IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
21 May 2018
Panjin Kim, Kyung Chul Jeong, Daewan Han
Shuichi Katsumata, Shota Yamada, Takashi Yamakawa
In this paper, we provide a much tighter proof for the GPV-IBE in the QROM in the single-challenge setting. We also show that a slight variant of the GPV-IBE has an almost tight reduction in the multi-challenge setting both in the ROM and QROM, where the reduction loss is independent of the number of challenge ciphertext. Our proof departs from the traditional partitioning technique and resembles the approach used in the public key encryption scheme of Cramer and Shoup (CRYPTO, 1998). Our proof strategy allows the reduction algorithm to program the random oracle the same way for all identities and naturally fits the QROM setting where an adversary may query a superposition of all identities in one random oracle query. Notably, our proofs are much simpler than the one by Zhandry and conceptually much easier to follow for cryptographers not familiar with quantum computation. Although at a high level, the techniques used for the single and multi-challenge setting are similar, the technical details are quite different. For the multi-challenge setting, we rely on the Katz-Wang technique (CCS, 2003) to overcome some obstacles regarding the leftover hash lemma.
David W. Archer, Dan Bogdanov, Y. Lindell, Liina Kamm, Kurt Nielsen, Jakob Illeborg Pagter, Nigel P. Smart, Rebecca N. Wright
Bart Mennink
Shoichi Hirose, Junji Shikata
Xiaofeng Xie, Tian Tian
Hua Dong, Li Yang
20 May 2018
Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen\'s University Belfast
The Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) is the UK national Innovation and Knowledge Centre for cyber security. With a remit to conduct world leading research into applied cryptography, network security and security analytics (Big Data) the centre also has responsibility to commercialise that research and support the growth of the cyber security industry in the UK
You will lead projects and initiatives that turn fundamental concepts into reliable maintainable code that is usable and extensible by the cryptographic community.
CSIT employs a team of 15 experienced product developers in both software and hardware systems to further develop these ideas into well-engineered prototypes and technology demonstrators.
The CSIT engineering function sits between in-house research teams and the R&D labs of our industrial partners such as BAE Systems, Thales, Infosys, Allstate, Direct Line Group, Seagate, First Derivatives etc.
CSIT hosts the UK Research Institute in Secure Hardware and Embedded systems (RISE) (www.ukrise.org).
In return you for your commitment you will be working on emerging technology and at the forefront of this innovation. QUB provides a strong commitment to professional development and opportunities for part time study and post-graduate research are available.
Closing date for applications: 13 June 2018
Contact: Gavin McWilliams, Director of Engineering, CSIT, QUB (Email: g.mcwilliams (at) qub.ac.uk)
More information: http://www.ecit.qub.ac.uk/Jobs/
Data in Chains, in Finland for the Streamr project
Have you worked on crypto projects, blockchains, or ICO projects? Do you have skills with decentralized protocols, IPFS, Swarm? Interested in showing your magic in an open source project?
Streamr (based in Zug, Switzerland) is creating an open source platform for the free and fair exchange of the world’s real-time data. Our blockchain-backed data Marketplace and powerful tools put your data back where it belongs – with you!
Data in Chains (based in Helsinki) is the primary development arm for Streamr. We have a dozen highly talented software engineers and blockchain specialists who are hard at work building the Streamr Platform in conjunction with Streamr developers in Switzerland.
