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02 July 2015
Nizamud Din, Arif Iqbal Umar, Abdul Waheed, Noor Ul Amin
Ruhul Amin, G.P. Biswas
Duc-Phong Le \\and Chik How Tan \\and Michael Tunstall
Pieter Maene, Ingrid Verbauwhede
Jean-Pierre Flori, Jérôme Plût, Jean-René Reinhard, Martin Ekerå
them in a cryptographic context is a hard task.
In this note, we don\'t make an explicit proposal
for an elliptic curve, but we deal with the following
issues.
Security: We give a list of criteria that should be
satisfied by a secure elliptic curve. Although a few
of these criteria are incompatible, we detail what we
think are the best choices for optimal security.
Transparency: We sketch a way to generate a
curve in a fully transparent way so that it can be
trusted and not suspected to belong to a (not publicly
known to be) vulnerable class. In particular, since the
computational cost of verifying the output of such a
process may be quite high, we sketch out the format
of a certificate that eases the computations. We think
that this format might deserve being standardized.
Léo Ducas, Thomas Prest
We present a Gaussian Sampler optimized for lattices over the ring of integer of a cyclotomic number field. At a high-level it works as Klein\'s sampler but uses an efficient variant of Peikert\'s sampler as a subroutine. The result is a new sampler that samples vectors with a quality close to Klein\'s sampler and achieves the same quasilinear complexity as Peikert\'s sampler. In practice, we get close to the best of both worlds.
Shane Kepley, David Russo, Rainer Steinwandt
tor machine that is suitable for fast software implementation. Building
on a combination of chosen ciphertexts and chosen plaintexts, we show
that in a setting with multiple recipients the recovery of an (equivalent) secret key can be feasible within minutes in a standard computer algebra system.
01 July 2015
University of Surrey
The Department of Computer Science embodies the ethos of “applying theory into practice” across its research and teaching activities and is currently ranked 8th in the Guardian League table. Its research activities are focused into two research groups: Secure Systems, and Nature Inspired Computing and Engineering (NICE). These appointments are to enhance the activities of the Secure Systems group. Surrey is recognised as an Academic Centre of Excellence for Cyber Security Research by GCHQ. This is an exciting opportunity in a department that is growing its reputation for delivering quality interdisciplinary and applied research based on strong fundamental principles.
The candidates for the Lectureships will conduct research in areas such as security analysis of systems, cyber-physical and embedded systems security, data privacy or mobile security. We are seeking individuals who can contribute to fundamental research and turn it into practice. An ability to produce high quality outputs is also required.
We are looking for individuals who can inspire students through their curiosity for leading-edge aspects of technology. In particular, the teaching duties of the role includes: delivering high quality teaching to all levels of students, supervising undergraduate project students and postgraduate dissertations and contributing to the teaching of security and other practical areas of Computer Science, such as networking and software engineering.
These are full-time and permanent positions. We would expect appointed candidates to start from September 2015 or as soon as possible thereafter.
Cambridge, UK, December 7 - December 9
Notification: 2 November 2015
From December 7 to December 9
Location: Cambridge, UK
More Information: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/events/passwords2015
Utrecht, Netherlands, July 17
From July 17 to July 17
Location: Utrecht, Netherlands
More Information: http://chae.cr.yp.to/workshop.html
Giulia Traverso, Denise Demirel, Johannes Buchmann
30 June 2015
Adam Everspaugh, Rahul Chatterjee, Samuel Scott, Ari Juels, Thomas Ristenpart
We propose a modern PRF service called PYTHIA designed to offer a level of flexibility, security, and ease- of-deployability lacking in prior approaches. The keystone of PYTHIA is a new cryptographic primitive called a verifiable partially-oblivious PRF that reveals a portion of an input message to the service but hides the rest. We give a construction that additionally supports efficient bulk rotation of previously obtained PRF values to new keys. Performance measurements show that our construction, which relies on bilinear pairings and zero-knowledge proofs, is highly practical. We also give accompanying formal definitions and proofs of security.
We implement PYTHIA as a multi-tenant, scalable PRF service that can scale up to hundreds of millions of distinct client applications on commodity systems. In our prototype implementation, query latencies are 15 ms in local-area settings and throughput is within a factor of two of a standard HTTPS server. We further report on implementations of two applications using PYTHIA, showing how to bring its security benefits to a new enterprise password storage system and a new brainwallet system for Bitcoin.
Cl\\\'{e}mentine Gritti, Willy Susilo, Thomas Plantard, Rongmao Chen
It appears that three attacks menace this scheme.
The first one enables the server to store only one block of a file $m$ and still pass the data integrity verification on any number of file blocks.
The second attack permits the server to keep the old version of a file block $m_{i}$ and the corresponding verification metadata $T_{m_{i}}$ after the client asked to modify them by sending the new version of these elements, and still pass the data integrity
verification.
The last attack allows the Third Party Auditor (TPA) to distinguish files when processing the data integrity checking.
In this paper, we propose several solution to overcome all the aforementioned issues.
For the two first attacks, we give two new constructions of the scheme, one using index-hash tables and the other based on the Merkle hash trees.
We compare the efficiency of these two new systems with the previous one.
For the third attack, we suggest a weaker security model for data privacy without modifying the current scheme and a new construction to enhance the security and to achieve the strongest data privacy notion.
Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich
Andrea Miele, Arjen K. Lenstra
David Bernhard, Marc Fischlin, Bogdan Warinschi
where the extractor has to recover witnesses for multiple, possibly adaptively chosen
statements and proofs. We also discuss extensions to simulation soundness, as typically
required for the ``encrypt-then-prove\'\' construction of strongly secure encryption
from IND-CPA schemes.
Utilizing our model we show three results:
(1) Simulation-sound adaptive proofs exist.
(2) The ``encrypt-then-prove\'\' construction with a simulation-sound
adaptive proof yields CCA security. This appears to be a ``folklore\'\' result
but which has never been proven in the random oracle model. As a corollary, we
obtain a new class of CCA-secure encryption schemes.
(3) We show that the
Fiat-Shamir transformed Schnorr protocol is _not_ adaptively secure and
discuss the implications of this limitation.
Our result not only separates
adaptive proofs from proofs of knowledge, but also gives a strong hint why
Signed ElGamal as the most prominent encrypt-then-prove example has not been
proven CCA-secure without making further assumptions.
David Bernhard, Marc Fischlin, Bogdan Warinschi
encryption with a non-interactive Schnorr proof of knowledge. While this
scheme should be intuitively secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks
in the random oracle model, its security has not yet been proven nor
disproven so far, without relying on further non-standard assumptions
like the generic group model. Currently, the best known positive result
is that Signed ElGamal is non-malleable under chosen-plaintext attacks.
In this paper we provide evidence that Signed ElGamal may not be CCA
secure in the random oracle model. That is, building on previous work of
Shoup and Gennaro (Eurocrypt\'98), Seurin and Treger (CT-RSA 2013),
and Bernhard et al. (PKC 2015), we exclude a large class of potential
reductions that could be used to establish CCA security of the scheme.
Roman Oliynykov, Ivan Gorbenko, Oleksandr Kazymyrov, Victor Ruzhentsev, Oleksandr Kuznetsov, Yurii Gorbenko, Oleksan
Stephan Kleber, Florian Unterstein, Matthias Matousek, Frank Kargl, Frank Slomka, Matthias Hiller
Benjamin Dowling, Douglas Stebila