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06 October 2020
Yusuke Yoshida, Fuyuki Kitagawa, Keita Xagawa, Keisuke Tanaka
Non-committing encryption (NCE) introduced by Canetti et al. (STOC '96) is a central tool to achieve multi-party computation protocols secure in the adaptive setting. Recently, Yoshida et al. (ASIACRYPT '19) proposed an NCE scheme based on the hardness of the DDH problem, which has ciphertext expansion $\mathcal{O}(\log\lambda)$ and public-key expansion $\mathcal{O}(\lambda^2)$.
In this work, we improve their result and propose a methodology to construct an NCE scheme that achieves constant ciphertext expansion.Our methodology can be instantiated from the DDH assumption and the LWE assumption. When instantiated from the LWE assumption, the public-key expansion is $\lambda\cdot\mathsf{poly}(\log\lambda)$. They are the first NCE schemes satisfying constant ciphertext expansion without using iO or common reference strings.
Along the way, we define a weak notion of NCE, which satisfies only weak forms of correctness and security.We show how to amplify such a weak NCE scheme into a full-fledged one using wiretap codes with a new security property.
Christian Badertscher, Ran Canetti, Julia Hesse, Björn Tackmann, Vassilis Zikas
The Global and Externalized UC frameworks [Canetti-Dodis-Pass-Walfish, TCC 07] extend the plain UC framework to additionally handle protocols that use a ``global setup'', namely a mechanism that is also used by entities outside the protocol. These frameworks have broad applicability: Examples include public-key infrastructures, common reference strings, shared synchronization mechanisms, global blockchains, or even abstractions such as the random oracle. However, the need to work in a specialized framework has been a source of confusion, incompatibility, and an impediment to broader use.
We show how security in the presence of a global setup can be captured within the plain UC framework, thus significantly simplifying the treatment. This is done as follows:
- We extend UC-emulation to the case where both the emulating protocol $\pi$ and the emulated protocol $\phi$ make subroutine calls to protocol $\gamma$ that is accessible also outside $\pi$ and $\phi$. As usual, this notion considers only a single instance of $\phi$ or $\pi$ (alongside $\gamma$).
- We extend the UC theorem to hold even with respect to the new notion of UC emulation. That is, we show that if $\pi$ UC-emulates $\phi$ in the presence of $\gamma$, then $\rho^{\phi\rightarrow\pi}$ UC-emulates $\rho$ for any protocol $\rho$, even when $\rho$ uses $\gamma$ directly, and in addition calls many instances of $\phi$, all of which use the same instance of $\gamma$. We prove this extension using the existing UC theorem as a black box, thus further simplifying the treatment.
We also exemplify how our treatment can be used to streamline, within the plain UC model, proofs of security of systems that involve global set-up, thus providing greater simplicity and flexibility.
We show how security in the presence of a global setup can be captured within the plain UC framework, thus significantly simplifying the treatment. This is done as follows:
- We extend UC-emulation to the case where both the emulating protocol $\pi$ and the emulated protocol $\phi$ make subroutine calls to protocol $\gamma$ that is accessible also outside $\pi$ and $\phi$. As usual, this notion considers only a single instance of $\phi$ or $\pi$ (alongside $\gamma$).
- We extend the UC theorem to hold even with respect to the new notion of UC emulation. That is, we show that if $\pi$ UC-emulates $\phi$ in the presence of $\gamma$, then $\rho^{\phi\rightarrow\pi}$ UC-emulates $\rho$ for any protocol $\rho$, even when $\rho$ uses $\gamma$ directly, and in addition calls many instances of $\phi$, all of which use the same instance of $\gamma$. We prove this extension using the existing UC theorem as a black box, thus further simplifying the treatment.
We also exemplify how our treatment can be used to streamline, within the plain UC model, proofs of security of systems that involve global set-up, thus providing greater simplicity and flexibility.
