International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In the linear garbling model introduced by Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans (Eurocrypt 2015), garbling an AND gate requires at least \(2\kappa\) bits of ciphertext, where $\kappa$ is the security parameter. Though subsequent works, including those by Rosulek and Roy (Crypto 2021) and Acharya et al. (ACNS 2023), have advanced beyond these linear constraints, a more comprehensive design framework is yet to be developed.

Our work offers a novel, unified, and arguably simple perspective on garbled circuits. We introduce a hierarchy of models that captures all existing practical garbling schemes. By determining the lower bounds for these models, we elucidate the capabilities and limits of each. Notably, our findings suggest that simply integrating a nonlinear processing function or probabilistic considerations does not break the \(2\kappa\) lower bound by Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans. However, by incorporating column correlations, the bound can be reduced to \((1+1/w)\kappa\), where \(w\ge 1\). Additionally, we demonstrate that a straightforward extension of Rosulek and Roy's technique (Crypto 2021) does not yield improved results. We also present a methodology for crafting new models and for exploring further extensions of both the new and the existing models.

Our new models set the course for future designs. We introduce three innovative garbling schemes based on a common principle called ``majority voting.'' The third construction performs on par with the state-of-the-art.

Sponge hashing is a novel class of cryptographic hash algorithms which underlies the current international hash function standard SHA-3. In a nutshell, a sponge function takes as input a bit-stream of any length and processes it via a simple iterative procedure: it repeatedly feeds each block of the input into a so-called block function, and then produces a short digest which consists of a subset of the final output bits. While much is known about the post-quantum security of the sponge construction in the case when the block function is modeled as a random function or permutation, the case of invertible permutations, which more accurately models the construction underlying SHA-3, has so far remained a fundamental open problem.

In this work, we make new progress towards overcoming this barrier and show several results. First, we prove the ``double-sided zero-search'' conjecture proposed by Unruh (eprint' 2021) and show that finding zero-pairs in a random $2n$-bit permutation requires at least $\Omega(2^{n/2})$ many queries---and this is tight due to Grover's algorithm. At the core of our proof lies a novel ``symmetrization argument'' which uses insights from the theory of Young subgroups. Second, we consider more general variants of the double-sided search problem and show similar query lower bounds for them. As an application, we prove the quantum one-wayness of the single-round sponge with invertible permutations in the quantum random oracle model.

In a particular case, we consider the extended Maiorana-McFarland’s class to obtain balanced bent functions restricted to vectors with even Hamming weight, an equal number of pre-images for each element in the range. Additionally, we demonstrate that all bent functions are balanced when we restrict to vectors of even Hamming weight or vectors with odd Hamming weight. Given the necessary tools, we provide a simple algorithm to obtain new bent functions using Maiorana-McFarland.

A ranking function for permutations maps every permutation of length $n$ to a unique integer between $0$ and $n!-1$. For permutations of size that are of interest in cryptographic applications, evaluating such a function requires multiple-precision arithmetic. This work introduces a quasi-optimal ranking technique that allows us to rank a permutation efficiently without needing a multiple-precision arithmetic library. We present experiments that show the computational advantage of our method compared to the standard lexicographic optimal permutation ranking. As an application of our result, we show how this technique improves the signature sizes and the efficiency of PERK digital signature scheme.

The Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm (FSwA) uses rejection sampling to remove a secret’s dependency on a given source distribution. Recent results revealed that unlike the uniform distribution in the hypercube, both the continuous Gaussian and the uniform distribution within the hypersphere minimise the rejection rate and the size of the proof of knowledge. However, in practice both these distributions suffer from the complexity of their sampler. So far, those three distributions are the only available alternatives, but none of them offer the best of all worlds: competitive proof of knowledge size and rejection rate with a simple sampler. We introduce a new generic framework for FSwA using polytope based rejection sampling to enable a wider variety of constructions. As a matter of fact, this framework is the first to generalise these results to integral distributions. To complement the lack of alternatives, we also propose a new polytope construction, whose uniform sampler approaches in simplicity that of the hypercube. At the same time, it provides competitive proof of knowledge size compared to that obtained from the Gaussian distribution. Concurrently, we share some experimental improvements of our construction to further reduce the proof size. Finally, we propose a signature based on the FSwA paradigm using both our framework and construction. We prove it to be competitive with Haetae in signature size and with Dilithium on sampler simplicity.

