IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
26 August 2020
Apheris | Deep tech company for privacy-preserving data ecosystems in Berlin, Germany
We are looking for an Expert in Cryptography and/or Privacy-Preserving Computations with the right skillset to complement our team with practical deep tech and coding expertise.
Join us putting cutting-edge privacy-preserving technologies and federated computations into production.
As a domain Expert in Cryptography, you will help us build never-seen-before deep tech products for our high-profile customers. You contribute to the Apheris products, including protocol and architecture and author detailed technical concepts around cryptography. You identify and resolve performance bottlenecks and perform and participate in code reviews. Together with our CTO and other senior engineers you will help us hit product milestones by writing high quality, well tested code.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Robin Röhm, career@apheris.com
More information: https://apheris-jobs.personio.de/job/242412
25 August 2020
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
In order to be considered for the position, the candidate must:
The MPI for Security and Privacy is co-located with the Ruhr University of Bochum (Germany) and offers a vibrant atmosphere for research that spans across all aspects of computer security. The knowledge of German is not required for a successful career at MPI. To apply for the position, send an email to Giulio Malavolta (address below) including the following documents:
If you have any questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Giulio Malavolta (giulio.malavolta@hotmail.it)
24 August 2020
University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Research area: Research areas include but are not limited to:
- Verifiable computation
- Secure Multi Party Computation
- Privacy-preserving authentication
- Cryptographic primitives
- A MsC degree in Computer Science, Applied Mathematics or a relevant field;
- Strong mathematical and algorithmic CS background;
- Good skills in programming is beneficial;
- Excellent written and verbal communication skills in English
Starting date: Fall 2020 or by mutual agreement
Contact: Prof. Katerina Mitrokotsa
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Katerina Mitrokotsa
More information: http://direktlink.prospective.ch/?view=2d5b5bd0-e017-4917-90bb-14f3b6efe9c4
Kolkata, India, 2 March - 5 March 2021
Submission deadline: 30 November 2020
Notification: 30 December 2020
23 August 2020
Steven D. Galbraith, Trey Li
Let n in N be the bit length, t in N be the threshold indicating big/small, x in {0,1}^n be the characteristic vector of a set, with its hamming weight |x| denoting the size of the set. Our obfuscation for x requires that ||x|-t| < n/2. Note that a random x has hamming weight approximately n/2, hence this condition is for free most of the time.
Our obfuscation requires hamming distance evasiveness, which is stronger than big subset and small superset evasiveness. Though, this requirement already implies a fairly large family of functions to obfuscate.
We also give a proof of input-hiding for the conjunction obfuscation by Bartusek et al. [5] (see Appendix A) and propose a new conjunction obfuscation based on the big subset and small superset obfuscation (see Appendix B). The security of our conjunction obfuscation is from our new assumption called the twin subset product problem.
22 August 2020
Andrey Sobol, Anastasiia Kondaurova
Abhishek Chakraborty, Ankit Mondal, Ankur Srivastava
Vasyl Ustimenko
Yuntao Liu, Ankur Srivastava
Shou-Ching Hsiao, Zi-Yuan Liu, Raylin Tso
Yi-Fu Lai, Steven D. Galbraith, Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem
In this work, we propose the first isogeny-based UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol in the presence of malicious adversaries without analogues in the Diffie-Hellman setting. The simple and compact CSIDH-based scheme consists of a constant number of isogeny computations. The underlying relaxed problem is called the computational reciprocal CSIDH problem which we can prove equivalent to the computational CSIDH problem with a quantum reduction.
Tancrède Lepoint, Sarvar Patel, Mariana Raykova, Karn Seth, Ni Trieu
We introduce the notion of private information retrieval (PIR) with default, which enables two-party PJC functionalities in a way that hides the size of the intersection of the two databases and incurs sublinear communication cost in the size of the bigger database. We provide two constructions for this functionality, one of which requires offline linear communication, which can be amortized across queries, and one that provides sublinear cost for each query but relies on more computationally expensive tools. We construct inner-product PJC, which has applications to ads conversion measurement and contact tracing, relying on an extension of PIR with default. We evaluate the efficiency of our constructions, which can enable $\mathbf{2^{12}}$ PIR with default lookups on a database of size $\mathbf{2^{30}}$ (or inner-product PJC on databases with such sizes) with the communication of $\mathbf{945}$MB, which costs less than $\mathbf{\$0.04}$ for the client and $\mathbf{\$5.22}$ for the server.
Romain Gay, Rafael Pass
More precisely, the circular security conjecture states that a notion of leakage-resilient security (which we refer to as shielded randomness leakage security) satisfied by GSW (assuming LWE) is retained in the presence of a key-cycle w.r.t. GSW and DJ.
Our work thus places iO on qualitatively similar assumptions as (unlevelled) FHE, for which known constructions also rely on a circular security conjecture.
Steven D. Galbraith, Lukas Zobernig
Leah Lathrop
Alessandro Budroni, Benjamin Chetioui, Ermes Franch
Jason LeGrow, Aaron Hutchinson
20 August 2020
Sydney, Australia, 3 May - 6 May 2021
Submission deadline: 4 December 2020
Notification: 19 February 2021
19 August 2020
Jamshedpur, India, 5 November - 6 November 2020
Submission deadline: 10 September 2020
Notification: 26 October 2020