International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In 2023, Mfungo et al. presented an image encryption scheme that relies on a series of diffusion techniques and uses a chaotic map to generate three secret keys. Note that two out of three keys are dynamically generated based on the size of the original image, while the remaining key is static. The authors claim that their proposal offers $149$ bits of security. Unfortunately, we found a chosen plaintext attack that requires $2$ oracle queries and has a worse case complexity of $\mathcal O(2^{32})$. If the attacker has access to $1$ encryption oracle query and $1$ decryption oracle query, we can lower the complexity to $\mathcal O(2^{18.58})$. Encrypting an image with Mfungo et al.'s scheme has a worst case complexity of $\mathcal O(2^{33})$. Therefore, both our attacks are faster than encrypting an image. Our attacks are feasible because the dynamic keys remain unchanged for different plaintext images of the same size, and the static key remains the same for all images.

Identity-based threshold signature (IDTS) enables the generation of valid signatures without revealing cryptographic keys in the signing process. While current protocols have achieved much progress in their efficiency, many schemes easily suffer from denial-of-service attacks in which misbehaving parties could keep from generating signatures without being caught. The identifiable abort property is designed to withstand such an attack in some recent IDTS protocols. However, all these schemes require many rounds of interaction for the resulting signature or utilize cryptographic techniques, which have a high complexity. In this study, we put forward a novel IDTS protocol that can achieve identifiable abort and resist arbitrary collusion attacks. Precisely, this ensures that corrupted parties are responsible in case of failure and cannot jointly obtain the input of honest parties. Moreover, we present the ideal IDTS functionality and provide the provable security of the proposed protocol with the global random oracle model. Our scheme has non-interactive signing, compatibility with the offline/online settings, and practical efficiency for the online phase. Finally, we give theoretical analyses and experimental results of our solution, showing that the signing time is less than two milliseconds and that the scheme is suitable for resource-constrained settings.

Recently, Geraud-Stewart and Naccache proposed two trapdoors based on matrix products. In this paper, we answer the call for cryptanalysis. We explore how using the trace and determinant of a matrix can be used to attack their constructions. We fully break their first construction in a polynomial-time attack. We show an information leak in the second construction using characteristic polynomials, and provide an attack using traces that decreases the bit security by about half.

We are looking for motivated, bright, and hard-working student that wish to pursue a PhD in Cryptography. The candidate will work on cryptographic research topics such as:

• zero-knowledge proofs & SNARKs
• polynomial/vector commitments & lookup arguments
• searchable encryption
• encrypted database query evaluation
• TEE-assisted cryptography

Other areas are possible, the specific research topic will be determined based on the common interests of the candidate and the supervisor.

Applicant's profile

• MSc or BSc degree in Computer Science or related field.
• Excellent programming skills.
• Very good understanding of CS fundamentals: algorithm analysis, data structures, etc.
• Good understanding of cryptographic primitives: hashing, encryption, commitments, etc.
• Strong enthusiasm for research.

Ideal candidates have prior knowledge in implementing cryptographic primitives or a relevant project. Solid background in theoretical computer science (complexity analysis, reduction proofs, etc.), or experience in programming for trusted-hardware environments (Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, etc.) is also a big plus.

Work environment

HKUST offers guaranteed funding for the PhD duration with competitive stipends. Our CSE department consistently ranks very high in global Computer Science and Engineering rankings. Our graduates typically produce research output of the highest quality and consistently staff world-class institutions. The lab offers a creative work environment that is ideal for excellent research.

Interested applicants, please send your CV and a short research statement to Prof. Dimitrios Papadopoulos.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: dipapado (at) cse.ust.hk