Quantum computers at some future date might be able to factor large numbers, and this poses a threat to some public key and key exchange systems in use today. This overview of recent progress in devising quantum algorithms and building quantum computing devices is meant to help technologists understand the difficult problems that quantum engineers are working on, where advances have been made, and how those things affect estimates of if and when large scale quantum computation might happen.

Imagine being able to deploy a small, battery-powered device nearly anywhere on earth that humans frequent and having it be able to send data to the cloud without needing to provision a network—without buying a physical gateway, setting up WiFi credentials, or acquiring a cellular SIM. Such a capability would address one of the greatest bottlenecks to deploying the long-tail of small, embedded, and power-constrained IoT devices in nearly any setting. Unfortunately, decoupling the device deployment from the network configuration needed to transmit, or backhaul, sensor data to the cloud remains a tricky challenge, but the success of Tile and AirTag offers hope. They have shown that mobile phones can crowd-source worldwide local network coverage to find lost items, yet expanding these systems to enable general-purpose backhaul raises privacy concerns for network participants. In this work, we present Nebula, a privacy-focused architecture for global, intermittent, and low-rate data backhaul to enable nearly any thing to eventually connect to the cloud while (i) preserving the privacy of the mobile network participants from the platform provider by decentralizing data flow through the system, (ii) incentivizing participation through micropayments, and (iii) preventing system abuse.

Before the emergence of inscriptions and ordinal protocols, Bitcoin was limited in its applications due to the Turing-incompleteness of its script language. Fortunately, with recent advances in techniques, Turing-complete off-chain execution layers are established via Bitcoin indexers. Yet, existing indexers have their data integrity and availability strongly dependent on the honesty of indexers. This violated the trustlessness and decentralization principle of the cryptocurrency literature. To provide an alternative Bitcoin indexer scheme and overcome the above limitations, we have reallocated the roles of committee indexers (for heavy computations), normal indexers, and light indexers (the client end), and established a fully user-verified execution layer based on our modular indexer protocol. For the trustless relay of data, we have adopted Verkle trees to store and prove the states. Thus, data integrity and availability are guaranteed even in the case of a majority of malicious committee indexers. Ideally, our modular indexer would safely bridge the gap between the Bitcoin layer-1 and applications from BRC-20, and contribute to the further prosperity of the Bitcoin ecosystem.

It is known that the sponge construction is tightly indifferentiable from a random oracle up to around $2^{c/2}$ queries, where $c$ is the capacity. In particular, it cannot provide generic security better than half of the underlying permutation size. In this paper, we aim to achieve hash function security beating this barrier. We present a hashing mode based on two $b$-bit permutations named the double sponge. The double sponge can be seen as the sponge embedded within the double block length hashing paradigm, making two permutation calls in parallel interleaved with an efficient mixing function. Similarly to the sponge, the permutation size is split as $b = r+c$, and the underlying compression function absorbs $r$ bits at a time. We prove that the double sponge is indifferentiable from a random oracle up to around $2^{2c/3}$ queries. This means that the double sponge achieves security beyond the birthday bound in the capacity. In addition, if $c>3b/4$, the double sponge beats the birthday bound in the primitive size, to our knowledge being the first hashing mode based on a permutation that accomplices this feature.

A compilation of various notes written over the years on some algorithms on abelian varieties.

Suppose Alice uses a $t$-out-of-$n$ secret sharing to store her secret key on $n$ servers. Her secret key is protected as long as $t$ of them do not collude. However, what if a less-than-$t$ subset of the servers decides to offer the shares they have for sale? In this case, Alice should be able to hold them accountable, or else nothing prevents them from selling her shares. With this motivation in mind, Goyal, Song, and Srinivasan (CRYPTO 21) introduced the concept of {\em traceable secret sharing}. In such schemes, it is possible to provably trace the leaked secret shares back to the servers who leaked them. Goyal et al.~presented the first construction of a traceable secret sharing scheme. However, secret shares in their construction are quadratic in the secret size, and their tracing algorithm is quite involved as it relies on Goldreich-Levin decoding.

