International Association
for Cryptologic Research

With the development of side-channel attacks, a necessity arises to invent authenticated key exchange protocols in a leakage-resilient manner. Constructing authenticated key exchange protocols using existing cryptographic schemes is an effective method, as such construction can be instantiated with any appropriate scheme in a way that the formal security argument remains valid. In parallel, constructing authenticated key exchange protocols that are proven to be secure in the standard model is more preferred as they rely on real-world assumptions. In this paper, we present a Diffie-Hellman-style construction of a leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange protocol, that can be instantiated with any CCLA2-secure public-key encryption scheme and a function from the pseudo-random function family. Our protocol is proven to be secure in the standard model assuming the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Furthermore, it is resilient to continuous partial leakage of long-term secret keys, that happens even after the session key is established, while satisfying the security features defined by the eCK security model.

We introduce a novel method for reducing an arbitrary $\delta$-noisy leakage function to a collection of $\epsilon$-random probing leakages. These reductions combined with linear algebra tools are utilized to study the security of linear Boolean masked circuits in a practical and concrete setting. The secret recovery probability (SRP) that measures an adversary's ability to obtain secrets of a masked circuit is used to quantify the security. Leakage data and the parity-check relations imposed by the algorithm's structure are employed to estimate the SRP

Both the reduction method and the SRP metric were used in the previous works. Here, as our main contribution, the SRP evaluation task is decomposed from the given $\mathbb{F}_q$ field to $q-1$ different binary systems indexed with $i$. Where for the $i$th system, the equivalent $\delta_i$-noisy leakage is reduced optimally to a $\epsilon_i$-random probing leakage with $\epsilon_i=2\delta_i$. Each binary system is targeting a particular bit-composition of the secret. The $q-1$ derived $\delta_i\leq \delta$ values are shown to be a good measure for the informativeness of the given $\delta$-noisy leakage function.

Our works here can be considered as an extension of the work of TCC 2016. There, only $ \delta$-noisy leakage from the shares of a secret was considered. Here, we also incorporate the leakages that are introduced by the computations over the shares.

We study masked implementation's security when an adversary randomly probes each of its internal variables, intending to recover non-trivial knowledge about its secrets. We introduce a novel metric called Secret Recovery Probability (SRP) for assessing the informativeness of the probing leakages about the masked secrets. To evaluate SRP, our starting point is to describe the relations of the intermediate variables with a parity equation system where the target secret is an unknown of this system ...

This paper describes the first practical single-trace side-channel power analysis of SIKE. While SIKE is a post-quantum key exchange, the scheme still relies on a secret elliptic curve scalar multiplication which involves a loop of a double-and-add procedure, of which each iteration depends on a single bit of the private key. The attack therefore exploits the nature of elliptic curve point addition formulas which require the same function to be executed multiple times. We show how a single trace of a loop iteration can be segmented into several power traces on which 32-bit words can be hypothesised based on the value of a single private key bit. This segmentation enables a classical correlation power analysis in an extend-and-prune approach. Further error-correction techniques based on depth-search are suggested. The attack is explicitly geared towards and experimentally verified on an STM32F3 featuring a Cortex-M4 microcontroller which runs the SIKEp434 implementation adapted to 32-bit ARM that is part of the official implementations of SIKE. We obtained a resounding 100% success rate recovering the full private key in each experiment. We argue that our attack defeats many countermeasures which were suggested in a previous power analysis of SIKE, and finally show that the well-known countermeasure of projective coordinate randomisation stops the attack with a negligible overhead.

Secure computation enables two or more parties to jointly evaluate a function without revealing to each other their private input. G-module is an abelian group M, where the group G acts compatibly with the abelian group structure on M. In this work, we present several secure computation protocols for G-module operations in the online/offline mode. We then show how to instantiate those protocols to implement many widely used secure computation primitives in privacy-preserving machine learning and data mining, such as oblivious cyclic shift, one-round shared OT, oblivious permutation, oblivious shuffle, secure comparison, oblivious selection, DReLU, and ReLU, etc. All the proposed protocols are constant-round, and they are 2X - 10X more efficient than the-state-of-the-art constant-round protocols in terms of communication complexity.

