International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Event date: 28 May to 31 May 2018
Submission deadline: 1 February 2018
Notification: 1 March 2018

The University of Luxembourg invites applications for a Ph.D. position at the Applied Security and Information Assurance (APSIA) group of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT).

The successful candidate will join the APSIA group led by Prof. Peter Y. A. Ryan. The candidate will be part of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) project “Stateful Zero-Knowledge”, which will start on 1st March 2018 and will conduct pioneering research on zero-knowledge proofs. The candidate will be supervised by Prof. Peter Y. A. Ryan and by Dr. Alfredo Rial. The candidate’s tasks include the following:

- Conducting research on the following topics: zero-knowledge proofs and zero-knowledge data structures, privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols, universal composability and related security frameworks, design and implementation of a zero-knowledge compiler

- Providing guidance to M.Sc. students

- Disseminating results through scientific publications and talks at conferences

Your Profile:

- M.Sc. degree in Computer Science, Applied Mathematics, Electrical Engineering, or a related field

- Strong mathematical and/or algorithmic CS background

- Good skills in programming

- Fluent written and verbal communication skills in English are mandatory

- Background in cryptography and information security (a plus)

The duration of a Ph.D is typically 3-4 years. The University offers highly competitive salaries and is an equal opportunity employer. You will work in an exciting international environment.

Applications, written in English, should include:

- Curriculum Vitae (including your contact address and email address, education, work experience, publications if any)

- Transcript of all modules and results from university-level courses taken

- A research statement indicating your interest, prior research (if any) and your motivation (max 1 page)

- Contact information for 2-3 referees

Closing date for applications: 15 January 2018

Contact: Dr. Alfredo Rial (e-mail: alfredo.rial (at) uni.lu)

More information: https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/research/apsia

Post-doc positions are available immediately at the Electrical Engineering Department in USF. The research is inter-disciplinary, and we focus on building innovative secure and privacy-enhancing technologies in research areas such as: Machine learning, Big Data Analytics, IoT and Edge Computing. Our projects are mainly funded by DARPA. Candidates with strong hands-on experience and strong publication record in relevant areas are encouraged to apply.

Minimum Qualifications:

• A PhD in Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Statistics, or related field completed within the past three years or soon to be completed.

• Research-level expertise in one (or more) of the following areas: – Privacy-enhancing technologies, – Machine Learning – Security and Applied Cryptography – IoT Security and Privacy – Big Data Analytics – Edge Computing

Preferred Qualifications:

• Candidates should have publications in high impact journals and conferences.

• The candidate should have strong programming skills including experience with Java, MATLAB, Pyton, and/or R.

Additional Information for Applicants:

A curriculum vitae, publication list, a cover letter/research statement outlining your research experience and interests, your research plans (not exceeding 2 pages), and the names of three academic/professional references.

Send the required documents to the email: brandeis.iastate_at_gmail_dot_com. To facilitate conveying the best image of your research, we recommend you attach to your application the two publications that you are most proud of.

Review of applications starts immediately and will continue until positions are filled.

Closing date for applications: 31 March 2018

Multivariate Public Key Cryptography is a leading option for security in a post quantum society. In this paper we propose a new encryption scheme, EFLASH, and analyze its efficiency and security.

Cryptographic primitives that are secure against quantum computing are receiving growing attention with recent, steady advances in quantum computing and standardization initiatives in post-quantum cryptography by NIST and ETSI. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the families in post-quantum cryptography, demonstrating desirable features such as well-understood security, efficient performance, and versatility.

In this work, we present Round2 that consists of a key-encapsulation mechanism and a public-key encryption scheme. Round2 is based on the General Learning with Rounding problem, that unifies the Learning with Rounding and Ring Learning with Rounding problems. Round2's construction using the above problem allows for a unified description and implementation. The key-encapsulation mechanism and public-key encryption scheme furthermore share common building blocks, simplifying (security and operational) analysis and code review. Round2's reliance on prime cyclotomic rings offers a large design space that allows fine-tuning of parameters to required security levels. The use of rounding reduces bandwidth requirements and the use of sparse-trinary secrets improves CPU performance and decryption success rates. Finally, Round2 includes various approaches of refreshing the system public parameter A, allowing efficient ways of preventing precomputation and back-door attacks.

