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22 April 2024
Jie Xie, Yuncong Hu, Yu Yu
Hadamard product is a point-wise product for two vectors. This paper presents a new scheme to prove Hadamard-product relation as a sub-protocol for SNARKs based on univariate polynomials. Prover uses linear cryptographic operations to generate the proof containing logarithmic field elements. The verification takes logarithmic cryptographic operations with constant numbers of pairings in bilinear group. The construction of the scheme is based on the Lagrange-based KZG commitments (Kate, Zaverucha, and Goldberg
at Asiacrypt 2010) and the folding technique. We construct an inner-product protocol from folding technique on univariate polynomials in Lagrange form, and by carefully choosing the random polynomials suitable for folding technique, we construct a Hadamard-product protocol from the inner-product protocol, giving an alternative to prove linear algebra relations in linear time, and the protocol has a better concrete proof size than previous works.
Gurgen Arakelov, Nikita Kaskov, Daria Pianykh, Yuriy Polyakov
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a powerful Privacy-Enhancing Technology (PET) that enables computations on encrypted data without having access to the secret key. While FHE holds immense potential for enhancing data privacy and security, creating its practical applications is associated with many difficulties. A significant barrier is the absence of easy-to-use, standardized components that developers can utilize as foundational building blocks. Addressing this gap requires constructing a comprehensive library of FHE components, a complex endeavor due to multiple inherent problems. We propose a competition-based approach for building such a library. More concretely, we present FHERMA, a new challenge platform that introduces black-box and white-box challenges, and fully automated evaluation of submitted FHE solutions. The initial challenges on the FHERMA platform are motivated by practical problems in machine learning and blockchain. The winning solutions get integrated into an open-source library of FHE components, which is available to all members of the PETs community under the Apache 2.0 license.
Ward Beullens, Pierre Briaud, Morten Øygarden
Restricted syndrome decoding problems (R-SDP and R-SDP($G$)) provide an interesting basis for post-quantum cryptography. Indeed, they feature in CROSS, a submission in the ongoing process for standardizing post-quantum signatures.
This work improves our understanding of the security of both problems. Firstly, we propose and implement a novel collision attack on R-SDP($G$) that provides the best attack under realistic restrictions on memory. Secondly, we derive precise complexity estimates for algebraic attacks on R-SDP that are shown to be accurate by our experiments. We note that neither of these improvements threatens the updated parameters of CROSS.
This work improves our understanding of the security of both problems. Firstly, we propose and implement a novel collision attack on R-SDP($G$) that provides the best attack under realistic restrictions on memory. Secondly, we derive precise complexity estimates for algebraic attacks on R-SDP that are shown to be accurate by our experiments. We note that neither of these improvements threatens the updated parameters of CROSS.
Min Xie, Peichen Ju, Yanqi Zhao, Zoe L. Jiang, Junbin Fang, Yong Yu, Xuan Wang
Delegatable Anonymous Credentials (DAC) are an enhanced Anonymous Credentials (AC) system that allows credential owners to use credentials anonymously, as well as anonymously delegate them to other users. In this work, we introduce a new concept called Delegatable Attribute-based Anonymous Credentials with Chainable Revocation (DAAC-CR), which extends the functionality of DAC by allowing 1) fine-grained attribute delegation, 2) issuers to restrict the delegation capabilities of the delegated users at a fine-grained level, including the depth of delegation and the sets of delegable attributes, and 3) chainable revocation, meaning if a credential within the delegation chain is revoked, all subsequent credentials derived from it are also invalid.
We provide a practical DAAC-CR instance based on a novel primitive that we identify as structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes on vector commitments (SPSEQ-VC). This primitive may be of independent interest, and we detail an efficient construction. Compared to traditional DAC systems that rely on non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, the credential size in our DAAC-CR instance is constant, independent of the length of delegation chain and the number of attributes. We formally prove the security of our scheme in the generic group model and demonstrate its practicality through performance benchmarks.
We provide a practical DAAC-CR instance based on a novel primitive that we identify as structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes on vector commitments (SPSEQ-VC). This primitive may be of independent interest, and we detail an efficient construction. Compared to traditional DAC systems that rely on non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, the credential size in our DAAC-CR instance is constant, independent of the length of delegation chain and the number of attributes. We formally prove the security of our scheme in the generic group model and demonstrate its practicality through performance benchmarks.
