International Association
for Cryptologic Research

The existence of pseudorandom unitaries (PRUs)---efficient quantum circuits that are computationally indistinguishable from Haar-random unitaries---has been a central open question, with significant implications for cryptography, complexity theory, and fundamental physics. In this work, we close this question by proving that PRUs exist, assuming that any quantum-secure one-way function exists. We establish this result for both (1) the standard notion of PRUs, which are secure against any efficient adversary that makes queries to the unitary $U$, and (2) a stronger notion of PRUs, which are secure even against adversaries that can query both the unitary $U$ and its inverse $U^\dagger$. In the process, we prove that any algorithm that makes queries to a Haar-random unitary can be efficiently simulated on a quantum computer, up to inverse-exponential trace distance.

Visa Research conducts both applied and fundamental research while engaging with the company's technology and product teams, business partners, academics, and governments, to explore and develop technologies that are critical to the payments industry in the future.
Currently, we focus on building research teams in key areas: Data Analytics, Cryptography, Security, and Future of Payment (Blockchain), and Artificial Intelligence. We are looking for outstanding researchers and engineers at all levels of experience as part of our growing team!
Visa Research’s goal of security is to enable policy-enforced, full lifecycle protection for data at rest, in transit and during computation for all payment-related scenarios. We accomplish this through fundamental and applied research in the following areas:

Cryptography (MPC, PQC, Foundational)

Systems Security

Identity & Authentication

Security and Privacy in Machine Learning

Please see https://smrtr.io/nhPGH for more information.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Samuel Cook (scook@visa.com) or Peter Rindal (perindal@visa.com)

More information: https://smrtr.io/nhPGH

The Cryptography Research Group at University College Cork, Ireland is looking for a highly motivated Post-Doctoral or Senior Post-Doctoral Researcher in differential privacy and related privacy preservation techinques. The researchers will be employed on an industry-funded research project sponsored by a major Internet company (get in touch for more details).

Candidates should have a PhD in cryptography or cyber security, with a good track record of publications. Ideally, they will have experience in one or more of the following areas: differential privacy, anonymity, re-identification and/or cryptography-based privacy enhancing technologies. Candidates with a background in other areas of cryptography/privacy/security, but with a strong interest in differential privacy will also be considered. A strong mathematical background is expected, complemented with programming skills. Experience with relevant libraries such as IBM Diffprivlib, Opacus, SecretFlow etc. is an asset (but not required).

The position is until December 2025, with a possibility of extension subject to availability of funding. The successful candidates will be appointed at Post-Doctoral or Senior Post-Doctoral level depending on their experience and qualifications. A budget for travel, equipment, publications and other research expenses is available as part of the project.

The Cryptography Research Group is led by Dr Paolo Palmieri and consists of 8 researchers at doctoral and post-doctoral level. The hired researcher will be encouraged to collaborate with other members of the group, and to take a mentoring role with some of the more junior researchers. There will also be ample opportunities to work with the group’s extensive network of international collaborations.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Informal inquiries can be made in confidence to Dr. Paolo Palmieri, at: p.palmieri@cs.ucc.ie
Applications should be submitted through the University portal at https://ore.ucc.ie/

More information: https://security.ucc.ie/vacancies.html

We are looking for two PhD students who wish to pursue research in applied cryptography. The positions are fully funded and the starting date is negotiable.

The candidates will work on topics including but not limited to:

• Cryptanalyzing existing cryptographic protocols in the literature and the industry
• Encrypted databases
• Distributed systems

Other research topics are possible upon negotiation.

