International Association
for Cryptologic Research

In 2017, Ward Beullenset al.submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil andVinegar, which is a modification to the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemeby Patarin. Previously, Dinget al.proposed the Subfield Differential Attack which prompted a change of parameters by the authors of LUOV for the sec-ond round of the NIST post quantum standardization competition. In this paper we propose a modification to the Subfield Differential Attack called the Nested Subset Differential Attack which fully breaks half of the pa-rameter sets put forward. We also show by experimentation that this attack ispractically possible to do in under 210 minutes for the level I security param-eters and not just a theoretical attack. The Nested Subset Differential attack isa large improvement of the Subfield differential attack which can be used inreal world circumstances. Moreover, we will only use what is called the "lifted"structure of LUOV, and our attack can be thought as a development of solving"lifted" quadratic systems.

We provide a novel electro-magnetic (EM) side-channel resistant symmetric-key authentication mechanism for small devices that uses a Benes network to permute the on-board authentication-key before computing a MAC of a challenge with the key. The permutation itself is derived from the challenge using a hash function acting as a random oracle. The solution has interesting applications such as forgery detection of currency bills.

This paper reports on the computation of a discrete logarithm in the finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^{30750}}$, breaking by a large margin the previous record, which was set in January 2014 by a computation in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{9234}}$. The present computation made essential use of the elimination step of the quasi-polynomial algorithm due to Granger, Kleinjung and Zumbr\"agel, and is the first large-scale experiment to truly test and successfully demonstrate its potential when applied recursively, which is when it leads to the stated complexity. It required the equivalent of about $2900$ core years on a single core of an Intel Xeon Ivy Bridge processor running at 2.6 GHz, which is comparable to the approximately $3100$ core years expended for the discrete logarithm record for prime fields, set in a field of bit-length $795$, and demonstrates just how much easier the problem is for this level of computational effort. In order to make the computation feasible we introduced several innovative techniques for the elimination of small degree irreducible elements, which meant that we avoided performing any costly Gr\"obner basis computations, in contrast to all previous records since early 2013. While such computations are crucial to the $L(\frac{1}{4} + o(1))$ complexity algorithms, they were simply too slow for our purposes. Finally, this computation should serve as a serious deterrent to cryptographers who are still proposing to rely on the discrete logarithm security of such finite fields in applications, despite the existence of two quasi-polynomial algorithms and the prospect of even faster algorithms being developed.

The ability to query a database privately is nowadays ubiquitous via an encrypted channel. With the advent of homomorphic encryption, there is a want to expand the notion of privacy in this context to querying privately on the database with the database learning as little to no information of the query data or its result. The ability to compute the intersection from at least two parties’ sets that are kept private only to themselves is known as private set intersection (PSI) and should be considered a fundamental operation in several homomorphic computation scenarios to do useful work; not least for the ability to implement queries on a database. We outline in this paper a novel highly configurable PSI structure to be used in private querying providing the possibility that even the exact query itself can be protected from the database if required. As well as complex database lookups, there is also a more complex partial matching. The outline of the system design is discussed and we report preliminary results on some of the fundamental operations. We demonstrate that this technology is emerging as a viable given response to lookup queries and partially matching on an encrypted database with over a million entries in approximately 9 minutes.

Broadcast is a fundamental primitive in distributed computing. It allows a sender to consistently distribute a message among $n$ recipients. The seminal result of Pease et al. [JACM'80] shows that in a complete network of synchronous bilateral channels, broadcast is achievable if and only if the number of corruptions is bounded by $t < n/3$. To overcome this bound, a fascinating line of works, Fitzi and Maurer [STOC'00], Considine et al. [JC'05] and Raykov [ICALP'15], proposed strengthening the communication network by assuming partial synchronous broadcast channels, which guarantee consistency among a subset of recipients.