Benoît Cogliati, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Louis Goubin, Brice Minaud
Hash-and-Sign with Retry is a popular technique to design efficient signature schemes from code-based or multivariate assumptions. Contrary to Hash-and-Sign signatures based on preimage-sampleable functions as defined by Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2008), trapdoor functions in code-based and multivariate schemes are not surjective. Therefore, the standard approach uses random trials. Kosuge and Xagawa (PKC 2024) coined it the Hash-and-Sign with Retry paradigm.
As many attacks have appeared on code-based and multivariate schemes, we think it is important for the ongoing NIST competition to look at the security proofs of these schemes. The original proof of Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari (PQCrypto 2011) was flawed, then corrected by Chatterjee, Das and Pandit (INDOCRYPT 2022). The fix is still not sufficient, as it only works for very large finite fields. A new proof in the Quantum ROM model was proposed by Kosuge and Xagawa (PKC 2024), but it is rather loose, even when restricted to the classical setting.
In this paper, we introduce several tools that yield tighter security bounds for Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures in the classical setting. These include the Hellinger distance, stochastic dominance arguments, and a new combinatorial tool to transform a proof in the non-adaptative setting to the adaptative setting. Ultimately, we obtain a sharp bound for the security of Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures, applicable to various code-based and multivariate schemes. Focusing on NIST candidates, we apply these results to the MAYO, PROV, and modified UOV signature schemes. In most cases, our bounds are tight enough to apply with the real parameters of those schemes; in some cases, smaller parameters would suffice.
As many attacks have appeared on code-based and multivariate schemes, we think it is important for the ongoing NIST competition to look at the security proofs of these schemes. The original proof of Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari (PQCrypto 2011) was flawed, then corrected by Chatterjee, Das and Pandit (INDOCRYPT 2022). The fix is still not sufficient, as it only works for very large finite fields. A new proof in the Quantum ROM model was proposed by Kosuge and Xagawa (PKC 2024), but it is rather loose, even when restricted to the classical setting.
In this paper, we introduce several tools that yield tighter security bounds for Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures in the classical setting. These include the Hellinger distance, stochastic dominance arguments, and a new combinatorial tool to transform a proof in the non-adaptative setting to the adaptative setting. Ultimately, we obtain a sharp bound for the security of Hash-and-Sign with Retry signatures, applicable to various code-based and multivariate schemes. Focusing on NIST candidates, we apply these results to the MAYO, PROV, and modified UOV signature schemes. In most cases, our bounds are tight enough to apply with the real parameters of those schemes; in some cases, smaller parameters would suffice.
Zhengjun Cao, Lihua Liu
The coexistence of RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) had continued over forty years. It is well-known that ECC has the advantage of shorter key than RSA, which often leads a newcomer to assume that ECC runs faster. In this report, we generate the Mathematica codes for RSA-2048 and ECC-256, which visually show that RSA-2048 runs three times faster than ECC-256. It is also estimated that RSA-2048 runs 48,000 times faster than Weil pairing with 2 embedding degree and a fixed point.
Truman Welling, Onur Gunlu, Aylin Yener
This paper considers an information theoretic model of secure integrated sensing and communication, represented as a wiretap channel with action dependent states. This model allows one to secure a part of the transmitted message against a sensed target that eavesdrops the communication, while allowing transmitter actions to change the channel statistics. An exact secrecy-distortion region is given for a physically-degraded channel. Moreover, a finite-length achievability region is established for the model using an output statistics of random binning method, giving an achievable bound for low-latency applications.
Sam Gunn, Yael Tauman Kalai, Anand Natarajan, Agi Villanyi
We define the notion of a classical commitment scheme to quantum states, which allows a quantum prover to compute a classical commitment to a quantum state, and later open each qubit of the state in either the standard or the Hadamard basis. Our notion is a strengthening of the measurement protocol from Mahadev (STOC 2018). We construct such a commitment scheme from the post-quantum Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, and more generally from any noisy trapdoor claw-free function family that has the distributional strong adaptive hardcore bit property (a property that we define in this work).
