International Association for Cryptologic Research

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18 February 2025

Vahid Jahandideh, Bart Mennink, Lejla Batina
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Masking is a common countermeasure against side-channel attacks that encodes secrets into multiple shares, each of which may be subject to leakage. A key question is under what leakage conditions, and to what extent, does increasing the number of shares actually improve the security of these secrets. Although this question has been studied extensively in low-SNR regimes, scenarios where the adversary obtains substantial information—such as on low-noise processors or through static power analysis—have remained underexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by deriving necessary and sufficient noise requirements for masking security in both standalone encodings and linear gadgets. We introduce a decomposition technique that reduces the relationship between an extended-field variable and its leakage into subproblems involving linear combinations of the variable’s bits. By working within binary subfields, we derive optimal bounds and then lift these results back to the extended field. Beyond binary fields, we also present a broader framework for analyzing masking security in other structures, including prime fields. As an application, we prove a conjecture by Dziembowski et al. (TCC 2016), which states that for an additive group \(\mathbb{G}\) with its largest subgroup \(\mathbb{H}\), a \(\delta\)-noisy leakage satisfying \(\delta < 1 - \tfrac{|\mathbb{H}|}{|\mathbb{G}|}\) ensures that masking enhances the security of the secret.
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Geoffroy Couteau, Naman Kumar
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Secure computation enables mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function on their secret inputs, while revealing nothing beyond the function output. A long-running challenge is understanding the required communication complexity of such protocols – in particular, when communication can be sublinear in the circuit representation size of the desired function. While several techniques have demonstrated the viability of sublinear secure computation in the two-party setting, known methods for the corresponding multi-party setting rely either on fully homomorphic encryption, non-standard hardness assumptions, or are limited to a small number of parties. In this work, we expand the study of multi-party sublinear secure computation by demonstrating sublinear-communication 10-party computation from various combinations of standard hardness assumptions. In particular, our contributions show:

– 8-party homomorphic secret sharing under the hardness of (DDH or DCR), the superpolynomial hardness of LPN, and the existence of constant-depth pseudorandom generators; – A general framework for achieving (N + M )-party sublinear secure computation using M-party homomorphic secret sharing for NC1 and correlated symmetric PIR.

Together, our constructions imply the existence of a 10-party MPC protocol with sublinear computation. At the core of our techniques lies a novel series of computational approaches based on homomorphic secret sharing.
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Geoffroy Couteau, Carmit Hazay, Aditya Hegde, Naman Kumar
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Garbling schemes are a fundamental cryptographic tool for enabling private computations and ensuring that nothing leaks beyond the output. As a widely studied primitive, significant efforts have been made to reduce their size. Until recently, all such schemes followed the Lindell and Pinkas paradigm for Boolean circuits (JoC 2009), where each gate is represented as a set of ciphertexts computed using only symmetric-key primitives. However, this approach is inherently limited to ?(?) bits per gate, where ? is the security parameter. Recently, it has been shown that achieving smaller garbled circuit size is possible under stronger assumptions, such as variants of Learning with Errors (LWE) or Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO). In addition to requiring high-end cryptography, none of these constructions is black-box in the underlying cryptographic primitives, a key advantage of prior work. In this paper, we present the first approach to garbling Boolean circuits that makes a black-box use of a group and uses ?(?) bits per gate.

