International Association
for Cryptologic Research

We study the effects of the XOR transformation, that is, $f^{\oplus 2}(x_1,x_2):= f(x_1)\oplus f(x_2)$, on one-wayness. More specifically, we present an example showing that if one-way functions exist, there also exists a one-way function $f$ such that $f^{\oplus 2}$ is not even a distributional one-way function, demonstrating that one-wayness may severely deteriorate.

Assume that $X_0,X_1$ (respectively $Y_0,Y_1$) are $d_X$ (respectively $d_Y$) indistinguishable for circuits of a given size. It is well known that the product distributions $X_0Y_0,\,X_1Y_1$ are $d_X+d_Y$ indistinguishable for slightly smaller circuits. However, in probability theory where unbounded adversaries are considered through statistical distance, it is folklore knowledge that in fact $X_0Y_0$ and $X_1Y_1$ are $d_X+d_Y-d_X\cdot d_Y$ indistinguishable, and also that this bound is tight.

We formulate and prove the computational analog of this tight bound. Our proof is entirely different from the proof in the statistical case, which is non-constructive. As a corollary, we show that if $X$ and $Y$ are $d$ indistinguishable, then $k$ independent copies of $X$ and $k$ independent copies of $Y$ are almost $1-(1-d)^k$ indistinguishable for smaller circuits, as against $d\cdot k$ using the looser bound. Our bounds are useful in settings where only weak (i.e. non-negligible) indistinguishability is guaranteed. We demonstrate this in the context of cryptography, showing that our bounds yield simple analysis for amplification of weak oblivious transfer protocols.

Repeated Modular Squaring is a versatile computational operation that has led to practical constructions of timed-cryptographic primitives like time-lock puzzles (TLP) and verifiable delay functions (VDF) that have a fast growing list of applications. While there is a huge interest for timed-cryptographic primitives in the blockchains area, we find two real-world concerns that need immediate attention towards their large-scale practical adoption: Firstly, the requirement to constantly perform computations seems unrealistic for most of the users. Secondly, choosing the parameters for the bound $T$ seems complicated due to the lack of heuristics and experience.

We present Opensquare, a decentralized repeated modular squaring service, that overcomes the above concerns. Opensquare lets clients outsource their repeated modular squaring computation via smart contracts to any computationally powerful servers that offer computational services for rewards in an unlinkable manner. Opensquare naturally gives us publicly computable heuristics about a pre-specified number ($T$) and the corresponding reward amounts of repeated squarings necessary for a time period. Moreover, Opensquare rewards multiple servers for a single request, in a sybil resistant manner to incentivise maximum server participation and is therefore resistant to censorship and single-points-of failures. We give game-theoretic analysis to support the mechanism design of Opensquare: (1) incentivises servers to stay available with their services, (2) minimizes the cost of outsourcing for the client, and (3) ensures the client receives the valid computational result with high probability. To demonstrate practicality, we also implement Opensquare's smart contract in Solidity and report the gas costs for all of its functions. Our results show that the on-chain computational costs for both the clients and the servers are quite low, and therefore feasible for practical deployments and usage.

The chair for Security Engineering at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany, is seeking for PhD students and Post-Docs in the areas of cryptographic hardware/software, side-channel analysis, FPGA security, etc.

For PhD positions, candidates must hold an MSc (or equivalent) in computer engineering, electrical engineering or computer science. The candidates are required to have outstanding grades.

For Post-Doc positions, candidates must hold a PhD in computer engineering, electrical engineering or computer science. Furthermore, they must have a demonstrated record of top-quality research in foundations of cryptographic hardware and embedded systems. This is usually proved by publications in IACR conferences, particularly CHES.

Please send your application per email (as a single PDF) to Amir Moradi (amir.moradi at rub.de). The application should include a full CV, a cover letter motivating you application, a short description of your two best research articles (for Post-Doc positions). Review of applications will begin immediately and will continue until the positions are filled, the starting date is flexible.

Closing date for applications:

Contact: Amir Moradi

More information: https://www.seceng.rub.de/moradi

Timed commitments [Boneh and Naor, CRYPTO 2000] are the timed analogue of standard commitments, where the commitment can be non-interactively opened after a pre-specified amount of time passes. Timed commitments have a large spectrum of applications, such as sealed bid auctions, fair contract signing, fair multi-party computation, and cryptocurrency payments. Unfortunately, all practical constructions rely on a (private-coin) trusted setup and do not scale well with the number of participants. These are two severe limiting factors that have hindered the widespread adoption of this primitive.