This PhD studentship offers an exciting opportunity to delve into the rapidly evolving fields of Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence (AI). As AI technologies become increasingly integrated into enterprise systems, the need to secure these systems against sophisticated cyber threats has never been more critical. This research project at the University of Sheffield is focused on addressing these challenges by developing advanced methods to protect AI systems from cyber attacks, ensuring their reliability, integrity, and resilience in real-world environments. As a PhD candidate, you will join the Security of Advanced Systems Research Group, working on cutting-edge research that bridges the gap between AI innovation and cybersecurity. Your work will involve identifying and analyzing vulnerabilities in AI systems, creating robust models capable of withstanding adversarial attacks, and implementing state-of-the-art security measures to safeguard AI infrastructures. Additionally, you will have the opportunity to collaborate with industry leaders, contributing to the development of new cybersecurity standards for AI. This studentship is ideal for individuals passionate about AI and cybersecurity who are eager to contribute to the protection of critical technologies. The position is open to candidates worldwide, offering a unique chance to make a significant impact in a high-demand field. Research Themes Include: Analyzing vulnerabilities in AI systems Developing robust AI models resistant to adversarial attacks Implementing advanced security measures within AI infrastructures Collaborating with industry leaders to set new cybersecurity standards for AI Position Details: Starting Date: Flexible, with preferred start dates in September 2024 or January 2025. Location: Department of Computer Science, University of Sheffield, UK. Duration: 3 years Additional Note: International candidates are encouraged to apply. Please note that supplementary funding may be required to cover the tuition fee differential.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: To apply, please send your CV, a letter of motivation, and academic transcripts to aryan.pasikhani@sheffield.ac.uk. Be sure to include [PhD-CyberAI] in the subject line of your email.

The Institute of Science and Technology Austria (ISTA) invites for faculty applications in all areas of computer science including security, cryptography and privacy, candidates working in systems and more applied topics are especially encouraged to apply.

Interdisciplinary applications bridging between areas are particularly encouraged to apply.

Assistant professors start with independent group leader positions for six years, progressing to tenured positions after a positive evaluation by international peers.

Tenured positions welcome distinguished scientists with proven leadership in research.

At ISTA, we promote a diverse and inclusive working environment and are committed to the principle of equal employment opportunities for all applicants, free of discrimination. We strongly encourage individuals from underrepresented groups to apply.

ISTA is an interdisciplinary research institution that combines basic science research with graduate education in theoretical and experimental research in Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Life Sciences, and Information and System Sciences.

Why ISTA

• Impactful research in a vibrant, international, and interdisciplinary research environment.

• Advanced facilities and comprehensive scientific support.

• Attractive salaries and generous resources.

• Guaranteed annual funding, including support for PhD students and postdocs.

• Graduate school with highly selective admissions.

• Professional development opportunities and employee support services.

• On-campus childcare facilities.

• Inclusive working environment.

• Proximity to Vienna, consistently ranked among the most livable cities worldwide.

The closing date for applications is November 28, 2024.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: For more information on the application process please go to https://www.ista.ac.at/en/jobs/faculty/

More information: https://www.ista.ac.at/en/jobs/faculty/

Event date: 16 December to 17 December 2024
Submission deadline: 15 September 2024
Notification: 30 October 2024

Tsinghua University in China and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore are jointly seeking for candidates to fill several post-doctoral research fellow positions on symmetric-key cryptography with a tentative duration of 2 years. Topics include but are not limited to the following sub-areas:

• tool aided cryptanalysis, such as MILP, CP, STP, and SAT
• machine learning aided cryptanalysis and designs
• privacy-preserving friendly symmetric-key designs
• quantum cryptanalysis
• provable security
• cryptanalysis against SHA-2, SHA-3, and AES
• threshold cryptography

Candidates will have the chance to spend half of the time with Assoc Prof Xiaoyang Dong at Tsinghua University, China, and the other half with Assoc Prof Jian Guo at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Candidates with strong record of publications in IACR conferences (Asiacrypt, Crypto, Eurocrypt, FSE) are encouraged to apply. These positions are available immediately until filled.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Assoc Prof Xiaoyang Dong, xiaoyangdong@tsinghua.edu.cn

The Cryptography Research Group at University College Cork (UCC) is looking for a highly motivated Post-Doctoral or Senior Post-Doctoral Researcher in differential privacy and related privacy preservation techinques. The researchers will be employed on an industry-funded research project sponsored by a major Internet company. The successful candidate will work under the supervision of Dr Paolo Palmieri, Senior Lecturer in Cyber Securit, and Prof. Barry O’Sullivan, Professor of Computer Science, in the School of Computer Science & Information Technology, University College Cork, Ireland.