In the area of distributed graph algorithms a number of network's entities with local views solve some computational task by exchanging messages with their neighbors. Quite unfortunately, an inherent property of most existing distributed algorithms is that throughout the course of their execution, the nodes get to learn not only their own output but rather learn quite a lot on the inputs or outputs of many other entities. This leakage of information might be a major obstacle in settings where the output (or input) of network's individual is a private information (e.g., distributed networks of selfish agents, decentralized digital currency such as Bitcoin, voting systems).

While being quite an unfamiliar notion in the classical distributed setting, the notion of secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the main themes in the Cryptography community. Yet despite all extensive work in the area, no existing algorithm fits the framework of classical distributed models in which there are no assumptions on the graph topologies and only messages of bounded size are sent on the edges in each round.

In this paper, we introduce a new framework for \emph{secure distributed graph algorithms} and provide the first \emph{general compiler} that takes any "natural" non-secure distributed algorithm that runs in $r$ rounds, and turns it into a secure algorithm that runs in $\widetilde{O}(r \cdot D \cdot poly(\Delta))$ rounds where $\Delta$ is the maximum degree in the graph and $D$ is its diameter. We also show that this is nearly (existentially) optimal for any round-by-round compiler for bounded degree graphs.

The main technical part of our compiler is based on a new cycle cover theorem: We show that the edges of every bridgeless graph $G$ of diameter $D$ can be covered by a collection of cycles such that each cycle is of length $\widetilde{O}(D)$ and each edge of the graph $G$ appears in $\widetilde{O}(1)$ many cycles. In fact, our construction can be made instance optimal with respect to each single edge. Letting $C_e$ be the shortest cycle containing $e$ in $G$, our cycle collection contains a cycle of length $\widetilde{O}(|C_e|)$ that covers $e$ for every $e \in G$, and in addition, each edge appears on $\widetilde{O}(1)$ many cycles. As a result, our compiler becomes instance optimal for bounded degree graphs.

The hardness of solving multivariate quadratic (MQ) systems is the underlying problem for multivariate-based schemes in the field of post-quantum cryptography. The concrete, practical hardness of this problem needs to be measured by state-of-the-art algorithms and high-performance implementations. We describe, implement, and evaluate an adaption of the Crossbred algorithm by Joux and Vitse for solving MQ systems over GF(2). Our adapted algorithm is highly parallelizable and is suitable for solving MQ systems on GPU architectures. Our implementation is able to solve an MQ system of 134 equations in 67 variables in 98.39 hours using one single commercial Nvidia GTX 980 graphics card, while the original Joux-Vitse algorithm requires 6200 CPU-hours for the same problem size. We used our implementation to solve all the Fukuoka Type-I MQ challenges for n = 55,...,74. Based on our implementation, we estimate that the expected computation time for solving an MQ system of 80 equations in 84 variables is about one year using a cluster of 3647 GTX 980 graphics cards. These parameters have been proposed for 80-bit security by, e.g., Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari in 2011.

This paper presents an FPGA implementation of the Niederreiter cryptosystem using binary Goppa codes, including modules for encryption, decryption, and key generation. We improve over previous implementations in terms of efficiency (time-area product and raw performance) and security level. Our implementation is constant time in order to protect against timing side-channel analysis. The design is fully parameterized, using code-generation scripts, in order to support a wide range of parameter choices for security, including binary field size, the degree of the Goppa polynomial, and the code length. The parameterized design allows us to choose design parameters for time-area trade-offs in order to support a wide variety of applications ranging from smart cards to server accelerators. For parameters that are considered to provide 128-bit ‘’post-quantum security'', our time-optimized implementation requires 966,400 cycles for the generation of both public and private portions of a key and 14,291 cycles to decrypt a ciphertext. The time-optimized design uses only 121,806 ALMs (52% of the available logic) and 961 RAM blocks (38% of the available memory), and results in a design that runs at about 250 MHz on a medium-size Stratix V FPGA.