Vitaly Kiryukhin
This article describes some approaches to bounding non-minimum weight differentials (EDP) and linear hulls (ELP) in 2-round LSX-cipher. We propose a dynamic programming algorithm to solve this problem. For 2-round Kuznyechik the nontrivial upper bounds on all differentials (linear hulls) with $18$ and $19$ active Sboxes was obtained. These estimates are also holds for other differentials (linear hulls) with a larger number of active Sboxes. We obtain a similar result for 2-round Khazad. As a consequence, the exact value of the maximum expected differential (linear) probability (MEDP/MELP) was computed for this cipher.
Kamyar Mohajerani, Richard Haeussler, Rishub Nagpal, Farnoud Farahmand, Abubakr Abdulgadir, Jens-Peter Kaps, Kris Gaj
Over 20 Round 2 candidates in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) process have been implemented in hardware by groups from all over the world. In August and September 2020, all implementations compliant with the LWC Hardware API, proposed in 2019, have been submitted for FPGA benchmarking to George Mason Universitys LWC benchmarking team, who co-authored this report. The received submissions were first verified for correct functionality and compliance with the hardware API's specification. Then, formulas for the execution times in clock cycles, as a function of input sizes, have been confirmed using behavioral simulation. If needed, appropriate corrections were introduced in collaboration with the submission teams. The compatibility of all implementations with FPGA toolsets from three major vendors, Xilinx, Intel, and Lattice Semiconductor was verified. Optimized values of the maximum clock frequency and resource utilization metrics, such as the number of look-up tables (LUTs) and flip-flops (FFs), were obtained by running optimization tools, such as Minerva, ATHENa, and Xeda. The raw post-place and route results were then converted into values of the corresponding throughputs for long, medium-size, and short inputs. The overhead of modifying vs. reusing a key between two consecutive inputs was quantified. The results were presented in the form of easy to interpret graphs and tables, demonstrating the relative performance of all investigated algorithms. For a few submissions, the results of the initial design-space exploration were illustrated as well. An effort was made to make the entire process as transparent as possible and results easily reproducible by other groups.
Andrey Sobol
This paper will contain the analysis of frontrunning potential on Quipuswap - a decentralized exchange with automated marketmaking in the context of the Proof Of Stake family consensus algo over Tezos protocol, and a proposal to boost the frontrunning resistance of the protocol via the implementation of commit reveal scheme.
Benjamin Kuykendall, Mark Zhandry
Witness hiding proofs require that the verifier cannot find a witness after seeing a proof. The exact round complexity needed for witness hiding proofs has so far remained an open question. In this work, we provide compelling evidence that witness hiding proofs are achievable non-interactively for wide classes of languages. We use non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs as the basis for all of our protocols. We give four schemes in different settings under different assumptions:
A universal non-interactive proof that is witness hiding as long as any proof system, possibly an inefficient and/or non-uniform scheme, is witness hiding, has a known bound on verifier runtime, and has short proofs of soundness.
A non-uniform non-interactive protocol justified under a worst-case complexity assumption that is witness hiding and efficient, but may not have short proofs of soundness.
A new security analysis of the two-message argument of Pass [Crypto 2003], showing witness hiding for any non-uniformly hard distribution. We propose a heuristic approach to removing the first message, yielding a non-interactive argument.
A witness hiding non-interactive proof system for languages with unique witnesses, assuming the non-existence of a weak form of witness encryption for any language in NP ∩ coNP.
Marc Fischlin, Felix Rohrbach
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs or arguments allow a prover to show validity of a statement without further interaction. For non-trivial statements such protocols require a setup assumption in form of a common random or reference string (CRS). Generally, the CRS can only be used for one statement (single-theorem zero-knowledge) such that a fresh CRS would need to be generated for each proof. Fortunately, Feige, Lapidot and Shamir (FOCS 1990) presented a transformation for any non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system that allows the CRS to be reused any polynomial number of times (multi-theorem zero-knowledge). This FLS transformation, however, is only known to work for either computational zero-knowledge or requires a structured, non-uniform common reference string.
