IACR News
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23 May 2017
Dallas, Texas, United States, 30 October 2017
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 4 August 2017
Notification: 8 September 2017
Jian Liu, Mika Juuti, Yao Lu, N. Asokan
ePrint ReportWe present MiniONN, the first approach for transforming an existing neural network to an oblivious neural network supporting privacy-preserving predictions with reasonable efficiency. Unlike prior work, MiniONN requires no change to how models are trained. To this end, we design oblivious protocols for commonly used operations in neural network prediction models. We show that MiniONN outperforms existing work in terms of response latency and message sizes. We demonstrate the wide applicability of MiniONN by transforming several typical neural network models trained from standard datasets.
Suvradip Chakraborty, Goutam Paul, C. Pandu Rangan
ePrint ReportElena Pagnin, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
ePrint ReportShihui Fu, Xiutao Feng, Baofeng Wu
ePrint ReportAlex Davidson
ePrint ReportHuige Li, Haibo Tian, Fangguo Zhang
ePrint ReportTo solve this dilemma, we find a compromised method by introducing the block chain into SSE. Our scheme achieves three goals stated below. Firstly, when the server does not return any thing to user after he gets the search token, the user can get some compensation from the server, because the server can infer some important information from the Index and this token. Besides, the user also doesn't pay the service charge. Secondly, if the documents that the server returns are false, the server cannot receive service fees, meanwhile, he will be punished. Lastly, when the user receives some bitcoin from server at the beginning, he may terminate the protocol. Under this situation, the server is a victim. In order to prevent such thing from happening, the server will broadcast a transaction to redeem his pledge after an appointed time.
Diana Maimut, George Teseleanu
ePrint ReportMichael Till Beck, Jan Camenisch, David Derler, Stephan Krenn, Henrich C. Pöhls, Kai Samelin, Daniel Slamanig
ePrint ReportMing Li, Jian Weng, Anjia Yang, Wei Lu
ePrint ReportJoel Alwen, Jeremiah Blocki, Ben Harsha
ePrint ReportEssentially all iMHFs can be viewed as some mode of operation (making $n$ calls to some round function) given by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with very low indegree. Recently, a combinatorial property of a DAG has been identified (called ``depth-robustness'') which results in good provable security for an iMHF based on that DAG. Depth-robust DAGs have also proven useful in other cryptographic applications. Unfortunately, up till now, all known very depth-robust DAGs are impractically complicated and little is known about their exact (i.e. non-asymptotic) depth-robustness both in theory and in practice.
In this work we build and analyze (both formally and empirically) several exceedingly simple and efficient to navigate practical DAGs for use in iMHFs and other applications. For each DAG we:
- Prove that their depth-robustness is asymptotically maximal.
- Prove bounds of at least $3$ orders of magnitude better on their exact depth-robustness compared to known bounds for other practical iMHF.
-Implement and empirically evaluate their depth-robustness and aAT against a variety of state-of-the art (and several new) depth-reduction and low aAT attacks. We find that, against all attacks, the new DAGs perform significantly better in practice than Argon2i, the most widely deployed iMHF in practice.
Along the way we also improve the best known empirical attacks on the aAT of Argon2i by implementing and testing several heuristic versions of a (hitherto purely theoretical) depth-reduction attack. Finally, for the best performing of the new DAGs we implement an iMHF using the Argon2i round function and code base and show that on a standard off-the-shelf CPU the new iMHF can actually be evaluated slightly faster than Argon2i (despite seemingly enjoying significantly higher aAT).
Jeremiah Blocki, Samson Zhou
ePrint Report- An Argon2i DAG is $\left(e,O\left(n^3/e^3\right)\right))$-reducible.
- The cumulative pebbling cost for Argon2i is at most $O\left(n^{1.768}\right)$. This improves upon the previous best upper bound of $O\left(n^{1.8}\right)$ [Alwen and Blocki, EURO S&P 2017].
- Argon2i DAG is $\left(e,\tilde{\Omega}\left(n^3/e^3\right)\right))$-depth robust. By contrast, analysis of [Alwen et al., EUROCRYPT 2017] only established that Argon2i was $\left(e,\tilde{\Omega}\left(n^3/e^2\right)\right))$-depth robust.
- The cumulative pebbling complexity of Argon2i is at least $\tilde{\Omega}\left( n^{1.75}\right)$. This improves on the previous best bound of $\Omega\left( n^{1.66}\right)$ [Alwen et al. EUROCRYPT 2017] and demonstrates that Argon2i has higher cumulative memory cost than competing proposals such as Catena or Balloon Hashing.
We also show that Argon2i has high fractional depth-robustness which strongly suggests that data-dependent modes of Argon2 are resistant to space-time tradeoff attacks.
Laboratoire Hubert Curien, University of Lyon, Saint-Etienne, France
Job PostingMore information on https://laboratoirehubertcurien.univ-st-etienne.fr/en/teams/secure-embedded-systems-hardware-architectures.html.
For a new project which addresses the problem of secure and privacy in MPSoC architectures, we proposes a Post Doc position to work on security evaluation of heterogeneous MPSoC. We are looking for candidates with an outstanding Ph.D in hardware security and a strong publication record in this field. Strong knowledge in side channel attacks and countermeasures, digital system (VHDL, FPGA) design would be appreciated. Knowledge of French is not mandatory.
The Post-Doc position will start in September or October 2017 (flexible starting date), it is funded for 13 month.
To apply please send your detailed CV (with publication list), motivation for applying (1 page) and names of at least two people who can provide reference letters (e-mail).
Closing date for applications: 30 June 2017
Contact: Prof. Lilian BOSSUET lilian.bossuet(at)univ-st-etienne.fr
Laboratoire Hubert Curien, University of Lyon, Saint-Etienne, France
Job PostingMore information on https://laboratoirehubertcurien.univ-st-etienne.fr/en/teams/secure-embedded-systems-hardware-architectures.html.
For a new project which addresses the problem of the security of TRNG against fault injection attack. We are looking for candidates with an outstanding Ph.D in hardware security and a strong publication record in this field. Strong knowledge in fault injection attacks with laser, and VLSI design would be appreciated. Knowledge of French is not mandatory.
The Post-Doc position will start in September or October 2017, it is funded for 34 month.
To apply please send your detailed CV (with publication list), motivation for applying (1 page) and names of at least two people who can provide reference letters (e-mail).
Closing date for applications: 30 June 2017
Contact: Prof. Lilian BOSSUET lilian.bossuet(at)univ-st-etienne.fr
22 May 2017
Suvradip Chakraborty, Janaka Alawatugoda, C. Pandu Rangan
ePrint ReportWe show how to construct a leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the bounded- memory leakage setting, from LR-NIKE protocol. Our construction differs from the state-of-the- art constructions of leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2-secure PKE, which use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resiliency. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying LR-NIKE and admits more efficient construction than the previous such PKE constructions.
We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the bounded-memory leakage setting. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient AKE protocol starting from LR-NIKE protocol.
We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols, in the bounded-memory leakage setting, and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from LR-NIKE protocol.