IACR News
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02 January 2021
M. R. Mirzaee Shamsabad, S. M. Dehnavi
Zi-Yuan Liu, Yi-Fan Tseng, Raylin Tso, Cheng-Yi Lee
Wyatt Howe, Andrei Lapets
Kobi Gurkan, Philipp Jovanovic, Mary Maller, Sarah Meiklejohn, Gilad Stern, Alin Tomescu
Ismail San
Mahdi Mahdavi Oliaee, Zahra Ahmadian
Dingfeng Ye
2-Step Multi-Client Quadratic Functional Encryption from Decentralized Function-Hiding Inner-Product
Michel Abdalla, David Pointcheval, Azam Soleimanian
To overcome this challenge, we present an efficient decentralized version of FHIP scheme of Lin (Crypto 16). This leads to a 2-step MCQFE (2-MCQFE) scheme. In a 2-step MCQFE scheme, the encryption phase is a (non-interactive) protocol among clients and a set of honest-but-curious authorities. More precisely, clients are the owner of messages and the master secret-key of the underlying FHIP is shared among authorities. In the first step, the client publishes a pre-ciphertext ``pct'' associated with its message. Then in the second step, each authority generates its share ``ct_i'' extracted from the pre-ciphertext. The public aggregation of these shares ``ct_i'' will generate the target ciphertext ``ct'' which then would be applied on the functional key ``sk_F'' to compute the quadratic functionality. The security model is strong enough to consider no trust among clients and authorities, and also the revelation of some secret keys (of clients or authorities) through corruptions. We instantiate our 2-MCQFE scheme and prove its security in the random-oracle model based on the SXDH assumption. Moreover, we show that its security holds as long as at least one of the authorities is not corrupted.
31 December 2020
Yi Chen, Hongbo Yu
In this paper, we propose a neural aided statistical attack that can be as generic as the differential cryptanalysis. It has no special requirements about the attacked cipher and allows us to estimate the theoretical complexities and success rate. For reducing the key space to be searched, we propose a Bit Sensitivity Test to identify which ciphertext bit is informative. Then specific key bits can be recovered by building neural distinguishers on related ciphertext bits. Applications to round reduced Speck32/64, Speck48/72, Speck48/96, DES prove the correctness and superiorities of our neural aided statistical attack.
Paul Kirchner, Pierre-Alain Fouque
Then, we consider general groups such as imaginary quadratic class group and the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve, and obtain new methods for group order computation. The repeated squaring problem and the adaptive root problem used in the construction of Verifiable Delay Functions are particularly easy to solve in the black box modular ring, the high degree of parallelism provided by our method allows a reduction in the time to solve them. We improve the smoothing time, and as a result, we break Verifiable Delay Functions and factorize weak keys with lower Area-Time cost.
Finally, we show new AT costs for computing a discrete logarithm over an adversarial basis in finite fields.
Benedikt Bünz, Alessandro Chiesa, William Lin, Pratyush Mishra, Nicholas Spooner
In this paper we show how to obtain PCD without relying on SNARKs. We construct a PCD scheme given any non-interactive argument of knowledge (e.g., with linear-size proofs) that has a *split accumulation scheme*, which is a weak form of accumulation that we introduce.
We additionally construct a transparent non-interactive argument of knowledge for R1CS whose accumulation is verifiable via a *constant number of group and field operations*. This leads, via the random oracle heuristic and our result above, to efficiency improvements for PCD. Along the way, we construct a split accumulation scheme for a simple polynomial commitment scheme based on Pedersen commitments.
Our results are supported by a modular and efficient implementation.
Steve Thakur
Recent work ([DGS20]) suggests that the hidden order groups need to be substantially larger in size that previously thought, in order to ensure the desired security level. Thus, in order to keep the communication complexity between the Prover and the the Verifier to a minimum, we have designed the protocols so that the proofs entail a constant number of group elements, independent of the number of the committed sets/multisets rather than just independent of the sizes of these sets/multisets.
If the underlying group of hidden order is an appropriate imaginary quadratic class group or a genus three Jacobian, the argument systems are transparent. Furthermore, since all challenges are public coin, the protocols can be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We build on the techniques from [BBF19] and [Wes18].
30 December 2020
Fan Peng, Hao Chen, Chang-An Zhao
In this paper it is proved that almost all subsets of $u \in [T,T+g-1]$ players have no information of the secret and almost all subsets of $u \in [T+g,T+2g-1]$ players can reconstruct the secret when the size $q$ goes to the infinity and the genus satisfies $\lim \frac{g}{\sqrt{q}}=0$. Then algebraic geometric secretsharing schemes over large finite fields are asymptotically threshold in this case. We also analyze the case when the size $q$ of the base field is fixed and the genus goes to the infinity.
Guoai Xu, Jiangtao Yuan, Guosheng Xu
Aljosha Judmayer, Nicholas Stifter, Alexei Zamyatin, Itay Tsabary, Ittay Eyal, Peter Gazi, Sarah Meiklejohn, Edgar Weippl
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Submission deadline: 31 July 2021
University of Erlangen
What we expect:
- A PhD degree in Cryptography
- Strong publication record
- Research statement
- Ideally two reference letters
- High motivation
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Dominique Schröder
Clemson University
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Felice Manganiello
More information: https://www.mathjobs.org/jobs/list/17017
National Sun Yat-sen University, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Prof. S.R. Kuang, Email: srkuang@cse.nsysu.edu.tw, TEL:+886-7-5252000 ext. 4340, FAX:+886-7-5254301
More information: https://cse.nsysu.edu.tw/index.php?Lang=en
New York University Abu Dhabi
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Christina Poepper, christina.poepper@nyu.edu
More information: https://apply.interfolio.com/77776