International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Event date: 10 May 2026
Submission deadline: 23 January 2026

Event date: 26 June 2026

Event date: 10 August to 14 August 2026
Submission deadline: 30 April 2026
Notification: 5 June 2026

Event date: 3 June to 5 June 2026
Submission deadline: 1 March 2026
Notification: 30 April 2026

Event date: 2 February to 5 February 2026
Submission deadline: 19 January 2026

Event date: 15 September to 17 September 2026

We propose Asymmetric Robust Threshold ECDSA (ART-ECDSA), a robust and hardware-friendly threshold ECDSA protocol designed for asymmetric settings where one participant is a resource-constrained hardware device. The scheme achieves full robustness and cheater identification while minimizing the computational and communication burden on the hardware signer. Our design leverages Castagnos–Laguillaumie (CL) homomorphic encryption to replace Paillier-based operations and remove costly range proofs, yielding compact ciphertexts and simple zero-knowledge proofs. All heavy multiparty computations, including multiplicative-to-additive (MtA) conversions and distributed randomness generation, are offloaded to online cosigners, allowing the hardware party to remain lightweight. ART-ECDSA provides an efficient asymmetric signing protocol with formal security proofs in the UC framework, achieving both robustness and hardware efficiency within a single design. Our implementation on an ARM Cortex-M7 microcontroller (400 MHz, 3 MB Flash, 2 MB SRAM) shows that the hardware party performs only lightweight computation (50 ms in presigning and ≤ 10 s in signing) and transmits about 300 Bytes and 3 KB in each phase, which easily fits within the bandwidth limits of BLE and NFC. These results demonstrate that ART-ECDSA is practical for cold-storage and embedded hardware environments without compromising security.

As quantum computing continues to advance, traditional public-key cryptosystems face increasing vulnerability, necessitating a global transition toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC). A primary challenge for both cryptographers and system architects is the efficient integration of PQC into high-performance computing platforms. ARM, a dominant processor architecture, has recently introduced ARMv9-A to accelerate modern workloads such as artificial intelligence and cloud computing. Leveraging its Scalable Vector Extension 2 (SVE2) and Scalable Matrix Extension (SME), ARMv9-A provides sophisticated hardware support for high-performance computing. This architectural evolution motivates the need for efficient implementations of PQC schemes on the new architecture. In this work, we present a highly optimized implementation of ML-KEM, the post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) standardized by NIST as FIPS 203, on the ARMv9-A architecture. We redesign the polynomial computation pipeline to achieve deep alignment with the vector and matrix execution units. Our optimizations encompass refined modular arithmetic and highly vectorized polynomial operations. Specifically, we propose two NTT variants tailored to the architectural features of SVE2 and SME: the vector-based NTT (VecNTT) and the matrix-based NTT (MatNTT), which effectively utilize layer fusion and optimized data access patterns. Experimental results on the Apple M4 Pro processor demonstrate that VecNTT and MatNTT achieve performance improvements of up to $7.18\times$ and $7.77\times$, respectively, compared to the reference implementation. Furthermore, the matrix-vector polynomial multiplication, which is the primary computational bottleneck of ML-KEM, is accelerated by up to $5.27\times$. Our full ML-KEM implementation achieves a 52.47% to 60.09% speedup in key encapsulation across all security levels. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to implement and evaluate ML-KEM leveraging SVE2 and SME on real ARMv9-A hardware, providing a practical foundation for future PQC deployments on next-generation ARM platforms.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows secure communication without relying on computational assumptions, but can currently only be deployed over relatively short distances due to hardware constraints. To extend QKD over long distances, networks of trusted repeater nodes can be used, wherein QKD is executed between neighbouring nodes and messages between non-neighbouring nodes are forwarded using a relay protocol. Although these networks are being deployed worldwide, no protocol exists which provides provable guarantees of integrity against manipulation from both external adversaries and corrupted intermediates. In this work, we present the first protocol that provably provides both confidentiality and integrity. Our protocol combines an existing cryptographic technique, Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes, with multi-path relaying over trusted repeater networks. This protocol achieves Information-Theoretic Security (ITS) against the detection of manipulation, which we prove formally through a sequence of games.