In this paper we present FLS-like transformations that work for non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge arguments in the common random string model. They allow to go from single-theorem to multi-theorem zero-knowledge and also preserve soundness, for both properties in the adaptive and non-adaptive case. Our first transformation is based on the general assumption that one-way permutations exist, while our second transformation uses lattice-based assumptions. Additionally, we define different possible soundness notions for non-interactive arguments and discuss their relationships.
In this paper we present FLS-like transformations that work for non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge arguments in the common random string model. They allow to go from single-theorem to multi-theorem zero-knowledge and also preserve soundness, for both properties in the adaptive and non-adaptive case. Our first transformation is based on the general assumption that one-way permutations exist, while our second transformation uses lattice-based assumptions. Additionally, we define different possible soundness notions for non-interactive arguments and discuss their relationships.
Jean-Philippe Bossuat, Christian Mouchet, Juan Troncoso-Pastoriza, Jean-Pierre Hubaux
We present a bootstrapping procedure for the full-RNS variant of the approximate homomorphic encryption scheme of Cheon et al., CKKS (Asiacrypt 17, SAC 18).
Compared to the previously proposed procedures (Eurocrypt 18 & 19, CT-RSA 20), our bootstrapping is simultaneously more precise and more efficient in terms of CPU cost and number of consumed levels.
Moreover, unlike the previous approaches, it does not require the use of sparse secret-keys.
Hence, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first procedure that enables efficient bootstrapping for parameters that are 128-bit-secure under more recent attacks on sparse R-LWE secrets.
We achieve this by introducing two novel contributions, applicable to the CKKS scheme: (i) We propose a generic algorithm for homomorphic polynomial evaluation that is scale-invariant and optimal in level consumption. (ii) We optimize the key-switch procedure and propose a new technique to perform rotations (``double hoisting'') that significantly reduces the complexity of homomorphic matrix-vector products.
Our scheme improvements and bootstrapping procedure are implemented in the open source Lattigo library (https://github.com/ldsec/lattigo). As an example, bootstrapping a plaintext in $\mathbb{C}^{32768}$ takes 17 seconds, with an output coefficient modulus of 505 bits and a mean precision of 19.2 bits. Hence, we achieve an order of magnitude improvement in bootstrapped throughput (plaintext-bit per second) with respect to the previous best results, while ensuring 128-bit of security.
We achieve this by introducing two novel contributions, applicable to the CKKS scheme: (i) We propose a generic algorithm for homomorphic polynomial evaluation that is scale-invariant and optimal in level consumption. (ii) We optimize the key-switch procedure and propose a new technique to perform rotations (``double hoisting'') that significantly reduces the complexity of homomorphic matrix-vector products.
Our scheme improvements and bootstrapping procedure are implemented in the open source Lattigo library (https://github.com/ldsec/lattigo). As an example, bootstrapping a plaintext in $\mathbb{C}^{32768}$ takes 17 seconds, with an output coefficient modulus of 505 bits and a mean precision of 19.2 bits. Hence, we achieve an order of magnitude improvement in bootstrapped throughput (plaintext-bit per second) with respect to the previous best results, while ensuring 128-bit of security.
Yunsi Fei, Guang Gong, Cheng Gongye, Kalikinkar Mandal, Raghvendra Rohit, Tianhong Xu, Yunjie Yi, Nusa Zidaric
WAGE is a hardware-oriented authenticated cipher, which has the smallest (unprotected) hardware cost (for 128-bit security level) among the round 2 candidates of the NIST lightweight cryptography (LWC) competition. In this work, we analyze the security of WAGE against the correlation power analysis (CPA) on ARM Cortex-M4F microcontroller. Our attack detects the secret key leakage from power consumption for up to 12 (out of 111) rounds of the WAGE permutation and requires 10,000 power traces to recover the 128-bit secret key. Motivated by the CPA attack and the low hardware cost of WAGE, we propose the first optimized masking scheme of WAGE in the t-strong non-interference (SNI) security model. We investigate different masking schemes for S-boxes by exploiting their internal structures and leveraging the state-of-the-art masking techniques.To practically demonstrate the effectiveness of masking, we perform the test vector leakage assessment on the 1-order masked WAGE. We evaluate the hardware performance of WAGE for 1, 2, and 3-order security and provide a comparison with
other NIST LWC round 2 candidates.