In this work, we put forth new definitions and practical constructions for traceable secret sharing. In our model, some $f < t$ servers output a reconstruction box~$R$ that may arbitrarily depend on their shares. Given additional $t-f$ shares, $R$ reconstructs and outputs the secret. The task is to trace $R$ back to the corrupted servers given black-box access to $R$. Unlike Goyal et al., we do not assume that the tracing algorithm has any information on how the corrupted servers constructed~$R$ from the shares in their possession.

We then present two very efficient constructions of traceable secret sharing based on two classic secret sharing schemes. In both of our schemes, shares are only twice as large as the secret, improving over the quadratic overhead of Goyal et al. Our first scheme is obtained by presenting a new practical tracing algorithm for the widely-used Shamir secret sharing scheme. Our second construction is based on an extension of Blakley's secret sharing scheme. Tracing in this scheme is optimally efficient, and requires just one successful query to $R$. We believe that our constructions are an important step towards bringing traceable secret-sharing schemes to practice. This work also raises several interesting open problems that we describe in the paper.

The DECT Standard Cipher (DSC) is a proprietary stream cipher used for encryption in the Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT), which is a standard for short range cordless communication and widely deployed worldwide both in residential and enterprise environments. New weaknesses of the DSC stream cipher which are not discovered in previous works are explored and analyzed in this paper. Based on these weaknesses, new practical key recovery attacks and distinguishing attack on DSC with lower time cost are proposed. The first cryptanalytic result show that DSC can be broken in about 13.12 seconds in the known IV setting, when an offline phase that takes about 58.33 minutes is completed. After then, a distinguishing attack on DSC in the related key chosen IV setting is given, which has a time complexity of only 2 encryptions and a success probability of almost 1. Finally, based on the slide property, a key recovery attack on DSC with practical complexities is proposed. The experimental result shows that DSC can be broken on a common PC within about 44.97 seconds in the multiple related key setting. The attacks on DSC proposed in this paper clearly show that a well-designed initialization is absolutely necessary to design a secure stream cipher.

Byzantine Agreement (BA) enables $n$ processes to reach consensus on a common valid $L_o$-bit value, even in the presence of up to $tn/3$. Different instantiations of ADA-DARE achieve near-optimal adaptive bit complexity of $O(nL_o + n(f + 1) \kappa)$ for both strong multi-valued validated BA (SMVBA) and interactive consistency (IC). By definition, for IC, $L_o = nL_{in}$, with $L_{in}$ representing the size of an input value. These results achieve optimal $O(n(L_o+f))$ word complexity and significantly improve the previous best results by up to a linear factor, depending on $L_o$ and $f$.

Multiparty private set intersection (mPSI) protocol is capable of finding the intersection of multiple sets securely without revealing any other information. However, its limitation lies in processing only those elements present in every participant's set, which proves inadequate in scenarios where certain elements are common to several, but not all, sets. In this paper, we introduce an innovative variant of the mPSI protocol named unbalanced quorum PSI to fill in the gaps of the mPSI protocol. Unlike the previous quorum-PSI proposals which detect elements present in at least $k$ out of $n$ equal sets, our protocol is particularly tailored for unbalanced cases where the size of the receiver's set is much smaller than the size of the senders' sets. Our work achieves logarithmic communication complexity in the semi-honest setting, significantly surpassing previous work in efficiency. The benchmarks show that it takes 22.7 seconds in WAN and 14.7 seconds in LAN for online computation, and only 87.8 MB of total communication to intersect 5535 elements across 15 sets, each containing $2^{24}$ elements. Compared to prior work, this is roughly an 87$\times$ reduction in communication and a 31$\times$ reduction in online time. Our protocols can be easily extended to the larger set with $2^{28}$ elements which is nearly impractical for prior work.

We introduce a toolkit for transforming lattice-based hash-and-sign signature schemes into masking-friendly signatures secure in the t-probing model. Until now, efficiently masking lattice-based hash-and-sign schemes has been an open problem, with unsuccessful attempts such as Mitaka. A first breakthrough was made in 2023 with the NIST PQC submission Raccoon, although it was not formally proven. Our main conceptual contribution is to realize that the same principles underlying Raccoon are very generic, and to find a systematic way to apply them within the hash-and-sign paradigm. Our main technical contribution is to formalize, prove, instantiate and implement a hash-and-sign scheme based on these techniques. Our toolkit includes noise flooding to mitigate statistical leaks, and an extended Strong Non-Interfering probing security (SNIu) property to handle masked gadgets with unshared inputs.