We extend this line of research to the asynchronous setting. We consider reliable broadcast protocols assuming a communication network which provides each subset of $b$ parties with reliable broadcast channels. A natural question is to investigate the trade-off between the size $b$ and the corruption threshold $t$. We answer this question by showing feasibility and impossibility results: 1) A reliable broadcast protocol that: For $3 \le b \le 4$, is secure up to $t < n/2$ corruptions; For $b > 4$ even, is secure up to $t < \left(\frac{b-4}{b-2} n + \frac{8}{b-2}\right)$ corruptions; For $b > 4$ odd, is secure up to $t < \left(\frac{b-3}{b-1} n + \frac{6}{b-1}\right)$ corruptions. 2) A nonstop reliable broadcast, where parties are guaranteed to obtain output as in reliable broadcast but may need to run forever, secure up to $t < \frac{b-1}{b+1} n$ corruptions. 3) There is no protocol for (nonstop) reliable broadcast secure up to $t \ge \frac{b-1}{b+1} n$ corruptions, implying that the reliable broadcast protocol is asymptotically optimal, and the nonstop reliable broadcast protocol is optimal.

We present a computer-verified formalization of the post-quantum security proof of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform (as analyzed by Hövelmanns, Kiltz, Schäge, and Unruh, PKC 2020). The formalization is done in quantum relational Hoare logic and checked in the qrhl-tool (Unruh, POPL 2019).

As cloud computing matures, Machine Learning as a Service(MLaaS) has received more attention. In many scenarios, sensitive information also has a demand for MLaaS, but it should not be exposed to others, which brings a dilemma. In order to solve this dilemma, many works have proposed some privacy-protected machine learning frameworks. Compared with plain-text tasks, cipher-text inference has higher computation and communication overhead. In addition to the difficulties caused by cipher-text calculations, the nonlinear activation functions in machine learning models are not friendly to Homomorphic Encryption(HE) and Secure Multi-Party Computation(MPC). The nonlinear activation function can effectively improve the performance of the network, and it seems that the high overhead brought by it is inevitable. In order to solve this problem, this paper re-explains the mechanism of the nonlinear activation function in forward propagation from another perspective, and based on this observation, proposed a dynamic parameters combination scheme as an alternative, called DPC. DPC allows the decoupling of nonlinear operations and linear operations in neural networks. This work further uses this feature to design the HE-based framework and MPC-based framework, so that non-linear operations can be completed locally by the user through pre-computation, which greatly improves the efficiency of privacy protection data prediction. The evaluation result shows that the linear neural networks with DPC can perform high accuracy. Without other optimizations, the HE-based proposed in this work shows 2x faster executions than CryptoNets only relying on the advantage of the DPC. The MPC-based framework proposed in this work can achieve similar efficiency to plain-text prediction, and has advantages over other work in terms of communication complexity and computational complexity.

The security of Internet of Things (IoT) devices relies on fundamental concepts such as cryptographically protected firmware updates. In this context attackers usually have physical access to a device and therefore side-channel attacks have to be considered. This makes the protection of required cryptographic keys and implementations challenging, especially for commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microcontrollers that typically have no hardware countermeasures. In this work, we demonstrate how unprotected hardware AES engines of COTS microcontrollers can be efficiently protected against side-channel attacks by constructing a leakage resilient pseudo random function (LR-PRF). Using this side-channel protected building block, we implement a leakage resilient authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme that enables secured firmware updates. We use concepts from leakage resilience to retrofit side-channel protection on unprotected hardware AES engines by means of software-only modifications. The LR-PRF construction leverages frequent key changes and low data complexity together with key dependent noise from parallel hardware to protect against side-channel attacks. Contrary to most other protection mechanisms such as time-based hiding, no additional true randomness is required. Our concept relies on parallel S-boxes in the AES hardware implementation, a feature that is fortunately present in many microcontrollers as a measure to increase performance. In a case study, we implement the protected AEAD scheme for two popular ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers with differing parallelism. We evaluate the protection capabilities in realistic IoT attack scenarios, where non-invasive EM probes or power consumption measurements are employed by the attacker. We show that the concept provides the side-channel hardening that is required for the long-term security of IoT devices.