Our scheme is succinct in the sense that the running time of the verifier in the commitment phase depends only on the security parameter (independent of the size of the committed state), and its running time in the opening phase grows only with the number of qubits that are being opened (and the security parameter). As a corollary we obtain a classical succinct argument system for QMA under the post-quantum LWE assumption. Previously, this was only known assuming post-quantum secure indistinguishability obfuscation. As an additional corollary we obtain a generic way of converting any X/Z quantum PCP into a succinct argument system under the quantum hardness of LWE.
Léo Perrin
We have investigated both the padding scheme and the applicability of algebraic attacks to both XHash8 and XHash12. The only vulnerability of the padding scheme we can find is plausibly applicable only in the multi-rate setting---for which the authors make no claim---and is safe otherwise.
For algebraic attack relying on the computation and exploitation of a Gröbner basis, our survey of the literature suggests to base a security argument on the complexity of the variable elimination step rather than that of the computation of the Gröbner basis itself. Indeed, it turns out that the latter complexity is hard to estimate---and is sometimes litteraly non-existent. Focusing on the elimination step, we propose a generalization of the "FreeLunch" approach which, under a reasonable conjecture about the behaviour of the degree of polynomial ideals of dimension 0, is sufficient for us to argue that both XHash8 and XHash12 are safe against such attacks.
We implemented a simplified version of the generation (and resolution) of the corresponding set of equations in SAGE, which allowed us to validate our conjecture at least experimentally, and in fact to show that the lower bound it provides on the ideal degree is not tight---meaning we are a priori understimating the security of these permutations against the algebraic attacks we consider.
At this stage, if used as specified, these hash functions seem safe from Gröbner bases-based algebraic attacks.
For algebraic attack relying on the computation and exploitation of a Gröbner basis, our survey of the literature suggests to base a security argument on the complexity of the variable elimination step rather than that of the computation of the Gröbner basis itself. Indeed, it turns out that the latter complexity is hard to estimate---and is sometimes litteraly non-existent. Focusing on the elimination step, we propose a generalization of the "FreeLunch" approach which, under a reasonable conjecture about the behaviour of the degree of polynomial ideals of dimension 0, is sufficient for us to argue that both XHash8 and XHash12 are safe against such attacks.
We implemented a simplified version of the generation (and resolution) of the corresponding set of equations in SAGE, which allowed us to validate our conjecture at least experimentally, and in fact to show that the lower bound it provides on the ideal degree is not tight---meaning we are a priori understimating the security of these permutations against the algebraic attacks we consider.
At this stage, if used as specified, these hash functions seem safe from Gröbner bases-based algebraic attacks.
Xiaoyang Dong, Boxin Zhao, Lingyue Qin, Qingliang Hou, Shun Zhang, Xiaoyun Wang
This paper proposes general meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack frameworks for preimage and collision attacks on hash functions based on (generalized) sponge construction.
As the first contribution, our MitM preimage attack framework covers a wide range of sponge-based hash functions, especially those with lower claimed security level for preimage compared to their output size. Those hash functions have been very widely standardized (e.g., Ascon-Hash, PHOTON, etc.), but are rarely studied against preimage attacks. Even the recent MitM attack framework on sponge construction by Qin et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023) cannot attack those hash functions. As the second contribution, our MitM collision attack framework shows a different tool for the collision cryptanalysis on sponge construction, while previous collision attacks on sponge construction are mainly based on differential attacks.
Most of the results in this paper are the first third-party cryptanalysis results. If cryptanalysis previously existed, our new results significantly improve the previous results, such as improving the previous 2-round collision attack on Ascon-Hash to the current 4 rounds, improving the previous 3.5-round quantum preimage attack on SPHINCS$^+$-Haraka to our 4-round classical preimage attack, etc.