If interested, please send an email (with a CV and cover letter) to Dr. Zichen Gui (Zichen.Gui@uga.edu).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Zichen Gui (Zichen dot Gui at uga dot edu)

The cryptography group at the University of Tartu, Estonia, has two openings for tenured lectureships (corresponding to the assistant professorship in the US) in cryptography. The first position is aimed at a person working in modern zero-knowledge proofs, zk-SNARKs, their construction, and security proofs. The person is expected to have a strong cryptography background and several publications in IACR or equivalent conferences. The second position is aimed at a person working at the intersection of coding theory and cryptography, and an interest in hash and code-based zk-SNARKs is appreciated. The person is expected to have a strong background either in coding-theory and cryptography (preferably both) with several publications in IACR or equivalent conferences in cryptography or equivalent venues in coding theory.

Helger Lipmaa leads the cryptography research group, but the department also has a strong coding theory group. Both applicants are expected to collaborate scientifically with the existing groups. Despite the name of the positions, they are research-heavy. We encourage outside activities, like consulting for ZK companies, as long as they are done via the university.

Please contact Helger Lipmaa if you have any questions.

Official application links with other relevant information are at https://ut.ee/en/job-offer/lecturer-cryptography and https://ut.ee/en/job-offer/lecturer-coding-theory-and-cryptography (two separate openings).

Application deadline: 01.11.2024

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Helger Lipmaa (firstname.lastname@gmail.com)

More information: https://crypto.cs.ut.ee/

CISPA is a world-leading research center that focuses on Information Security and Machine Learning at large. To expand and further strengthen our center, we are looking for

Tenure-Track Faculty in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (f/m/d)

All applicants are expected to grow a research team that pursues an internationally visible research agenda. To aid you in achieving this, CISPA provides institutional base funding for three full-time researcher positions and a generous budget for expenditures. Upon successful tenure evaluation, you will hold a position that is equivalent to an endowed full professorship at a top research university.

We invite applications of candidates with excellent track records in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, especially in (but not limited to) the fields of

Accountability and Authenticity

Causality

Fairness

Federated and Decentralized Learning

Foundations of Statistically Sound (Deep) Learning from Data

Human Factors of AI

Interpretability and Explainability,

Neuro-Symbolic Learning

Privacy

Reinforcement Learning

Robustness and Reliability

Sample- and Computationally Efficient Mining and Learning

Secure and Safe AI

CISPA values diversity and is committed to equality. We provide special dual-career support. We explicitly encourage female and diverse researchers to apply.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: scientific-recruiting@cispa.de

More information: https://jobs.cispa.saarland/de_DE/jobs/detail/tenure-track-faculty-in-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-f-m-d-2024-2025-254

CISPA is a world-leading research center that focuses on Information Security and Machine Learning at large. To expand and further strengthen our center, we are looking for

Tenure-Track Faculty in all areas related to Information Security (f/m/d)

All applicants are expected to grow a research team that pursues an internationally visible research agenda.

To aid you in achieving this, CISPA provides institutional base funding for three full-time researcher positions and a generous budget for expenditures. Upon successful tenure evaluation, you will hold a position that is equivalent to an endowed full professorship at a top research university.

We invite applications of candidates with excellent track records in all areas related to Information Security.

CISPA values diversity and is committed to equality. We provide special dual-career support. We explicitly encourage female and diverse researchers to apply.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: scientific-recruiting@cispa.de

More information: https://jobs.cispa.saarland/de_DE/jobs/detail/tenure-track-faculty-in-all-areas-related-to-information-security-f-m-d-2024-2025-255

We are looking for a strong candidate that would be interested in pursuing a PhD on privacy-preserving machine learning at Monash University (a world top 50 university) in the vibrant city of Melbourne, Australia (frequently ranked among the top 10 cities to live in the world).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: rafael.dowsley@monash.edu

