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29 May 2016
Benoît Cogliati, Yannick Seurin
Sanjam Garg, Akshayaram Srinivasan
The indistinguishability ($\IND$) based security notion of $\FE$ can be parameterized based on whether the adversary obtains bounded/unbounded number of challenge ciphertexts, whether she is allowed to query bounded/unbounded number of functional secret keys or whether she is forced to commit to the challenge messages prior to seeing the public parameters (selective/adaptive). It is possible to weaken further the selective security requirement (called as weakly selective setting) where the adversary is restricted to make all the function secret key queries before seeing the public parameters. These notions can be formalized as $\{xx,yy,zzz\}$-$\mathsf{IND}$-$\FE$ where $xx$ denotes the number of challenge ciphertexts, $yy$ denotes the number of functional secret keys and $zzz$ denotes weakly selective ($\Sel^*$) or selective ($\sel$) or adaptive ($\adp$).
In this work, we show that {\em polynomially hard} $(1,1,\sel^*)$-$\mathsf{IND}$-$\FE$ having {\em weakly compact ciphertexts} implies all other notions {\em generically}. Prior results required sub-exponentially hard $(1,1,\sel^*)$-$\mathsf{IND}$-$\FE$ with weakly compact ciphertexts or polynomially hard $(1,\unb,\sel)$-$\mathsf{IND}$-$\FE$ to imply all other notions generically.
Jiang Zhang, Yu Chen, Zhenfeng Zhang
Daisuke Fujimoto, Shivam Bhasin, Makoto Nagata, Jean-Luc Danger
Frédéric Lafitte, Liran Lerman, Olivier Markowitch, Dirk Van Heule
Franziskus Kiefer, Mark Manulis
In this paper we propose the first construction of an universally composable 2PAKE protocol, alongside with its ideal functionality. The protocol is proven UC-secure in the standard model, assuming a common reference string which is a common assumption to many UC-secure PAKE and PASS protocols. The proposed protocol remains secure for arbitrary password distributions. As one of the building blocks we define and construct a new cryptographic primitive, called Trapdoor Distributed Smooth Projective Hash Function (TD-SPHF), which could be of independent interest.
Benny Applebaum; Pavel Raykov
* In a non-uniform setting, statistical randomized encoding with one-side privacy ($1RE$) is equivalent to non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge ($NISZK$). These variants were studied in the past as natural relaxation/strengthening of the original notions. Our theorem shows that proving $SRE=SZK$ is equivalent to showing that $1RE=RE$ and $SZK=NISZK$. The latter is a well-known open problem (Goldreich, Sahai, Vadhan, CRYPTO 1999).
* If $SRE$ is non-trivial (not in $BPP$), then infinitely-often one-way functions exist. The analog hypothesis for $SZK$ yields only \emph{auxiliary-input} one-way functions (Ostrovsky, Structure in Complexity Theory, 1991), which is believed to be a significantly weaker implication.
* If there exists an average-case hard language with \emph{perfect randomized encoding}, then collision-resistance hash functions (CRH) exist. Again, a similar assumption for $SZK$ implies only constant-round statistically-hiding commitments, a primitive which seems weaker than CRH.
We believe that our results sharpen the relationship between $SRE$ and $SZK$ and illuminates the core differences between these two classes.
Vladimir Kolesnikov, Hugo Krawczyk, Yehuda Lindell, Alex J. Malozemoff, Tal Rabin
David McCann, Carolyn Whitnall, Elisabeth Oswald
Ferucio Laurentiu Tiplea, George Teseleanu, Sorin Iftene, Anca-Maria Nica
Mihai Barbulescu, Adrian Stratulat, Vlad Traista-Popescu, Emil Simion
Yu Yu, Jiang Zhang
Inspired by the ``sampling from subspace'' technique by Yu (eprint 2009/467) and Goldwasser et al. (ITCS 2010), we show that standard LPN can work in a mode (reducible to itself) where the constant-noise LPN (by sampling its matrix from a random subspace) is robust against sub-exponentially hard-to-invert auxiliary input with comparable security to the underlying LPN. Plugging this into the framework of [DKL09], we obtain the same applications as considered in [DKL09] (i.e., CPA/CCA secure symmetric encryption schemes, average-case obfuscators, reusable and robust extractors) with resilience to a more general class of leakages, improved efficiency and better security under standard assumptions.
As a main contribution, under constant-noise LPN with certain sub-exponential hardness (i.e., \[2^{\omega(n^{1/2})}\] for secret size $n$) we obtain a variant of the LPN with security on poly-logarithmic entropy sources, which in turn implies CPA/CCA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. Prior to this, basing PKE and OT on constant-noise LPN had been an open problem since Alekhnovich's work (FOCS 2003).
Michael Tunstall, Gilbert Goodwill
Lucjan Hanzlik, Kamil Kluczniak
Ran Canetti, Oxana Poburinnaya, Mariana Raykova
25 May 2016
University of Surrey, UK
The PhD student is expected to hold at least an upper second class honours degree and preferably a Master\'s degree in CS, EE, Information Security or similar discipline. Basic knowledge of computer networking, network and embedded systems security is required, with some background in cryptography and native code based systems.
The position is funded for three years and is intended to start in July 2016 or as soon as possible thereafter.
Closing date for applications: 16 June 2016
Contact: Thanassis Giannetsos
Lecturer in Secure Systems
Department of Computer Science
University of Surrey
GU2 7XH
Email:a.giannetsos (at) surrey.ac.uk
More information: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/projects/phd-student-position-iot-security-and-privacy
IBM Research - Zurich, Switzerland
Candidates will perform scientific research in the areas mentioned above under the direct guidance of the permanent researchers in our team. Their main task will consist of publishing at respected academic conferences and journals. They will occasionally implement prototypes of cryptographic schemes developped.
Post-Doc candidates must have a PhD degree in cryptography. All candidates must be fluent in spoken and written English; knowledge of German is not required.
PhD student candidates must have a Master degree or equivalent in computer science, mathematics, electrical engineering, or related disciplines. Knowledge of cryptography (in particular public key cryptography) is required, proven experience in the form of theses or published papers is a strong asset.
IBM Research - Zurich offers a stimulating international research environment among experts in computer science, physics, and mathematics. The laboratory is located in Rüschlikon, Switzerland, at 10km from the city of Zurich and on the coast of Lake Zurich. A competitive salary will be offered, adjusted to the high local living standards.
The positions will remain open until suitable candidates have been hired.
Closing date for applications: 1 October 2016
Contact: Interested candidates should send a CV and motivation letter to Jan Camenisch jca(at)zurich.ibm.com
More information: http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/
Jean-Claude Bajard, Julien Eynard, Anwar Hasan, Vincent Zucca
Xiaoyang Dong, Xiaoyun Wang
Dominique Unruh
Furthermore, we show that collapse-binding commitments imply selected other security definitions for quantum commitments, answering an open question by Unruh (Eurocrypt 2016).