Divesh Aggarwal, Leong Jin Ming, Alexandra Veliche
In this work, we study the worst-case to average-case hardness of the Learning with Errors problem (LWE) under an alternative measure of hardness $−$ the maximum success probability achievable by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm. Previous works by Regev (STOC 2005), Peikert (STOC 2009), and Brakerski, Peikert, Langlois, Regev, Stehle (STOC 2013) give worst-case to average-case reductions from lattice problems, specifically the approximate decision variant of the
Shortest Vector Problem (GapSVP) and the Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) problem, to LWE. These reductions, however, are lossy in the sense that even the strongest assumption on the worst-case hardness of GapSVP or BDD implies only mild hardness of LWE. Our alternative perspective gives a much tighter reduction and strongly relates the hardness of LWE to that of BDD. In particular, we show that under a reasonable assumption about the success probability of solving BDD via a PPT algorithm, we obtain a nearly tight lower bound on the highest possible success probability for solving LWE via a PPT algorithm. Furthermore, we show a tight relationship between the best achievable success probability by any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for decision-LWE to that of search-LWE. Our results not only refine our understanding of the computational complexity of LWE, but also provide a useful framework for analyzing the practical security implications.
Amos Beimel, Oriol Farràs, Oded Nir
In a secret-sharing scheme, a secret is shared among $n$ parties such that the secret can be recovered by authorized coalitions, while it should be kept hidden from unauthorized coalitions. In this work we study secret-sharing for $k$-slice access structures, in which coalitions of size $k$ are either authorized or not, larger coalitions are authorized and smaller are unauthorized. Known schemes for these access structures had smaller shares for small $k$'s than for large ones; hence our focus is on "high" $(n-k)$-slices where $k$ is small.
Our work is inspired by several motivations: 1) Obtaining efficient schemes (with perfect or computational security) for natural families of access structures; 2) Making progress in the search for better schemes for general access structures, which are often based on schemes for slice access structures; 3) Proving or disproving the conjecture by Csirmaz (J. Math. Cryptol., 2020) that an access structures and its dual can be realized by secret-sharing schemes with the same share size.
The main results of this work are: - Perfect schemes for high slices. We present a scheme for $(n-k)$-slices with information-theoretic security and share size $kn\cdot 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{k \log n})}$. Using a different scheme with slightly larger shares, we prove that the ratio between the optimal share size of $k$-slices and that of their dual $(n-k)$-slices is bounded by $n$. - Computational schemes for high slices. We present a scheme for $(n-k)$-slices with computational security and share size $O(k^2 \lambda \log n)$ based on the existence of one-way functions. Our scheme makes use of a non-standard view point on Shamir secret-sharing that allows to share many secrets with different thresholds with low cost. - Multislice access structures. $(a:b)$-multislices are access structures that behave similarly to slices, but are unconstrained on coalitions in a wider range of cardinalities between $a$ and $b$. We use our new schemes for high slices to realize multislices with the same share sizes that their duals have today. This solves an open question raised by Applebaum and Nir (Crypto, 2021), and allows to realize hypergraph access structures that are chosen uniformly at random under a natural set of distributions with share size $2^{0.491n+o(n)}$ compared to the previous result of $2^{0.5n+o(n)}$.
Our work is inspired by several motivations: 1) Obtaining efficient schemes (with perfect or computational security) for natural families of access structures; 2) Making progress in the search for better schemes for general access structures, which are often based on schemes for slice access structures; 3) Proving or disproving the conjecture by Csirmaz (J. Math. Cryptol., 2020) that an access structures and its dual can be realized by secret-sharing schemes with the same share size.
The main results of this work are: - Perfect schemes for high slices. We present a scheme for $(n-k)$-slices with information-theoretic security and share size $kn\cdot 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{k \log n})}$. Using a different scheme with slightly larger shares, we prove that the ratio between the optimal share size of $k$-slices and that of their dual $(n-k)$-slices is bounded by $n$. - Computational schemes for high slices. We present a scheme for $(n-k)$-slices with computational security and share size $O(k^2 \lambda \log n)$ based on the existence of one-way functions. Our scheme makes use of a non-standard view point on Shamir secret-sharing that allows to share many secrets with different thresholds with low cost. - Multislice access structures. $(a:b)$-multislices are access structures that behave similarly to slices, but are unconstrained on coalitions in a wider range of cardinalities between $a$ and $b$. We use our new schemes for high slices to realize multislices with the same share sizes that their duals have today. This solves an open question raised by Applebaum and Nir (Crypto, 2021), and allows to realize hypergraph access structures that are chosen uniformly at random under a natural set of distributions with share size $2^{0.491n+o(n)}$ compared to the previous result of $2^{0.5n+o(n)}$.