We present the first practical, round-optimal blind signatures in pairing-free groups. We build on the Fischlin paradigm (EUROCRYPT 2007) where a first signature is computed on a commitment to the message and the final signature is a zero-knowledge proof of the first signature. We use the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme as the basis (CCS 1993), it is a well-studied scheme with a verification equation that is sufficiently algebraic to allow efficient proofs, that do not need to make non-black box use of a random oracle. Our construction offers flexibility for trade-offs between underlying assumptions and supports issuance of signatures on vectors of attributes making it suitable for use in anonymous credential systems. As a building block, we show how existing NIZKs can be modified to allow for straight-line extraction. We implement variants of our construction to demonstrate its practicality, varying the choice of elliptic curve and the proof system used to compute the NIZK. With conservative parameters (NIST-P256 and SHA-256) and targeting short proofs, signatures are 1349 bytes long, and on a typical laptop can be generated in under 500ms and verified in under 100ms.

Blind signatures play a central role in cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving authentication and have attracted substantial attention in both theory and practice. A major line of research, dating back to the 1990s, has focused on constructing blind signatures from pairing-free groups. However, all known constructions in this setting require at least three moves of interaction between the signer and the user. These schemes treat the underlying group as a black box and rely on the random oracle in their security proofs. While computationally efficient, they suffer from the drawback that the signer must maintain state during a signing session. In contrast, round-optimal solutions are known under other assumptions and structures (e.g., RSA, lattices, and pairings), or via generic transformations such as Fischlin’s method (CRYPTO~'06), which employ non-black-box techniques.

This paper investigates whether the three-round barrier for pairing-free groups is inherent. We provide the first negative evidence by proving that, in a model combining the Random Oracle Model (ROM) with Maurer’s Generic Group Model, no blind signature scheme can be secure if it signs sufficiently long messages while making at most a logarithmic number of random oracle queries. Our lower-bound techniques are novel in that they address the interaction of both models (generic groups and random oracles) simultaneously.

The Plonky3 Merkle tree implementation has become one of the most widely deployed Merkle tree constructions due to its high efficiency, and—through its integration into numerous succinct-argument systems—it currently helps secure an estimated \$4 billion in assets. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the underlying 2-to-1 compression function is not collision-resistant, nor even one-way, which at first glance appears to undermine the security of the entire Merkle tree. The prevailing ad-hoc countermeasure is to pre-hash data before using them as leaves in this otherwise insecure Merkle tree.

In this work, we provide the first rigorous security analysis of this Merkle tree design and show that the Plonky3 approach is, in fact, sound. Concretely, we show (strong) position-binding and extractability.

This paper introduces BLISK, a framework that compiles a monotone Boolean authorization policy into a single signature verification key, enabling only the authorized signer subset to produce the standard constant-size aggregated signatures. BLISK combines (1) $n$-of-$n$ multisignatures to realize conjunctions, (2) key agreement protocols to realize disjunctions, and (3) verifiable group operations (for instance, based on the 0-ART framework). BLISK avoids distributed key generation (allowing users to reuse their long-term keys), supports publicly verifiable policy compilation, and enables non-interactive key rotation.

Anonymous credential schemes such as BBS face a significant deployment barrier: currently available secure hardware such as HSMs required for eIDAS Level of Assurance High does not yet support BBS signatures or pairing-friendly curves. We address this challenge by augmenting BBS credentials with a conventional signature (such as ECDSA), where the issuer additionally signs part of the BBS signature using a conventional signature private key that can be secured in widely available HSMs. While disclosing the extra signature breaks unlinkability, we argue this is acceptable for high-assurance use cases where disclosed attributes already uniquely identify the user. For use cases not requiring this additional security, the conventional signature can be omitted to preserve BBS unlinkability. We prove that augmented BBS credentials are existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, with security depending solely on the conventional signature private key rather than the BBS private key. This approach provides a practical migration path to full BBS deployment while (apart from unlinkability) maintaining several key BBS advantages.

General-purpose secure multiparty computation (MPC) remains bottlenecked in large part by a lack of efficient techniques for handling memory access. We demonstrate a remarkably simple and efficient 2PC instantiation of random access memory (RAM), based on distributed point functions (DPFs, Gilboa and Ishai, Eurocrypt'14). Our semi-honest 2PC protocol can be achieved from oblivious transfer (OT) and a black-box pseudorandom generator (PRG).