Building on a novel application of the Reverse Multiplication-Friendly Embeddings (RMFE) paradigm (Cascudo et al., CRYPTO 2018), We introduce a new packing mechanism for garbling schemes, that packs boolean values into integers and leverage techniques for arithmetic garbling over integer rings. Our results introduce two new succinct schemes that achieve improved rates by a factor of√︁ log ?, retaining the black-box usage. (1) Our first scheme is proven in the Generic Group model (GGM) for circuits with Ω(√︁ log ?) width, obtaining a garbled circuit size of ? · |C|/√︁ log(?). (2) Our second scheme is proven in the plain model under the Power-DDH assumption, attaining a garbled circuit size of ? · (|C|/√︁ log(?) + poly(?) · depth(C), but is restricted to layered circuits. Our schemes are the first to achieve sublinear (in ?) cost per gate under assumptions that do not imply fully homomorphic encryption; in addition, our scheme is also the first to achieve this while making a black-box use of cryptography.
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Sander Q. Dijkhuis
ePrint Report ePrint Report
How to be assured that a user entered their PIN on their smartphone? The question is especially relevant when deploying remotely secured services such as with mobile wallets for digital identity and banking, which typically deploy a server side backed by a hardware security module (HSM). As long as the server can be trusted, authentication can be performed with high assurance, but it is challenging to guarantee sole control. This report defines an approach in terms of an abstract security problem and a concrete solution based on threshold signatures. It can be applied to use cases such as HSM-backed mobile identity wallets and other identification means.
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Yu Wei, Lei Bi, Xianhui Lu, Kunpeng Wang
ePrint Report ePrint Report
The study of attack algorithms for the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is crucial for the cryptanalysis of LWE-based cryptosystems. The BKW algorithm has gained significant attention as an important combinatorial attack for solving LWE. However, its exponential time and memory requirements severely limit its practical applications, even with medium-sized parameters. In this paper, we present a memory-efficient BKW algorithm for LWE, which extends Bogos's work [Asiacrypt'16] on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. While their work improved efficiency, it overlooked the high memory demands of the BKW algorithm. We address this with two key improvements. First, we propose an efficient reduction technique for low-memory regimes, \(c\)-sum-PCS-reduce, which combines the \(c\)-sum technique with Parallel Collision Search (PCS) to achieve a better time-memory trade-off. Second, we present an improved memory-optimized finite automaton for our optimized BKW algorithm by incorporating several efficient memory-saving reduction techniques and pruning potential high-memory paths. Our algorithm, using graphs as a meta tool, can automatically identify the optimal reduction path within the graph, aiming to reduce both time and memory complexities. Compared to the state-of-the-art coded-BKW in the lattice-estimator, our algorithm achieves time complexity improvements ranging from \(2^{3.3}\) to \(2^{26.2}\). Furthermore, memory complexity is improved, with reductions ranging from \(2^{9.7}\) to \(2^{71.3}\).
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Fuyuki Kitagawa, Ryo Nishimaki
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Software watermarking for cryptographic functionalities enables embedding an arbitrary message (a mark) into a cryptographic function. An extraction algorithm, when provided with a (potentially unauthorized) circuit, retrieves either the embedded mark or a special symbol unmarked indicating the absence of a mark. It is difficult to modify or remove the embedded mark without destroying the functionality of a marked function. Previous works have primarily employed black-box extraction techniques, where the extraction algorithm requires only input-output access to the circuit rather than its internal descriptions (white-box extraction). Zhandry (CRYPTO 2021) identified several challenges in watermarking public-key encryption (PKE) with black-box extraction and introduced the notion of privacy for white-box watermarking against classical adversaries. Kitagawa and Nishimaki (Journal of Cryptology 37(3)) extended watermarking techniques to pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and PKE in the presence of quantum adversaries, enabling extraction from pirate quantum circuits but failing to achieve privacy.

In this work, we investigate white-box watermarking for digital signatures secure against quantum adversaries. Our constructions enable the extraction of embedded marks from the description of a pirate quantum circuit that produces valid signatures while ensuring that black-box access to a marked signing function does not reveal information about the embedded mark. We define and construct white-box watermarking signatures that are secure against quantum adversaries, leveraging the leaning with errors (LWE) assumption and quantum fully homomorphic encryption. Furthermore, we highlight that privacy concerns are even more critical in the context of signatures than in PKE. We also present a compelling practical application of white-box watermarking signatures.