Candidates should hold a PhD degree in cryptography, cyber security or related areas, with a good track record of publications. Ideally, they will have experience in one or more of the following areas: differential privacy, anonymity, re-identification and/or cryptography-based privacy enhancing technologies. Candidates with a background in other areas of cryptography/privacy/security, but with a strong interest in differential privacy will also be considered. A strong mathematical background is expected, complemented with programming skills. Experience with relevant libraries such as IBM Diffprivlib, Opacus, SecretFlow etc. is an asset.

The position is until December 2025, with a possibility of extension subject to availability of funding. The successful candidates will be appointed at Post-Doctoral or Senior Post-Doctoral level depending on their experience and qualifications. A budget for travel, equipment, publications and other research expenses is available as part of the project.

The Cryptography Research Group is led by Dr Paolo Palmieri and consists of 8 researchers at doctoral and post-doctoral level. The hired researcher will be encouraged to collaborate with other members of the group, and to take a mentoring role with some of the more junior researchers. There will also be ample opportunities to work with the group’s extensive network of international collaborations. The role will be based in Insight - SFI Research Centre for Data Analytics, as part of the SFI Empower Spoke.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Informal inquiries can be made in confidence to Dr. Paolo Palmieri, at: p.palmieri@cs.ucc.ie

Applications should be submitted through the University portal at https://ore.ucc.ie/ (search for reference number: 078931). E-mail applications cannot be considered.

More information: https://security.ucc.ie/vacancies.html

It is well known that the best small private exponent attack against RSA is that when the private exponent $d < N^{0.292}$, one can factor the RSA modulus $N = pq$. However, the bound $N^{0.292}$ is very difficult to achieve directly since we need to deal with some lattice with very high dimension, which seems infeasible by now. Recently, Li et al. proposed a practical attack that can solve cases when $d$ approaches $N^{0.292}$ within a month for $1024$ bit $N$. In this paper, we propose an improved practical small private exponent attack by enumerating the most significant bits of $p + q$. Together with some skills in implementations, we can also achieve the bound $N^{0.292}$, but with significantly less time compared to previous work.

Coppersmith's method, combined with the Jochemsz-May strategy, is widely used to find the small roots of multivariate polynomials for cryptanalysis. At Asiacrypt'23, Meers and Nowakowski improved the Jochemsz-May strategy from a single polynomial equation to a system of polynomial equations and proposed a new method, called Automated Coppersmith. Note that it is typically a tedious and non-trivial task to determine asymptotic upper bounds for Coppersmith’s method and manual analysis has to be performed anew when a new set of polynomials is considered. By making certain heuristic assumption, Meers and Nowakowski showed that the bound can be obtained using Lagrange interpolation with the computer, but it is still time-consuming. Moreover, we find that sometimes the interpolation method may get stuck in local convergence, which will result in an incorrect bound when a natural termination strategy is employed in the method.

In this paper, we revisit the Jochemsz-May strategy as well as the work of Meers and Nowakowski and point out that the bound can be obtained by calculating the leading coefficient of some Hilbert function, which is exactly the volume of the corresponding Newton polytope. To this end, we introduce the concept of Sumsets theory and propose a series of related results and algorithms. Compared with the Automated Coppersmith, we overcome the issue of getting stuck in local convergence and directly eliminate the time-consuming calculation for $f^m$ in Automated Coppersmith when $m$ is large, which brings a 1000x$\sim$1200x improvement in running time for some polynomials in our experiment.

Additionally, our new method offers a new perspective on understanding Automated Coppersmith, thus providing proof of Meers and Nowakowski's Heuristic 2 for the system of a single polynomial.

Let $(N,e)$ be a public key of the RSA cryptosystem, and $d$ be the corresponding private key. In practice, we usually choose a small $e$ for quick encryption. In this paper, we improve partial private key exposure attacks against RSA with MSBs of $d$ and small $e$. The key idea is that under such a setting we can usually obtain more information about the prime factors of $N$ and then, by solving a univariate modular polynomial equation using Coppersmith's method, $N$ can be factored in polynomial time. Compared to previous results, we reduce the number of the leaked bits in $d$ that are needed to mount the attack by $\log_2 (e)$ bits. For $e=65537$, previous work required an additional enumeration of 17 bits to achieve our new bound, resulting in a $2^{10}$ (or 1,024x) increase in time consumption. Furthermore, our experiments show that for a $1024$-bit modulus $N$, our attack can achieve the theoretical bound on a simple personal computer, which verifies the new method.

