsl{actually verified} $x$. By ``actually verifying'' we mean providing a proof or a convincing argument that a program running on Vadim's machine checked the correctness of $x$.
This paper proposes several solutions for doing so, thereby providing a useful building-block in numerous commercial and legal interactions for proving informed consent.
Cécile Delerablée, Lénaïck Gouriou, David Pointcheval
Attribute-based cryptography allows fine-grained control on the use of the private key. In particular, attribute-based signature (ABS) specifies the capabilities of the signer, which can only sign messages associated to a policy that is authorized by his set of attributes. Furthermore, we can expect signature to not leak any information about the identity of the signer. ABS is a useful tool for identity-preserving authentication process which requires granular access-control, and can furthermore be enhanced with additional properties, for example delegation where users are able to manage a set of keys derived from their original one.
In this paper, we address delegation of signing keys. Our first delegation works for any subset of the original attributes, which is the intuitive approach of delegation. Furthermore, we also provide another kind of delegation where the delegator can choose a policy at delegation time to produce keys that can sign any message under this specific policy. This last approach to delegation is a direct application of a new version of the indexing technique, which was first introduced by Okamoto and Takashima in order to prove adaptive security in ABS and its counterpart for encryption, ABE. On top of that, we prove that our scheme is compatible with a well studied feature of ABS, traceability, by using an approach based on Linearly-Homomorphic signatures. All our schemes also guarantee the anonymity of the real signer. The unforgeability of our schemes is proven using the SXDH assumption, and our constructions use the Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS) framework developed by Okamoto and Takashima, which has been widely used for all kind of attribute and functional cryptography mechanisms.
In this paper, we address delegation of signing keys. Our first delegation works for any subset of the original attributes, which is the intuitive approach of delegation. Furthermore, we also provide another kind of delegation where the delegator can choose a policy at delegation time to produce keys that can sign any message under this specific policy. This last approach to delegation is a direct application of a new version of the indexing technique, which was first introduced by Okamoto and Takashima in order to prove adaptive security in ABS and its counterpart for encryption, ABE. On top of that, we prove that our scheme is compatible with a well studied feature of ABS, traceability, by using an approach based on Linearly-Homomorphic signatures. All our schemes also guarantee the anonymity of the real signer. The unforgeability of our schemes is proven using the SXDH assumption, and our constructions use the Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS) framework developed by Okamoto and Takashima, which has been widely used for all kind of attribute and functional cryptography mechanisms.