Additionally, we explore the concept of universal copy protection for signatures. We define universal copy protection as a mechanism that transforms any quantumly secure signature scheme into a copy-protected variant without altering the verification key or verification algorithm. This approach is preferable to developing specific copy-protected signature schemes, as it allows existing schemes to be secured without modifying their published verification keys. We demonstrate that universal copy protection for all quantum secure signatures is impossible by leveraging our white-box watermarking signatures secure against quantum adversaries.
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Yanbo Chen
ePrint Report ePrint Report
The adaptive security of threshold signatures considers an adversary that adaptively corrupts users to learn their secret key shares and states. Crites, Komlo, and Maller (Crypto 2023) proposed Sparkle, the first threshold signature scheme in the pairing-free discrete-log setting to be proved adaptively secure. However, its proof of full adaptive security requires the algebraic group model (AGM) and is based on an interactive assumption. Bacho, Loss, Tessaro, Wagner, and Zhu (Eurocrypt 2024) proposed Twinkle, whose full adaptive security can be based on the standard DDH assumption only.

We propose Dazzle and Dazzle-T, adaptively secure threshold signature schemes based on DDH without the AGM, the same assumption and model as Twinkle. Our schemes improve upon Twinkle in signature size, round complexity, and/or security tightness. In particular, Dazzle and Dazzle-T both have signatures that are shorter than Twinkle by one group element. Regarding the round complexity and tightness, Twinkle is three-round and non-tight. Our Dazzle is two-round and has the same security loss as Twinkle, while Dazzle-T is three-round and fully tight.

We achieve our improvements by optimizing the underlying single-party signature scheme and showing that the single-party scheme can be transformed to a threshold scheme by a simpler transformation than that of Twinkle.
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Yuanju Wei, Xinxuan Zhang, Yi Deng
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Recently, there is a growing need for SNARKs to operate over a broader range of algebraic structures, and one important structure is Galois ring. We present transparent SNARK schemes over arbitrary Galois rings. Compared with Rinocchio scheme in Ganesh et al. (J Cryptol 2023), our SNARK schemes do not require a trusted third party to establish a structured reference string (SRS).

In this paper, we present the expander code over arbitrary Galois rings, which can be encoded in $O(n)$ time. Using this expander code, we then extend the Brakedown commitment scheme in Golovnev et al. (CRYPTO 2023) to Galois rings. By combining the Libra framework in Xie et al. (CRYPTO 2019), we present a transparent SNARK for log-space uniform circuits over Galois rings, achieving $O(n)$ prover time, $O(\sqrt{n})$ proof size, and $O(\sqrt{n})$ verifier time. And by combining HyperPlonk in Chen et al. (EUROCRYPT 2023), we present a transparent SNARK for NP circuits over Galois rings, with $O(n\log^2 n)$ prover time, $O(\sqrt{n})$ proof size, and $O(\sqrt{n})$ verifier time.
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Fuyuki Kitagawa, Ryo Nishimaki, Nikhil Pappu
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Secure key leasing (SKL) is an advanced encryption functionality that allows a secret key holder to generate a quantum decryption key and securely lease it to a user. Once the user returns the quantum decryption key (or provides a classical certificate confirming its deletion), they lose their decryption capability. Previous works on public key encryption with SKL (PKE-SKL) have only considered the single-key security model, where the adversary receives at most one quantum decryption key. However, this model does not accurately reflect real-world applications of PKE-SKL. To address this limitation, we introduce collusion-resistant security for PKE-SKL (denoted as PKE-CR-SKL). In this model, the adversary can adaptively obtain multiple quantum decryption keys and access a verification oracle which validates the correctness of queried quantum decryption keys. Importantly, the size of the public key and ciphertexts must remain independent of the total number of generated quantum decryption keys. We present the following constructions:

- A PKE-CR-SKL scheme based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption.

- An attribute-based encryption scheme with collusion-resistant SKL (ABE-CR-SKL), also based on the LWE assumption.