Tingting Cui, Lorenzo Grassi
Farfalle, a permutation-based construction for building a pseudorandom function (PRF), is really versatile.
It can be used for message authentication code, stream cipher, key derivation function, authenticated encryption and so on.
Farfalle construction relies on a set of permutations and on so-called rolling functions: it can be split into a compression layer followed by a two-step expansion layer.
As one instance of Farfalle, Xoofff is very efficient on a wide range of platforms from low-end devices to high-end processors by combining the narrow permutation Xoodoo and the inherent parallelism of Farfalle. In this paper, we present key-recovery attacks on reduced-round Xoofff. After identifying a weakness in the expanding rolling function, we first propose practical attacks on Xoofff instantiated with 1-/2-round Xoodoo in the expansion layer. We next extend such attack on Xoofff instantiated with 3-/4-round Xoodoo in the expansion layer by making use of Meet-in-the-Middle algebraic attacks and the linearization technique. All attacks proposed here -- which are independent of the details of the compression and/or middle layer -- have been practically verified (either on the "real" Xoofff or on a toy-version Xoofff with block-size of 96 bits).
As a countermeasure, we discuss how to slightly modified the rolling function for free to reduce the number of attackable rounds.
As one instance of Farfalle, Xoofff is very efficient on a wide range of platforms from low-end devices to high-end processors by combining the narrow permutation Xoodoo and the inherent parallelism of Farfalle. In this paper, we present key-recovery attacks on reduced-round Xoofff. After identifying a weakness in the expanding rolling function, we first propose practical attacks on Xoofff instantiated with 1-/2-round Xoodoo in the expansion layer. We next extend such attack on Xoofff instantiated with 3-/4-round Xoodoo in the expansion layer by making use of Meet-in-the-Middle algebraic attacks and the linearization technique. All attacks proposed here -- which are independent of the details of the compression and/or middle layer -- have been practically verified (either on the "real" Xoofff or on a toy-version Xoofff with block-size of 96 bits).
As a countermeasure, we discuss how to slightly modified the rolling function for free to reduce the number of attackable rounds.
Yatao Yang, Ye Zhang , Yuying Zhai, Zheng Yuan, Guangwu Xu
The aim of white-box cryptography is to protect a secret key in a whitebox environment in which an adversary has full control ability over the computers execution process and the running environment. In order to solve the issues of lower security in static white-box algorithm and inconvenient application in traditional dynamic white-box algorithm, it is proposed that a white-box block cipher scheme based on dynamic library named WBCD. In this scheme, look-up tables and affine transformations are used to construct dynamic white-box library, which ensure that
the different look-up tables can be used for each round of encryptions. In order to illustrate the effectiveness of WBCD, it is designed a novel white-box mechanism (WBDL) based on dynamic library, ,which adopt MDS matrix. In this mechanism, different round-keys have been employed to implement encryption by randomly selecting look-up tables in each round of operations. According to the analysis, WBDL mechanism can resist differential attack, linear attack, BGE attack and side channel energy attack against SM4. After being calculated and tested, WBDL mechanism requires 466.914KB of memory to store the look-up tables, maximum differential probability(MDP) of each round is 2^−26, maximum linear probability(MLP) of each round is 2^−25.61, the encryption speed can reach to 0.273×10^−3 Gbps, and decryption speed can achieve 0.234×10^−3 Gbps. Our mechanism has better security and working efficiency, which can be used in mobile communication security and digital payment security.