Henry Bambury, Phong Q. Nguyen
Lattice-based cryptography typically uses lattices with special properties
to improve efficiency. We show how blockwise reduction can exploit lattices with special geometric properties, effectively reducing the required blocksize to solve the shortest vector problem to half of the lattice's rank, and in the case of the hypercubic lattice $\mathbb{Z}^n$, further relaxing the approximation factor of blocks to $\sqrt{2}$.
We study both provable algorithms and the heuristic well-known primal attack, in the case where the lattice has a first minimum that is almost as short as that of the hypercubic lattice $\mathbb{Z}^n$.
Remarkably, these near-hypercubic lattices cover Falcon and most concrete instances of the NTRU cryptosystem:
this is the first provable result showing that breaking NTRU lattices can be reduced to finding shortest lattice vectors in halved dimension, thereby providing a positive response to a conjecture of Gama, Howgrave-Graham and Nguyen at Eurocrypt 2006.
Mustafa Khairallah
Tweakable HCTR is an tweakable enciphering proposed by Dutta and Nandi in Indocrypt 2018. It provides beyond birthday bound security when each tweak value is not used too frequently. More importantly for this note, its security bound degrades linearly with the maximum input length. We show in this note that this is not true by showing a single query distinguisher with advantage $O(l^2/2^n)$ where $l$ is the length of that query. The distinguisher does not break the beyond-birthday-bound claim but gives higher advantage than the claimed bound.
18 April 2024
Shany Ben-David
A probabilistically checkable argument (PCA) is a computational relaxation of PCPs, where soundness is guaranteed to hold only for false proofs generated by a computationally bounded adversary. The advantage of PCAs is that they are able to overcome the limitations of PCPs. A succinct PCA has a proof length that is polynomial in the witness length (and is independent of the non-deterministic verification time), which is impossible for PCPs, under standard complexity assumptions. Bronfman and Rothblum (ITCS 2022) constructed succinct PCAs for NC that are publicly-verifiable and have constant query complexity under the sub-exponential hardness of LWE.
We construct a publicly-verifiable succinct PCA with constant query complexity for all NP in the adaptive security setting. Our PCA scheme offers several improvements compared to the Bronfman and Rothblum construction: (1) it applies to all problems in NP, (2) it achieves adaptive security, and (3) it can be realized under any of the following assumptions: the polynomial hardness of LWE; $O(1)$-LIN on bilinear maps; or sub-exponential DDH.
Moreover, our PCA scheme has a succinct prover, which means that for any NP relation that can be verified in time $T$ and space $S$, the proof can be generated in time $O_{\lambda,m}(T\cdot\mathrm{polylog}(T))$ and space $O_{\lambda,m}(S\cdot\mathrm{polylog}(T))$. Here, ${O}_{\lambda,m}$ accounts for polynomial factors in the security parameter and in the size of the witness. En route, we construct a new complexity-preserving RAM delegation scheme that is used in our PCA construction and may be of independent interest.
We construct a publicly-verifiable succinct PCA with constant query complexity for all NP in the adaptive security setting. Our PCA scheme offers several improvements compared to the Bronfman and Rothblum construction: (1) it applies to all problems in NP, (2) it achieves adaptive security, and (3) it can be realized under any of the following assumptions: the polynomial hardness of LWE; $O(1)$-LIN on bilinear maps; or sub-exponential DDH.
Moreover, our PCA scheme has a succinct prover, which means that for any NP relation that can be verified in time $T$ and space $S$, the proof can be generated in time $O_{\lambda,m}(T\cdot\mathrm{polylog}(T))$ and space $O_{\lambda,m}(S\cdot\mathrm{polylog}(T))$. Here, ${O}_{\lambda,m}$ accounts for polynomial factors in the security parameter and in the size of the witness. En route, we construct a new complexity-preserving RAM delegation scheme that is used in our PCA construction and may be of independent interest.
Ganyuan Cao
We introduce a novel notion, denoted as IND-rCCA, to formalize the security and robustness of authenticated encryption. This notion is an augmentation of common notions defined for AEAD schemes by considering indistinguishability of potential leakage due to decryption failure in the presence of multiple checks for errors. We further extend this notion to IND-sf-rCCA to formalize the stateful security involving out-of-order ciphertext. Additionally, we present a modification to the Encode-then-Encrypt-then-MAC (EEM) paradigm to boost its robustness. We then analyze the security of the modification and show that it satisfies IND-rCCA security.