- An ABE-CR-SKL scheme with classical certificates, relying on multi-input ABE with polynomial arity.
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Fengrun Liu, Haofei Liang, Tianyu Zhang, Yuncong Hu, Xiang Xie, Haisheng Tan, Yu Yu
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computations on encrypted data, ensuring privacy for outsourced computation. However, verifying the integrity of FHE computations remains a significant challenge, especially for bootstrapping, the most computationally intensive operation in FHE. Prior approaches, including zkVM-based solutions and general-purpose SNARKs, suffer from inefficiencies, with proof generation times ranging from several hours to days. In this work, we propose HasteBoots, a succinct argument tailored for FHE operations. By designing customized polynomial interactive oracle proofs and optimized polynomial commitment schemes, HasteBoots achieves proof generation in a few seconds for FHE bootstrapping, significantly outperforming existing methods. Our approach demonstrates the potential for scalable and efficient verifiable FHE, paving the way for practical, privacy-preserving computations.
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Yujin Oh, Kyungbae Jang, Hwajeong Seo
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Grover's algorithm, which reduces the search complexity of symmetric-key ciphers and hash functions, poses a significant security challenge in cryptography. Recent research has focused on estimating Grover's search complexity and assessing post-quantum security. This paper analyzes a quantum circuit implementation of ASCON, including ASCON-AEAD, hash functions, and ASCON-80pq, in alignment with NIST’s lightweight cryptography standardization efforts. We place particular emphasis on circuit depth, which directly impacts execution time, and analyze the quantum resource costs associated with Grover’s algorithm-based key recovery and collision attacks. Additionally, we estimate the resources required to assess the quantum-resistant security strength of ASCON, based on security levels and the latest research trends.
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Augustin Bariant, Aurélien Boeuf, Pierre Briaud, Maël Hostettler, Morten Øygarden, Håvard Raddum
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In the last decade, the introduction of advanced cryptographic protocols operating on large finite fields $\mathbb{F}_q$ has raised the need for efficient cryptographic primitives in this setting, commonly referred to as Arithmetization-Oriented (AO). The cryptanalysis of AO hash functions is essentially done through the study of the CICO problem on the underlying permutation. Two recent works at Crypto 2024 and Asiacrypt 2024 managed to solve the CICO problem much more efficiently than traditional Gröbner basis methods, using respectively advanced Gröbner basis techniques and resultants.