Proving non-native operations is still a bottleneck in existing incrementally verifiable computations. Prior attempts to solve this issue either simply improve the efficiency of proofs of non-native operations or require folding instances in each curve of a cycle. This paper shows how to avoid altogether in-circuit proofs of non-native operations in the incre- mental steps, and only record them in some auxiliary proof information. These operations are proved natively at the end of the computation, at the cost of only a small constant number (four or five) of non-native field multiplications to go from a non-native operation record to a native one. To formalise the security guarantees of the scheme, the paper introduces the concept of incrementally verifiable computation with auxiliary proof information, a relaxation of the standard notion of incrementally veri- fiable computation. The knowledge-soundness now guarantees the cor- rectness of a computation only if the piece of information attached to a proof is valid. This new primitive is thus only to be used if there is an efficient mechanism to verify the validity of that information. This relaxation is exactly what enables a construction which does not require in-circuit proofs of non-native operations during the incremental part of the computation. Instantiated in the Plonk arithmetisation, the construction leads to savings in circuit-gate count (compared to standard folding-based constructions) of at least one order of magnitude, and that can go up to a factor of 50.

Oblivious map (OMAP) is an important component in encrypted databases, utilized to safeguard against the server inferring sensitive information about client's encrypted key-value stores based on \emph{access patterns}. Despite its widespread usage and importance, existing OMAP solutions face practical challenges, including the need for a large number of interaction rounds between the client and server, as well as the substantial communication bandwidth requirements. For example, the state-of-the-art protocol named OMIX++ in VLDB 2024 still requires $O(\log{n})$ interaction rounds and $O(\log^2{n})$ communication bandwidth per access, where $n$ denote the total number of key-value pairs stored.

In this work, we introduce more practical and efficient OMAP constructions. Consistent with all prior OMAPs, our proposed constructions also adapt only the \emph{tree-based Oblivious RAM} (ORAM) to achieve OMAP for enhanced practicality. In terms of complexity, our approach needs only $O(\log{n}/\log{\log{n}})$ interaction rounds and $O(\log^2{n}/\log{\log{n}})$ communication bandwidth per data access, achieving the lowest communication volume to the best our of knowledge. This improvement results from our two main contributions. First, unlike prior works that rely solely on search trees, we design a novel framework for OMAP that combines hash table with search trees. Second, we propose a more efficient tree-based ORAM named DAORAM, which is of significant independent interest. This newly developed ORAM noticeably accelerates our constructions. We implement both our proposed constructions and prior methods to experimentally demonstrate that our constructions substantially outperform prior methods in terms of efficiency.

We improve the performance of lattice-based cryptosystems Dilithium on Cortex-M3 with expensive multiplications. Our contribution is two-fold: (i) We generalize Barrett multiplication and show that the resulting shape-independent modular multiplication performs comparably to long multiplication on some platforms without special hardware when precomputation is free. We call a modular multiplication “shape-independent” if its correctness and efficiency depend only on the magnitude of moduli and not the shapes of the moduli. This was unknown in the literature even though modular multiplication has been studied for more than 40 years. In the literature, shape-independent modular multiplications often perform several times slower than long multiplications even if we ignore the cost of the precomputation. (ii) We show that polynomial multiplications based on Nussbaumer fast Fourier transform and Toom–Cook over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ perform the best when modular multiplications are expensive and $k$ is not very close to the arithmetic precision.

For practical evaluation, we implement assembly programs for the polynomial arithmetic used in the digital signature Dilithium on Cortex-M3. For the modular multiplications in Dilithium, our generalized Barrett multiplications are 1.92 times faster than the state-of-the-art assembly-optimized Montgomery multiplications, leading to 1.38−1.51 times faster Dilithium NTT/iNTT. Along with the improvement in accumulating products, the core polynomial arithmetic matrix-vector multiplications are 1.71−1.77 times faster. We further apply the FFT-based polynomial multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ to the challenge polynomial multiplication $c t_0$, leading to 1.31 times faster computation for $c t_0$.

We additionally apply the ideas to Saber on Cortex-M3 and demonstrate their improvement to Dilithium and Saber on our 8-bit AVR environment. For Saber on Cortex-M3, we show that matrix-vector multiplications with FFT-based polynomial multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ are 1.42−1.46 faster than the ones with NTT-based polynomial multiplications over NTT-friendly coefficient rings. When moving to a platform with smaller arithmetic precision, such as 8-bit AVR, we improve the matrix-vector multiplication of Dilithium with our Barrett-based NTT/iNTT by a factor of 1.87−1.89. As for Saber on our 8-bit AVR environment, we show that matrix-vector multiplications with NTT-based polynomial multiplications over NTT-friendly coefficient rings are faster than polynomial multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$ due to the large $k$ in Saber.