We derive necessary conditions related to the notions, in additive combinatorics, of Sidon sets and sum-free sets, on those exponents $d\in {\mathbb Z}/(2^n-1){\mathbb Z}$ which are such that $F(x)=x^d$ is an APN function over ${\mathbb F}_{2^n}$ (which is an important cryptographic property). We study to which extent these new conditions may speed up the search for new APN exponents $d$. We also show a new connection between APN exponents and Dickson polynomials: $F(x)=x^d$ is APN if and only if the reciprocal polynomial of the Dickson polynomial of index $d$ is an injective function from $\{y\in {\Bbb F}_{2^n}^*; tr_n(y)=0\}$ to ${\Bbb F}_{2^n}\setminus \{1\}$. This also leads to a new and simple connection between Reversed Dickson polynomials and reciprocals of Dickson polynomials in characteristic 2 (which generalizes to every characteristic thanks to a small modification): the squared Reversed Dickson polynomial of some index and the reciprocal of the Dickson polynomial of the same index are equal.

Error reconciliation is an important technique for Learning With Error (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE)-based constructions. In this paper, we present a comparison analysis on two error reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols: Ding et al. in 2012 (DING12) and Bos et al. in 2015 (BCNS15). We take them as examples to explain core idea of error reconciliation, building key exchange over RLWE problem, implementation, real-world performance and compare them comprehensively. We also analyse a LWE key exchange “Frodo” that uses an improved error reconciliation mechanism in BCNS15. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to present at least 128-bit classic (80-bit quantum) and 256-bit classic (>200-bit quantum) secure parameter choices for DING12 with efficient portable C/C++ implementations. Benchmark shows that our efficient implementation is 11x faster than BCNS15 and one key exchange execution only costs 0.07ms on a 4-year-old middle range CPU. Error reconciliation is 1.57x faster than BCNS15.

Mobile platforms use biometrics for authentication. Unfortunately, biometrics exhibit noise between repeated readings. Due to the noise, biometrics are stored in plaintext, so device compromise completely reveals the user's biometric value.

To limit privacy violations, one can use fuzzy extractors to derive a stable cryptographic key from biometrics (Dodis et al., Eurocrypt 2004). Unfortunately, fuzzy extractors have not seen wide deployment due to insufficient security guarantees. Current fuzzy extractors provide no security for real biometric sources and no security if a user enrolls the same biometric with multiple devices or providers.

Previous work claims key derivation systems from the iris but only under weak adversary models. In particular, no known construction securely handles the case of multiple enrollments. Canetti et al. (Eurocrypt 2016) proposed a new fuzzy extractor called sample-then-lock.

We construct biometric key derivation for the iris starting from sample-then-lock. Achieving satisfactory parameters requires modifying and coupling of the image processing and the cryptography. Our construction is implemented in Python and being open-sourced. Our system has the following novel features:

-- 45 bits of security. This bound is pessimistic, assuming the adversary can sample strings distributed according to the iris in constant time. Such an algorithm is not known.

-- Secure enrollment with multiple services.

-- Natural incorporation of a password, enabling multifactor authentication. The structure of the construction allows the overall security to be sum of the security of each factor (increasing security to 79 bits).

The high cost of IC design has made chip protection one of the first priorities of the semiconductor industry. Although there is a common impression that combinational circuits must be designed without any cycles, circuits with cycles can be combinational as well. Such cyclic circuits can be used to reliably lock ICs. Moreover, since memristor is compatible with CMOS structure, it is possible to efficiently obfuscate cyclic circuits using polymorphic memristor-CMOS gates. In this case, the layouts of the circuits with different functionalities look exactly identical, making it impossible even for an inside foundry attacker to distinguish the defined functionality of an IC by looking at its layout. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive chip protection method based on cyclic locking and polymorphic memristor-CMOS obfuscation. The robustness against state-of-the-art key-pruning attacks is demonstrated and the overhead of the polymorphic gates is investigated.

We consider generic Garbled Circuit (GC)-based techniques for Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the semi-honest model.

We describe efficient GC constructions for addition, subtraction, multiplication, and comparison functions. Our circuits for subtraction and comparison are approximately two times smaller (in terms of garbled tables) than previous constructions. This implies corresponding computation and communication improvements in SFE of functions using our efficient building blocks. The techniques rely on recently proposed ``free XOR'' GC technique.