For a memory that stores large enough data words, our 2PC RAM incurs constant communication overhead per access. Like prior works that leverage DPFs to achieve memory access, our work incurs linear computation per access, but our per-access communication is lean.

Our 2PC RAM is built on top of an obliviousness-friendly model of computation called the single access machine model (SAM, Appan et al., CCS'24). In the SAM model, each memory slot can be read at most once. We present a simple 2PC SAM protocol, where each single-access memory operation incurs at most $2w + O(\lambda \lg n)$ bits of communication, where $w$ is the word size, $n$ is the number of memory words, and $\lambda$ is a security parameter. Of this cost, only $2w + 2\lg n$ bits are incurred in the online phase.

Our RAM operations are (non-cryptographically) compiled to SAM operations. At most a logarithmic number of SAM operations are needed per RAM operation; if word size is large, even fewer SAM operations are required. Alternatively, there are now many oblivious algorithms that compile directly to SAM more efficiently than via a compilation to RAM, and our 2PC SAM can instantiate these algorithms. As one example, we can use our 2PC SAM to implement privacy-preserving graph traversal (DFS or BFS) over a secret-shared size-$n$ graph while revealing nothing beyond the runtime of the SAM program. Our construction achieves online communication $O(n \lg n)$ bits, asymptotically matching the number of bits touched in a corresponding cleartext graph traversal.

The block cipher (BC) mode for realizing a variable-input-length strong tweakable pseudorandom permutation (VIL-STPRP), also known as the accordion mode, is a rapidly growing research field driven by NIST's standardization project, which considers AES as a primitive. Widely used VIL-STPRP modes, such as HCTR2, have birthday-bound security and provide only 64-bit security with AES. To provide higher security, NIST is considering two directions: to develop new modes with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security and to use Rijndael-256-256 with HCTR2. This paper pursues the first direction while maintaining compatibility with HCTR2. In particular, we provide two solutions to achieve BBB security for two different approaches: (i) general cases without any conditions on the tweak and (ii) under the condition that the same tweak is not repeated too often as adopted in bbb-ddd-AES recently presented at Eurocrypt 2025. For the first approach, we propose a new mode, CHCTR, that iterates HCTR2 with two independent keys, which achieves $2n/3$-bit security in the multi-user (mu) setting and satisfies NIST's requirements. For the second approach, we prove mu security of HCTR2, which allows us to apply the tweak-based key derivation (TwKD) to HCTR2 in a provable manner. When the number of BC calls processed by a single tweak is upper-bounded by $2^{n/3}$, HCTR2-TwKD achieves $2n/3$-bit mu security. By benchmarking optimized software implementations, we show that CHCTR with AES-256 outperforms HCTR2 with Rijndael-256-256, in all the twelve processor models examined. Similarly, HCTR2-TwKD outperforms bbb-ddd-AES in general cases, and it is even comparable to bbb-ddd-AES rigorously optimized for tweak-repeating use cases using precomputation.

Cryptographic hardware implementations are vulnerable to combined physical implementation attacks, integrating Side-Channel Analysis and Fault-Injection Analysis to compromise their security. Although theoretically sound countermeasures exist, their practical application is often complicated and error-prone, making automated security verification a necessity. Various tools have been developed to address this need, using different approaches to formally verify security, but they are limited in their ability to analyze complex hardware circuits in the context of Combined Analysis and advanced probabilistic adversary models.

In this work, we introduce a novel verification method that assesses the security of complex hardware circuits in the context of random probing with random faults, a scenario that more closely reflects real-world combined attack scenarios. Our approach centers around symbolic fault simulation and the derivation of a fault-enhanced leakage function using the Fourier-Hadamard Transform, enabling the computation of tight leakage probabilities for arbitrary circuits and providing a more accurate and comprehensive security analysis. By integrating our method into the INDIANA security verification framework, we extended its capabilities to analyze the leakage behavior of circuits in the presence of random faults, demonstrating the practicality of our approach.

The results of our evaluation highlight the versatility and scalability of our approach, which can efficiently compute leakage probabilities under various fault scenarios for large-scale attacks, e.g., for a masked round of the PRESENT cipher. Notably, our method can complete most experiments in less than an hour, demonstrating a significant improvement over existing estimation-based tools. This achievement confirms the potential of our approach to provide a more comprehensive and practically useful security assessment of hardware circuits, and marks an important step forward for the development of secure hardware systems.