Yevgeniy Dodis, Pooya Farshim, Sogol Mazaheri, Stefano Tessaro
In the backdoored random-oracle (BRO) model, besides access to a random function $H$, adversaries are provided with a backdoor oracle that can compute arbitrary leakage functions $f$ of the function table of $H$. Thus, an adversary would be able to invert points, find collisions, test for membership in certain sets, and more. This model was introduced in the work of Bauer, Farshim, and Mazaheri (Crypto 2018) and extends the auxiliary-input idealized models of Unruh (Crypto 2007), Dodis, Guo, and Katz (Eurocrypt 2017), Coretti et al. (Eurocrypt 2018), and Coretti, Dodis, and Guo (Crypto 2018). It was shown that certain security properties, such as one-wayness, pseudorandomness, and collision resistance can be re-established by combining two independent BROs, even if the adversary has access to both backdoor oracles.
In this work we further develop the technique of combining two or more independent BROs to render their backdoors useless in a more general sense. More precisely, we study the question of building an indifferentiable and backdoor-free random function by combining multiple BROs. Achieving full indifferentiability in this model seems very challenging at the moment. We however make progress by showing that the xor combiner goes well beyond security against preprocessing attacks and offers indifferentiability as long as the adaptivity of queries to different backdoor oracles remains logarithmic in the input size of the BROs. We even show that an extractor-based combiner of three BROs can achieve indifferentiability with respect to a linear adaptivity of backdoor queries. Furthermore, a natural restriction of our definition gives rise to a notion of indifferentiability with auxiliary input, for which we give two positive feasibility results.
To prove these results we build on and refine techniques by Göös et al. (STOC 2015) and Kothari et al. (STOC 2017) for decomposing distributions with high entropy into distributions with more structure and show how they can be applied in the more involved adaptive settings.
In this work we further develop the technique of combining two or more independent BROs to render their backdoors useless in a more general sense. More precisely, we study the question of building an indifferentiable and backdoor-free random function by combining multiple BROs. Achieving full indifferentiability in this model seems very challenging at the moment. We however make progress by showing that the xor combiner goes well beyond security against preprocessing attacks and offers indifferentiability as long as the adaptivity of queries to different backdoor oracles remains logarithmic in the input size of the BROs. We even show that an extractor-based combiner of three BROs can achieve indifferentiability with respect to a linear adaptivity of backdoor queries. Furthermore, a natural restriction of our definition gives rise to a notion of indifferentiability with auxiliary input, for which we give two positive feasibility results.
To prove these results we build on and refine techniques by Göös et al. (STOC 2015) and Kothari et al. (STOC 2017) for decomposing distributions with high entropy into distributions with more structure and show how they can be applied in the more involved adaptive settings.
Davide Poggi, Philippe Maurine, Thomas Ordas, Alexandre Sarafianos, Jérémy Raoult
For many years EM Side-Channel Attacks, which exploit the statistical link between the magnetic field radiated by secure ICs and the data they process, are a critical threat. Indeed, attackers need to find only one hotspot (position of the EM probe over the IC surface) where there is an exploitable leakage to compromise the security. As a result, designing secure ICs robust against these attacks is incredibly difficult because designers must warrant there is no hotspot over the whole IC surface. This task is all the more difficult as there is no CAD tool to compute the magnetic field radiated by ICs and hence no methodology to detect hotspots at the design stages. Within this context, this paper introduces a flow allowing predicting the EM radiations of ICs and two related methodologies. The first one aims at identifying and quantifying the dangerousness of EM hotspots at the surface of ICs, i.e. positions where to place an EM probe to capture a leakage. The second aims at locating leakage hotspots in ICs, i.e. areas in circuits from where these leakages originate.
Rachit Garg, Dakshita Khurana, George Lu, Brent Waters
There has been recent exciting progress on building non-interactive non-malleable commitments from judicious assumptions. All proposed approaches proceed in two steps. First, obtain simple "base'' commitment schemes for very small tag/identity spaces based on a various sub-exponential hardness assumptions. Next, assuming sub-exponential non-interactive witness indistinguishable proofs (NIWIs), and variants of keyless collision resistant hash functions, construct non-interactive compilers that convert tag-based non-malleable commitments for a small tag space into tag-based non-malleable commitments for a larger tag space.