This article discusses fully homomorphic encryption and homomorphic sorting. Homomorphic encryption is a special encryption technique that allows all kinds of operations to be performed on ciphertext, and the result is still decryptable, such that when decrypted, the result is the same as that obtained by performing the same operation on the plaintext. Homomorphic sorting is an important problem in homomorphic encryption. Currently, there has been a volume of work on homomorphic sorting. In these works, each integer in a sequence is encrypted in a separate ciphertext, there is a lack of research on sorting sequences of integers encrypted in a single ciphertext. This paper addresses the sorting problem by utilizing Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) technology to provide new algorithms to improve computational efficiency. The content includes the following aspects. For plaintexts encrypted word-wise, this paper studies sorting an integer sequence stored in one or multiple ciphertexts, and proposes a new SIMD-style homomorphic sorting algorithm. On theoretical complexity, compared with three existing sorting algorithms, namely, homomorphic sorting by polynomial computation over a finite field, by TFHE bootstrapping, or by Liu-Wang parallel bootstrapping, the new algorithm achieves a speedup of $O((\log n)^2)$, $O(n(\log n)^3)$, and $O((\log n)^4)$, respectively, for sorting a plaintext integer sequence of length $n$. By experimental results, the new algorithm is 1.7-9.2 times faster than the three sorting algorithms. The third situation involves sorting multiple shorter sequences simultaneously, all of which can be stored in a single ciphertext. For this situation, this paper proposes a method for calculating the ord function, and uses this method to provide a new sorting algorithm. On theoretical complexity, if the total number of numbers to be sorted is $n$ and there are $n^r$ numbers in each sequence, the new algorithm is faster than three existing sorting algorithms, with speed-ups of $O(n^{1-r}(\log n)^2)$, $O(n^{2-r}(\log n)^3)$, and $O(n^{1-r}(\log n)^4)$, respectively. By experimental results, the new algorithm is 2.1-6.4 times faster than existing sorting algorithms.

Zero-knowledge for set membership is a building block at the core of several privacy-aware applications, such as anonymous payments, credentials and whitelists. We propose a new efficient construction for the batching variant of the problem, where a user intends to show knowledge of several elements (a batch) in a set without any leakage on the elements. Our construction is transparent—it does not requires a trusted setup—and based on Curve Trees by Campanelli, Hall-Andersen and Kamp (USENIX 2023). Our first technical contribution consists in techniques to amortize Curve Trees costs in the batching setting for which we crucially exploit its algebraic properties. Even for small batches we obtain $\approx 2\times$ speedups for proving, $\approx3\times$ speedups for verification and $\approx 60\%$ reduction in proof size. Our second contribution is a modifications of a key technical requirement in Curve Trees (related to so called "permissible points") which arguably simplifies its design and obtains a stronger security property. In particular, our construction is secure even for the case where the commitment to the set is provided by the adversary (in contrast to the honest one required by the original Curve Trees).

This paper studies transaction execution mechanisms (TEMs) for blockchains, as the efficient resource allocation across multiple parallel executions queues or "local fee markets." We present a model considering capacity constraints, user valuations, and delay costs in a multi-queue system with an aggregate capacity constraint due to global consensus. We show that revenue maximization tends to allocate capacity to the highest-paying queue, while welfare maximization generally serves all queues. Optimal relative pricing of different queues depends on factors such as market size, demand elasticity, and the balance between local and global congestion. Our results have implications for evolving blockchain architectures, including parallel execution, DAG-based systems, and multiple concurrent proposers, and can help design more efficient TEMs.