In building boomerang distinguishers, Murphy indicated that two independently chosen differentials for a boomerang may be incompatible. In this paper, we find that similar incompatibility also happens to key-recovery phase. When generating quartets for the rectangle attack on linear key-schedule ciphers, we find that the right quartets which may suggest key candidates have to satisfy some nonlinear relationships. However, some quartets generated always violate these relationships, so that they will never suggest any key candidates. We call those quartets as nonlinearly incompatible quartets. Inspired by previous rectangle frameworks, we find that guessing certain key cells before generating quartets may reduce the number of nonlinearly incompatible quartets. However, guessing a lot of key cells at once may lose the benefit from the guess-and-filter or early abort technique, which may lead to a higher overall complexity. To get better tradeoff from the two aspects, we build a new rectangle attack framework on linear key-schedule ciphers with the purpose of reducing the overall complexity or attacking more rounds. The first application is on SKINNY. In the tradeoff model, there are many parameters affecting the overall complexity. We build a uniform automatic model on SKINNY to identify all the optimal parameters, which includes the optimal rectangle distinguishers for key-recovery phase, the number and positions of key guessing cells before generating quartets, the size of key counters to build that affecting the exhaustive search step, etc. Based on the automatic model, we identify a 32-round key-recovery attack on SKINNY-128-384 in related-key setting, which extend the best previous attack by 2 rounds. For other versions with n-2n or n-3n, we also achieve one more round than before. In addition, using the previous rect- angle distinguishers, we achieve better attacks on reduced ForkSkinny, Deoxys-BC-384 and GIFT-64. At last, we discuss the conversion of our rectangle framework from related-key setting into single-key setting and give new single-key rectangle attack on 10-round Serpent.

Payment channel networks are a promising solution to the scalability issues of current decentralized cryptocurrencies. They allow arbitrarily many payments between any two users connected through a path of intermediate payment channels while minimizing interaction with the blockchain only to open and close those channels. Yet, compromised intermediaries may make payments unreliable, slower, expensive, and privacy-invasive. Virtual channels mitigate these issues by allowing the two endpoints of a path to create a channel over the intermediaries such that after the channel is constructed, the intermediaries are no longer involved in payments. Unfortunately, existing UTXO-based virtual channel constructions are either limited to a single intermediary or only recursively build a virtual channel over multiple intermediaries. While the former single-hop channels are overly restrictive, the latter recursive constructions introduce issues such as forced closure and virtual griefing attacks.

This work presents Donner, the first virtual channel construction over multiple intermediaries in a single round of communication. We formally define the security and privacy in the Universal Composability framework and show that Donner is a realization thereof. Our experimental evaluation shows that Donner reduces the on-chain number of transactions for disputes from linear in the path length to a single one. Moreover, Donner reduces the storage overhead from logarithmic in the path length to constant. Donner is an efficient virtual channel construction that is backward compatible with the prominent, 50K channels strong Lightning network.

A full funded (at UK/EU-home rate) PhD studentship is available at UWE Bristol. The studentship is themed around cyber security analytics in telecommunications systems: Managing security and service in complex real-time 5G networks.

UWE is an accredited (by the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)) Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Education. You will be joining the Cyber Security team (http://www.cems.uwe.ac.uk/~pa-legg/uwecyber/) part of the Computer Science Research Centre (https://www.uwe.ac.uk/research/centres-and-groups/csrc). The student will be supervised by Dr Phil Legg. The deadline for applications is 1st July 2021.

When applying, please use the Application Reference: 2021-OCT-FET03. For any queries, contact Dr Phil Legg (Phil.Legg@uwe.ac.uk)

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Dr Phil Legg (Phil.Legg@uwe.ac.uk)

More information: https://www.uwe.ac.uk/research/postgraduate-research-study/how-to-apply/studentship-opportunities/fet-phd-studentships#section-5

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is nowadays a very active research field [1]. We follow a non-standard way to achieve it, taking any common protocol and replacing arithmetic with GF(2^8) field operations, a procedure defined as R-Propping [2-7]. The resulting protocol security relies on the intractability of a generalized discrete log problem, combined with the power sets of algebraic ring extension tensors and resilience to quantum and algebraic attacks. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a keystone for Secure Multiparty Computing (SMPC) [8], one of the most pursued cryptographic areas. It is a critical issue to develop a fast OT solution because of its intensive use in many protocols. Here, we adopt the simple OT protocol developed by Chou and Orlandi [9] as the base model to be propped. Our solution is fully scalable to achieve quantum and classical security levels as needed. We present a step-by-step numerical example of the proposed protocol.