In this paper we show several quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (qCPAs) on contracting Feistel structures. In the classical setting, a $d$-branch $r$-round contracting Feistel structure can be shown to be PRP-secure when $d$ is even and $r \geq 2d-1$, meaning it is secure against polynomial-time chosen-plaintext attacks. We propose a polynomial-time qCPA distinguisher on the $d$-branch $(2d-1)$-round contracting Feistel structure, which solves an open problem by Dong et al. In addition, we show a polynomial-time qCPA that recovers the keys of the $d$-branch $r$-round contracting Feistel structure when each round function $F^{(i)}_{k_i}$ has the form $F^{(i)}_{k_i}(x) = F_i(x \oplus k_i)$ for a public random function $F_i$. This is applicable to the Chinese block cipher standard {\texttt{SM4}}, which is a special case where $d=4$. Finally, in addition to quantum attacks under single-key setting, we also show related-key quantum attacks on balanced Feistel structures in the model that adversaries can only control part of the key difference in quantum superposition. Our related-key attacks on balanced Feistel structures can easily be extended to ones on contracting Feistel structures.

Classical protocols for reliable broadcast and consensus provide security guarantees as long as the number of corrupted parties $f$ is bounded by a single given threshold $t$. If $f > t$, these protocols are completely deemed insecure. We consider the relaxed notion of multi-threshold reliable broadcast and consensus where validity, consistency and termination are guaranteed as long as $f \le t_v$, $f \le t_c$ and $f \le t_t$ respectively. For consensus, we consider both variants of $(1-\epsilon)$-consensus and \emph{almost-surely terminating} consensus, where termination is guaranteed with probability $(1-\epsilon)$ and $1$, respectively. We give a very complete characterization for these primitives in the asynchronous setting and with no signatures: -Multi-threshold reliable broadcast is possible if and only if $\max\{t_c,t_v\} + 2t_t < n$. -Multi-threshold almost-surely consensus is possible if $\max\{t_c, t_v\} + 2t_t < n$, $2t_v + t_t < n$ and $t_t < n/3$. Assuming a global coin, it is possible if and only if $\max\{t_c, t_v\} + 2t_t < n$ and $2t_v + t_t < n$. -Multi-threshold $(1-\epsilon)$-consensus is possible if and only if $\max\{t_c, t_v\} + 2t_t < n$ and $2t_v + t_t < n$.

Strong Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), as a promising security primitive, are supposed to be a lightweight alternative to classical cryptography for purposes such as device authentication. Most of the proposed candidates, however, have been plagued by machine-learning attacks breaking their security claims. The Interpose PUF (iPUF), which has been introduced at CHES 2019, was explicitly designed with state-of-the-art machine-learning attacks in mind and is supposed to be impossible to break by classical and reliability attacks. In this paper, we analyze its vulnerability to reliability attacks. Despite the increased difficulty, these attacks are still feasible, against the original authors’ claim. We explain how adding constraints to the machine-learning objective streamlines reliability attacks and allows us to model all individual components of an iPUF successfully. In order to build a practical attack, we give several novel contributions. First, we demonstrate that reliability attacks can be performed not only with CMA-ES but also with gradient-based optimization. Second, we show that the switch to gradient-based reliability attacks makes it possible to combine reliability attacks, weight constraints, and Logistic Regression (LR) into a single optimization objective. This framework makes machine-learning attacks more efficient, as it exploits knowledge of responses and reliability information at the same time. Third, we show that a differentiable model of the iPUF exists and how it can be utilized in a combined reliability attack. We confirm that iPUFs are harder to break than regular XOR Arbiter PUFs. However, we are still able to break (1,10)-iPUF instances, which were originally assumed to be secure, with less than 10^7 PUF response queries.