Further, we present concrete and detailed improved GC protocols for the problem of secure integer comparison, and related problems of auctions, minimum selection, and minimal distance. Performance improvement comes both from building on our efficient basic blocks and several problem-specific GC optimizations. We provide precise cost evaluation of our constructions, which serves as a baseline for future protocols.

Event date: 1 December to 1 September 2018
Submission deadline: 1 February 2018
Notification: 1 April 2018

Event date: 9 September to 12 September 2018
Submission deadline: 16 April 2018
Notification: 18 June 2018

We invite applications for a Postdoctoral Research Assistant position to join the Cryptography Group at the Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford in association with the Oxford-Emirates Data Science Lab (OEDSL). This is a fixed-term position, funded via the Emirates-Oxford Data Science Lab, which will terminate on 1 January 2021 and is available from 1 February 2018 or as soon as possible thereafter.

Candidates should have a PhD in computer science or a mathematical science related subject, with a strong cryptography/security background and a proven publication record. Candidates with experience in distributed ledger/blockchain technology/financial cryptography (Bitcoin, Ethereum, cryptocurrencies and smart contracts) are encouraged to apply. Experience in privacy enhancing technologies is also desirable.

Closing date for applications: 10 January 2018

Contact: Ali El Kaafarani (ali.elkaafarani (at) maths.ox.ac.uk)

More information: http://www.maths.ox.ac.uk/node/27252

The CSEE department of UMBC is seeking one or two postdocs/scientists to work on either 1) cloud computing, cloud storage, and cloud security, focusing on OpenStack re-design and implementation, and/or 2) ANY distributed systems design and implementation, e.g., blockchains, software-defined networking. The salary will be highly competitive. The title is negotiable.

Our group has a strong background in building permissioned blockchains (BChain, ByzID, CBFT, CPBFT) and building OpenStack systems (Nova, Neutron, Swift, Keystone).

Closing date for applications: 1 April 2018

Contact: Haibin Zhang: hbzhang (at) umbc.edu

More information: https://www.csee.umbc.edu/~hbzhang/

The CSEE/IS department of UMBC is seeking 4 or more PhD to work on security, cryptography (e.g., ORAM), distributed systems, cloud computing (OpenStack), permissioned blockchains (BFT), food safety, SDN, or high-performance computing. The candidates are expected to have a strong programming ability and a strong desire to work with real systems. UMBC is in a nice location nearby many funding agencies and industrial companies.

Our group has a strong background in building permissioned blockchains (BChain, ByzID, CBFT, CPBFT) and building OpenStack systems (Nova, Neutron, Swift, Keystone).

UMBC is ranked 70 in CS/IS according to US News, and places 7th in a new ranking of \"Most Innovative\" national universities. At UMBC, we have 6 HPC, have access to D-Wave 2X quantum, and the NSF CHMPR center which has more than 30 industry and government partners (e.g., IBM, Northrop Grumman, Lexis Nexis, Dwave Systems Inc, Seagate, Collab Med Tech, GE, Morgan Stanley, NIST/ ISL, NSA/Lab for Phys. Sci., NSA/Central Sec. Services, NASA/GSFC, DHS) and a big and energetic cybersecurity center.

CSEE application deadline is 1/1/2018, and IS deadline is 2/1/18. Please let us know if you could not make the deadlines.

Closing date for applications: 1 February 2018

Contact:

Haibin Zhang: hbzhang (at) umbc.edu

Sisi Duan: sduan (at) umbc.edu

The department of CA at Aarhus University has an open position as full professor in Cryptology and Security.

For more information, follow the link below and look for [Professor in Cryptography and Security 950389] in the table.

Closing date for applications: 5 January 2018

Contact: ivan (at) cs.au.dk

More information: http://scitech.au.com/om-science-and-technology/stillinger/videnskabelige-stillinger

The department of CS at Aarhus University has an opening for one or more positions on tenure-track or associate professor level in all areas of computer science, including of course cryptology and security in general.

For more information, follow link below and look for [Assistant Professor (tenure-track) or Associate Professor in Computer Science 934877] in the table.

Closing date for applications: 5 January 2018

Contact: Ivan Damgard, ivan (at) cs.au.dk

More information: http://scitech.au.com/om-science-and-technology/stillinger/videnskabelige-stillinger