Recently, the NSA has proposed a block cipher called ARADI and a mode of operation called LLAMA for memory encryption applications. In this note, we comment on this proposal, on its suitability for the intended application, and describe an attack on LLAMA that breaks confidentiality of ciphertext and allows a straightforward forgery attack breaking integrity of ciphertext (INT-CTXT) using a related-IV attack. Both attacks have negligible complexity.

The notion of (Receiver-) Anamorphic Encryption was put forth recently to show that a dictator (i.e., an overreaching government), which demands to get the receiver’s private key and even dictates messages to the sender, cannot prevent the receiver from getting an additional covert anamorphic message from a sender. The model required an initial private collaboration to share some secret. There may be settings though where an initial collaboration may be impossible or performance-wise prohibitive, or cases when we need an immediate message to be sent without private key generation (e.g., by any casual sender in need). This situation, to date, somewhat limits the applicability of anamorphic encryption.

To overcome this, in this work, we put forth the new notion of “public-key anamorphic encryption,” where, without any initialization, any sender that has not coordinated in any shape or form with the receiver, can nevertheless, under the dictator control of the receiver’s private key, send the receiver an additional anamorphic secret message hidden from the dictator. We define the new notion with its unique new properties, and then prove that, quite interestingly, the known CCA-secure Koppula-Waters (KW) system is, in fact, public-key anamorphic.

We then describe how a public-key anamorphic scheme can support a new hybrid anamorphic encapsulation mode (KDEM) where the public-key anamorphic part serves a bootstrapping mechanism to activate regular anamorphic messages in the same ciphertext, thus together increasing the anamorphic channel capacity.

Looking at the state of research thus far, we observe that the initial system (Eurocrypt’22) that was shown to have regular anamorphic properties is the CCA-secure Naor-Yung (and other related schemes). Here we identify that the KW CCA-secure scheme also provides a new type of anamorphism. Thus, this situation is hinting that there may be a connection between some types of CCA-secure schemes and some type of anamorphic schemes (in spite of the fact that the goals of the two primitives are fundamentally different); this question is foundational in nature. Given this, we identify a sufficient condition for a “CCA-secure scheme which is black-box reduced from a CPA secure scheme” to directly give rise to an “anamorphic encryption scheme!” Furthermore, we identify one extra property of the reduction, that yields a public-key anamorphic scheme as defined here.

Smart farming uses different vehicles to manage all the operations on the farm. These vehicles should be put to good use for secure data transmission. The Vangala et al.'s key agreement scheme [IEEE TIFS, 18 (2023), 904-9193] is designed for agricultural IoT networks. In this note, we show that the scheme fails to keep anonymity, instead pseudonymity. The scheme simply thinks that anonymity is equivalent to preventing the real identity from being recovered. But the true anonymity means that the adversary cannot attribute different sessions to target users. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to clarify the differences between anonymity and pseudonymity.

Robust message authentication codes (MACs) and authenticated encryption (AE) schemes that provide authenticity in the presence of side-channel leakage are essential primitives. These constructions often rely on primitives designed for strong leakage protection, among others including the use of strong-unpredictable (tweakable) block-ciphers. This paper extends the strong-unpredictability security definition to the versatile and new forkcipher primitive. We show how to construct secure and efficient MAC and AEs that guarantee authenticity in the presence of leakage. We present a leakage-resistant MAC, ForkMAC, and two leakage-resistant AE schemes, ForkDTE1 and ForkDTE2, which use forkciphers instead of traditional secure (tweakable) block-ciphers as compared to the prior art. We prove and analyze their security in the presence of leakage based on a strong unpredictable forkcipher. A comparison with the state-of-the-art in terms of both security and efficiency is followed in the paper. Key advantages and highlights promoted by the proposed constructions are that for the minimal assumptions they require, unpredictability with leakage-based security, the tag-generation of ForkMAC is the most efficient among leakage-resilient MAC proposals, equivalent to HBC. ForkDTE 1 and 2 have a more efficient encryption than any other scheme, achieving integrity with leakage (and also providing misuse-resistance).