In this work, we set out to resolve these two issues and propose an efficient timed commitment scheme that also satisfies the strong notion of CCA-security. Specifically, our scheme has a transparent (i.e. public-coin) one-time setup and the amount of sequential computation is essentially independent of the number of participants. As a key technical ingredient, we propose the first (linearly) homomorphic time-lock puzzle with a transparent setup, from class groups of imaginary quadratic order. To demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we use it to construct a new distributed randomness generation protocol, where $n$ parties jointly sample a random string. Our protocol is the first to simultaneously achieve (1) high scalability in the number of participants, (2) transparent one-time setup, (3) lightning speed in the optimistic case where all parties are honest, and (4) ensure that the output random string is unpredictable and unbiased, even when the adversary corrupts $n-1$ parties. To substantiate the practicality of our approach, we implemented our protocol and our experimental evaluation shows that it is fast enough to be used in practice. We also evaluated a heuristic version of the protocol that is at least 3 orders of magnitude more efficient both in terms of communication size and computation time. This makes the protocol suitable for supporting hundreds of participants.

Number-theoretic algorithms often need to calculate one or both of two related quantities: modular inversion and Jacobi symbol. These two functions seem unrelated at first glance, but in fact the algorithms for calculating them are closely related: they can both be calculated either by variants of Euclid's GCD algorithm, or when the modulus is prime, by exponentiation. As a result, an implementation of one algorithm can often be adapted to compute the other instead, or they can even be calculated together in a batch.

The Bernstein-Yang right-to-left modular inversion algorithm is notable for taking constant, asymptotically subquadratic time. Right-to-left algorithms are tricky to adapt for the Jacobi symbol, because they do not consider the signs of the values being operated on. But the Jacobi symbol is defined only on positive integers, and the rules for computing it need corrections if negative integers are introduced.

In this short paper, we show how to overcome this difficulty and produce a right-to-left Jacobi symbol algorithm based on Bernstein-Yang.

The goal of the bounded storage model (BSM) is to construct unconditionally secure cryptographic protocols, by only restricting the storage capacity of the adversary, but otherwise giving it unbounded computational power. Here, we consider a streaming variant of the BSM, where honest parties can stream huge amounts of data to each other so as to overwhelm the adversary's storage, even while their own storage capacity is significantly smaller than that of the adversary. Prior works showed several impressive results in this model, including key agreement and oblivious transfer, but only as long as adversary's storage $m = O(n^2)$ is at most quadratically larger than the honest user storage $n$. Moreover, the work of Dziembowski and Maurer (DM) also gave a seemingly matching lower bound, showing that key agreement in the BSM is impossible when $m > n^2$.

In this work, we observe that the DM lower bound only applies to a significantly more restricted version of the BSM, and does not apply to the streaming variant. Surprisingly, we show that it is possible to construct key agreement and oblivious transfer protocols in the streaming BSM, where the adversary's storage can be significantly larger, and even exponential $m = 2^{O(n)}$. The only price of accommodating larger values of $m$ is that the round and communication complexities of our protocols grow accordingly, and we provide lower bounds to show that an increase in rounds and communication is necessary.

As an added benefit of our work, we also show that our oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in the BSM satisfies a simulation-based notion of security. In contrast, even for the restricted case of $m = O(n^2)$, prior solutions only satisfied a weaker indistinguishability based definition. As an application of our OT protocol, we get general multiparty computation (MPC) in the BSM that allows for up to exponentially large gaps between $m$ and $n$, while also achieving simulation-based security.

A randomness encoder is a generalization of encoding schemes with an efficient procedure for encoding \emph{uniformly random strings}. In this paper we continue the study of randomness encoders that additionally have the property of being continuous non-malleable. The beautiful notion of non-malleability for encoding schemes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs (ICS’10), states that tampering with the codeword can either keep the encoded message identical or produce an uncorrelated message. Continuous non-malleability extends the security notion to a setting where the adversary can tamper the codeword polynomially many times and where we assume a self-destruction mechanism in place in case of decoding errors. Our contributions are: (1) two practical constructions of continuous non-malleable randomness encoders in the random oracle model, and (2) a new compiler from continuous non-malleable randomness encoders to continuousnon-malleable codes, and (3) a study of lower bounds for continuous non-malleability in the random oracle model.