We propose the first black-box construction of non-interactive non-malleable commitments. Our key technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the non-interactive proof of consistency required by the tag amplification process. Prior to our work, the only known approach to tag amplification without setup and with black-box use of the base scheme (Goyal, Lee, Ostrovsky and Visconti, FOCS 2012) added multiple rounds of interaction.
Our construction satisfies the strongest known definition of non-malleability, i.e., CCA (chosen commitment attack) security. In addition to being black-box, our approach dispenses with the need for sub-exponential NIWIs, that was common to all prior work. Instead of NIWIs, we rely on sub-exponential hinting PRGs which can be obtained based on a broad set of assumptions such as sub-exponential CDH or LWE.
Arthur Van Der Merwe, David Paul, Jelena Schmalz, Timothy M. Schaerf
We examine the security of the Australian card payment system by analysing existing cryptographic protocols in this analysis. We compare current Australian cryptographic methods with their international counterparts, such as the ANSI TR-31 methods. Then, finally, we formulate a formal difference between the two schemes using security proofs.
David Cash, Andrew Drucker, Alexander Hoover
We initiate a fine-grained study of the round complexity of Oblivious RAM (ORAM). We prove that any one-round balls-in bins ORAM that does not duplicate balls must have either \Omega(\sqrt{N}) bandwidth or \Omega(\sqrt{N}) client memory, where N is the number of memory slots being simulated. This shows that such schemes are strictly weaker than general (multi-round) ORAMs or those with server computation, and in particular implies that a one-round version of the original square-root ORAM of Goldreich and Ostrovksy (J. ACM 1996) is optimal. We prove this bound via new techniques that differ from those of Goldreich and Ostrovksy, and of Larsen and Nielsen (CRYPTO 2018), which achieved an \Omega(\log N) bound for balls-in-bins and general multi-round ORAMs respectively. Finally we give a weaker extension of our bound that allows for limited duplication of balls, and also show that our bound extends to multiple-round ORAMs of a restricted form that include the best known constructions.
Andrea Coladangelo, Christian Majenz, Alexander Poremba
Copy-protection allows a software distributor to encode a program in such a way that it can be evaluated on any input, yet it cannot be "pirated" - a notion that is impossible to achieve in a classical setting. Aaronson (CCC 2009) initiated the formal study of quantum copy-protection schemes, and speculated that quantum cryptography could offer a solution to the problem thanks to the quantum no-cloning theorem.
In this work, we introduce a quantum copy-protection scheme for a large class of evasive functions known as "compute-and-compare programs" - a more expressive generalization of point functions. A compute-and-compare program $\mathsf{CC}[f,y]$ is specified by a function $f$ and a string $y$ within its range: on input $x$, $\mathsf{CC}[f,y]$ outputs $1$, if $f(x) = y$, and $0$ otherwise. We prove that our scheme achieves non-trivial security against fully malicious adversaries in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), which makes it the first copy-protection scheme to enjoy any level of provable security in a standard cryptographic model. As a complementary result, we show that the same scheme fulfils a weaker notion of software protection, called "secure software leasing", introduced very recently by Ananth and La Placa (eprint 2020), with a standard security bound in the QROM, i.e. guaranteeing negligible adversarial advantage.
In this work, we introduce a quantum copy-protection scheme for a large class of evasive functions known as "compute-and-compare programs" - a more expressive generalization of point functions. A compute-and-compare program $\mathsf{CC}[f,y]$ is specified by a function $f$ and a string $y$ within its range: on input $x$, $\mathsf{CC}[f,y]$ outputs $1$, if $f(x) = y$, and $0$ otherwise. We prove that our scheme achieves non-trivial security against fully malicious adversaries in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), which makes it the first copy-protection scheme to enjoy any level of provable security in a standard cryptographic model. As a complementary result, we show that the same scheme fulfils a weaker notion of software protection, called "secure software leasing", introduced very recently by Ananth and La Placa (eprint 2020), with a standard security bound in the QROM, i.e. guaranteeing negligible adversarial advantage.
