IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
02 November 2020
Temasek Labs, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Job PostingPhysical Analysis and Cryptographic Engineering (PACE) is research group under Temasek Laboratories, NTU, Singapore. As a group of dynamic researchers, the main focus of PACE is to explore advanced aspects of embedded security.
PACE group is seeking applications for a motivated researcher in the area of embedded and mobile security. The successful candidate will work with experienced researchers to explore new security vulnerabilities in commercial products like smartphones and IoT, with a focus on secure boot.
We are looking for a candidate who meets the following requirements:
- Have already completed, or be close to completing a PhD degree in mathematics, computer science, electrical engineering, or related disciplines, with strong track record in research and development (publications in international journals and conferences). Master degree with relevant research experience can be considered.
- Experienced in security evaluation and have understanding of crypto- graphic algorithms (symmetric and asymmetric). Coding background in C/Java/Assembly/Python/VHDL for analysis is required.
- Has experience in working with embedded/IoT devices or android devices for vulnerability assessment.
- Has previous lab experience in developing prototypes, FPGA design, manipulating oscilloscopes, writing device drivers and communication interfaces, which are used in analysis of implemented designs.
- Knowledge of side-channel or fault attacks is a plus.
- Fluent in written and spoken English
- Creative, curious, self-motivated and a team player with good analyti- cal and problem-solving skills.
You will be joining a dynamic group performing research on embedded security, specific to physical attacks. This position is available from December 2020. The initial contract will be one year. There are strong possibilities for extensions upon successful performance. TL offers competitive salary package plus other benefits.
Closing date for applications:
Contact:
Dr. Shivam Bhasin
Programme Manager
sbhasin (at) ntu.edu.sg
Palaiseau, France, 3 November - 4 November 2020
Event CalendarParis, France, 6 September - 10 December 2021
Event CalendarUniversity of Warsaw
Job PostingWe offer:
- very interesting research problems (ranging from theory of cryptography to more applied topics),
- membership in an active and vibrant research team with several international collaborators,
- budget for conference travel and research visits,
- attractive salary: approximately 6,500 PLN per month (gross), and
- an employment contract.
Other details:
- Starting date: January 2021
- Duration: 2 years
The successful candidates will have to enroll in the PhD program at the University of Warsaw (Poland).
Application deadline: Dec 2nd, 2020.
To apply please follow this link: https://www.crypto.edu.pl/research-assistants.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Stefan Dziembowski
More information: https://www.crypto.edu.pl/research-assistants
Mohammed VI Polytechnic University (UM6P), Benguerir. Morroco
Job PostingLocated at the heart of the future Green City of Benguerir, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University (UM6P), a higher education institution with an international standard, is established to serve Morocco and the African continent. Its vision is honed around research and innovation at the service of education and development. This unique nascent university, with its state-of-the-art campus and infrastructure, has woven a sound academic and research network, and its recruitment process is seeking high quality academics and professionals in order to boost its quality-oriented research environment in the metropolitan area of Marrakech.
The School of Computer and Communication Sciences at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University (UM6P), Benguerir, Morocco is currently looking for motivated and talented Postdoctoral researchers in the area of applied cryptography, and Information security. The successful candidates will primarily be working on the following topics (but not limited to):
- Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies
- Secure Multi Party Computation
The ideal candidates should have a PhD degree in cryptography (or related field) from a leading university, and a proven record of publications in top cryptography/security/TCS venues. We offer competitive salary (the net salary per month is 2000 USD), a budget for conference travel and research visit, and membership in a young and vibrant team with several international contacts (for more see: https://www.um6p.ma/en).
Submit your application via email including
- full CV,
- sample publications,
- a detailed research proposal,
- and 2-3 reference letters sent directly by the referees.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Assoc. Prof. Mustapha Hedabou (mustapha.hedabou@um6p.ma) https://career2.successfactors.eu/sfcareer/jobreqcareer?jobId=1339&company=ump
More information: https://career2.successfactors.eu/sfcareer/jobreqcareer?jobId=1339&company=ump
Quebec City, Canada, 6 December - 10 December 2021
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 1 December 2020
Notification: 28 February 2021
Clément Hoffmann, Pierrick Méaux, Thomas Ricosset
ePrint ReportChan Fan, Xiaolei Dong, Zhenfu Cao, Jiachen Shen
ePrint ReportTwo-Source Non-Malleable Extractors and Applications to Privacy Amplification with Tamperable Memory
Divesh Aggarwal, Maciej Obremski, João Ribeiro, Mark Simkin, Luisa Siniscalchi
ePrint ReportTo complement the above, we study unconditional explicit constructions of computational two-source non-malleable extractors for samplable sources in the CRS model with significantly better parameters than their information-theoretic counterparts by exploiting stronger hardness assumptions. Under a quasipolynomial hardness assumption, we achieve security against bounded distinguishers, while assuming the existence of nearly optimal collision-resistant hash functions allows us to achieve security against unbounded distinguishers.