In this work various approaches for constant time conditional branching in Montgomery ladder have been studied. A previous method appearing in a code for implementing X25519 has been formalized algorithmically. This algorithm is based on a conditional select operation. We consider a variant of this algorithm which groups together operations in a more convenient manner. Further, we provide a new implementation of the conditional select operation using the cmov operation such that cmov works only on registers. This provides a better guarantee of constant time behavior.

The industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) integrates sensors, instruments, equipment, and industrial applications, enabling traditional industries to automate and intelligently process data. To reduce the cost and demand of required service equipment, IIoT relies on cloud computing to further process and store data. However, the means for ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of the outsourced data and the maintenance of flexibility in the use of these data remain unclear. Public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS) is a variant of public-key encryption with keyword search that not only allows users to search encrypted data by specifying keywords but also prevents insider keyword guessing attacks (IKGAs). However, all current PAEKS schemes are based on the discrete logarithm assumption and are therefore vulnerable to quantum attacks. Additionally, the security of these schemes are only proven under random oracle and are considered insufficiently secure. In this study, we first introduce a generic PAEKS construction that enjoys the security under IKGAs in the standard model. Based on the framework, we propose a novel instantiation of quantum-resistant PAEKS that is based on ring learning with errors assumption. Compared with its state-of-the-art counterparts, our instantiation is more efficient and secure.

The best existing pairing-based traitor tracing schemes have $O(\sqrt{N})$-sized parameters, which has stood since 2006. This intuitively seems to be consistent with the fact that pairings allow for degree-2 computations, yielding a quadratic compression.

In this work, we show that this intuition is false by building a tracing scheme from pairings with $O(\sqrt[3]{N})$-sized parameters. We additionally give schemes with a variety of parameter size trade-offs, including a scheme with constant-size ciphertexts and public keys (but linear-sized secret keys). All of our schemes make black-box use of the pairings. We obtain our schemes by developing a number of new traitor tracing techniques, giving the first significant parameter improvements in pairings-based traitor tracing in over a decade.

While many similarities between Machine Learning and cryptanalysis tasks exists, so far no major result in cryptanalysis has been reached with the aid of Machine Learning techniques. One exception is the recent work of Gohr, presented at Crypto 2019, where for the first time, conventional cryptanalysis was combined with the use of neural networks to build a more efficient distinguisher and, consequently, a key recovery attack on Speck32/64. On the same line, in this work we propose two Deep Learning (DL) based distinguishers against the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) and its evolution RAIDEN. Both ciphers have twice block and key size compared to Speck32/64. We show how these two distinguishers outperform a conventional statistical distinguisher, with no prior information on the cipher, and a differential distinguisher based on the differential trails presented by Biryukov and Velichkov at FSE 2014. We also present some variations of the DL-based distinguishers, discuss some of their extra features, and propose some directions for future research.

In recent years, many papers have shown that deep learning can be beneficial for profiled side-channel analysis. However, in order to obtain good performances with deep learning, an attacker needs a lot of data for training. The training data should be as similar as possible to the data that will be obtained during the attack, a condition that may not be easily met in real-world scenarios. It is thus of interest to analyse different scenarios where the attack makes use of ``imperfect" training data.

The typical situation in side-channel is that the attacker has access to an unlabelled dataset of measurements from the target device (obtained with the key he actually wants to recover) and, depending on the context, he may also take profit of a labelled dataset (say profiling data) obtained on the same device (with known or chosen key(s)). In this paper, we extend the attacker models and investigate the situation where an attacker additionally has access to a neural network that has been pre-trained on some other dataset not fully corresponding to the attack one. The attacker can then either directly use the pre-trained network to attack, or if profiling data is available, train a new network, or adapt a pre-trained one using transfer learning.

We made many experiments to compare the attack metrics obtained in both cases on various setups (different probe positions, channels, devices, size of datasets). Our results show that in many cases, a lack of training data can be counterbalanced by additional "imperfect" data coming from another setup.