We introduce the problem of private signaling. In this problem, a sender posts a message to a certain location of a public bulletin board, and then computes a signal that allows only the intended recipient (and no one else) to learn that it is the recipient of the posted message. Besides privacy, this problem has the following crucial efficiency requirements. First, the sender and recipient do not participate in any out-of-band communication, and second, the overhead of the recipient should be asymptotically better than scanning the entire board.

Existing techniques, such as the server-aided fuzzy message detection (Beck et al., CCS’21), could be employed to solve the private signaling problem. However, this solution requires that the computational effort of the recipient grows with the amount of privacy desired, providing no saving over scanning the entire board if the maximum privacy is required.

In this work, we present a server-aided solution to the private signaling problem that guar- antees full privacy for all recipients, while requiring only constant amount of work for both the recipient and the sender. We provide the following contributions. First, we provide a formal definition of private signaling in the Universal Composability (UC) framework and show that it generalizes several real-world settings where recipient anonymity is desired. Second, we present two protocols that UC-realize our definition: one using a single server equipped with a trusted execution environment, and one based on two servers that employs garbled circuits. Third, we provide an open-source implementation of both of our protocols and evaluate their performance and show that they are practical.

A full funded (at UK/EU-home rate) PhD studentship is available at UWE Bristol. The studentship is themed around fuzzing and the candidate should have an interest in Software Security and AI. UWE is an accredited (by the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)) Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Education. You will be joining the Cyber Security team (http://www.cems.uwe.ac.uk/~pa-legg/uwecyber/) part of the Computer Science Research Centre (https://www.uwe.ac.uk/research/centres-and-groups/csrc). The student will be supervised by Dr Panagiotis Andriotis, and Prof Jun Hong. The deadline for applications is 1st July 2021. When applying, please use the Application Reference: 2021-OCT-FET03 For any queries, contact Dr Panagiotis Andriotis (Panagiotis.Andriotis@uwe.ac.uk)

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Dr Panagiotis Andriotis (Panagiotis.Andriotis@uwe.ac.uk)

More information: https://www.uwe.ac.uk/research/postgraduate-research-study/how-to-apply/studentship-opportunities/fet-phd-studentships#section-5

In the project SEC4FACTORY financed by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, we are developing the future security solutions for interconnected factories or what is often referred to Industry 4.0 systems. The project objectives are to investigate how cloud based resources can be used to control and supervise production system while at the same time offering a high level of information security, availability and performance. We are in particular looking into how one can use digital twins to improve security in production systems. Especially, we welcome candidates interested in the combination of AI and security for these applications The project is developing a large demonstrator showing how the new security mechanisms work in practice. We are now looking for a new post-doc that can join the project and give significant contributions to the research.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Christian Gehrmann

More information: https://lu.varbi.com/en/what:job/jobID:411795/

The College of Science and Engineering (CSE) in Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) is seeking to recruit a full-time Post-Doctoral Research Fellow (PDRF) to work in the area of Physical Layer Security (PLS). The position is available for 2-3 years (minimum), renewable every year based on performance.

Post description
The PDRF will work with a member of the CSE faculty on topics related to PLS. In particular, the PDRF will join international academic and industry teams as part of 3 externally funded projects focusing on PLS in IOT, Satellite Communication and Underwater Communication (with collective fund of 1.5M USD). The PDRF will have the opportunity to work with other faculty and postdocs within CSE on related areas within or outside the scope of the projects above, but still in PLS.

Duration
Initially, the post is for 12 months, then based on satisfactory performance, the contract can be renewed for several years. Although the resource will work on externally funded projects, this is an internally funded position and is not bound to a fixed-term external fund.

Qualifications
Candidates are expected to have a PhD in relevant disciplines with excellent research track record and to have published on reputable venues.

Remuneration
HBKU offers an attractive compensation package that includes a tax-free salary and benefits (up to 85,000 USD per annum + benefits)

Deadline
Applications will be reviewed on a rolling basis until the position is filled. However, successful applicant should expect around 3-4 months hiring process.

