IACR News
If you have a news item you wish to distribute, they should be sent to the communications secretary. See also the events database for conference announcements.
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
26 October 2020
Vanesa Daza, Carla Ràfols, Alexandros Zacharakis
Ashley Fraser, Elizabeth A. Quaglia
23 October 2020
The registration to TCC 2020 and its virtual affiliated event is open: https://tcc.iacr.org/2020/registration.php
The affiliated event "Matches made in heaven: Cryptography and Theoretical Computer Science" will focus on the tight relationship between these areas (check out the speakers at https://tcc.iacr.org/2020/program.php, a web page with abstract and title is coming soon) and will take place before and after TCC talks.
Technische Universität Darmstadt
- Quantum algorithms
- Quantum engineering
- Quantum programming systems
- Quantum compilers
- Simulation of quantum computers
Application Deadline is November 22nd, 2020. For information about the process please follow the URL.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: For further information or questions please contact Prof. Dr. Felix Wolf, e-mail: wolf@cs.tu-darmstadt.de
More information: https://www.tu-darmstadt.de/universitaet/karriere_an_der_tu/stellenangebote/aktuelle_stellenangebote/stellenausschreibungen_detailansichten_1_379840.en.jsp
IMDEA Software Institute, Madrid, Spain
The IMDEA Software Institute offers an intern position in the area of security and privacy in blockchain, in the context of the project SLN: Scalability for the Lightning Network. The intern will work under the supervision of Pedro Moreno-Sanchez.
Who should apply?: Applicants should have finished (or be close to finish) a master degree in Computer Science. Experience in cryptography, distributed systems or blockchain is highly valued.
Working at IMDEA Software: The positions are based in Madrid, Spain where the IMDEA Software Institute is situated. Salaries are internationally competitive and include attractive conditions such as access to an excellent public healthcare system. The working language at the institute is English. Knowledge of Spanish is not required.
Dates: The position has guaranteed funding for 6 months. There exists the possibility to stay afterwards as PhD student. The preferred starting date is early 2021.
How to apply?: Applicants interested in the position should submit their application at https://careers.software.imdea.org/ using reference code 2020-10-intern-blockchain. Deadline for applications is November 30th, 2020. Review of applications will begin immediately.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: For enquiries about the positions, please contact: pedro(dot)moreno(at)imdea(dot)org
More information: http://software.imdea.org/open_positions/2020-10-intern-blockchain.html
University Jean Monnet, Laboratory Hubert Curien, SESAM team, Saint-Etienne, France
Closing date for applications:
Contact: fischer(at)univ-st-etienne.fr
More information: https://laboratoirehubertcurien.univ-st-etienne.fr/en/teams/secure-embedded-systems-hardware-architectures/job-opportunities-2.html
University of Surrey, Department of Computer Science, UK
Topics of interest: distributed/concurrent systems, blockchain, internet data science or social computing, with links to security and/or AI.
Closing deadline: November 22, 2020
See https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/vacancy.aspx?ref=045220
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Informal inquiries to Mark Manulis (m dot manulis at surrey dot ac dot uk)
More information: https://jobs.surrey.ac.uk/vacancy.aspx?ref=045220
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany
The group offers excellent working environment as a part of Horst Görtz Institut for IT Security (HGI https://hgi.rub.de/en/ ) including more than 200 scientists active in several different aspects of IT security and cryptography.
The candidate should have a PhD in IT-security, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science with excellent publication records.
Since the position is funded by a national project, having the ability to fluently talk, write, and read in German is a must. The position is for two years, with an option to extend.
Send your application in a single pdf file to amir.moradi (at) rub.de
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Amir Moradi
More information: https://www.seceng.rub.de/moradi/
NYU Shanghai
Closing date for applications:
Contact: shanghai.faculty.recruitment@nyu.edu
More information: https://apply.interfolio.com/80168
Center for Information Security and Trust, IT University of Copenhagen
The Center for Information Security and Trust (CISAT) at the Computer Science Department of the IT University of Copenhagen invites highly motivated individuals to apply for a Postdoc position starting in January 2021 or soon thereafter for a duration of 2 years.
The position is in the context of the project “Enabling User-Accountable Mechanisms for Decision Systems”, which looks at ways to provide dispute resolution capabilities to decision systems (e.g. voting protocols) by combining cryptographic techniques for human senses with advanced cryptographic protocols.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Rosario Giustolisi (rosg@itu.dk) or Carsten Schürmann (carsten@itu.dk)
More information: https://candidate.hr-manager.net/ApplicationInit.aspx?cid=119&ProjectId=181223&DepartmentId=3439&MediaId=5
Lund University, Sweden
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Thomas johansson (thomas@eit.lth.se)
More information: https://lu.varbi.com/en/what:job/jobID:358175/
Athena Research Center
Interested candidates are advised to contact the coordinator (see details below) for further clarifications.