In early August 2024, three NSA researchers -- Patricia Greene, Mark Motley, and Bryan Weeks -- published the technical specifications for a new low-latency block cipher, ARADI, along with its corresponding authenticated encryption mode, LLAMA, which is specifically designed for memory encryption applications. Their manuscript offered minimal security analysis of the design, only briefly discussing the differential, linear and algebraic properties of cipher's underlying components. In this work, we present a set of distinguishers for the round reduced ARADI block cipher, discovered using the automated cryptanalysis tool CLAASP. More precisely, using CLAASP, we evaluate the resistance of ARADI against avalanche, statistical and continuous diffusion tests, differential and linear distinguishers, impossible differentials, algebraic attacks, and neural distinguishers. Accordingly, we give distinguishers that reach up to 9 out of 16 rounds of ARADI. We hope these preliminary findings will encourage further in-depth cryptanalysis of the cipher to enhance confidence in its security.

Framed within the general context of cyber-security, standard cryptographic constructions often represent an enabling technology for associated solutions. Alongside or in combination with their design, therefore, the implementation of such constructions is an important challenge: beyond delivering artefacts that are usable in practice, implementation can impact many quality metrics (such as efficiency and security) which determine fitness-for-purpose. A rich design space of implementation techniques can be drawn on in order to address this challenge, but threat- and opportunity-driven innovation based on clear understanding and empirical evidence remains vital.

In at least some use-cases, software-based implementation of cryptography is important, e.g., because it delivers an attractive trade off or is mandated for some reason. Such an implementation is heavily influenced both by 1) the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) it is expressed using, and 2) the micro-architecture it is executed using. For example, the extent to which a general-purpose ISA can support more domain-specific requirements of a cryptographic construction will influence how the latter is mapped to the former (i.e., which implementation techniques are viable) and behavioural properties of doing so (e.g., the execution latency stemming from use of a given implementation technique).

This paper attempts to systematise the topic of cryptographic Instruction Set Extensions (ISEs), which represent an approach to provision of a platform where such support is more explicit and extensive. At a high level, the goal is to improve understanding of what is an extensive and somewhat inter-disciplinary body of literature (e.g., spanning academia and industry, hardware and software, as well as cryptographic and non-cryptographic publication venues). We argue that doing so will help to maximise the quality of subsequent work on this and associated topics.

Side-channel analysis on complex SoC devices with high-frequency microprocessors and multitasking operating systems presents significant challenges in practice due to the high costs of trace acquisition and analysis, generally involving tens of thousands to millions of traces. This work uses a cryptographic execution process on a Broadcom 2837 SoC as a case study to explore ways to reduce costs in electromagnetic side-channel analysis. In the data acquisition phase, we propose an efficient electromagnetic probe positioning strategy that does not require additional tool assistance, significantly accelerating the collection of effective electromagnetic traces. In the side-channel analysis phase, we investigate the combined use of preprocessing techniques, where the optimal preprocessing approach successfully reduces the number of required electromagnetic traces by 12 times, significantly improving the success rate of attacks. Additionally, we implement profiling attacks on such devices, including traditional template attacks, MLP-based, and CNN-based side-channel analysis, demonstrating that even minimal modeling costs can yield excellent analysis performance. Our study confirms the feasibility of low-cost side-channel analysis on complex SoCs and indicates that the sensitive applications running on these devices still require protection.

The strength of Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) relies on curve choice. This work analyzes weak keys in standardized curves, i.e., private keys within small subgroups of the auxiliary group $\mathbb{Z}^*_p$. We quantify weak key prevalence across standardized curves, revealing a potential vulnerability due to numerous small divisors in auxiliary group orders. To address this, we leverage the implicit "baby-steps giant-steps algorithm", which transforms the complex elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem into a simpler problem within $\mathbb{Z}^*_p$. This enables efficient detection of weak keys in small-order subgroups. Our findings highlight the importance of rigorous key testing in applications using standardized ECC. While random weak keys are unlikely, malicious actors could exploit this by manipulating key generation libraries. To this end, we show how users can assess their private key vulnerabilities and mitigate risks by eliminating weak keys. Hence, this work contributes to improved ECC security through proactive key management practices.