IACR News
Here you can see all recent updates to the IACR webpage. These updates are also available:
19 April 2021
Mircea Digulescu
Mircea Digulescu
Surbhi Shaw, Ratna Dutta
In this work, we introduce the first isogeny-based KOE scheme. Isogeny is a fairly young post-quantum cryptographic field with sophisticated algebraic structures and unique security properties. Our KOE scheme is resistant to quantum attacks and derives its security from Commutative Supersingular Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CSSDDH), which is an isogeny based hard problem. More concretely, we have shown that our construction exhibits key randomizability, plaintext indistinguishability under key randomization and key privacy under key randomization in the standard model adapting the security framework of [KM15]. Furthermore, we have manifested instantiation of our scheme from cryptosystem based on Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (CSIDH-512) [BKV19]. Additionally, we demonstrate the utility of our KOE scheme by leveraging it to construct an isogeny-based ATS scheme preserving anonymity under tracing, traceability, non-frameability, anonymity with accountability and trace obliviousness in the random oracle model following the security framework of [LNWX19].
Ming-Shing Chen, Tung Chou, Markus Krausz
Ming-Shing Chen, Tung Chou
Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Quentin Yang
Chao Liu, Anyu Wang, Zhongxiang Zheng
16 April 2021
Virtual event, Anywhere on Earth, 16 September 2021
Submission deadline: 1 June 2021
Notification: 14 July 2021
Peng Xu, Willy Susilo, Wei Wang, Tianyang Chen, Qianhong Wu, Hai Jin
Javier Herranz, Ramiro Martínez, Manuel Sánchez
In this paper we propose the first sub-linear (on $N$) post-quantum zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle, for which we have mainly used two ideas: arithmetic circuit satisfiability results from Baum \textit{et al.} (CRYPTO'2018) and Bene$\check{\text{s}}$ networks to model a permutation of $N$ elements. The achieved communication complexity of our protocol with respect to $N$ is $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N}\log^2(N))$, but we will also highlight its dependency on other important parameters of the underlying lattice ingredients.
"Danny" Niu Jianfang
Takanori Isobe, Ryoma Ito
Ferhat Yaman, Ahmet Can Mert, Erdinç Öztürk, Erkay Savaş
Alireza Kavousi, Javad Mohajeri, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh
15 April 2021
This year the CHES Challenge has two tracks:
- A hardware security challenge: HACK@CHES 2021
- A white-box cryptography challenge: The WhibOx Contest 2021
The WhibOx Contest 2021 challenges participants to design and/or break white-box implementations of ECDSA. Winners will be awarded with fame and a 2000$ cash prize. Challenge website: https://whibox-contest.github.io/2021/
Spread the word and have fun!
Subspace Labs | SFBA & Remote
Responsibilities
- Become a leading contributor and core maintainer of the Subspace Network
- Implement a series of novel consensus, execution, and scalability proposals
- Maintain the highest standards of distributed open-source software development including modular design, comprehensive testing, proper documentation, and responsive support.
- Experience with current blockchain technologies and landscape
- Theoretical background in distributed systems, such as consensus algorithms, as well as cryptographic fundamentals
- Strong knowledge of a modern systems programming language, such as Rust, C++, or Go and willing to learn Rust.
- Experience working with large open-source codebases
- Familiarity with the Rust language and its ecosystem
- Familiarity with Substrate and the Polkadot ecosystem
- Experience implementing blockchain consensus protocols
- A passion for decentralized, peer-to-peer systems and Web3 technologies
- A remote work environment with a high degree of autonomy and agency
- You will play a critical role in implementing a new layer one blockchain
- Salary and options befitting an early hire at a venture-backed startup
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Jeremiah Wagstaff
More information: https://jobs.lever.co/subspacelabs/7f6a654b-60a8-4740-aa19-36b9f7a9e624?lever-origin=applied&lever-source%5B%5D=IACR%20Jobs
LTCI, Télécom Paris, Institut polytechnique de Paris, France
Guaranteeing the confidentiality of sensitive information held or communicated by an object involves the use of various security mechanisms, such as authentication or encryption. These mechanisms rely on cryptographic algorithms that are secure from a mathematical point of view, but whose physical implementation may contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a malicious person. For instance, reducing the supply voltage or increasing the clock frequency of an integrated circuit beyond the limits for which it has been designed is a mean to introduce faults into its operations. It is then possible at low cost to recover all or part of the data memory, to bypass checks of passwords or access rights.
These attacks, called fault injection attack (FIA), are carried out in practice using a laser beam or a near-field probe radiating a pulsed electromagnetic field. Numerous FIA countermeasures have been proposed, mainly based on redundancy, and considering one injection faulting only one single sensitive variable. However, we have recently shown that a single injection could fault several successive assembler instructions, and consequently several variables, and it is also known that several injections, also faulting several variables, can be carried out.