Gewu BU, Serge Fdida, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Bilel Zaghdoudi
This paper presents a novel blockchain-based decentralized identity system (DID), tailored for enhanced digital identity management in Internet of Things (IoT) and device-to-device (D2D) networks. The proposed system features a hierarchical structure that effectively merges a distributed ledger with a mobile D2D network, ensuring robust security while streamlining communication. Central to this design are the gateway nodes, which serve as intermediaries, facilitating DID registration and device authentication through smart contracts and distributed storage systems. A thorough security analysis underscores the system’s resilience to common cyber threats and adherence to critical principles like finality and liveness.
Djimnaibeye Sidoine, Guy Mobouale Wamba, Abiodoun Clement Hounkpevi, Tieudjo Daniel, Djiby Sow
Cumplido, María et al. have recently shown that the Wang-Hu digital signature is not secure and has presented a potential attack on the root extraction problem. The effectiveness of generic attacks on solving this problem for braids is still uncertain and it is unknown if it is possible to create braids that require exponential time to solve these problems. In 2023, Lin and al. has proposed a post-quantum signature scheme similar to the Wang-Hu scheme that is proven to be able to withstand attacks from quantum computers. However, evidence is presented here for the existence of an algorithm based on mean-set attacks that can recover the private key in both schemes without solving the root extraction problem. In the post-quantum signature version, we prove that the attacker can forge a signature passing the verification without recovering the private key
Morten Øygarden, Patrick Felke, Håvard Raddum
A common strategy for constructing multivariate encryption schemes is to use a central map that is easy to invert over an extension field, along with a small number of modifications to thwart potential attacks. In this work we study the effectiveness of these modifications, by deriving estimates for the number of degree fall polynomials. After developing the necessary tools, we focus on encryption schemes using the $C^*$ and Dobbertin central maps, with the internal perturbation (ip), and $Q_+$ modifications. For these constructions we are able to accurately predict the number of degree fall polynomials produced in a Gröbner basis attack, up to and including degree five for the Dob encryption scheme and four for $C^*$. The predictions remain accurate even when fixing variables. Based on this new theory we design a novel attack on Dob, which completely recovers the secret key for the parameters suggested by its designers. Due to the generality of the presented techniques, we also believe that they are of interest to the analysis of other big field schemes.
17 April 2024
Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology
Are you passionate about research? So are we! Come and join us
The Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST) is a Research and Technology Organization (RTO) active in the fields of materials, environment and IT.
Discover our IT for Innovative Services department: https://www.list.lu/en/informatics/
How will you contribute?
Your specific mission includes, but is not limited to, participating into the following activities along the project partners:
• to design and develop DevSecOps solutions and Data security solutions
• to prototype ML-based anti-fuzzing, vulnerability detection, information sharing technologies for cybersecurity, and anomaly detection solutions
• to develop open-source software
• to validate the effectiveness of developed technologies
You are in charge of disseminating and promoting the research activities that will be carried out, whether through publications, prototype development or technical reports.
You’re highly motivated and have proven skills in machine learning & cybersecurity to address the security concerns in software development and data protection. You have already good experience in collaborative cyberthreat intelligence systems that use advanced analytics solutions as can offer significant advantages over the local systems by detecting cyberattacks early and promptly responding to them.
And last, but not least, you’re a great practitioner of cybersecurity techniques such as vulnerability detection, information sharing, fuzzing, anti-fuzzing.
As to join us, you:
• hold a PhD. degree in Computer Science or related disciplines
• have good programming skills (particularly experience on Python and C++)
• have good track record on applied ML for cybersecurity, such as fuzzing and ML-based vulnerability detection and anomaly detection.
• have good track record on data protection for applications such as data spaces and digital twin.
• demonstrate strong interest and experience in fuzzing techniques such as mutation testing, symbolic execution, AFL, etc.
• familiar with ML frameworks, such as Pytorch, Tenso
Closing date for applications:
Contact: jobs@list.lu