The NIST lattice-based cryptographic standards are set to be widely adopted, offering solutions to the most common cryptographic needs, namely key establishment and authentication (signature). This shifted the attention to more advanced primitives such as threshold cryptography as well as privacy-enhanced technologies, where the transition is expected to be more complex. This is particularly true in the context of post-quantum anonymous authentication where the existing mechanisms may not match the performance requirements of industrial applications. An important avenue for improvement of said performances is the lattice sampler, which is at the center of these mechanisms. Despite recent progress, prior samplers neglected one component: the tag. The latter is not only necessary for security, but it also impacts the efficiency of the subsequent constructions if not handled properly. In this paper, we introduce a new sampler with an enhanced tag management that yet retain the main features of current samplers, and can thus be used as a plug-in replacement. It offers a sampling quality independent of the tag, allowing for producing preimages that are both smaller and faster to generate than those from the very recent sampler of Jeudy and Sanders (Asiacrypt'25). Far from being anecdotal, plugging it into several advanced authentication mechanisms results in size improvements of up to 30%, while being 35% faster.

The Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem forms the foundation of many post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Its inherent hardness, with best known algorithms for common parameter regimes running in time exponential in $n^2$ (for $n$ being the code length), enables compact parameter choices and efficient constructions. Several RSD-based submissions to the first NIST PQC process in 2017 were, however, invalidated by algebraic attacks, raising fundamental concerns about the security of RSD-based designs.

In this work, we revisit the parameters of prominent rank-based constructions and analyze the rationales that guided their selection, as well as their security against modern attacks. We provide a unified complexity analysis of all major RSD algorithms, including combinatorial, algebraic, and hybrid approaches, under a common cost model. All estimates are made publicly available through a dedicated open source module.

Furthermore, we present the first asymptotic analysis of these algorithms, yielding deep insights into the relations between different procedures. We show that all studied algorithms converge to one of three distinct asymptotic runtime exponents. We then provide an asymptotic baseline in terms of the worst-case decoding exponent. In particular, we find that for an extension degree equal to the code length, the best known algorithms achieve a complexity of $2^{0.1481n^2 + o(n^2)}$, attained simultaneously by algebraic and combinatorial approaches. Overall, our results reinforce confidence in the RSD assumption and the design rationales of modern RSD-based schemes such as RYDE.

Post-quantum secure digital signatures based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm, a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof-based construction, are becoming increasingly popular due to their small public key size. However, the development of techniques for protecting MPCitH-based schemes against side-channel attacks remains slow, despite them being critical for real-world deployment. In this work, we adapt the Hypercube-MPCitH framework exploiting its native use of additive secret sharing to enable inherent protection against first- and high-order differential power analysis (DPA). We first perform a sensitivity analysis of the Hypercube Syndrome Decoding in the Head (SDitH) digital signature scheme with respect to both simple and differential power analysis. Based on the insight into its side-channel sensitivity, we then propose a tweak to the signature scheme to increase its inherent resistance against DPAs by design, eliminating the need to explicitly mask large parts of the signing procedure. More specifically, this is achieved through the novel (k+1)-Hypercube ZK Protocol: the proposed tweak increases the number of hidden shares an adversary must probe to recover the secret key from one to k+1, thus achieving inherent masking order k. Typically, increasing the amount of hidden shares results in a degradation of soundness in the zero-knowledge proof and as a result increases the signature size to a point where the scheme becomes of limited practical interest. To address this, we propose a technique to select the hidden shares in a more structured and optimal fashion, by exploiting the GGM tree structure in the Hypercube-MPCitH framework. As a result, the amount of revealed seeds is reduced, thus resulting in a smaller signature size even compared to the original hypercube protocol. Finally, we implement and benchmark the proposed Hypercube-SDitH signature scheme, comparing it against the cost of traditional masking. We propose different parameter sets that explore a trade-off between computational overhead and signature size. For 3rd-order protection, our tweaked signature scheme only incurs a 35-50% overhead in computational cost, compared to an estimated overhead of 300% for a fully masked implementation, while the overhead in signature size stays relatively low (52%). Overall, we demonstrate that the proposed (k+1)-Hypercube ZK Protocol can be used to construct efficient, DPA-resistant MPCitH-based digital signatures.