PhD candidates are expected to hold a Master’s degree (or equivalent) in Computer Science or related disciplines and with a strong interest in the field of security in the aforementioned fields. Excellent working knowledge of English is required.
Post-Doc candidates are expected to hold a PhD degree the fields of Computer Security of Machine Learning, have experience in EU funded projects and excellent working knowledge of English.
Deadline for applications 3/11/2020.Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. Constantinos Patsakis (kpatsak@unipi.gr)
More information: https://www.imsi.athenarc.gr/el/announcements/announcement/464
National Institute of Technology Jamshedpur, Jamshedpur, India
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Sumit Kumar Debnath (PI)
More information: http://www.nitjsr.ac.in/uploads/index.php?id=3524&category=notifications
Kristian Gjøsteen, Thomas Haines, Morten Rotvold Solberg
Anders Dalskov, Daniel Escudero, Marcel Keller
We implement our four-party protocol with abort in the MP-SPDZ framework for multiparty computation and benchmark multiple applications like MNIST classification training and ImageNet inference. Our results show that our four-party protocol performs similarly to an efficient honest-majority three-party protocol that only provides semi-honest/passive security, which suggest that adding a fourth party can be an effective method to achieve active security without harming performance.
Pratyay Mukherjee
In this work we augment the DiSE TSE definitions to the fully adaptive (and malicious) setting, in that the adversary is allowed to corrupt parties dynamically at any time during the execution. The adversary may choose to corrupt a party depending on the information acquired thus far, as long as the total number of corrupt parties stays below the threshold. We also augment DiSEs DPRF definitions to support adaptive corruption. We show that their generic TSE construction, when plugged-in with an adaptive DPRF (satisfying our definition), meets our adaptive TSE definitions.
We provide an efficient instantiation of the adaptive DPRF, proven secure assuming decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH), in the random oracle model. Our construction borrows ideas from Naor, Pinkas and Reingolds [Eurocrypt 1999] statically secure DDH-based DPRF (used in DiSE) and Libert, Joye and Yungs [PODC 2014] adaptively secure threshold signature. Similar to DiSE, we also give an extension satisfying a strengthened adaptive DPRF definition, which in turn yields a stronger adaptive TSE scheme. For that, we construct a simple and efficient adaptive NIZK protocol for proving a specific commit-and-prove style statement in the random oracle model assuming DDH.
Zichen Gui, Kenneth G. Paterson, Sikhar Patranabis, Bogdan Warinschi
Joël Alwen, Daniel Jost, Marta Mularczyk
The cryptographic core of the MLS protocol (from which it inherits essentially all of its efficiency and security properties) is a Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) protocol. CGKA protocols provide asynchronous E2E secure group management by allowing group members to agree on a fresh independent symmetric key after every change to the group's state (e.g. when someone joins/leaves the group).
In this work, we make progress towards a precise understanding of the insider security of MLS in the form of 3 contributions. On the theory side, we overcome several subtelties to formulate the first notion of insider security for a CGKA (or group messaging) protocol. Next, we isolate the core components of MLS to obtain a CGKA protocol we dubbed Insider Secure TreeKEM (ITK). Finally, we give a rigorous proof that ITK provides (adaptive) insider security. In particular, this work also initiates the study of insider secure CGKA protocols, a primitive of interest in its own right.
Chris Brzuska, Geoffroy Couteau
Our results lay the foundations for a program towards building fine-grained one-way functions from strong forms of average-case hardness, following the template of constructions in the Random Language Model. We provide a preliminary investigation of this program, showing black-box barriers toward instantiating our idealized constructions from natural hardness properties.
Adrián Ranea, Bart Preneel
In this work, we analyse the security of white-box implementations based on self-equivalence encodings for a broad class of SPN ciphers. First, we characterize the self-equivalence groups of S-box layers, and we prove that all the self-equivalences of a cryptographically strong S-box layer have a diagonal shape. Then, we propose the first generic attack on self-equivalence encodings. Our attack, based on affine equivalence problems, identifies the connection between the security of self equivalence encodings and the self-equivalence structure of the cipher components. While we show that traditional SPN ciphers with cryptographically strong S-box layers cannot be secured with self-equivalence encodings, our analysis shows that self-equivalence encodings resist the generic attack if the cipher components satisfy several conditions, revealing the potential of self-equivalence encodings to secure other types of ciphers.