We showcase the efficiency of our techniques in a signature scheme, Plover, based on (hint) Ring-LWE. It is the first lattice-based masked hash-and-sign scheme with quasi-linear complexity O(d log d) in the number of shares d. Our performances are competitive with the state-of-the-art masking-friendly signature, the Fiat-Shamir scheme Raccoon.

Event date: 9 September to 13 September 2024
Submission deadline: 15 March 2024

Event date: 17 September to 19 September 2024
Submission deadline: 16 April 2024
Notification: 20 June 2024

Bosch Research is developing an open source cloud platform (https://carbynestack.io) for computing on encrypted data using Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC). Potential use cases include, but are not limited to, Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning and Privacy-Preserving Data Analytics. For such large computations on big data, active secure MPC becomes quite expensive. Bosch Research is therefore trying to reduce the computational and communication costs of MPC by optimizing the underlying cryptographic primitives and protocols.

Thus, we are looking for a highly motivated PhD candidate with a strong background in applied cryptography and preferably also MPC.
The candidates should meet the following requirements:

• Education: Hold an M.Sc. degree (or equivalent) with excellent grades in IT security or computer science.
• Experience and Knowledge: Strong background in (applied) cryptography with a particular focus on cryptographic protocols/MPC, including security models and basic security proof techniques. Good software development/programming skills.
• Personality and Working Practice: Self-motivated and enthusiastic, independent, reliable, creative, and able to work in an international team with diverse background.
• Language: Fluent English language skills

If the above requirements apply to you, you are welcome to read on. The successful candidate will:

• become a part of the team and advance research on MPC,
• develop novel approaches to improve the practical efficiency of actively secure MPC protocols,
• design efficient MPC protocols for diverse use-cases, and
• publish and present your results in top-tier journals and at conferences.

The position is based at the Bosch Research Campus in Renningen, Germany, fully funded for three years, no teaching duties, with 30 days annual leave, and the usual benefits.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Please submit your application, including your CV, transcripts of records from your Master studies, and a cover letter including your research background and research interest, via: https://smrtr.io/hmG3C

More information: https://smrtr.io/hmG3C

The Young Investigator Group “COSYS - Control Systems and Cyber Security Lab” at the Chair of IT Security at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg has an open PhD/Postdoc position in the following areas:

• Privacy-Enhancing Technologies in Cyber-Physical Systems.
• AI-based Network Attack Detection and Simulation.
• AI-enabled Penetration Testing.

The available position is funded as 100% TV-L E13 tariff in Germany and limited until 31.07.2026, with possibility for extension. Candidates must hold a Master’s degree (PhD degree for Postdocs) or equivalent in Computer Science or related disciplines, or be close to completing it. If you are interested, please send your CV, transcript of records from your Master studies, and an electronic version of your Master's thesis (if possible), as a single pdf file. Applications will be reviewed until the position is filled.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Ivan Pryvalov (ivan.pryvalov@b-tu.de)

The successful candidate will contribute to the formal security specification and design of cryptographic protocols in the Open Finance area. In Open Finance we envision multiple entities, each holding private data, that want to perform joint computation over this data to offer to customers the best possible financial products. The main goal of the project is to investigate what are the security requirements for Open Finance, and then provide a formal security specification (e.g., in the Universal Composable framework) of such a system. The successful candidate will then work on designing a protocol that matches this security definition, and in the final stage of the project, will implement part of the system, focusing on a specific use case. The candidate will be supported by members of the Business School to successfully complete the first phase of the project related to understanding the basic security requirements of an Open Finance system. The majority of the project will be related to the formal design of the system that will be supported by members of the School of Informatics. The project is funded by Input-Output Global. Candidates must have a Ph.D. (or nearing completion) in cryptography or related fields. Evidence of strong research experience as demonstrated through publications at top-tier conferences or high-impact journals is essential. We are looking for a highly motivated candidate with strong initiative and commitment to excellence, and an ability to conduct world-class research. The successful candidate will have the opportunity to work remotely if they require that (as long as they are in the UK). For more info, we refer to the application page. Application deadline 12/03/2024, 23:59GMT

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Michele Ciampi michele.ciampi@ed.ac.uk

More information: https://elxw.fa.em3.oraclecloud.com/hcmUI/CandidateExperience/en/sites/CX_1001/job/9810