This paper investigates the open problem of how to construct non-interactive rational proofs. Rational proofs, introduced by Azar and Micali (STOC 2012), are a model of interactive proofs where a computationally powerful server can be rewarded by a weaker client for running an expensive computation $f(x)$. The honest strategy is enforced by design when the server is rational: any adversary claiming a false output $y \neq f(x)$ will lose money on expectation. Rational proof constructions have appealing properties: they are simple, feature an extremely efficient verifier—reading only a sublinear number of bits of the input $x$—and do not require any collateral from the prover. Currently, all non-trivial constructions of rational proofs are interactive. Developing non-interactive rational protocols would be a game-changer, making them practical for use in smart contracts, one of their most natural applications. Our investigation revolves around the Fiat-Shamir transform, a common approach to compiling interactive proofs into their non-interactive counterparts. We are the first to tackle the question: "Can Fiat-Shamir be successfully applied to rational protocols?" We find negative evidence by showing that, after applying Fiat-Shamir in the random oracle model to two representative protocols in literature (AM13 and CG15) these lose their security guarantees. Our findings point to more general impossibility theorems, which we leave as future work. To achieve our results we first need to address a fundamental technical challenge: the standard Fiat-Shamir transform does not apply to protocols where the verifier has only oracle access to its input $x$ (a core feature of the rational setting). We propose two versions of Fiat-Shamir for this setting, a "vanilla" variant and a "stronger" variant (where the verifier has access to an honestly computed digest of its input). We show that neither variant is sufficient to ensure that AM13 or CG15 are secure in the non-interactive setting. Finally, as an additional contribution, we provide a novel, and arguably simpler, definition for the soundness property of rational proofs (interactive or non-interactive) of independent interest.

A trapdoor Memory-Hard Function is a function that is memory-hard to evaluate for any party who does not have a trapdoor, but is substantially less expensive to evaluate with the trapdoor. Biryukov and Perin (ASIACRYPT 2017) introduced the first candidate trapdoor Memory-Hard Function called \textsc{Diodon} which modifies a Memory-Hard Function called \textsc{Scrypt} by replacing a hash chain with repeated squaring modulo a composite number $N=pq$. The trapdoor, which consists of the prime factors $p$ and $q$, allows one to compute the function with significantly reduced cumulative memory cost (CMC) $O( n \log n \log^2 N )$ where $n$ denotes the running time parameter, e.g., the length of the hash chain or repeated squaring chain. By contrast, the best-known algorithm to compute \textsc{Diodon} without the trapdoor has the CMC $O(n^2\log N)$. Auerbach et al. (EUROCRYPT 2024) provided the first provable lower bound on the CMC of \textsc{TdScrypt} --- a specific instantiation of \textsc{Diodon}. In particular, in idealized models, they proved that the CMC of \textsc{TdScrypt} is $\Omega(\frac{n^2}{\log n}\log N)$ which almost matches the upper bound $O(n^2\log N)$ but is off by a multiplicative $\log n$ factor. In this work, we show how to tighten the analysis of Auerbach et al. (EUROCRYPT 2024) and eliminate the gap. In particular, our results imply that \textsc{TdScrypt} has the CMC at least $\Omega(n^2\log N)$.

Blockchain-based auction markets offer stronger fairness and transparency compared to their centralized counterparts. Deposits and sealed bid formats are usually applied to enhance security and privacy. However, to our best knowledge, the formal treatment of deposit-enabled sealed-bid auctions remains lacking in the cryptographic literature. To address this gap, we first propose a decentralized anonymous deposited-bidding (DADB) scheme, providing formal syntax and security definitions. Unlike existing approaches that rely on smart contracts, our construction utilizes a mainchain-sidechain structure that is also compatible with the extended UTXO model. This design further allows us to develop a consensus mechanism on the sidechain dedicated to securely recording bids for allocation. Specifically, we build atop an Algorand-style protocol and integrate a novel block qualification mechanism into the block selection. Consequently, we prove, from a game-theoretical perspective, that our design optimizes liveness latency for rational users who want to join the auction, even without explicit incentives (e.g., fees) for including bids. Finally, our implementation results demonstrate the potential performance degradation without the block qualification mechanism.