Selective opening attacks (SOA) (for public-key encryption, PKE) concern such a multi-user scenario, where an adversary adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to break into a subset of honestly created ciphertexts, and tries to learn the information on the messages of some unopened (but potentially related) ciphertexts. Until now, the notion of selective opening attacks is only considered in two settings: sender selective opening (SSO), where part of senders are corrupted and messages together with randomness for encryption are revealed; and receiver selective opening (RSO), where part of receivers are corrupted and messages together with secret keys for decryption are revealed.

In this paper, we consider a more natural and general setting for selective opening security. In the setting, the adversary may adaptively corrupt part of senders and receivers \emph{simultaneously}, and get the plaintext messages together with internal randomness for encryption and secret keys for decryption, while it is hoped that messages of uncorrupted parties remain protected. We denote it as Bi-SO security since it is reminiscent of Bi-Deniability for PKE.

We first formalize the requirement of Bi-SO security by the simulation-based (SIM) style, and prove that some practical PKE schemes achieve SIM-Bi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security in the random oracle model. Then, we suggest a weak model of Bi-SO security, denoted as SIM-wBi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security, and argue that it is still meaningful and useful. We propose a generic construction of PKE schemes that achieve SIM-wBi-$\text{SO}$-CCA security in the standard model and instantiate them from various standard assumptions. Our generic construction is built on a newly presented primitive, namely, universal$_{\kappa}$ hash proof system with key equivocability, which may be of independent interest.

We prove classical and quantum indifferentiability of a rate-1/3 compression function introduced by Shrimpton and Stam (ICALP '08). This construction was one of the first constructions based on three random functions that achieved optimal collision-resistance. We also prove that our result is tight, we define a classical and a quantum attackers that match the indifferentiability security level. Our tight indifferentiability results provide a negative result on the optimality of security of the construction by Shrimpton and Stam, security level of the strong indifferentiability notion is below that of collision-resistance.

To arrive at these results, we generalize the results of Czajkowski, Majenz, Schaffner, and Zur (arXiv '19). Our generalization allows to analyze quantum security of constructions based on multiple independent random functions, something not possible before.

Many recent studies focus on dynamic searchable encryption (DSE), which provides efficient data-search and data-update services directly on outsourced private data. Most encryption schemes are not optimized for update-intensive cases, which say that the same data record is frequently added and deleted from the database. How to build an efficient and secure DSE scheme for update-intensive data is still challenging. We propose UI-SE, the first DSE scheme that achieves single-round-trip interaction, near-zero client storage, and backward privacy without any insertion patterns. UI-SE involves a new tree data structure, named OU-tree, which supports oblivious data updates without any access-pattern leakage. We formally prove that UI-SE is adaptively secure under Type-1$^-$ backward privacy, which is stronger than backward privacy proposed by Bost et al. in CCS 2017. Experimental data also demonstrate UI-SE has low computational overhead, low local disk usage, and high update performance on scalable datasets.

We generalize the knowledge extractor for constant-round special sound protocols presented by Wikström (2018) to a knowledge extractor for the corresponding non-interactive Fiat-Shamir proofs in the random oracle model and give an exact analysis of the extraction error and running time.

Relative the interactive case the extraction error is increased by a factor $\ell$ and the running time is increased by a factor $O(\ell)$, where $\ell$ is the number of oracle queries made by the prover.

Through carefully chosen notation and concepts, and a technical lemma, we effectively recast the extraction problem of the notoriously complex non-interactive case to the interactive case. Thus, our approach may be of independent interest.

An extractable one-way function (EOWF), introduced by Canetti and Dakdouk (ICALP 2008) and generalized by Bitansky et al. (SIAM Journal on Computing vol. 45), is an OWF that allows for efficient extraction of a preimage for the function. We study (generalized) EOWFs that have a public image verification algorithm. We call such OWFs verifiably-extractable and show that several previously known constructions satisfy this notion. We study how such OWFs relate to subversion zero-knowledge (Sub-ZK) NIZKs by using them to generically construct a Sub-ZK NIZK from a NIZK satisfying certain additional properties, and conversely show how to obtain them from any Sub-ZK NIZK. Prior to our work, the Sub-ZK property of NIZKs was achieved using concrete knowledge assumptions.