Security amplification is a fundamental problem in cryptography. In this work, we study security amplification for functional encryption (FE). We show two main results:

1) For any constant epsilon in (0,1), we can amplify any FE scheme for P/poly which is epsilon-secure against all polynomial sized adversaries to a fully secure FE scheme for P/poly, unconditionally. 2) For any constant epsilon in (0,1), we can amplify any FE scheme for P/poly which is epsilon-secure against subexponential sized adversaries to a fully subexponentially secure FE scheme for P/poly, unconditionally.

Furthermore, both of our amplification results preserve compactness of the underlying FE scheme. Previously, amplification results for FE were only known assuming subexponentially secure LWE.

Along the way, we introduce a new form of homomorphic secret sharing called set homomorphic secret sharing that may be of independent interest. Additionally, we introduce a new technique, which allows one to argue security amplification of nested primitives, and prove a general theorem that can be used to analyze the security amplification of parallel repetitions.

We introduce garbled encryption, a relaxation of secret-key multi-input functional encryption (MiFE) where a function key can be used to jointly compute upon only a particular subset of all possible tuples of ciphertexts. We construct garbled encryption for general functionalities based on one-way functions.

We show that garbled encryption can be used to build a self-processing private sensor data system where after a one-time trusted setup phase, sensors deployed in the field can periodically broadcast encrypted readings of private data that can be computed upon by anyone holding function keys to learn processed output, without any interaction. Such a system can be used to periodically check, e.g., whether a cluster of servers are in an "alarm" state.

We implement our garbled encryption scheme and find that it performs quite well, with function evaluations in the microseconds. The performance of our scheme was tested on a standard commodity laptop.

The Department of Computer Science and Engineering at National Sun Yat-sen University invites applications for tenure-track positions from February 2021 or August 2021. Applicants in areas of information security and artificial intelligence are sought. Applicants for assistant professorship must demonstrate strong research potential, in addition to good teaching ability. Applicants for associate professorship and professorship must have an exceptional record of research achievement. All successful candidates are expected to conduct both research and teaching activities. The department offers BS, MS and Ph. D. degrees in Computer Science and Engineering. The official language of teaching is Chinese, and English teaching is encouraged by the university. For more information, please visit our website: https://cse.nsysu.edu.tw/index.php?Lang=en Applications should include a curriculum vitae, recent publications, and reference letters from at least three people who can comment on the applicant's professional qualification. Other supporting material is welcome. Applications should be sent to: Faculty Recruiting Committee Department of Computer Science and Engineering National Sun Yat-sen University Kaohsiung, Taiwan 80424 Email:srkuang@cse.nsysu.edu.tw TEL:+886-7-5252000 ext. 4340 FAX:+886-7-5254301 The deadline for applications is October 31, 2020, and will continue to receive documents as appropriate until February 28, 2021.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Email: srkuang@cse.nsysu.edu.tw TEL:+886-7-5252000 ext. 4340 FAX:+886-7-5254301

More information: https://cse.nsysu.edu.tw/index.php?Lang=en

The University of Cologne invites applications for a Professorship (f/m/d) for IT Security (W2) in the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, starting at earliest convenience.
The successful candidate has a proven track record of high-quality scientific publications in one of, but not limited to, the following areas:
- Cryptography and its protocols
- Quantum and post-quantum cryptography
- Software security
- Security of embedded systems
- Security of the Internet of Things and of cyber physical systems
- Security of autonomous systems and related technologies

Please apply with the usual documents (curriculum vitae, list of publications and teaching activities, copies of certificates of academic examinations and appointments) via the University of Cologne’s Academic Job Portal (https://professorships.uni-koeln.de) no later than September 22, 2020. Your application should be addressed to the Dean of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences.
For further details please find complete job announcement in the Academic Job Portal of the University.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Dean of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Prof. Dr. Paul H. M. van Loosdrecht (email: mnf-berufungen@uni-koeln.de)

More information: https://professorships.uni-koeln.de