Finally, we introduce the setting of privacy amplification resilient against memory-tampering active adversaries. Here, we aim to design privacy amplification protocols that are resilient against an active adversary that can additionally choose one honest party at will and arbitrarily corrupt its memory (i.e., its shared secret and randomness tape) before the execution of the protocol. We show how to design such protocols using two-source non-malleable extractors.
Daniel J. Bernstein
ePrint ReportAs concrete examples, this paper shows two manipulated comparisons of size-security tradeoffs of lattice-based encryption proposals submitted to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project. One of these manipulated comparisons appears to match public claims made by NIST, while the other does not, and the underlying facts do not. This raises the question of whether NIST has been subjected to this attack.
This paper also considers a weak defense and a strong defense that can be applied by standards-development organizations and by other people comparing cryptographic algorithms. The weak defense does not protect the integrity of comparisons, although it does force this type of attack to begin early. The strong defense stops this attack.
Arthur Lavice, Nadia El Mrabet, Alexandre Berzati, Jean-Baptiste Rigaud
ePrint ReportIn this paper, we transposed previous work on multiplication over extesnsion fields using Newton's interpolation to construct a new formula for multiplication in Fp4 and propose time x area efficient hardware implementation of this operation.
This co-processor is implemented on Kintex-7 Xilinx FPGA. The efficiency of our design in terms of time x area is almost 3 times better than previous specific architecture for multiplication in Fp4. Our architecture is used to estimate the efficiency of hardware implementations of full pairings on BLS12 and BLS24 curves with a 128-bit security level. This co-processeur can be easily modified to anticipate further curve changes.
Melissa Azouaoui, François Durvaux, Romain Poussier, François-Xavier Standaert, Kostas Papagiannopoulos, Vincent Verneuil
ePrint ReportLoïc Etienne
ePrint ReportIoana Boureanu, Daniel Migault, Stere Preda, Hyame Assem Alamedine, Sanjay Mishra, Frederic Fieau, Mohammad Mannan
ePrint ReportZhengjun Cao , Lihua Liu, Leming Hong
ePrint ReportMatthew Campagna, Adam Petcher
ePrint ReportShashank Agrawal, Saikrishna Badrinarayanan, Pratyay Mukherjee, Peter Rindal
ePrint ReportWe design a suite of secure protocols for external-facing authentication based on the cosine similarity metric which provide privacy for both user templates stored on their devices and the biometric measurement captured by external sensors in this open setting. The protocols provide different levels of security, ranging from passive security with some leakage to active security with no leakage at all. With the help of new packing techniques and zero-knowledge proofs for Paillier encryption - and careful protocol design, our protocols achieve very practical performance numbers. For templates of length 256 with elements of size 16 bits each, our fastest protocol takes merely 0.024 seconds to compute a match, but even the slowest one takes no more than 0.12 seconds. The communication overhead of our protocols is very small too. The passive and actively secure protocols (with some leakage) need to exchange just 16.5KB and 27.8KB of data, respectively. The first message is designed to be reusable and, if sent in advance, would cut the overhead down to just 0.5KB and 0.8KB, respectively.
29 October 2020
Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 7 June - 11 June 2021
Event CalendarSubmission deadline: 8 January 2021
Notification: 22 February 2021
Rouzbeh Behnia, Eamonn W. Postlethwaite, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Attila Altay Yavuz
ePrint ReportAlex B. Grilo, Kathrin Hövelmann, Andreas Hülsing, Christian Majenz
ePrint Report1) We give a tighter proof of security of the message compression routine as used by XMSS. 2) We show that the standard ROM proof of chosen-message security for Fiat-Shamir signatures can be lifted to the QROM, straightforwardly, achieving a tighter reduction than previously known. 3) We give the first QROM proof of security against fault injection and nonce attacks for the hedged Fiat-Shamir transform.