In this paper, we propose an attack framework based on resultants that applies to a wide range of AO permutations and improves significantly upon these two recent works. Our improvements mainly come from an efficient reduction procedure that we propose and rigorously analyze, taking advantage of fast multivariate multiplication. We present the most efficient attacks on Griffin, Arion, Anemoi, and Rescue. We show that most variants of Griffin, Arion and Anemoi fail to reach the claimed security level. For the first time, we successfully break a parameter set of Rescue, namely its $512$-bit security variant. The presented theory and complexity estimates are backed up with experimental attacks. Notably, we practically find CICO solutions for $8$ out of $10$ rounds of Griffin, $11$ out of $20$ rounds of Anemoi, $6$ out of $18$ rounds of Rescue, improving by respectively $1$, $3$ and $1$ rounds on the previous best practical attacks.
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Marc Rivinius
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Publicly identifiable abort is a critical feature for ensuring accountability in outsourced computations using secure multiparty computation (MPC). Despite its importance, no prior work has specifically addressed identifiable abort in the context of outsourced computations. In this paper, we present the first MPC protocol that supports publicly identifiable abort with minimal overhead for external clients. Our approach minimizes client-side computation by requiring only a few pseudorandom function evaluations per input. On the server side, the verification process involves lightweight linear function evaluations using homomorphic encryption. This results in verification times of a few nanoseconds per operation for servers, with client overhead being approximately two orders of magnitude lower. Additionally, the publicly verifiable nature of our protocol reduces client input/output costs compared to SPDZ-based protocols, on which we base our protocol. For example, in secure aggregation use cases, our protocol achieves over twice the efficiency during the offline phase and up to an 18 % speedup in the online phase, significantly outperforming SPDZ.
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Loris Bergerat, Ilaria Chillotti, Damien Ligier, Jean-Baptiste Orfila, Samuel Tap
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Floating-point arithmetic plays a central role in computer science and is used in various domains where precision and computational scale are essential. One notable application is in machine learning, where Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) can play a crucial role in safeguarding user privacy. In this paper, we focus on TFHE and develop novel homomorphic operators designed to enable the construction of precise and adaptable homomorphic floating-point operations. Integrating floating-point arithmetic within the context of FHE is particularly challenging due to constraints such as small message space and the lack of information during computation. Despite these challenges, we were able to determine parameters for common precisions (e.g., 32-bit, 64-bit) and achieve remarkable computational speeds, with 32-bit floating-point additions completing in 2.5 seconds and multiplications in approximately 1 second in a multi-threaded environment. These metrics provide empirical evidence of the efficiency and practicality of our proposed methods, which significantly outperform previous efforts. Our results demonstrate a significant advancement in the practical application of FHE, making it more viable for real-world scenarios and bridging the gap between theoretical encryption techniques and practical usability.
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Daniel Alabi, Lav R. Varshney
ePrint Report ePrint Report
In this work, we construct distortion-free and unforgeable watermarks for language models and generative agents. The watermarked output cannot be forged by a adversary nor removed by the adversary without significantly degrading model output quality. That is, the watermarked output is distortion-free: the watermarking algorithm does not noticeably change the quality of the model output and without the public detection key, no efficient adversary can distinguish output that is watermarked from outputs which are not. The core of the watermarking schemes involve embedding a message and publicly-verifiable digital signature in the generated model output. The message and signature can be extracted during the detection phase and verified by any authorized entity that has a public key. We show that, assuming the standard cryptographic assumption of one-way functions, we can construct distortion-free and unforgeable watermark schemes. Our framework relies on analyzing the inaccessible entropy of the watermarking schemes based on computational entropy notions derived from the existence of one-way functions.
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Bohan Wang, Juelin Zhang, Yu Yu, Weijia Wang
ePrint Report ePrint Report
To counteract side-channel attacks, a masking scheme splits each intermediate variable into $n$ shares and transforms each elementary operation (e.g., field addition and multiplication) to the masked correspondence called gadget, such that intrinsic noise in the leakages renders secret recovery infeasible in practice. A simple and efficient security notion is the probing model ensuring that any $n-1$ shares are independently distributed from the secret input. One requirement of the probing model is the noise in the leakages should increase with the number of shares, largely restricting the side-channel security in the low-noise scenario. Another security notion for masking, called the random probing model, allows each variable to leak with a probability $p$. While this model reflects the physical reality of side channels much better, it brings significant overhead. At Crypto 2018, Ananth et al. proposed a modular approach that can provide random probing security for any security level by expanding small base gadgets with $n$ share recursively, such that the tolerable leakage probability $p$ decreases with $n$ while the security increases exponentially with the recursion depth of expansion. Then, Belaïd et al. provided a formal security definition called Random Probing Expandability (RPE) and an explicit framework using the modular approach to construct masking schemes at Crypto 2020.

In this paper, we investigate how to tighten the RPE definition via allowing the dependent failure probabilities of multiple inputs, which results in a new definition called related RPE. It can be directly used for the expansion of multiplication gates and reduce the complexity of the base multiplication gadget from $\mathcal{O}(n^2\log n)$ proposed at Asiacrypt 2021 to $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ and maintain the same security level. Furthermore, we describe a method to expand any gates (rather than only multiplication) with the related RPE gadgets. Besides, we denote another new RPE definition called Multiple inputs RPE used for the expansion of multiple-input gates composed with any gates. Utilizing these methods, we reduce the complexity of 3-share circuit compiler to $\mathcal{O}(|C|\cdot\kappa^{3.2})$, where $|C|$ is the size of the unprotected circuit and the protection failure probability of the global circuit is $2^{-\kappa}$. In comparison, the complexity of the state-of-the-art work, proposed at Eurocrypt 2021, is $\mathcal{O}(|C|\cdot\kappa^{3.9})$ for the same value of $n$. Additionally, we provide the construction of a 5-share circuit compiler with a complexity $\mathcal{O}(|C|\cdot\kappa^{2.8})$.
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Liqiang Liu, Tianren Liu, Bo Peng
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Garbled Circuit (GC) is a fundamental tool in cryptography, especially in secure multiparty computation. Most garbling schemes follow a gate-by-gate paradigm. The communication cost is proportional to the circuit size times the security parameter $\lambda$.

Recently, Heath, Kolesnikov and Ng (Eurocrypt 2024) partially transcend the circuit size barrier by considering large gates. To garble an arbitrary $n$-input $m$-output gate, their scheme requires $O(nm\lambda) + 2^nm$ bits of communication. The security relies on circular correlation robust hash functions (CCRH).