This questions redundancy as a protection strategy, with software counter-measures, or even hardware counter-measures such as memory with error correcting code, or dual-core processor in lockstep mode. The first objective of the thesis is evaluating the resistance of this kind of protection, first in a practical way, then using preferably static simulations, or dynamic ones. The second objective is evaluating, and if necessary improving, resilience-based countermeasures, in particular infective countermeasures.
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Laurent Sauvage
More information: https://www.adum.fr/as/ed/voirproposition.pl?langue=&site=TelecomPT&matricule_prop=36459
IMDEA Software Institute
Applications are invited for one PhD student position at the IMDEA Software Institute (Madrid, Spain). Selected candidates will work with Marco Guarnieri (https://mguarnieri.github.io, marco dot guarnieri at imdea dot org) on the testing (specifically fuzzing) and verification of hardware-level defenses against microarchitectural attacks. The specific topic of the research will be determined based on the common interests of the candidate and the supervisor.
Who should apply?
Ideal candidates have earned (or are in their last year of) a Master's degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or Mathematics, with experience and interest in at least one of the following areas:
- Computer security
- Testing (and fuzzing in particular)
- Computer architectures
- Program analysis and verification
- Formal methods
- Logics
Working at IMDEA Software
The IMDEA Software Institute is ranked among the best European research institutes in the areas of Programming Languages and Computer Security. Located in the Montegancedo Science and Technology Park, it perfectly combines the sunny and vibrant city of Madrid with cutting edge research and inspiring working environment. The institute provides an internationally competitive stipend, access to an excellent public health care system, unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, and support for research related travel. The working language at the institute is English. Knowledge of Spanish is not required.
Dates
The duration of the position is intended to be for the duration of the doctoral studies. The ideal starting period is summer/fall 2021. Deadline for applications is April 30th, 2021. Review of applications will begin immediately, and continue until the positions are filled.
How to apply?
See http://software.imdea.org/open_positions/2021-04-phd-uarchsec-testing.html
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Marco Guarnieri (marco dot guarnieri at imdea dot org)
More information: http://software.imdea.org/open_positions/2021-04-phd-uarchsec-testing.html
IMDEA Software Institute
Applications are invited for one PhD student position at the IMDEA Software Institute (Madrid, Spain). Selected candidates will work with Marco Guarnieri (https://mguarnieri.github.io) on the design, verification, and implementation of compiler-level countermeasures against microarchitectural and side-channel attacks. The specific topic of the research will be determined based on the common interests of the candidate and the supervisor.
Who should apply?
Ideal candidates have earned (or are in their last year of) a Master's degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or Mathematics, with experience and interest in at least one of the following areas:
- Computer security
- Programming languages and compilers
- Program analysis and verification
- Formal methods
- Logics
Working at IMDEA Software
The IMDEA Software Institute is ranked among the best European research institutes in the areas of Programming Languages and Computer Security. Located in the Montegancedo Science and Technology Park, it perfectly combines the sunny and vibrant city of Madrid with cutting edge research and inspiring working environment. The institute provides an internationally competitive stipend, access to an excellent public health care system, unemployment benefits, retirement benefits, and support for research related travel. The working language at the institute is English. Knowledge of Spanish is not required.
Dates
The duration of the position is intended to be for the duration of the doctoral studies. The ideal starting period is summer/fall 2021. Deadline for applications is April 30th, 2021. Review of applications will begin immediately, and continue until the positions are filled.
How to apply?
See https://software.imdea.org/open_positions/2021-04-phd-uarchsec-compilers.html
Closing date for applications:
Contact: Marco Guarnieri (marco dot guarnieri at Imdea dot org)
Joppe W. Bos, Marc Gourjon, Joost Renes, Tobias Schneider, Christine van Vredendaal
In this work, we demonstrate the first completely masked implementation of Kyber which is protected against first- and higher-order attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this results in the first higher-order masked implementation of any post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanism algorithm. This is realized by introducing two new techniques. First, we propose a higher-order algorithm for the one-bit compression operation. This is based on a masked bit-sliced binary-search that can be applied to prime moduli. Second, we propose a technique which enables one to compare uncompressed masked polynomials with compressed public polynomials. This avoids the costly masking of the ciphertext compression while being able to be instantiated at arbitrary orders.
We show performance results for first-, second- and third-order protected implementations on the Arm Cortex-M0+. Notably, our implementation of first-order masked Kyber decapsulation requires 12.2 million cycles. This is a factor 2.2 overhead compared to an unprotected implementation. We experimentally show that the first-order implementation of our new modules is hardened against attacks using 100,000 traces and mechanically verify the security in a fine-grained leakage model using the verification tool scVerif.