This paper introduces Verdict, a transparency dictionary, where an untrusted service maintains a label-value map that clients can query and update (foundational infrastructure for end-to-end encryption and other applications). To prevent unauthorized modifications to the dictionary, for example, by a malicious or a compromised service provider, Verdict produces publicly-verifiable cryptographic proofs that it correctly executes both reads and authorized updates. A key advance over prior work is that Verdict produces efficiently-verifiable proofs while incurring modest proving overheads. Verdict accomplishes this by composing indexed Merkle trees (a new SNARK-friendly data structure) with Phalanx (a new SNARK that supports amortized constant-sized proofs and leverages particular workload characteristics to speed up the prover). Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that Verdict scales to dictionaries with millions of labels while imposing modest overheads on the service and clients.

We study Multi-party computation (MPC) in the setting of subversion, where the adversary tampers with the machines of honest parties. Our goal is to construct actively secure MPC protocols where parties are corrupted adaptively by an adversary (as in the standard adaptive security setting), and in addition, honest parties' machines are compromised. The idea of reverse firewalls (RF) was introduced at EUROCRYPT'15 by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz as an approach to protecting protocols against corruption of honest parties' devices. Intuitively, an RF for a party $\mathcal{P}$ is an external entity that sits between $\mathcal{P}$ and the outside world and whose scope is to sanitize $\mathcal{P}$’s incoming and outgoing messages in the face of subversion of their computer. Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz constructed a protocol for passively-secure two-party computation. At CRYPTO'20, Chakraborty, Dziembowski and Nielsen constructed a protocol for secure computation with firewalls that improved on this result, both by extending it to multi-party computation protocol, and considering active security in the presence of static corruptions. In this paper, we initiate the study of RF for MPC in the adaptive setting. We put forward a definition for adaptively secure MPC in the reverse firewall setting, explore relationships among the security notions, and then construct reverse firewalls for MPC in this stronger setting of adaptive security. We also resolve the open question of Chakraborty, Dziembowski and Nielsen by removing the need for a trusted setup in constructing RF for MPC. Towards this end, we construct reverse firewalls for adaptively secure augmented coin tossing and adaptively secure zero-knowledge protocols and obtain a constant round adaptively secure MPC protocol in the reverse firewall setting without setup. Along the way, we propose a new multi-party adaptively secure coin tossing protocol in the plain model, that is of independent interest.

Our context is anonymous encryption schemes hiding their receiver, but in a setting which allows authorities to reveal the receiver when needed. While anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a natural candidate for such fair anonymity (it gives trusted authority access by design), the de facto security standard (a.k.a. IND-ID-CCA) is incompatible with the ciphertext rerandomizability which is crucial to anonymous communication. Thus, we seek to extend IND-ID-CCA security for IBE to a notion that can be meaningfully relaxed for rerandomizability while it still protects against active adversaries. To the end, inspired by the notion of replayable adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (RCCA) security (Canetti et al., Crypto'03), we formalize a new security notion called Anonymous Identity-Based RCCA (ANON-ID-RCCA) security for rerandomizable IBE and propose the first construction with rigorous security analysis. The core of our scheme is a novel extension of the double-strand paradigm, which was originally proposed by Golle et al. (CT-RSA'04) and later extended by Prabhakaran and Rosulek (Crypto'07), to the well-known Gentry-IBE (Eurocrypt'06). Notably, our scheme is the first IBE that simultaneously satisfies adaptive security, rerandomizability, and recipient-anonymity to date. As the application of our new notion, we design a new universal mixnet in the identity-based setting that does not require public key distribution (with fair anonymity). More generally, our new notion is also applicable to most existing rerandomizable RCCA-secure applications to eliminate the need for public key distribution infrastructure while allowing fairness.

In their pursuit to maximize their return on investment, cybercriminals will likely reuse as much as possible between their campaigns. Not only will the same phishing mail be sent to tens of thousands of targets, but reuse of the tools and infrastructure across attempts will lower their costs of doing business. This reuse, however, creates an effective angle for mitigation, as defenders can recognize domain names, attachments, tools, or systems used in a previous compromisation attempt, significantly increasing the cost to the adversary as it would become necessary to recreate the attack infrastructure each time.

However, generating such cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is resource-intensive, so organizations often turn to CTI providers that commercially sell feeds with such indicators. As providers have different sources and methods to obtain their data, the coverage and relevance of feeds will vary for each of them. To cover the multitude of threats one organization faces, they are best served by obtaining feeds from multiple providers. However, these feeds may overlap, causing an organization to pay for indicators they already obtained through another provider.