So, here is the job:
Participate in planning and implementation of the security aspects and proof/token mechanics on the Streamr Network
Dig deep into end-to-end encryption, multicast encryption, key management and delivery, content signing, security best practices, game theoretical implications of adversarial networks
Work together with the overall Streamr team to make the Network layer work seamlessly with other components of the Streamr system and the companion blockchain (in the beginning, Ethereum)
Requirements:
Working experience in cryptography / security
Highly analytical mind with good math skills and ability to read and understand academic papers
Good programming fluency in JavaScript, Go, Java, or similar
Interest in decentralized technology and blockchains
Excellent English and communication skills
We Appreciate Experience In:
Experience with end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols (Matrix, Signal)
Familiarity with peer-to-peer networking, especially protocols and libraries used in the decentralized/blockchain space (Whisper, PPS (Swarm), libp2p, devp2p)
Code contributions to blockchains or other P2P networks
Ethereum smart contract development in Solidity
Experience with real-time data or messaging
Closing date for applications: 14 September 2018
Contact: Gavin Roush
Recruiter
gavin (at) datainchains.com
More information: https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/664561386/
Eindhoven, Netherlands, 28 May 2018
18 May 2018
New Delhi, India, 9 December - 12 December 2018
Submission deadline: 25 August 2018
Notification: 12 October 2018
Paris, France, 24 June - 27 June 2019
Submission deadline: 28 February 2019
Cardiff, United Kingdom, 10 September - 12 September 2018
Submission deadline: 20 June 2018
Notification: 27 July 2018
17 May 2018
Kaosiung, Taiwan, 10 December - 13 December 2018
Submission deadline: 26 May 2018
Notification: 14 August 2018
15 May 2018
San Francisco, USA, 4 March - 8 March 2019
Submission deadline: 14 September 2018
Notification: 19 November 2018
Yang Wang, Mingqiang Wang
Bing Zeng
Rishab Goyal
Recently a number of works have studied the problem of constructing quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) which is to perform quantum computations over encrypted quantum data. In this work we initiate the study of quantum multi-key homomorphic encryption (QMHE) and obtain the following results:
1) We formally define the notion of quantum multi-key homomorphic encryption and construct such schemes from their classical counterpart. Building on the framework of Broadbent and Jeffery (Crypto 2015) and Dulek et al. (Crypto 2016), we show that any classical multi-key leveled homomorphic encryption can be used to build a quantum multi-key leveled homomorphic encryption if we also have certain suitable error-correcting quantum gadgets. The length of the evaluation key grows linearly with the number of $T$-gates in the quantum circuit, thereby giving us a quantum multi-key leveled homomorphic encryption for circuits with polynomial but bounded number of $T$-gates.
2) To enable a generic transformation from any classical multi-key scheme, we introduce and construct a new cryptographic primitive which we call conditional oblivious quantum transform (COQT). A COQT is a distributed non-interactive encoding scheme that captures the essence of error-correcting gadgets required for quantum homomorphic encryption in the multi-key setting. We then build COQTs themselves from any classical multi-key leveled homomorphic encryption with $\boldsymbol{\mathrm{NC}}^1$ decryption. We believe that COQTs might be an object of independent interest.
3) We also show that our quantum multi-key homomorphic encryption schemes support distributed decryption of multi-key ciphertexts as well as allows ciphertext re-randomizability (thereby achieves quantum circuit privacy) if the underlying classical scheme also supports distributed decryption and satisfies classical circuit privacy. We show usefulness of distributed decryption and ciphertext re-randomizability for QMHE by providing efficient templates for building multi-party delegated/server-assisted quantum computation protocols from QMHE.
Additionally, due to our generic transformation, our quantum multi-key HE scheme inherits various features of the underlying classical scheme such as: identity/attribute-based, multi-hop, etc.
14 May 2018
Sameer Wagh, Divya Gupta, Nishanth Chandran
Experimentally, we build a system and train a (A) 3-layer DNN (B) 4-layer CNN from MiniONN, and (C) 4-layer LeNet network. Compared to the state-of-the-art prior work SecureML (Mohassel and Zhang, IEEE S&P 2017) that provided (computationally-secure) protocols for only the network A in the 2 and 3-party setting, we obtain 93X and 8X improvements, respectively. In the WAN setting, these improvements are more drastic - for example, we obtain an improvement of 407X. Our efficiency gains come from a >8X improvement in communication, coupled with the complete elimination of expensive oblivious transfer protocols. In fact, our results show that the overhead of executing secure training protocols is only between 17-33X of the cleartext implementation even for networks that achieve >99% accuracy.
Amos Beimel, Naty Peter
Our main result is a construction of linear $k$-party CDS protocols for an arbitrary function $f:[N]^{k}\rightarrow \{0,1\}$ with messages of size $O(N^{(k-1)/2})$. By a lower bound of Beimel et al. [TCC 2017], this message size is optimal. We also consider functions with few inputs that return one, and design more efficient CDS protocols for them.
CDS protocols can be used to construct secret-sharing schemes for uniform access structures, where for some $k$ all sets of size less than $k$ are unauthorized, all sets of size greater than $k$ are authorized, and each set of size $k$ can be either authorized or unauthorized. We show that our results imply that every $k$-uniform access structure with $n$ parties can be realized by a linear secret-sharing scheme with share size $\min\{ (O(n/k))^{(k-1)/2},O(n \cdot 2^{n/2})\}$. Furthermore, the linear $k$-party CDS protocol with messages of size $O(N^{(k-1)/2})$ was recently used by Liu and Vaikuntanathan [STOC 2018] to construct a linear secret-sharing scheme with share size $O(2^{0.999n})$ for any $n$-party access structure.