Apply and further information
For further information and to apply, please send your CV, research statement and cover letter to Dr. Saif Al-Kuwari smalkuwari@hbku.edu.qa. The personal statement should include information about the candidate’s qualification and relevant research experience (highlighting research directly related to PLS in IOT, Satellite, Underwater communication).

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Dr. Saif Al-Kuwari, smalkuwari@hbku.edu.qa

More information: https://www.hbku.edu.qa

We introduce a new technique for indexing joins in encrypted SQL databases called partially precomputed joins which achieves lower leakage and bandwidth than those used in prior constructions. These techniques are incorporated into state-of-the-art structured encryption schemes for SQL data, yielding a hybrid indexing scheme with both partially and fully precomputed join indexes. We then introduce the idea of leakage-aware query planning by giving a heuristic that helps the client decide, at query time, which index to use so as to minimize leakage and stay below a given bandwidth budget. We conclude by simulating our constructions on real datasets, showing that our heuristic is accurate and that partially-precomputed joins perform well in practice.

This paper extends the two-candidate's protocol of Spadafora et al. to the multi-candidate case, making it applicable to elections where each voter expresses $P$ preferences among $M$ possible choices. The generalized protocol still achieves coercion and vote-selling resistance while being transparent, fully verifiable and receipt-based. The protocol relies on a generic blockchain with standard properties, and we prove the security of the construction under the standard Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption.

The threat of quantum computers has sparked the development of a new kind of cryptography to resist their attacks. Isogenies between elliptic curves are one of the tools used for such cryptosystems. They are championed by SIKE (Supersingular isogeny key encapsulation), an "alternate candidate" of the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process. While all candidates are believed to be mathematically secure, their implementations may be vulnerable to hardware attacks. In this work we investigate for the first time whether Ti's 2017 theoretical fault injection attack is exploitable in practice. We also examine suitable countermeasures. We manage to recover the secret thanks to electromagnetic fault injection on an ARM Cortex A53 using a correct and an altered public key generation. Moreover we propose a suitable countermeasure to detect faults that has a low overhead as it takes advantage of a redundancy already present in SIKE implementations.

This paper presents a side-channel analysis (SCA) on key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on Fujisaki–Okamoto (FO) transformation. FO transformation has been widely used for realizing actively secure KEMs from passively secure public key encryption (PKE), as it is employed in most of NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) candidates for KEM. The proposed attack exploits side-channel leakage from target implementation during execution of psuedorandom function (PRF) in re-encryption of KEM decapsulation as a plaintext-checking oracle that tells whether the PKE decryption result is equivalent to the reference plaintext. Due to the generality and practicality of the plaintext-checking oracle, the proposed attack can attain a full key recovery of various KEMs where an active attack on the underlying PKE is known. This paper demonstrates that the proposed attack can perform a full key recovery on most NIST PQC third-round candidates for KEM, namely, Kyber, Saber, FrodoKEM, NTRU Prime, NTRU, HQC, BIKE, and SIKE. For BIKE, the proposed attack achieves a partial key recovery. The applicability to Classic McEliece is unclear because no active attack on Classic McEliece using a plaintext-checking oracle is known. This paper also presents a side-channel distinguisher design based on deep learning (DL) for mounting the proposed attack on practical implementation, which requires no profiling device. This paper validates the attack feasibility through experimental attacks on various PRF implementations (herein, a SHAKE software, an AES software, a masked AES software, and a masked AES hardware). As a result, we confirm the practicality as the proposed attack is successful for all implementation used in the experiment, including masked hardware based on threshold implementation.

The classic work of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee (CRYPTO 2012) and follow-ups provided constructions of bounded collusion Functional Encryption (FE) for circuits from mild assumptions. In this work, we improve the state of affairs for bounded collusion FE in several ways:

1. $New$ $Security$ $Notion$. We introduce the notion of $dynamic$ bounded collusion FE, where the declaration of collusion bound is delayed to the time of encryption. This enables the encryptor to dynamically choose the collusion bound for different ciphertexts depending on their individual level of sensitivity. Hence, the ciphertext size grows linearly with its own collusion bound and the public key size is independent of collusion bound. In contrast, all prior constructions have public key and ciphertext size that grow at least linearly with a fixed bound $Q$.