This paper presents a privacy-preserving protocol that allows an organization to query the databases of multiple data providers to obtain an estimate of their total coverage without revealing the data they store. In this way, a customer can make a more informed decision on their choice of CTI providers. We implement this protocol in Rust to validate its performance experimentally: When performed between three CTI providers who collectively have 20,000 unique indicators, our protocol takes less than 6 seconds to execute. The code for our experiments is freely available.

In many occasions, the knowledge error $\kappa$ of an interactive proof is not small enough, and thus needs to be reduced. This can be done generically by repeating the interactive proof in parallel. While there have been many works studying the effect of parallel repetition on the soundness error} of interactive proofs and arguments, the effect of parallel repetition on the knowledge error has largely remained unstudied. Only recently it was shown that the $t$-fold parallel repetition of any interactive protocol reduces the knowledge error from $\kappa$ down to $\kappa^t +\nu$ for any non-negligible term $\nu$. This generic result is suboptimal in that it does not give the knowledge error $\kappa^t$ that one would expect for typical protocols, and, worse, the knowledge error remains non-negligible.

In this work we show that indeed the $t$-fold parallel repetition of any $(k_1,\dots,k_{\mu})$-special-sound multi-round public-coin interactive proof optimally reduces the knowledge error from $\kappa$ down to $\kappa^t$. At the core of our results is an alternative, in some sense more fine-grained, measure of quality of a dishonest prover than its success probability, for which we show that it characterizes when knowledge extraction is possible. This new measure then turns out to be very convenient when it comes to analyzing the parallel repetition of such interactive proofs.

While parallel repetition reduces the knowledge error, it is easily seen to increase the completeness error. For this reason, we generalize our result to the case of $s$-out-of-$t$ threshold parallel repetition, where the verifier accepts a claim if $s$-out-of-$t$ of the parallel instances are accepting. An appropriately chosen threshold $s$ allows both the knowledge error and completeness error to be reduced simultaneously.

We introduce a novel framework for quantifying the bit security of security games. Our notion is defined with an operational meaning that a $\lambda$-bit secure game requires a total computational cost of $2^\lambda$ for winning the game with high probability, e.g., 0.99. We define the bit security both for search-type and decision-type games. Since we identify that these two types of games should be structurally different, we treat them differently but define the bit security using the unified framework to guarantee the same operational interpretation. The key novelty of our notion of bit security is to employ two types of adversaries: inner adversary and outer adversary. While the inner adversary plays a ``usual'' security game, the outer adversary invokes the inner adversary many times to amplify the winning probability for the security game. We find from our framework that the bit security for decision games can be characterized by the information measure called the R\'enyi divergence of order $1/2$ of the inner adversary. The conventional ``advantage,'' defined as the probability of winning the game, characterizes our bit security for search-type games. We present several security reductions in our framework for justifying our notion of bit security. Many of our results quantitatively match the results for the bit security notion proposed by Micciancio and Walter in 2018. In this sense, our bit security strengthens the previous notion of bit security by adding an operational meaning. A difference from their work is that, in our framework, the Goldreich-Levin theorem gives an optimal reduction only for ``balanced'' adversaries who output binary values in a balanced manner.

In the shuffle model for differential privacy, users locally randomize their data and then submit the results to a trusted ``shuffler'' who mixes the responses before sending them to a server for analysis. This is a promising model for real-world applications of differential privacy, as a series of recent results have shown that, in some cases, the shuffle model offers a strictly better privacy/utility tradeoff than what is possible in a purely local model. The recent ``privacy blanket'' notion provides a simple method for analyzing differentially private protocols in the shuffle model.

A downside of the shuffle model is its reliance on a trusted shuffling mechanism, and it is natural to try to replace this with a distributed shuffling protocol run by the users themselves. Unfortunately, with only one exception, existing fully secure shuffling protocols require $\Omega(n^2)$ communication. In this work, we put forth a notion of differential obliviousness for shuffling protocols, and prove that this notion provides the necessary guarantees for the privacy blanket, without requiring a trusted shuffler. We also show a differentially oblivious shuffling protocol based on onion routing that can tolerate any constant fraction of corrupted users and requires only $O(n \log n)$ communication.