05 October 2020
Telecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris & Thalès Group
Context and funding: Chair C3S (Connected Cars and Cyber Security), https://chairec3s.wp.imt.fr/
Ph.D. positions in cryptography and security, with focus on distributed protocols, cryptology and Secure Multi-party Computation. Secure “multi-party computation” (MPC) is a type of cryptographic protocol that allows a set of parties to compute a function of each of their individual inputs, without having to reveal their inputs. It would be interesting to explore the use of this approach in the context of the autonomous connected vehicles to define protocols that preserve privacy and integrity, and ensure secure communications in a highly distributed context.
Position is available in the INFRES (Computer Science and Network) Department at Telecom Paris of the Institute of Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), France.
The expected Ph.D research takes part of research activities carried out in the Axis 2 of the Chair C3S and especially related to topic 2 – Protection of data and data flow in real time, cryptography and agility focusing on light and robust cryptography, real-time cryptography and crypto-agility. Candidates should have a strong background in computer science and cryptography. Demonstrated expertise in cryptography, distributed computing, or multi-party computation is a plus. Applicants must hold a master degree in the relevant research fields. Positions are available and come with a competitive salary. The selection process runs until suitable candidates are found. If you are interested, please apply by sending email with one single PDF file and subject line set to Application for Ph.D., addressed directly to Prof. Duong Hieu Phan and Prof. Houda Labiod from Infres Department, Institute Polytecnique de Paris and Dr. Aurélien Dupin from Thalès Group. Since we receive many applications, we encourage you to include necessary materials that demonstrate your motivation and strengths.
Ph.D. positions in cryptography and security, with focus on distributed protocols, cryptology and Secure Multi-party Computation. Secure “multi-party computation” (MPC) is a type of cryptographic protocol that allows a set of parties to compute a function of each of their individual inputs, without having to reveal their inputs. It would be interesting to explore the use of this approach in the context of the autonomous connected vehicles to define protocols that preserve privacy and integrity, and ensure secure communications in a highly distributed context.
Position is available in the INFRES (Computer Science and Network) Department at Telecom Paris of the Institute of Polytechnique de Paris (IP Paris), France.
The expected Ph.D research takes part of research activities carried out in the Axis 2 of the Chair C3S and especially related to topic 2 – Protection of data and data flow in real time, cryptography and agility focusing on light and robust cryptography, real-time cryptography and crypto-agility. Candidates should have a strong background in computer science and cryptography. Demonstrated expertise in cryptography, distributed computing, or multi-party computation is a plus. Applicants must hold a master degree in the relevant research fields. Positions are available and come with a competitive salary. The selection process runs until suitable candidates are found. If you are interested, please apply by sending email with one single PDF file and subject line set to Application for Ph.D., addressed directly to Prof. Duong Hieu Phan and Prof. Houda Labiod from Infres Department, Institute Polytecnique de Paris and Dr. Aurélien Dupin from Thalès Group. Since we receive many applications, we encourage you to include necessary materials that demonstrate your motivation and strengths.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Hieu Phan (hieu.phan@telecom-paris.fr) and Houda Labiod (houda.labiod@telecom-paris.fr).
01 October 2020
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 27 January - 28 January 2021
Event date: 27 January to 28 January 2021
Submission deadline: 15 November 2020
Notification: 15 December 2020
Submission deadline: 15 November 2020
Notification: 15 December 2020
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
I am looking to hire a number of post-doctoral fellows and PhD students with expertise and interests in the area of hardware security, AI hardware security, homomorphic encryption, neuromorphic computing, physical design verification, digital twins, VLSI design, and more. Candidates with strong background on these areas should send me their CV at tehranipoor@ufl.edu .
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Mark Tehranipoor tehranipoor@ufl.edu
More information: http://tehranipoor.ece.ufl.edu/