We further improve the communication cost to $O(n \lambda_{\sf DCR} + m\lambda)$, removing the exponential term. The computation cost is $O(2^n (\lambda_{\sf DCR})^2)$, dominated by $O(2^nn)$ exponentiations. Our construction is built upon recent progress in DCR-based Homomorphic Secret Sharing (HSS), so it additionally relies on the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption.

As an intermediate step, we construct programmable distributed point functions with decomposable keys, relying on the DCR assumption. Previously, such primitive can only be constructed from multilinear maps or sub-exponential lattice assumptions.
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Weidan Ji, Zhedong Wang, Lin Lyu, Dawu Gu
ePrint Report ePrint Report
Current adaptively secure identity-based encryption (IBE) constructions from lattices are unable to achieve a good balance among the master public key size, secret key size, modulus and reduction loss. All existing lattice-based IBE schemes share a common restriction: the modulus is quadratic in the trapdoor norm. In this work, we remove this restriction and present a new adaptively secure IBE scheme from lattices in the standard model, which improves the state-of-the-art construction proposed by Abla et al. (TCC 2021) and achieves asymptotically better efficiency. More precisely, we achieve the asymptotically minimal number of public vectors among all the existing schemes, along with a significantly smaller modulus compared to the scheme by Abla et al. (TCC 2021). Furthermore, our scheme enjoys the smallest Gaussian width of the secret key among all existing schemes and has the same tightness as Abla et al.'s scheme. We propose a novel cross-multiplication design for our IBE scheme, along with several novel tools and techniques, including: (a) a homomorphic computation algorithm that outputs BGG+-style encoding with two distinct-norm trapdoors; (b) a sampling algorithm with hybrid Gaussian outputs; and (c) a partial rerandomization algorithm. These new tools and techniques are general and could find rich applications in lattice-based cryptography.
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Florian Hirner, Florian Krieger, Sujoy Sinha Roy
ePrint Report ePrint Report
This paper presents a high-performance architecture for accelerating Multi-Scalar Multiplication (MSM) on ASIC platforms, targeting cryptographic applications with high throughput demands. Unlike prior MSM accelerators that focus solely on efficient processing elements (PEs), our chiplet-based design optimally balances area, power, and computational throughput. We identify a mixed window configuration of 12- and 13-bit windows that enables an efficient multi-PE integration of 10 PEs per chiplet. Our single-PE design achieves a 1.37x speedup and 1.3x area reduction over prior works, while the multi-PE chiplet design improves the area-time product by 2.2x, offering scalability, lower production costs, and higher manufacturing yields.
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Abtin Afshar, Rishab Goyal
ePrint Report ePrint Report
We propose a new incrementally computable proof system, called Incrementally Verifiable $\textit{Streaming}$ Computation (IVsC). IVsC enables computing incremental proofs of correct execution for any RAM program $\mathcal{M}$ on a $\textit{streaming}$ input $x$. Input $x$ is called a $\textit{streaming}$ input if it is only available on-the-fly as part of an ongoing data generation/streaming process, and not available at once. We also propose a new notion of zero-knowledge features for IVsC that guarantees the proof can be incrementally verified w.r.t.~an encrypted digest, where the proof and digest hide the full data stream. We design zero-knowledge IVsC from a wide variety of standard falsifiable assumptions (such as decision-linear/sub-exponential DDH/LWE).

We also introduce a new notion of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, that we call $\textit{step-by-step}$ zero-knowledge protocols. Such protocols have strong zero-knowledge guarantees, wherein the prover's entire internal memory is simulatable at any point during proof generation. That is, unlike standard zero-knowledge proofs, where only the final proof is simulatable, we can also simulate prover's state at every step of the computation. Such proof systems will be useful in settings where an adversary could corrupt an honest prover even before it generates the full proof. We show that a zero-knowledge IVsC system can be used (almost) as a black-box to design step-by-step zero-knowledge proof systems, therefore secure under standard assumptions.
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