In private set intersection (PSI), two parties who each hold sets of items can learn their intersection without revealing anything about their other items. Fuzzy PSI corresponds to a relaxed variant that reveals pairs of items which are ``close enough,'' with respect to some distance metric. In this paper we propose a new protocol framework for fuzzy PSI, compatible with arbitrary distance metrics. We then show how to efficiently instantiate our framework for $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$, and $\ell_\infty$ metrics, in a way that uses exclusively cheap symmetric-key operations. One notable feature of our protocol is that it has only logarithmic dependency on the distance threshold, whereas most other protocols have linear (or higher) dependency. For many reasonable combinations of parameters, our protocol has the lowest communication cost of existing fuzzy PSI protocols.

Key agreement and public key encryption are two elementary cryptographic primitives, suitable for different scenarios. But their differences are still not familiar to some researchers. In this note, we show that the Safkhani et al.'s key agreement scheme [Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 15(3), 1595-1616, 2022] is a public key encryption in disguise. We stress that the ultimate use of key agreement is to establish a shared key for some symmetric key encryption. We also present a simplification of the scheme by removing some repetitive computations. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to clarify the fundamental differences between the two primitives. The techniques developed in this note will be helpful for the future works on designing such schemes.

For Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), an idealized setup such as random oracle (RO) or a trusted setup such as common reference string (CRS) is a must in the universal composability (UC) framework (Canetti, FOCS 2001). Given the potential failure of a CRS or RO setup, it is natural to consider distributing trust among the two setups, resulting a CRS-or-RO-setup (i.e., CoR-setup).

However, the infeasibility highlighted by Katz et al. (PODC 2014) suggested that it is impossible to construct UC-secure PAKE protocols with a straightforward CoR-setup (i.e., either the CRS is functional but the RO is compromised, or the RO is functional but the CRS is compromised). To circumvent this impossibility result, we investigate how to design UC-secure PAKE protocols with a fine-grained CoR-setup, where either the CRS is functional but the RO is non-functional, or vice versa. Different from the straightforward CoR-setup, a fine-grained non-functional setup is not necessarily completely compromised and fully controlled by the adversary; Instead, we consider this non-functional setup may still offer certain security properties. Certainly, the non-functional setup alone should be useless for achieving UC-security.

We present a UC-secure PAKE protocol under two conditions: either the CRS is functional while the RO is non-functional (falling back to a collision-resistant hash function), or the RO is functional while the CRS is non-functional (falling back to a global CRS). Before presenting our construction, we first prove that a global CRS setup alone is insufficient for achieving UC-secure PAKE. This impossibility result highlights the non-triviality of our approach.

To obtain our construction, we introduce several techniques as follows:

(1) We propose a new variant of Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE), called homomorphic NIKE with associated functions, which captures key properties of existing RO-based PAKE protocols. This new primitive serves as an important component in our construction.

(2) We develop a ``Brute Force'' extraction strategy which allows us to provide security analysis for our UC-secure PAKE with a fine-grained CoR-setup for polynomial-sized password spaces.

(3) We introduce a novel password space extension technique that enables the expansion of PAKE protocols from polynomial-sized to arbitrary-sized password spaces.

(4) Finally, to ensure provable security for our password space extension in UC-secure PAKEs, we modify existing PAKE functionalities to prevent responses that reveal the correctness of password guesses. This is a reasonable adjustment, as our protocol provides only implicit authentication.

We further present a PAKE protocol in the BPR framework (Bellare, Pointcheval, Rogaway, EuroCrypt 2000), assuming either the CRS is functional while the RO falls back to a collision-resistant hash function, or the RO is functional but the CRS trapdoor is allowed to be learned by the adversary.