2. $CPFE$ $for$ $circuits$ $with$ $Dynamic$ $Bounded$ $Collusion$. We provide the first CPFE schemes for circuits enjoying dynamic bounded collusion security. By assuming identity based encryption (IBE), we construct CPFE for circuits of $unbounded$ size satisfying $non-adaptive$ simulation based security. By strengthening the underlying assumption to IBE with receiver selective opening security, we obtain CPFE for circuits of $bounded$ size, output length and depth enjoying $adaptive$ simulation based security. Moreover, we show that IBE is a necessary assumption for these primitives.

Moreover, by relying on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, we obtain the first $succinct$ CPFE for circuits, i.e. supporting circuits with unbounded size, but fixed output length and depth. This scheme achieves $adaptive$ simulation based security.

3. $KPFE$ $for$ $circuits$ $with$ $dynamic$ $bounded$ $collusion$. We provide the first KPFE for circuits of unbounded size, but bounded depth and output length satisfying dynamic bounded collusion security. Our construction relies on LWE and achieves $adaptive$ simulation based security. This improves the security of succinct KPFE by Goldwasser et al. [GKPVZ13b].

4. $KP$ $and$ $CP$ $FE$ $for$ $TM/NL$ $with$ $dynamic$ $bounded$ $collusion$. We provide the first KPFE and CPFE constructions of bounded collusion functional encryption for Turing machines in the public key setting from LWE. Our constructions achieve non-adaptive simulation based security. Both the input and the machine in our construction can be of $unbounded$ polynomial length but the ciphertext size grows with the upper bound on the running time of the Turing machine on the given input. Given RAM access to the ciphertext, the scheme enjoys input specific decryption time.

We provide a variant of the above scheme that satisfies $adaptive$ security, but at the cost of supporting a smaller class of computation, namely Nondeterministic Logarithmic-space (NL). Since NL contains Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFA), this result subsumes $all$ prior work of bounded collusion FE for uniform models from standard assumptions [AMY19,AS17].

Functional Encryption is a powerful notion of encryption in which each decryption key is associated with a function $f$ such that decryption recovers the function evaluation $f(m)$. Informally, security states that a user with access to function keys $\mathsf{sk}_{f_1}, \mathsf{sk}_{f_2}, \ldots$ (and so on) can only learn $f_1(m), f_2(m), \ldots$ (and so on) but nothing more about the message. The system is said to be $q$-bounded collusion resistant if the security holds as long as an adversary gets access to at most $q = q(\lambda)$ function keys. A major drawback of such \emph{statically} bounded collusion systems is that the collusion bound $q$ must be declared at setup time and is fixed for the entire lifetime of the system.

We initiate the study of \emph{dynamically} bounded collusion resistant functional encryption systems which provide more flexibility in terms of selecting the collusion bound, while reaping the benefits of statically bounded collusion FE systems (such as quantum resistance, simulation security, and general assumptions). Briefly, the virtues of a dynamically bounded scheme can be summarized as:

(i) [Fine-grained individualized selection.] It lets each encryptor select the collusion bound by weighing the trade-off between performance overhead and the amount of collusion resilience.

(ii) [Evolving encryption strategies.] Since the system is no longer tied to a single collusion bound, thus it allows to dynamically adjust the desired collusion resilience based on any number of evolving factors such as the age of the system, or a number of active users, etc.

(iii) [Ease and simplicity of updatability.] None of the system parameters have to be updated when adjusting the collusion bound. That is, the same key $\mathsf{sk}_f$ can be used to decrypt ciphertexts for collusion bound $q = 2$ as well as $q = 2^\lambda$.

We construct such a dynamically bounded functional encryption scheme for the class of all polynomial-size circuits under the general assumption of Identity-Based Encryption.

This is team SmartPools’ submission for the first Ergo Hackathon. It suggests that Ergo lacks the decentralization, and focus on regular people that it was designed for, and presents a potential solution for these problems in laying the framework for crowdfunded smart contract pools compatible with non-outsourceabilty. It should allow for pool formation with a greater level of decentralization than previously possible by including metrics for diminishing returns on over-contributing hash power to pools with data gathered from Ergo Oracles. This work is informal and preliminary. Further research is required to formalize this work and attempt to provide functional proof for its arguments; readers are highly encouraged to read the included references, and their references, for greater clarity.